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Abstract 
The Guide to Enactment identified that a bidder remedies system helps to make procurement 
law to “an important degree self-policing and self-enforcing”. This is because it provides an 
avenue to litigate for bidders that have interest in monitoring procuring entities’ compliance 
with the procurement rules. In an attempt to protect their rights or to remedy the injury caused 
by breach of procurement rules, bidders act as “private attorney generals” to enforce 
compliance. Bidder remedies regime is an integral part of the public procurement systems of 
many countries in Africa. Nigeria and South Africa are examples of African countries that have 
such regimes. Bidder remedies have assumed an academic and practical importance due to the 
actual and perceived role that it plays in the proper functioning of a public procurement system. 
Although research interest in bidder remedies has been on the increase globally, only a 
negligible portion of the research focuses on Africa. The information gap that exists due to the 
availability of very little academic information on bidder remedies in Africa remains to be 
filled, by detailed research. This study fills this information gap by undertaking an in-depth 
comparative analysis of the bidder remedies systems of Nigeria and South Africa, and assessing 
their effectiveness using clearly identified yardsticks/elements. 
The key research question which this study addressed towards achieving the above, 
was: “Whether the bidder remedies regimes of South Africa and Nigeria are effective for the 
enforcement of public procurement rules?” 
This study was conducted by way of doctrinal legal analysis. The study adopted a 
comparative approach in analysing the bidder remedies systems of South Africa and Nigeria, 
with a view to assessing their respective effectiveness in enforcing public procurement law. 
Analytical references were made to the bidder remedies regimes provided under international 
regulatory regimes, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement. The primary 
materials which this study relied on are relevant legislation and case laws from both 
jurisdictions. Similarities as well as striking differences exist between the South African and 
Nigerian bidder remedies regimes, which made the systems suitable for a comparative study. 
The study established that the bidder remedies systems of both countries are reasonably 
effective, although this is undermined by certain legal and structural factors. The key finding 
is that the design of bidder remedies systems affects their effectiveness. Thus, based on this 
and the lessons obtained from studying the two systems, this work towards the end presented 
a blueprint for any country wishing to design or redesign its remedies systems.  
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Opsomming 
Die Guide to Enactment het bevind dat 'n bieër-remediesisteem help om die verkrygingsreg 'n 
belangrike mate van selfpolisiëring en self-afdwinging te maak. Dit is omdat dit 'n laan bied 
vir die bieërs wat belang het in die monitering van die verkryging van entiteite se nakoming 
van die verkrygingsreëls. In 'n poging om hul regte te beskerm of om die besering wat 
veroorsaak word deur die skending van die verkrygingsreëls te verhelp, tree bieërs op as 
"private prokureur generaals" om nakoming te handhaaf. Bieërremedie regime is 'n integrale 
deel van die openbare verkryging stelsels van baie lande in Afrika. Nigerië en Suid-Afrika is 
voorbeelde van Afrika-lande wat sulke regimes het. Bieërremedies het 'n akademiese en 
praktiese belang aangeneem as gevolg van die werklike en waargenome rol wat dit speel in die 
behoorlike funksionering van 'n openbare verkrygingsisteem. Alhoewel navorsingsbelang in 
bieërmedisyne wêreldwyd aan die toeneem is, fokus slegs 'n onbeduidende gedeelte van die 
navorsing op Afrika. Die inligtingsgaping wat bestaan weens die beskikbaarheid van baie min 
akademiese inligting oor bieërmedisyne in Afrika, moet nog gevul word deur gedetailleerde 
navorsing. Hierdie studie vul hierdie inligtingsgaping deur 'n in-diepte vergelykende analise 
van die bieër-remediesisteme van Nigerië en Suid-Afrika te onderneem en die effektiwiteit 
daarvan te assesseer deur gebruik te maak van duidelik geïdentifiseerde maatstawwe / 
elemente. 
 Die sleutelnavorsingsvraag wat hierdie studie aangespreek het om bogenoemde te 
bereik, was: "Of die bodemremedieregimes van Suid-Afrika en Nigerië effektief is vir die 
handhawing van reëls vir openbare verkryging?" 
 Hierdie studie is deur middel van leerstellige regsanalise uitgevoer. Die studie het 'n 
vergelykende benadering aangewend om die bieërremediesisteme van Suid-Afrika en Nigerië 
te ontleed met die oog op die beoordeling van hul onderskeie effektiwiteit in die afdwinging 
van die wet op die verkryging van openbare aankope. Analitiese verwysings is gemaak aan die 
bieër regstellings regimes wat voorsien word onder internasionale regulatoriese regimes, soos 
die UNCITRAL Model Wet op Openbare Verkryging. Die primêre materiaal waarop hierdie 
studie berus, is relevante wetgewing en regspraak van beide jurisdiksies. Gelykhede sowel as 
opvallende verskille bestaan tussen die Suid-Afrikaanse en Nigeriese bodemremedie-regimes, 
wat die stelsels geskik gemaak het vir 'n vergelykende studie. Die studie het bevind dat die 
bieër-remedies-stelsels van beide lande redelik effektief is, hoewel dit deur sekere regs- en 
strukturele faktore ondermyn word. Die sleutelbevinding is dat die ontwerp van bieërmedisyne 
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stelsels hul effektiwiteit beïnvloed. Op grond van hierdie en die lesse wat verkry is om die twee 
stelsels te bestudeer, het hierdie werk tot die einde 'n bloudruk voorgestel vir enige land wat sy 
remediesisteem wil ontwerp of herontwerp.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 1 Background 
Most African countries have laws to regulate their government procurement, in line with global 
trends.1 However, what has remained a major concern is whether these laws are adequately 
being adhered to or enforced. It has been widely recognized that an effective means of 
enforcing public procurement regulation is by vesting bidders2 with the right to challenge 
breaches of procurement rules by procuring entities.3 In exercising this right, suppliers may 
obtain remedies for losses or injuries suffered as a result of the breach of procurement rules; in 
addition, the procuring entity could be ordered by the challenge forum to comply with 
applicable rule or law. This procurement enforcement mechanism is here referred to as “bidder 
remedies”.4  
Bidder remedies regime is an integral part of the public procurement systems of many 
countries in Africa.5 Nigeria and South Africa are two of such countries that have bidder 
                                                          
1 Examples include: Botswana Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 2001 (as amended); Ethiopia Federal 
Government Procurement and Property Administration Proclamation No. 649/2009; Ghana Public Procurement 
Act 663 of 2003 (as amended by Act 914 of 2016); Kenya Public Procurement Act No 33 of 2015, Nigeria Public 
Procurement Act 2007; Rwanda Public Procurement Law No 12/2007 of 27/03/2007; the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 s 217, and Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act No 5 of 2000; Tanzania 
Public Procurement Act 2011; Uganda Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003 (as amended 
by Act No 11 of 2011); and, Zimbabwe Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act ch 22:23 2017. 
2 In this study, unless it is expressly stated otherwise, or the context otherwise requires, “bidder” includes a 
supplier, contractor or consultant that is interested in or that actually submitted bids for a particular procurement 
contract. Thus, the terms “bidder”, “supplier”, “contractor” are largely used interchangeably. 
3 See Guide to Enactment of the 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 95, 228; S Arrowsmith 
“Remedies for Enforcement the Procurement Rules” in S Arrowsmith (ed) Public Procurement in the European 
Community Vol IV (1993) 1 3. See also G Quinot “A Comparative Perspective on Supplier Remedies in African 
Public Procurement Systems” in G Quinot & S Arrowsmith (eds) Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (2013) 
390; D Gordon “Constructing a Bid Protest Process: The Choices that Every Procurement Challenge 
System Must Make” (2006) 35 Pub Contract LJ 427 428.  
4 The mechanism is also referred to as “supplier remedies”, “supplier review”, “challenge proceedings”, “bid 
protest”, “bid challenge”, “complaints mechanism” depending on the jurisdiction, the wordings of the various 
laws or the authors.  Bidder remedies as a concept is analysed in chapter 3. 
5 Examples include: Botswana Public Procurement Act, ss 53, 95-109; Ethiopia Federal Government Procurement 
and Property Administration Proclamation 15(7), chs 13 & 14); Ghana Public Procurement Act (as amended) ss 
78-82; Kenya Public Procurement Act ss 167-175; Nigeria Public Procurement Act s 54; Rwanda Public 
Procurement Law ch IV; South Africa reg.16A9.3 of the Treasury Regulations under the Public Finance 
Management Act, reg.49 (read with reg.50) of the Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations under the 
Municipal Finance Management Act; Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 s 62; Tanzania 
Public Procurement Act part IX; Uganda Public Procurement Act part VII; and, Zimbabwe Public Procurement 
Act part x. 
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remedies regime.  Bidder remedies have assumed an academic and practical importance as a 
result of the actual and perceived role that it plays in the proper functioning of a public 
procurement system.6 Research interest in bidder remedies has been on the increase globally; 
although, only a negligible portion of such research focuses on Africa. There are various 
contemporary issues that have engaged leading practitioners and scholars in this regard. One 
of the issues is the extent of effectiveness of bidder remedies as a means of securing compliance 
with procurement rules. The general view is that having a bidder remedies regime is beneficial 
to suppliers and the procurement system.7 However, some scholars have argued that the 
mechanism may actually be disadvantageous to the procurement process.8 For example, it is 
possible that aggrieved suppliers may resort to speculative instigation of review process, which 
leads to avoidable disruption of the procurement process. However, the advantages or 
disadvantages of a remedies regime depend on the design and operation of the regime. As noted 
by Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace: 
 “The potential adverse effects of litigation will be affected by the characteristics of the 
regulatory rules, in particular whether their requirements are clear. They will also be 
affected by the features of the remedies system itself…”9    
 Another research interest is the comparative analysis of bidder remedies in different 
countries. Using findings from an empirical study, Pachnou compared the operation of the 
bidder remedies systems of United Kingdom and Greece.10 She identified some similarities and 
differences in how the remedies are perceived by their end users in the countries studied and 
their resultant responses towards exploiting the remedies. One of the legal theories propounded 
by Pachnou is that the willingness or reluctance of bidders to explore bidder remedies when 
they perceive a breach of rules depends on the features of the review system. Particularly, that 
where there are procedural difficulties in the procurement law or the review process, which 
reduces the chances of getting remedies for breaches, the suppliers become reluctant to seek 
                                                          
6 Discussed in 2 3 2 below. 
7 See fn 2 above. 
8 S Arrowsmith Government Procurement and Judicial Review (1988) 305; R Marshal, M Meurer, & J F Richard 
“Curbing Agency Problems in the Procurement Process by Protest Oversight” (1994) 25 Rand Journal of 
Economics 297. 
9 S Arrowsmith, J Linarelli, & D Wallace Regulating Public Procurement: National and International 
Perspectives (2000) 760. 
10 D Pachnou The Effectiveness of Bidder Remedies for Enforcing the EC Public Procurement Rules: a Case Study 
of the Public Works Sector in the United Kingdom and Greece PhD thesis University of Nottingham (2003).  
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procurement review.11 This finding may be applied in studying or understanding other systems. 
However, one is mindful that the social context of United Kingdom and Greece, studied by 
Pachnou, is not quite similar to those found in some other regions, especially Africa. This 
factor, among others, limits the transposition of the findings and lessons of the study to other 
regions. The need to comparatively study other countries remains relevant and justifiable. That 
is why the comparative analysis by Quinot of the bidder remedies systems of some African 
countries is apposite.12 The analysis raised some cogent issues that call for further study or 
analysis. One of such issues is how the systems attempt to balance the interest of transparency 
in procurement (perceived to be enhanced by bidder remedies), with the interest of avoiding 
financial losses to the government due to disruption of procurement contracts caused by 
challenge proceedings.13 However, as Quinot pointed out,14 the chapter does not provide a 
detailed analysis of bidder remedies regimes in the procurement systems reviewed, which 
included Nigeria and South Africa. It is necessarily a broad overview aimed at highlighting 
patterns in supplier remedies operating in Africa. Thus, the information gap that exists due to 
the availability of very little academic information on bidder remedies in Africa still remains 
to be filled, by detailed research.15  
This study integrates and substantially extends existing findings, theories and analysis 
on bidder remedies, especially as they relate to Africa, particularly Nigeria and South Africa. 
Its focus is to comparatively analyse the bidder remedies systems of Nigeria and South Africa, 
and assess the extent of their effectiveness compared with the relevant indicators or elements 
identified in 2 4 3 below. In addition, aspects of these systems are compared with leading 
international procurement regimes, particularly, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public 
Procurement (“UNCITRAL Model Law”). The doctrinal legal analysis and structure of this 
study could afford a template for assessing the effectiveness of other bidder remedies systems. 
                                                          
11 431. 
12 Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 308. 
13 330-335. 
14 309. 
15 Apart from Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation; a few other published work on this 
topic at present include: G Quinot “Enforcement of procurement law from a South African perspective” (2011) 
20 PPLR 193-207; G Quinot ‘Towards Effective Judicial Review of State Commercial Activity’ (2009) 3 TSAR 
436-449; and KT Udeh “A Critical Analysis of the Legal Framework for Supplier Remedies System of Kenya in 
the Light of International Standards” (2012) 21(5) PPLR 183. 
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1 2 Research Objectives 
As a background on the objectives of this study, it is apt to cite Gordon who had noted that:  
“[T]he striking similarities in the challenges and benefits of various bid protest systems 
mean that there are rich opportunities for comparative review. Indeed, we will be remiss 
if we do not learn as much as we can about others’ successes and failures in their own 
protest systems.” 16 
As would be expatiated upon under subheading 1 4 below, there are similarities in the legal 
systems of Nigeria and South Africa, as well as similarities in the bidder remedies systems of 
both countries. Equally, there are other aspects of the two systems that differ, which necessarily 
lead to different outcomes in these systems in terms of enforcing public procurement rules. The 
similar and varying aspects of the systems could be analysed to determine how they impact on 
the effectiveness of the regimes in enforcing procurement rules. Furthermore, lessons could be 
drawn from the comparative assessment of these systems and transposed to improve the 
effectiveness of the systems studied. It is these ends that this study pursues.  
Specifically, the objectives of this study are to: 
a. Analytically compare the bidder remedies regimes of South Africa and Nigeria, with a view 
to assessing their effectiveness as mechanisms for enforcing procurement rules in both 
jurisdictions; 
b. Identify and appraise the inherent legal and practical factors that hamper the effectiveness 
of the available bidder remedies in both jurisdictions; 
c. Present suggestions for improving the effectiveness of the bidder remedies regimes under 
review, based on the findings made by the study and relying on applicable jurisprudence.  
To achieve the aforementioned research objectives, this study had set out to address a 
key research question, that is: 
 “Whether the bidder remedies regimes of South Africa and Nigeria are effective for 
the enforcement of public procurement rules.” 
1 3 Methodology 
As stated earlier, this study is conducted by doctrinal legal analysis. The study adopts a 
comparative approach in analysing the bidder remedies systems of South Africa and Nigeria, 
                                                          
16 Gordon (2006) Pub Contract LJ 445. 
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with a view to assessing their respective effectiveness in enforcing public procurement 
regulation. Notwithstanding that the focus of this study is on South Africa and Nigeria, 
analytical references are made to the bidder remedies regime provided by UNCITRAL, the 
European Union and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). The reference to these other 
regimes is only for the purposes of critical assessment of the South African and Nigerian 
systems. The primary materials which this study relies on for the comparative analysis are 
relevant legislation and case laws from the jurisdictions studied. This is because the bidder 
remedies systems are mainly products of legislation; and the interpretation given to the relevant 
legislation by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies may explicate or modify the legislation. Also, 
relevant subsidiary legislation, policy documents and quasi-legal instruments, which are 
important in the countries studied, are considered. Established practice and procedures before 
the administrative review bodies and the courts, as contained in documents and as seen in 
operation are compared. The secondary materials considered are academic literature, and the 
opinions and theories of scholars that are relevant to the subject-matter. 
There are two main reasons for adopting the comparative method here. First, acquiring 
and comparing the knowledge of bidder remedies in the countries studied affords a better and 
wider understanding of bidder remedies, than where only one regime is studied.  Secondly, it 
identifies the different approaches and solutions offered by the systems studied, to similar 
challenges and issues. In addition, the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches and 
solutions offered by the regimes become more glaring when compared. This could stimulate 
law reviews in these jurisdictions. This is even more relevant for bidder remedies, since it is a 
relatively new legal development and research interest.  
1 4 Choice of jurisdictions 
There are cogent reasons for the choice of South Africa and Nigeria for this comparative study. 
First, public procurement in Africa has not been widely researched. The academic resources 
that exist so far on bidder remedies regimes in Africa have been limited to a few published 
articles and chapters of a few books.17 There is no known doctoral thesis on bidder remedies in 
Africa. Conversely, there are several published works and a doctoral thesis on remedies 
                                                          
17 See fn 13 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6 
 
regimes in Europe.18  This study of the South African and Nigerian bidder remedies regimes 
will help to close the research gap on bidder remedies in Africa.  
Secondly, both are African countries that have bidder remedies regimes. The remedies 
regimes of both countries have operated for a length of time that suffices to provide resources 
for the comparative examination of their effectiveness.  
Thirdly, the procurement spending and the market size of the two countries in relation 
to Africa are significant.  The economies of South Africa and Nigeria comprised over 50% of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Sub-Saharan Africa.19 They are the largest markets in Sub-
Saharan Africa; and public procurement spending is huge in both countries.20 The actual and 
potential role that bidder remedies may play in these economies makes this study imperative. 
Fourthly, there are similarities as well as striking differences between the South African 
and Nigerian bidder remedies regimes, which make the systems suitable for a comparative 
study. For instance, both the Nigerian and South African remedies regimes provide for 
administrative and judicial enforcements in the procurement review process. Conversely, the 
South African bidder remedies system is based on several pieces of legislation; while the 
Nigerian remedies system is a creation of single public procurement legislation. The federal 
government of Nigeria has its own procurement regime, and the various states have their 
separate regimes. This study, as it relates to Nigeria, is focused on the federal procurement 
system and its bidder remedies. In South Africa, regulation of public procurement is largely 
uniform within each tier of government; but not uniform vertically across the tiers; yet the 
                                                          
18 A few of these include: Arrowsmith “Remedies for Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules” in S Arrowsmith 
(ed) Public Procurement in the European Community Vol IV (1993); Arrowsmith Procurement and Judicial 
Review; P Trepte Public Procurement in the EU: a Practitioner’s Guide 2 ed (2007); H J PrieB & P Friton 
“Designing Effective Challenge Procedures: The EU’s Experience with Remedies” in S Arrowsmith & R D 
Anderson (eds) The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (2011) 526;  Pachnou 
Effectiveness of Bidder Remedies. 
19 The World Bank “50 Things You Didn't Know About Africa” (2013) Statistics in Africa 
<http://go.worldbank.org/58IOKF4O80> (accessed 29-08-2017). 
20 Nigeria estimated public procurement spend (capital expenditure) for 2017 was N 2,177,866,775,867: 
Appropriation Act 2017 schedule part D; Budget Office of the Federation “2017 Appropriation Act” (29-06-2017) 
Budget Office of the Federation <http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/index.php/resources/internal-
resources/executive-order/2017-appropriation-act> (accessed 31-01-2018). South Africa had an annual 
procurement spend of R500bn as at 2016: A Scott “South Africa reforms public procurement to save R25bn” (26-
02-2016) Supply Management (CIPS) <https://www.cips.org/supply-management/news/2016/february/south-
africa-to-reform-public-procurement-processes/> (accessed 31-01-2018); P Bolton “Public Procurement as a Tool 
to Drive Innovation in South Africa” (2016) 19 PER/PELJ subheading 3. See Statistics South Africa “The 
Economy of South Africa” (30-01-2018) STATS SA < http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=595> (accessed 31-01-
2018). 
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country’s main procurement legislation21 apply to all the tiers. Furthermore, Nigeria’s remedies 
regime is modelled after the UNCITRAL Model Law 1994; while the South African regime is 
an offshoot of combined application of legal rules from various distinct fields of South African 
law. Some of the issues that arise as a result of these similarities and differences, which a 
comparative analysis can address include: how do the distinguishing features of the two 
regimes affect their effectiveness? Which of the two regimes has features that are more 
effective in enforcing procurement rules? Could practical lessons be learnt from each regime, 
which may offer a source of improvement in the administration of the other regime?  It is 
expected that the comparative study would offer valuable mutual lessons for both countries and 
may actually lead to possible future modification of the existing bidder remedies regime in the 
two countries. As Quinot pointed out: 
“The eventual question is thus how to proceed in developing a new public procurement 
remedies regime for South Africa. In answering this question comparative insights will 
be important...”22 
Finally, the researcher has practical knowledge of bidder remedies in Nigeria, having 
conducted prior research on the Nigerian public procurement system. In addition, he has been 
involved in handling cases of procurement challenge in Nigeria. On the other hand, there are 
several published materials on the supplier remedies system of South Africa. There are 
numerous reported cases on South African procurement challenge. South African legal 
documents on the subject matter are easily accessible. Also, there are government officials, 
scholars and practitioners in South Africa who provided valuable information on South African 
bidder remedies regime, especially on practice and procedures before the administrative bodies 
and the courts. In other words, materials were available to enable a research on the South 
African bidder remedies system. With this background, it is reasonable that South Africa and 
Nigeria were chosen for this study. 
1 5 Major findings and structure of the study 
The overarching finding, and the thesis statement of this study, is that the design of the bidder 
remedies systems affects their effectiveness. This confirms similar finding and postulation of 
                                                          
21 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act No 5 of 2000 (PPPFA), and s 217 of the 
South African Constitution. 
22 Quinot (2011) PPLR 207 (emphasis added). 
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earlier studies on remedies systems.23 However, this study is original, and substantially 
contributes to the limited research on the subject; as it specifically focuses on bidder remedies 
of Nigeria and South Africa. These systems have not been explored in a comprehensive and 
systematic manner as this study does. It fills the research and knowledge gap in the literature 
through the assessment of the effectiveness of remedies systems, and how they should be 
reformed; specifically, in relation to the two jurisdictions, and generally, in relation to African 
and global public procurement regulation. The study is far more in-depth than existing 
scholarship on the subject, in relation to the two jurisdictions, and Africa generally.24 The study 
is placed in the context of existing research. The proposals it makes for reform are unique and 
based on the findings of this research. Its comparative and interpretive methods afforded it the 
opportunity to identify what works and what does not work in the two jurisdictions, and to 
provide a context for the jurisdictions to cross-learn from each other. 
This study is comprised of nine chapters. The current chapter has presented a general 
introduction, which sets out the background and objectives of the study, and the research 
methodology. Chapter 2 establishes certain doctrinal foundation upon which bidder remedies 
and the other mechanisms for enforcing procurement law in Nigeria and South Africa are 
subsequently analysed. Specifically, the chapter explores the relationship between regulating 
public procurement and enforcing the regulations; and establishes that public procurement 
regulation necessarily requires enforcement to make it efficacious. It also examines the general 
features of bidder remedies as an enforcement mechanism. In addition, it identifies the elements 
or indicators for assessing the effectiveness of bidder remedies systems. 
From Chapter 3 onward, the study narrows down to the Nigerian and South African 
public procurement systems. The chapter analyzes how these countries structure their public 
procurement; and gives an overview of the institutional frameworks involved in public 
procurement enforcement in these jurisdictions.  A major finding under this chapter is that 
while the tiers of government in South Africa have a largely uniform procurement regime, 
Nigeria operates separate procurement regimes at the various tiers. These different situations 
have implications for the remedies systems, as discussed in the chapter. Another major finding 
in chapter 3 is that membership of both countries in intergovernmental organizations does not 
                                                          
23 See Pachnou Effectiveness of Bidder Remedies 76, 431; Arrowsmith et al Regulating Public Procurement 760; 
Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 391; P Craig & G De Burca EU Law. Texts, Cases 
and Materials 2 ed (1998) 235. 
24 Examples include: Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation: Quinot (2011) PPLR 193-
207; Quinot (2009) TSAR 436-449; and Udeh (2012) PPLR 183 
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directly impact upon their bidder remedies systems, for reasons presented in that chapter. 
Chapter 4 traces the historical development of the public procurement regulatory regimes of 
Nigeria and South Africa from the old to the current; with analytical focus on their features that 
relate to bidder remedies and enforcement. In this regard, the improvements made by the 
current regulatory regimes over the old are identified. The major findings of this chapter are 
that the current regimes in both jurisdictions: (1) grant bidders a general right to challenge 
procurement decisions of procuring entity, and to have access to relevant records; (2) do not 
exempt any unlawful acts or decisions in a procurement procedure from review; and, (3) 
provide, at least, a body to hear a challenge as a first step and a further body to hear an appeal 
as a second step.   
Chapters 5 to 7 comparatively examine the features and effectiveness of the various 
bidder remedies mechanisms in Nigeria and South Africa: the internal administrative review, 
external administrative review, and judicial recourse, respectively. The components of these 
mechanisms analysed include: their enabling legislative provisions, causes of action or grounds 
of review, locus standi and parties to proceedings, the forums, commencement procedures and 
timeframes, access to procurement records for purpose of the proceedings, the procedures and 
duration of proceedings, available remedies and appeal, and the enforcement.  Apart from 
examining the internal review mechanisms, chapter 5 initially presents an overview of the 
bidder remedies systems of Nigeria and South Africa; highlighting the objectives of the 
systems, the structuring of the systems, also the limits of the application of standstill period, 
and the extent to which donors’ bidder remedies regimes apply to their funded procurement in 
both countries. A major finding in chapter 5 is that the internal review mechanisms in both 
countries are similar in a few respects, as follows: their jurisdiction is limited to the 
procurement undertaken by a particular tier of government; they are the compulsory first 
remedy; review is by considering written submission of parties; and, review decisions are 
binding and appealable. However, dissimilarities exist in most other aspects. The major finding 
of chapter 6 is that Nigerian (federal) external review mechanism is well structured and 
effective; whereas, its South African counterpart is unsystematic, structurally inchoate, and 
ineffective. In chapter 7, the major finding is that procurement judicial remedies in both 
jurisdictions are substantially effective in relation to the relevant elements considered. 
Nevertheless, certain factors, discussed in the chapter, undermine the advantages of these 
judicial remedies regimes. 
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 Chapter 8 comparatively examines other mechanisms for redressing breaches and 
enforcing public procurement regulations in both jurisdictions. Such mechanisms considered 
include: alternative dispute resolution; investigation, administrative remedial actions, and 
sanctions; audit; and CSOs’ action. The major findings of chapter 8 are as follows: (1) ADR is 
effective for resolving procurement disputes where an organ of government engages another 
organ for its procurement, for it accords with routine inter-governmental relations; (2) 
investigation, and the concomitant remedial action or sanctions, are effective where there is a 
report or a reasonable suspicion of procurement-related offences, since bidder remedies cannot 
effectively address this criminal aspect; and, (3) the relevance of procurement audit lies in 
detecting and suggesting redress against institutional lapses that encourage procurement 
breaches or corruption. 
Chapter 9 presents a summary of key findings and draws some conclusions on the 
overall effectiveness of the bidder remedies systems under review; and presents practical 
recommendations on improving the effectiveness of each system. It draws from lessons from 
the two systems to suggest a blueprint for designing a bidder remedies system suitable for the 
African context. 
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Chapter 2  
Enforcement of Procurement Regulation and the Concept of Bidder Remedies 
2 1 Introduction 
This chapter examines general issues relating to bidder remedies. Particular references are 
made to the Nigerian and South African public procurement systems only where apposite. The 
following issues will be examined in this order: the concept of enforcement and its relevance 
to public procurement regulation; the concept and essential features of bidder remedies (under 
which the relationship between bidder remedies and contract dispute proceedings is examined, 
among other issues); the elements of an effective bidder remedies system; and the relationships 
between bidder remedies and other procurement enforcement mechanisms. This will provide a 
basis for the detailed assessment of the two systems in subsequent chapters. 
2 2 Enforcement and Procurement Regulation  
2 2 1 Concept of Legal Enforcement  
There are different views on what constitutes a legal enforcement. John Austin had postulated 
that enforcement must involve the use or threat of sanction to actualise the dictate of law or a 
command of a sovereign; and must be accomplished by the power of the state or officials 
internal to the regime.1 Many scholars agree with this conception of law and enforcement.2 A 
view in support was expressed thus: “[A]n order will be called… law if it is externally 
guaranteed by the probability that physical or psychological coercion will be applied by a staff 
of people in order to bring about compliance or avenge violation.”3 However, the Austinian 
conception of enforcement has been viewed as too restrictive by some scholars.4 One of such 
views holds that: “[Sanctions and force] do not represent a logical feature of our concept of 
law. . . . Is it possible for there to be a legal system in force which does not provide for sanctions 
or which does not authorize their enforcement by force? The answer seems to be that it is 
                                                          
1 J Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832) 6-8 11 19-20 28.  
2 See for example: M Weber “The Profession and Vocation of Politics” in P Lassman (ed) Political Writings 
(1919) 309 310-11; H Kelsen General Theory of Law and State A Wedberg (trans) (1945) 21; M Weber Economy 
and Society (1978) (1921-22) 34. See also J Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights 2 ed (2011) 260-264 266-
270; R Dworkin Law’s Empire (1986) 93. 
3 Weber Economy and Society 34. 
4 J Kleinfeld “Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International Law Is Law” (2010) 78 Fordham L 
Rev 2451 2505-2506; J Kleinfeld “Enforcement and the Concept of Law” (2011) 121 Yale L J Online 293 302; J 
Raz Practical Reason and Norms (1975) 158. See also S J Shapiro Legality (2011) 169. 
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humanly impossible but logically possible.”5 Remedies derived from a challenge proceeding 
may be regarded in some sense as sanctions, but it is not tenable to hold that the bidder that 
initiated the enforcement used force. Although it could be viewed that the bidder by instituting 
a challenge proceeding has indirectly invoked force (of law), as the review body may give 
decisions or remedies which the state may use force to execute.  Perhaps, the major argument 
against Austin’s postulation is that it assumes that to have a governmental overlord with power 
to inflict sanction is simply what enforcement means.6 This assumption may not be 
unconnected to the legal realities in England at the time Austin wrote, which was the non-
liability of the Crown, particularly in tort.7 In England, Crown subjection to normal legal 
liability was only statutorily established in 1947 with the passing of the Crown Proceedings 
Act 1947.8  In contemporary times, it has become frequent for governments and their agencies 
to be compelled by the legal actions of individuals or subjects to comply with the dictates of 
law. As will be seen in detail in section 2 3 below, this is what obtains in bidder remedies 
proceedings, as they are usually instituted by individual bidders to compel government 
procuring entities to comply with the law.   
Broader conceptions of enforcement have therefore been proposed. One of such, 
adopted in public procurement literature,9 defines enforcement as “any rules and principles of 
organisational or substantive nature which concern actions in law aiming at judicial 
protection”.10  A deficiency in this definition is that it limits enforcement to only judicial 
remedies; whereas enforcement could, inter alia, be in the form of administrative remedies.11 
                                                          
5 Raz Reason and Norms 158, (emphasis added). 
6 Kleinfeld (2010) Fordham L Rev 2505-2506; Kleinfeld (2011) Yale L J Online 302. 
7 See Raleigh v Goschen (1898) 1 Ch. 73, Mullins v Secretary of State for War (1926) 43 T.L.R. 106 and 
MacKenzie-Kennedy v Air Council (1927) 2 KB.517. See also Binda v Colonial Government (1887) 5 SC 284 
291 297; and Ransome-Kuti v A G of the Federation [1985] 2 NSCC 879. 
8 G Quinot State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009); G Williams Crown Proceedings: an Account 
of Civil Proceedings by and against the Crown as Affected by the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 (1948) 1 & 16; 
S Arrowsmith The Law of Public & Utilities Procurement 2 ed (2005) 114; Matthews v Ministry of Defence [2003] 
UKHL 4 paras 83-87. See also S Deakin, A Johnston & B Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 7 ed 
(2012) 344; WV Horton Rogers “Liability for Damage Caused by Others under English Law” in J Spier & F 
Busnelli (eds) Unification of Tort Law: Liability for Damage Caused by Others (2003) 63 77. 
9 D Pachnou “Enforcement of the EC Procurement Rules: the Standards Required of National Review Systems 
under EC Law in the Context of the Principle of Effectiveness” (2000) 2 PPLR 55 55. 
10 S Prechal “E.C. Requirements for an Effective Judicial Remedy” in J Lonbay & A Biondi (eds) Remedies for 
Breach of E C Law (1997) 3. 
11 These include: administrative review, administrative rulemaking proceedings, petition for reconsideration, etc. 
See MR Gelpe “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The Lesson from Environmental Cases” (1985) 53 
George Washington Law Review 1 5-7. 
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A definition regarded here as more apposite reads: “legal enforcement is the activity by which 
a legally constituted power is applied to make the law’s dictates actual.”12 This definition will 
be adopted as the meaning of enforcement in this study, because it captures the essence of 
bidder remedies as a procurement law enforcement mechanism. The definition is briefly 
analysed in relation to bidder remedies to support this assertion. Bidder remedies involves 
initiation of a review action (activity), by an aggrieved bidder or potential bidder in pursuance 
of the right vested on it by law (legally constituted power), to challenge and redress non-
compliance with procurement regulations (applied to make the law’s dictates actual). 
Furthermore, this definition of enforcement is preferred to the former, as it encompasses all 
possible remedies derivable from bidder-initiated review, which include both administrative 
and judicial remedies. The concept of bidder remedies is further discussed in detail in section 
2 3 below. 
2 2 2 Enforcement vis-à-vis Procurement Regulation  
Enforcement through bidder challenge proceeding commonly arises in jurisdictions where 
public procurement is regulated by law, as non-compliance with the procurement regulation is 
the main basis upon which a bidder seeks redress. Even in jurisdictions where a bidder’s right 
to challenge is not created by procurement legislation, but instead regarded as part of general 
civil or constitutional right, there would usually be legislation on procurement, the breach of 
which can activate the right of challenge. For example, in Belgium, which has a history of 
Roman Dutch law,13 the right of bidder challenge is regarded as part of the general 
constitutional “civil right” or “political right”.14 However, what gives a bidder the standing to 
exercise this right is mostly that there has been a breach of statutory provision(s) on award of 
                                                          
12 Kleinfeld (2011) Yale L J Online 300. 
13 Up until 1830, Belgium was a colony of Netherlands, which has a history of Roman Dutch law (as would be 
seen later, Roman Dutch law, apart from common law, is the foundation of the legal system of South Africa, 
which also was formerly a colony of Netherlands). See University of Oxford “Dutch legal system: quick facts” 
Oxford LibGuide http://libguides.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/content.php?pid=290644&sid=2387397 (accessed 
30/08/2017); see also University of Oxford “Belgian legal system: quick facts” Oxford LibGuide 
http://libguides.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/content.php?pid=309908&sid=2537549 (accessed 30/08/2017). See further T 
K Saha Textbook on Legal Methods, Legal Systems & Research (2010) 71; and, D Heirbaut “Legal History in 
Belgium” (2009) 1 Clio@Themis 2, 4 <http://www.cliothemis.com/Legal-History-in-Belgium>  (accessed 
29/04/2017).  
14 D D’Hooghe “Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules in Belgium” (1992) 5 PPLR 389 389-394. 
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government contracts.15 At common law,16 various remedies available in bidder challenge, 
derivable from principles of administrative law, contract and tort, may only be claimed where 
a legislative provision has been breached. One of such remedies is damages for tort of 
misfeasance. This arises where a person acting in public office knowingly acts unlawfully or 
unlawfully omits to act, which the person knows will probably cause injury.17  It may also arise 
in certain cases where the public officer was subjectively reckless as to the legality of the act.18 
Another of such possible procurement review remedies includes the tort of breach of statutory 
duty. This arises where it may be implied that there is a legislative intention to give damages 
for the breach of statutory duty; however, the court may rarely find such an intention in 
legislation regulating procurement.19 
Nevertheless, where there is no procurement regulation, bidders can still in certain 
circumstances rely solely on general principles of contract, delict/tort or administrative law to 
challenge a government procurement award. A bidder can sue in contract where a procuring 
entity advertises in the invitation to bid that it will award to the lowest bidder, but fails to award 
it accordingly.20 Also, a bidder can sue where there is a breach of the administrative law 
principle of natural justice in a procurement process.21 A bidder can sue in tort where a public 
                                                          
15 See D’Hooghe (1992) PPLR 389 389-394; A Alen International Encyclopaedia of Constitutional Law: Belgium 
118 No. 201. See also the following cases C.S., July 4, 1967, De Nul, no. 12511; C.S., May 7, 1981, Stefens, 
no.21147. 
16 As would be seen later, the Nigerian legal system is an offshoot of English common law. In this work references 
to “common law” refers to English common law, except when it is clearly indicated otherwise as in the case of 
South Africa, where reference will be made to “South African common law”. In South Africa the concept of 
“common law” does not necessarily mean English common law – common law in South Africa often includes 
civil law. E.g., South African common law of contract is mostly made up of Roman-Dutch law, i.e. it is civil in 
nature. 
17 See Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd v The Corporate Officer of the House of Commons [2002] 2 L.G.L.R. 
372; Bourgoin SA v Ministry of Agriculture [1986] Q.B 716, CA; Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No. 3) 
(summary judgment) [2003] A.C 1. See KM Stanton, P Skidmore & M Harris Statutory Torts (2003) ch 4; P Craig 
Administrative Law 5ed (2003) 908-914. 
18 See n 17 above. 
19 In R v Knowsley MBC ex parte Maguire [1992] 90 L.G.R 653, QBD, Schiemann J. said: “we do not have in our 
law a general right to damages for maladministration.” See Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement 1379; 
see further Stanton Statutory Torts ch 2; S Arrowsmith Civil Liability and Public Authorities (1992) ch 7. 
20 This is what obtained in the English case of Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust of Canada (CI) Ltd [1986] 
AC 207. Contrast with Spencer v Harding (1870) LR 5 CP 561. See also CBN v System Application Products 
Nigeria Limited 3 NWLR (Pt. 911) 152, where the Nigerian court relied on the terms of the invitation to bid issued 
by the procuring entity to adjudicate over a bidder challenge, in the absence of a public procurement legislation. 
21 In R v Enfield L.B.C, ex parte Unwin (1989) C.O.D 466, it was held that a contractor who was heavily dependent 
on his business with the Council was entitled to fair hearing before being suspended from the Council’s list of 
approved tenderers. 
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officer has acted improperly with the intention of injuring the bidder.22 Furthermore, a bidder 
can bring a delictual claim to challenge a government contract award tainted with fraud.23 In 
fact in Nigeria, Central Bank of Nigeria (“CBN”) v System Application Products Nigeria 
Limited,24 a bidder review case, was instituted before the enactment of the Public Procurement 
Act 2007 (“PPA”) and entertained on grounds of general principles of contract, tort and 
administrative law.25 Apart from procurement legislation, public procurement is also 
extensively regulated by common law rules in South Africa;26 as such, breach of common law 
rules can act as grounds for procurement challenge there. The role played by common law 
principles in the development of the bidder remedies systems of Nigeria and South Africa is 
discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
For various reasons, the scope of bidder remedies may be limited in jurisdictions that 
do not have legislation applicable to public procurement. First, relevant administrative 
remedies may scarcely be available, since such remedies and the authorities that exercise them, 
are typically creations of legislation applicable to procurement. Second, bidder challenge in the 
courts may be rare as bidders’ right of action will be restricted to breaches of general principles 
of law applicable to procurement; and these principles are usually not far-reaching in such 
jurisdictions.27 This was the case in Nigeria until the enactment of the PPA. It was the same in 
the United Kingdom (“UK”), before the enactment of its procurement related legislation, 
particularly the Local Government Act 1988.28 Third, general principles of administrative law 
may not be applicable to government procurement in jurisdictions where government contract 
is governed by private law. For example, it was once widely assumed in the UK that the general 
                                                          
22 See Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No. 3) (summary judgment) [2003] A.C 1. 
23 See Minister of Finance v Gore NO. 2007 (1) SA 111 (SCA), where the Supreme Court of South Africa awarded 
delictual damages against a procuring entity for fraudulent conduct of contract award process; the claim was based 
purely on fraud and not on breach of any procurement statutory duty. Also see Transnet Limited v Sechaba 
Photoscan (Pty) Limited 2005 (1) SA 299 (SCA); South African Post Office v De Lacy 2009 (5) SA 255 (SCA) at 
[2]–[5], [14]; and Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) at [55(a)].  
24 (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 911) 152.  
25 However, the challenge was unsuccessful. 
26 See Quinot State Commercial Activity 134-211; G Quinot “Enforcement of Procurement Law from a South 
African Perspective” (2011) 20 PPLR 193 195. A review of the procurement related legislation of South Africa 
that is relevant to this study shall be undertaken in chapter 4. 
27 On how this postulation relates to the UK system see S Arrowsmith “Enforcing the EC Public Procurement 
Rules: the Remedies System in England and Wales” (1992) 2 PPLR 92 93-94. See also K T Udeh & L Ahmadu 
“The Regulatory Framework for Public Procurement in Nigeria” in G Quinot & S Arrowsmith (eds) Public 
Procurement Regulation in Africa (2013) 141 153, as it relates to Nigeria. 
28 See n 26 above.  
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principles of administrative law did not apply to government procurement.29 However, that 
perception in the UK has largely changed in favour of applying administrative law to public 
procurement.30  
Enacting a procurement law that provides for bidder remedies normally extends the 
scope of enforcement by bidders, as additional grounds for review and additional remedies may 
be provided. It tends also to revive remedies derivable from administrative law, delict/tort or 
contract law, which have not been utilized prior to the enactment.31 Furthermore, procurement 
legislation may create special forums for bidder challenge, in addition to the courts or tribunals. 
This is the case in Nigeria, but not in South Africa, as will be seen later.  
2 2 3 Objectives of procurement regulation 
Since procurement regulation is a precursor to the operation of bidder remedies, it may be 
pertinent at this juncture to generally consider why governments enact laws to regulate their 
procurement. There are nine objectives frequently identified, from procurement legislation and 
literature,32 as the objectives of regulating government procurement; namely: competition, 
integrity, transparency, efficiency, customer satisfaction, value for money, wealth distribution, 
risk avoidance, and uniformity. However, a legislation that is enacted specifically to provide 
for and regulate bidder remedies, such as the European Union (“EU”) Remedies Directives,33 
will necessarily have its objectives narrowed to enforcing the substantive procurement law and 
protecting the rights of the aggrieved bidders.34 The nine objectives of procurement regulation 
identified above are not exhaustive. For example, procurement legislation could aim at 
redressing the economic situation of a disadvantaged group of people, as obtainable in South 
                                                          
29 See S A de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action J M Evans (ed) 4 ed (1980) 163; P Cane, An 
Introduction to Administrative Law (1986) 21.  
30 See S Arrowsmith “Government Contract and Public Law” (1990) 10 L.S 231; S Arrowsmith “Judicial Review 
and the Contractual Powers of Public Authorities” (1990) 106 L.Q.R 277; S Arrowsmith “Enforcing the EC Public 
Procurement Rules” (1992) PPLR 95. See also R v Enfield L.B.C, ex parte Unwin (1989) C.O.D 466. 
31 For example, in Nigeria, prior to the PPA, notwithstanding that bidder remedies proceeding could be initiated 
based on administrative law principles, contract and tort, that opportunity was hardly utilized.  
32 See S L Schooner “Desiderata: objectives for a system of government contract law” (2002) 2 PPLR 103 103-
110; S Arrowsmith, L Linarelli & D Wallace Regulating Public Procurement: National and International 
Perspectives (2000) 27-72; Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement ch 3; R Boyle “Regulated procurement 
- a purchaser's perspective” (1995) 3PPLR 105 109; S L Schooner “Fear of Oversight: the Fundamental Failure 
of Businesslike Government” (2001) 50 AMULR 627 630; S Arrowsmith “Towards a Multilateral Agreement on 
Transparency in Government Procurement” (1998) 47 Int'l & Comp L Q 793 796. 
33 Directives 89/665 [1989] O.J. L395/33; and Directives 92/13 [1992] O.J. L76/14, as amended by Directive 
2007/66/EC. 
34 On this see Pachnou (2000) PPLR 63-64. 
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Africa under the procurement related Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 
2003.35 No piece of procurement legislation can provide for or attempt to achieve all the 
identified objectives, since the pursuit of one of the objectives may militate against the 
achievement of another objective. For instance, the pursuit of best value for money may be at 
the expense of customer satisfaction.36 Of the above identified nine objectives, four 
(competition, integrity, transparency and value for money) appear to be widely accepted as the 
overarching objectives of procurement regulation.37 As will be seen in chapter 4, the 
procurement regulatory objectives of Nigeria and also South Africa include those four. 
It should be noted however that a statement of objectives of procurement regulation is 
to provide guidance in the interpretation and application of the law. Such a statement of 
objectives generally does not itself create substantive rights or obligations for procuring entities 
or for bidders.38  
Most public procurement legislation of state and national governments specify the 
objectives that they seek to achieve or the guiding principles for public procurement.39 This 
development is partly as a result of the example set by the UNCITRAL Model Law.40 
Procurement legislative texts of 29 countries, including Nigeria, are reported to be based on or 
                                                          
35 See P Bolton & G Quinot “Social Policies in Procurement and the Government Procurement Agreement: a 
Perspective from South Africa” in S Arrowsmith & R Anderson (eds) The WTO Regime on Government 
Procurement: Recent Developments and Challenges Ahead (2011) 459. The dimension of this South African 
policy that may relate to bidder remedies is further examined in chapter 4.  
36 See Schooner (2002) PPLR 108; W Kovacic “Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest 
Disputes” (1995) 9 Admin.L.J. Am.U. 461 486-487; R C Marshall, M J Muerer & J-F Richard “The Private 
Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight by Protest” (1991) 20 Hofstra L. Rev 1 7-
8. 
37 See Schooner “Desiderata” (2002) PPLR 104; Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement ch 3. The 
UNCITRAL Model Law provides for these four objectives. It also provides for the promotion of international 
trade as an objective; however, the objective is seldom adopted by countries, except for countries involved in trade 
agreements, such as EU and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries. 
38 Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, pt II, para 1, 27. 
39 For example: s 26 of Botswana Public Procurement Act; s 2 of Ghana Public Procurement Act; s 3 of Kenya 
Public Procurement Act, s 47 of Tanzania Public Procurement Act, ss 43-49 of Uganda Public Procurement Act, 
s 4 of Zimbabwe Public Procurement Act. See also art 3 of the Government Procurement Law of the People's 
Republic of China, art 7 of Poland Public Procurement Act 2004 (as amended); and, s 1.102 of the United States 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 48 CFR. 
40 UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Service 1994 (“UNCITRAL Model Law 
1994); and, UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 2011 (“UNCITRAL Model Law 2011”). See 
preamble to the UNCITRAL Model Laws.  
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largely inspired by the 1994 Model Law.41 The South African Constitution42 and Nigerian PPA 
contain the objectives of procurement regulation of the respective countries.43 A bidder 
remedies forum may refer to these objectives in determining the form and extent of remedies 
to grant towards enforcing compliance with the law.44 Equally, bidder challenge, as a 
procurement enforcement mechanism, contributes in ensuring the achievement of various 
objectives of government procurement policy and regulations.45 How the mechanism achieves 
enforcement of procurement regulation is discussed in section 2 3 2 2 below. 
2 2 4 Need to enforce public procurement regulations  
The discussion above revolved round the assumption that enforcement is indispensable to the 
operation of law. However, that assumption is controversial in jurisprudence.46 The assumption 
is rejected by some legal theorists,47 and defended by many others.48 Some others reject it in 
one sense and defend it in another.49 The assumption is usually rejected on the grounds that it 
is possible in special circumstances for law to operate without provision for enforcement.50 
While the core of the argument in defence of the assumption is that without enforcement a law 
will lack validity or sufficiency.51 The argument on the middle ground is that enforcement is 
necessary in applying law to practical affairs, but that enforcement is not strictly necessary for 
the existence of law.52 A middle ground approach is adopted in the current study. It is the view 
here that on one hand, a legal regime may be operative even where the right or power to enforce 
                                                          
41 UNCITRAL “Status” (2017) UNCITRAL 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model_status.html> 
(accessed 17/09/2017). Apart from Nigeria, 10 other African countries are also included; South Africa is not 
among those.   
42 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
43 These objectives are discussed in chapter 4. 
44 See Pachnou (2000) PPLR 63-64 where the author analysed the influence that the objectives of the EU Remedies 
Directives may exert on a review forum in applying the principle of effectiveness. 
45 X Zhang “Supplier Review as a Mechanism for Securing Compliance with Government Public Procurement 
Rules: a Critical Perspective” (2007) 16 PPLR 325 327; Marshall et al “Procurement Oversight by Protest” (1991) 
Hofstra Law Review 2-3.  
46 Kleinfeld (2011) Yale L J Online 293. 
47 Raz Reason and Norms 158; Shapiro Legality 169. 
48 J Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights 2 ed (2011) 260-64 266-70; Dworkin Law’s Empire 93; Kelsen Law 
and State 21; Weber Economy and Society 34. 
49 A Hamilton The Federalist No. 15 C Rossiter (ed) (1961) 110; H L A Hart The Concept of Law 2 ed (1994) 27-
33; L Fuller The Morality of Law (1964) 108-10; Kleinfeld (2011) Yale L J Online 306-311. 
50 Raz Reason and Norms 158 
51 Kelsen General Theory of Law 39-42 
52 Fuller Morality of Law 108-10; Kleinfeld (2011) Yale L J Online 306-311. 
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it is unavailable or excluded; but on the other hand, enforcement is necessary for a legal regime 
to be effective. An illustration of the fact that law can operate even where its enforcement is 
excluded is chapter 2 of the Constitution of Nigeria.53 The chapter stipulates the fundamental 
objectives and directive principles of Nigeria’s state policy. However, section 6(6)(c) of the 
Constitution provides that the question of non-compliance with the provisions of chapter 2 shall 
not be entertained by the courts for the purpose of enforcing them. Therefore, chapter 2 
provisions are non-justiciable.  In other words, the provisions are intended to be and are to an 
extent followed,54 as guiding principles for governmental and private decisions, policies and 
actions;55 but generally, cannot be enforced if breached.56 The non-justiciable nature of chapter 
2 provisions lead to non-compliance with them in many regards.57 
There are various procurement enforcement mechanisms,58 however, the concept of 
bidder remedies appears to have received the most attention. It has been described as the most 
important form of redress for breach of procurement rules.59 Although the postulation was 
made in the context of enforcing EU procurement regime, it is arguably true for other 
procurement regimes. Many countries around the world,60 including African countries,61 have 
                                                          
53 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). 
54 For example, the chapter informed the enactment of the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act No 
6 of 2003, to abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power, as declared under the chapter, in section 15(5). See 
Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772) 222. 
55 Section 13, under chapter 2 of the Constitution, provides: “It shall be the duty and responsibility of all organs 
of government, and of all authorities and persons, exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers, to conform 
to, observe and apply the provisions of this Chapter of this Constitution.” 
56 There are however exceptions to this rule, which include: (1) where the legislature makes a law to promote and 
enforce chapter 2 provisions; (2) where a provision(s) of the Constitution outside chapter 2 stipulate(s) that a 
provision or principle under chapter 2 shall be observed or applied in carrying out an activity prescribed by the 
former provision(s). See Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation (2002) 9 NWLR 
(Pt.772) 222; item 60 of the Exclusive Legislative List, 2nd schedule to the Nigerian Constitution. 
57 See Juriscope Explaining the 1999 Constitution with Decided Cases 39. 
58 Discussed in 2 5 below. 
59 Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 93; Pachnou (2000) PPLR 55. 
60 The system in the United States of America (popularly referred to as “bid protest system”) has been in operation 
since the 1920s, with the establishment of the General Accounting Office (“GAO”).  This appears to be one of the 
oldest legislative establishments of bidder remedies system. See D I Gordon “In the Beginning: the Earliest Bid 
Protests Filed with the US General Accounting Office” (2004) 5 PPLR 147 147-164. 
61 Some of which are: Botswana (by virtue of Botswana Public Procurement Act, ss 53, 95-109); Ethiopia (by 
virtue of Ethiopia Federal Government Procurement and Property Administration Proclamation No. 649/2009, 
15(7), chs 13 & 14); Ghana (by virtue of Ghana Public Procurement Act  (as amended) ss 78-82); Kenya (Public 
Procurement Act ss 167-175); Nigeria (by virtue of Nigeria Public Procurement Act s 54); Rwanda (by virtue of 
Rwanda Public Procurement Law No 12/2007 of 27/03/2007 ch IV); South Africa (by virtue of reg.16A9.3 of the 
Treasury Regulations under the Public Finance Management Act 1 of  1999, reg.49 (read with reg.50) of the 
Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations under the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003, 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000); Tanzania (by virtue of Tanzania Public Procurement 
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adopted systems of bidder remedies. It is likewise provided for in many international legislative 
texts on government procurement, which include: the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public 
Procurement,62 the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”)'s Agreement on Government 
Procurement (“GPA”) 2014,63 the EU Remedies Directives64 and North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).65 Also a wealth of academic resources exists on the concept and systems 
of bidder remedies;66 although as noted in chapter 1, African systems have not received 
sufficient academic attention.  
A legal regime such as a public procurement regulation necessarily requires 
enforcement to make it efficacious, for various reasons discussed below. 
2 2 4 1 Preventing abuse 
 The nature of procurement creates opportunity for abuse; and where abuse occurs, the potential 
consequential losses could be significant, considering that procurement spending may 
represent 10-20 per cent of gross domestic product (“GDP”) and up to 50 per cent or even more 
                                                          
Actpt IX); Uganda (by virtue of Uganda Public Procurement Act pt VII); and Zimbabwe (by virtue of Zimbabwe 
Public Procurement Act part X). For a broad comparative perspective on the supplier remedies system in some of 
the aforementioned countries see Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 308-335. For a 
broad perspective on the bidder remedies systems of Kenya and South Africa respectively see K T Udeh “A 
Critical Appraisal of Kenya’s Supplier Remedies System in the Light of International Standards” (2013) 5 PPLR 
183; and, Quinot (2011) PPLR 195.  
62 Chapter VIII. 
63 Article XX. For an analysis of the bidder remedies system under the GPA see S Arrowsmith Government 
Procurement in the WTO (2003) ch14; S Arrowsmith “The Character and Role of National Challenge Procedures 
under the Government Procurement Agreement” (2002) 4 PPLR. 235; M Footer “Remedies under the New GATT 
Agreement on Government Procurement” (1995) 4 PPLR 80; J Dalby “Remedies for Infringement of the 
Government Procurement Agreement” in A Tyrrell & B Bedford (eds) Public Procurement in Europe: 
Enforcement and Remedies (1997) ch14. 
64 These are Directive 89/665/EEC (the Remedies Directive), that provides remedies for enforcing the Public-
Sector Directives; and Directive 92/13/EEC (the Utilities Remedies Directive), that provides remedies for 
enforcing the Utilities Directive. These two Remedies Directives “are designed to help ensure that government 
procurement of member countries carried out in contravention of the EU procurement rules will be remedied 
through review procedures. The Remedies Directives were in November 2007 amended by Directive 2007/66/EC 
(new Remedies Directive); and further by Directive 2014/23/EU (Concessions Directives), arts 46 & 47. For a 
discussion on reforms introduced in the new Directive, see R Williams “A New Remedies Directive for the 
European Community” (2008) 17 PPLR NA19; J Golding & P Henty “The New Remedies Directive of the EC: 
Standstill and Ineffectiveness” (2008) 17 PPLR 146; P Trepte “Public Procurement in the EU: A Practitioner's 
Guide” 2 ed (2007) 590-600. See also R Craven “The EU’s 2014 Concessions Directive” (2014) 4 PPLR 188. 
65Chapter 10, Section C (Art 1017). For a discussion on the provisions on government procurement, especially 
the article concerning bid protest, see further S Greenwold “The Government Procurement Chapter of The North 
American Free Trade Agreement” (1994) 4 PPLR 129; E A Troff “The United States Agency-level Bid Protest 
Mechanism: A Model for Bid Challenge Procedures in Developing Nations” (2005) 57 AFL Rev 113 134-37. 
66 See EU-Asia Link Bibliography on Public Procurement Law and Regulation (2012) 43-44 and other relevant 
literature referred to in this work.  
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of total government spending.67 The United States (“US”) massive procurement spending 
generally underscores this point- federal procurement totals between $350 billion to above 
$500 billion annually,68 while procurement spending across the tiers of government is around 
70% of total US public sector spending.69 South Africa’s public procurement market is 
estimated to account for approximately 21.77 per cent of the country’s GDP.70 Nigeria’s 
procurement spending falls within the range of 10-20 per cent of the country’s GDP,71 as 
extrapolated by UNCITRAL.72 Lack of integrity or corruption is a major concern in public 
procurement, especially in Africa.73 From a legal perspective, one of the key ways to address 
concerns regarding integrity is to develop an effective enforcement mechanism, particularly a 
bidder remedies regime.74 A bidder remedies regime helps to expose abuses of the public 
                                                          
67 UNCITRAL “UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2011)” (2017) UNCITRAL 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/2011Model.html> (accessed 17-
09-2017). Most Country Procurement Assessment Reviews on various African countries conducted by the World 
Bank indicate that huge losses were caused by corruption in the public procurement systems reviewed.  
68 US GAO Strategic Sourcing: Improved and Expanded Use Could Save Billions in Annual Procurement Costs 
GAO-12-919 2; The Whitehouse “Turning the Tide on Contract Spending” (04-02-2011) Office of Management 
& Budget <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/04/turning-tide-contract-spending> (accessed 27-12-2014); 
International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR), R Stumberg, A Ramasastry & M Roggensack 
Turning a Blind Eye? Respecting Human Rights in Government Purchasing (2014) 1. 
69 C Cram “$3.5tn Global Spend on Local Procurement ‘Woefully’ Mismanaged” (22-10-2012) The Guardian 
<http://www.theguardian.com/local-government-network/2012/oct/22/colin-cram-local-government-global-
procurement> (accessed 17-09-2017). 
70 D Audet “Government Procurement: A synthesis Report” (2002) 2 OECD Journal on Budgeting 1 180; see also 
P Bolton “Regulatory Framework for Public Procurement in South Africa” in G Quinot & S Arrowsmith (eds) 
Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (2013) 178 181 
71 Nigeria estimated public procurement spending (capital expenditure) for 2017 was N 2,177,866,775,867: 
Appropriation Act 2017 schedule part D; Budget Office of the Federation “2017 Appropriation Act” (29-06-2017) 
Budget Office of the Federation <http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/index.php/resources/internal-
resources/executive-order/2017-appropriation-act> (accessed 31-01-2018). 
72 UNCITRAL “UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2011)” UNCITRAL 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/2011Model.html (accessed 17-09-
2017). 
73 G Quinot “A Comparative Perspective on Supplier Remedies in African Public Procurement Systems” in G 
Quinot & S Arrowsmith (eds) Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (2013) 308 308; S Williams-Elegbe “A 
Perspective on Corruption and Public Procurement in Africa” in G Quinot & S Arrowsmith (eds) Public 
Procurement Regulation in Africa (2013) 336 345. See also Udeh & Ahmadu “Nigeria” in Public Procurement 
Regulation 144; W Odhiambo & P Kamau “Public Procurement: Lessons from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda” 
208 (2003) OECD Development Centre: Working Paper 36; OECD Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement: 
OECD Joint Learning Study on Morocco (2008); T Asare, A Kane, F Leautier and S Majoni “Trends in Public 
Procurement in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges of Capacity Building Interventions” presentation at the III 
Global Conference on Electronic Government Procurement (2009); R Hunja “Obstacles to Public Procurement 
Reforms in Developing Countries” in S Arrowsmith and M Trybus (eds) Public Procurement: the Continuing 
Revolution (2003) 13-22.  
74 Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 308; Williams-Elegbe “Corruption and Public 
Procurement” in Public Procurement Regulation 351. See also Gordon (2006) Pub. Cont L J 428 430-445. 
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procurement regime and acts as a redress against abuses, and deters future potential abuses.75 
In recognition of this, article 9 (1) (d) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(“UNCAC”) requires procurement systems to include an effective challenge mechanism, to 
ensure legal recourse and remedies in the event that the procurement rules or procedures are 
breached. Eliminating or redressing abuses, which enforcement engenders, ensures that corrupt 
practices do not interfere with the transparent and open conduct of procurement.76  
2 2 4 2 Enhancing public confidence  
Public procurement legislation regulates competitors (bidders) that seek to maximize their 
economic self-interest. It is therefore necessary that all parties involved be compelled to play 
by the rules. In the absence of enforcement to compel compliance with the rules, competitors 
may engage in improper conduct to outsmart one another and the system, in a bid to win 
contracts. Examples of such improper conduct include: collusion, price-fixing, and 
maintenance of cartels.77 Where such improper conduct is allowed or perceived, it lowers 
public confidence and creates a barrier to participation of bidders in the procurement market.78 
This barrier in turn lowers the opportunity of deriving value for money which competition 
affords. Public confidence is enhanced where enforcement of the rules is clearly visible, and 
transgressions appropriately punished.79 Potential bidders will hardly trust that the procurement 
rules shall be followed if the regulatory regime does not provide for enforcement. They may 
also not trust that the regime will protect bidders who suffer damage caused by breach of the 
regulations. All of this may deter bidders from participating in public bids, thus lowering 
competition.  
2 2 4 3 Protecting bidders’ rights  
Public procurement involves decision-taking on behalf of government, which directly affects 
the economic and legal rights of bidders. For example, a bidder possesses the right to participate 
in a procurement exercise if it is eligible. Bids are to be evaluated using only criteria contained 
                                                          
75 Zhang (2007) PPLR 327 
76 L Ferola “Anti-Bribery Measures in the European Union: A Comparison with the Italian Legal Order” (2000) 
28 I J L I 515; S Williams-Elegbe Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement: A Comparative Analysis of 
Disqualification Measures (2012) 42. 
77 See Williams-Elegbe “Corruption and Public Procurement” in Public Procurement Regulation 347; R Klitgaard, 
Controlling Corruption (1988) ch 6. 
78 See Gordon (2006) Pub Cont L J 427 431 445  
79 Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2012, pt II, para 30, 33.  
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in the solicitation documents or the procurement regulation as of right. Legal rights import 
correlative obligations, that is, they contain or imply commands addressed to identifiable 
individuals to refrain from conduct that would violate those rights.80 Consequently, a 
sufficiently proven violation justifies enforcement to protect rights.81 
2 2 4 4 Engendering transparency and control 
Transparency, which is at the core of public procurement regulations, demands that the 
procurement procedure or the decision or action involved shall be subject to scrutiny and liable 
to challenge. According to the Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law 2012 
(“Guide to Enactment”),82 one of the main elements of transparency in procurement is the 
existence of mechanisms to monitor compliance with procurement rules and enforce them 
where necessary. The fact that public procurement process involves exercise of discretion by 
government officials makes oversight imperative, as the incentives of the officials are often 
poorly aligned with public interest.83 Enforcement or oversight is necessary to control the 
exercise of discretion. 
2 3  Concept and features of bidder remedies 
The concept of bidder remedies, its essential features, and the factors that contribute to its 
importance and drawbacks as a procurement enforcement mechanism are discussed under this 
section. No attempt is made to particularise the discussion to Nigeria and South Africa, except 
where the contexts demands. It is intended to provide an understanding of general issues 
relating to a bidder remedies system. The detailed and particularised analysis of the issues as 
obtained in Nigerian and South African systems is undertaken in the subsequent chapters.   
2 3 1 Concept of bidder remedies  
Bidder remedies refer to the right provided or recognized by law by which a person that is 
interested in being awarded a government contract may challenge and seek redress against a 
decision, action or inaction of a public procuring entity, which is perceived to be in breach of 
                                                          
80 S M Schneebaum “Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium” (2009) 9 Human Rights & Human Welfare 103 103. 
81 As captured by the Latin maxim: Ubi jus ibi remedium (“where there is a right there is a remedy”). See Ashby 
v White (1703) 14 St Tr 695, 92 ER 126, per Lord Chief Justice Holt. 
82 Part II, para 32 at 34. 
83 Marshall et al (1991) Hofstra Law Review 3. 
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applicable public procurement rules.84 The person interested in being awarded a government 
contract is here referred to as a bidder, except as otherwise stated. A cursory examination of 
the above definition gives the impression that it does not cover or foresee a circumstance where 
it is the breach by a bidder that gives rise to the review. However, on further analysis, it would 
be realized that where a bidder breaches a procurement rule in the course of procurement 
exercise, it will give rise to a cause of action only if the procuring entity permits the breach. 
For instance, where a bidder submits a bid after the deadline for bid submission, it will become 
a matter fit for review only if the procuring entity does not reject the bid. This is because the 
procuring entity acts as an umpire in the competition for a government procurement contract. 
Thus, it bears the responsibility of adhering to and ensuring compliance with the procurement 
law. However, the bidder whose non-compliant action or omission was permitted by the 
procuring entity may also be joined as a defendant in the challenge proceeding. Ultimately, it 
is the procuring entity’s decision, action or omission that is always in issue, as the definition 
above indicates. Consequently, the procuring entity involved is always the main defendant in 
the review proceedings.  
Another question that may arise from the definition above is whether it is only bidders 
that can exercise the right to institute a challenge proceeding? This question is addressed in 
detail below.85 But it suffices at this juncture to state that, as the name and definition implies, 
the right to bidder remedies is primarily exercisable by bidders.86 As the Guide to Enactment87 
puts it, bidders “have a natural interest in monitoring procuring entities' compliance with the 
provisions of the … law.” In Scanwell Labs Inc v Shaffer,88 the court while noting the 
paramount role of an aggrieved bidder in initiating a challenge proceeding, referred to it as 
“private attorney general”.89  
Although “bidder remedies” is used here to refer to a mechanism or bidders’ right to 
challenge procurement decisions;90 nevertheless, in a narrow sense, bidder remedies may be 
used to refer to the actual heads of claims (remedies) available in law for bidders that initiate a 
                                                          
84 For other definition of bidder remedies, see Guide to Enactment ch VIII para 1, 228; Zhang (2007) PPLR 325; 
Gordon (2006) Pub. Cont. L.J.  428.  
85 2 3 2 3. 
86 See F J Lees “Resolving Differences: Protests and Disputes” (2002) 2 PPLR 138 138. 
87 Chapter VIII, para 2, 228. 
88 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 867. 
89 Also described as such generally in Marshall et al (1991) Hofstra Law Review; see also Lees (2002) PPLR n 3. 
90 Used as such in Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 308. 
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challenge.91 In other words, it may be used to refer to the decision(s) or order(s) that may be 
made by the review authority or forum in resolving the review case. It may even be used to 
refer to other remedies for breach of procurement rules provided by law, which bidders can 
explore instead of or in addition to challenge proceedings. Such secondary remedies include a 
procurement regulatory agency’s power to investigate breaches and take punitive or corrective 
measures.92 
A bidder remedies system may involve merely an opportunity for an aggrieved bidder 
to apply to the procuring entity to reconsider its action or decision and reply to the bidder.93 It 
may also be in the form of instituting a legal proceeding before an external (usually 
independent) administrative body or a court or tribunal, which has the power to grant corrective 
or punitive remedies against the alleged breach of procurement rules.94 Where bidder remedies 
involve such formal adjudicatory proceedings, it is often referred to as challenge proceedings.95  
 Apart from the various terms used in referring to bidder remedies, presented in chapter 
1, different nomenclature is used (in legislation and practice) to denote the application or 
process of the review. Similar to what is obtained in Nigeria, “complaint” is used in South 
Africa to refer to an application for administrative review of a government procurement 
decision or action. The use of the term is derived from several pieces of legislation that make 
up public procurement law of South Africa.96 Another term used in South Africa to refer to a 
review application, albeit seldom, is “objection”.97 In addition, “appeal” is used to refer to a 
case for administrative scrutiny of procurement decision or action, especially where it involves 
taking the matter before an official or tribunal within the same administrative hierarchy as the 
initial decision maker.98 The term “appeal” used in the above context is also a derivative of 
                                                          
91 See Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement (2005) ch 21. The focus there was largely not on bidder 
remedies as a concept of procurement enforcement but on remedies as heads of claims available to aggrieved 
bidders. Although the passage uses the term legal remedies or remedies not bidder remedies, it still illustrates the 
point. See also Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 92-118. 
92See Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement (2005) ch 21 1444-1464. 
93 Such as provided under UNCITRAL Model Law, art 66. 
94 General issues relating to forums for entertaining bidder remedies are considered in 2 3 2 3 below. 
95 As used in the UNCITRAL Model Law, ch VIII. The GPA, art XX, has similar term: “challenge procedure”. 
96 Such as Treasury Regulations, reg.16A9.3; Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations, regs 49 and 50; 
and Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000 (“PAJA”), s 10(2)(a)(ii). 
97 This is derived from regs 49 and 50 of Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations. 
98 Often the official or tribunal is more senior than the initial decision-maker, either administratively or politically. 
See Reed v Master of the High Court of SA [2005] 2 ALL SA 429 (E) op 436A. 
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relevant South African legislation.99 However, South African courts have different opinions on 
whether “appeal” as contained in section 62 of Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 
2000 (“Systems Act”),100 correctly refers to an internal review right of an aggrieved bidder. 
The High Court, per Binns-Ward J, in Loghdey v City of Cape Town101 opined that “objections 
or complaints”, as stated in the Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations,102 are what 
properly refer to the review right of unsuccessful bidders. Conversely, that “appeals” in section 
62 of Systems Act does not refer to such right and generally cannot be relied on by an 
unsuccessful bidder to pursue redress against a government contract award.103 Prior to that, it 
had been accepted by the South African courts that “appeals” as provided under section 62 of 
Systems Act, inter alia, refers to bidders’ right of review.104 The terminology above used in the 
legislation appears to have played a part in the distinction made by the High Court. 
Considering the above decision in Loghdey v City of Cape Town, the use of such terms 
in procurement legislation may be relevant in ascertaining legislative intent as it relates to 
bidder remedies process. It may, for instance, be apposite in determining what procedures 
(whether formal or informal) would best serve the substance of a review case. This is especially 
so where the relevant legislation is silent on the procedure or some aspects of procedure to be 
followed in conducting the review. As held in Salomon v Salomon:105  
                                                          
99 Such as s. 62(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 2000 (“Systems Act”); and s. 10(2)(a)(ii) of 
PAJA. 
100 Section 62(1) states: “A person whose rights are affected by a decision taken by a political structure, political 
office bearer, councillor or staff member of a municipality in terms of a power or duty delegated or sub-delegated 
by a delegating authority to the political structure, political office bearer, councillor or staff member, may appeal 
against that decision by giving written notice of the appeal and reasons to the municipal manager within 21 days 
of the date of the notification of the decision.” (Emphasis added). 
101 20/1/2010 case no 100/09 para 29 n 19. 
102 Regulation 49 (read with reg.50) states: “Supply chain management policy … must allow persons aggrieved 
by decisions or actions taken … in the implementation of its supply chain management system, to lodge within 
14 days of the decision or action a written objection or complaint to the municipality or municipal entity against 
the decision or action.” (Emphasis added). 
103 The court referred to Reader v Ikin 2008 (2) SA 582 (C); and Municipality of the City of Cape Town v Reader 
[2008] ZASCA 130, 2009 (1) SA 555 (SCA); where it was held that s 62 of the Systems Act is nothing more than 
a codification of the limited circumstances in which a decision-maker can, at common law, withdraw or alter its 
own decision without infringing the doctrine of functus officio. 
104 See Jicama 17 (Pty) Ltd v West Coast District Municipality 2006 (1) SA 116 (C); Loghdey v Advanced Parking 
Solutions CC 2009 (5) SA 595 (C); Total Computer Services (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Manager, Potchefstroom Local 
Municipality 2008 (4) SA 346 (T). 
105 [1897] AC 22 38, as quoted in BA Garner (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary 9 ed (2009) 983. 
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“In a court of law or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done 
can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in 
express words or by reasonable and necessary implication.”  
2 3 2 Essential components of bidder remedies  
This section, pursuant to the aim and context expressed in 2 3 above, analyses key aspects of 
bidder remedies and their related theories under the following subheading: scope of bidder 
remedies, objectives and effects of bidder remedies and components of a bidder remedies 
system.   
2 3 2 1  Scope of bidder remedies 
A bidder remedies system is generally empowered to review pre-bid, bidding and award 
decisions of a procuring entity. Examples of such decisions include: inclusion of an 
inappropriate technical specification in a solicitation document (pre-bid); acceptance of late 
bid (bidding); and, award to a bidder who did not submit the lowest evaluated responsive bid 
(award). When a contract has been concluded, a bidder may or may not be permitted to initiate 
a review, depending on the jurisdiction.106 In jurisdictions where reviews of concluded 
contracts are not permitted, a period of mandatory standstill between notice of award and 
conclusion of contract may be stipulated to restrain the procuring entity from rushing to sign 
the contract.107 Another safeguard in the circumstances is that procurement legislation may 
define concluded contracts to mean contracts signed in accordance with the provisions of the 
applicable legislation. In that case, if a contract is signed contrary to statutory provisions, it 
will be regarded as invalid or having not been concluded.108 In jurisdictions where concluded 
contracts are reviewable, there is usually a time limit within which to bring a complaint against 
such concluded contracts. This is to safeguard against delaying smooth execution of the 
contract.  
Bidder remedies and contract disputes resolution are related public procurement 
enforcement mechanisms, but they are clearly distinguishable as discussed below. It should be 
                                                          
106 What is obtainable in this regard in Nigeria and South Africa is analysed in chapter 5. 
107 See for example art 22 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, and art 2a(2) of the EU’s Directive 2007/66/EC. 
108 For example, Kenya Public Procurement Act s 167(4) is to the effect that it is only contracts concluded in 
accordance with s 135 of the Act that shall not be reviewable. Section 135 provides that a contract shall be entered 
into with the successful bidder based on the tender documents, and that a standstill period of at least 14 days after 
notification of award shall elapse before the contract is signed. For an analysis of these provisions in the 2005 
Act, see Udeh (2013) PPLR 190-192. 
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noted that this work will generally not treat contract dispute resolution beyond analysing its 
relationship with bidder remedies; as focus is on bidder remedies and virtually all textbooks on 
law of contract in both jurisdictions amply treat contract dispute resolution. 
(i) Bidder remedies and contract dispute resolution: distinction 
It is apposite to distinguish between a bidder remedies system and a contract dispute resolution 
system as it relates to a procuring entity. Contract disputes are disagreements or controversies, 
which arise between a contractor and the procuring entity during performance of the contract 
between the parties.109 The two mechanisms differ as they relate to who may bring the action, 
the purpose of the action, the forum in which the action may be brought, the applicable law and 
regulation, procedures followed, and the relief available to the successful party.110  
In bidder remedies, as seen above, the complainant against the procuring entity is an 
aggrieved or unsuccessful bidder; while in contract dispute the complainant is the contractor 
that won the procurement contract. The bidder’s purpose for initiating bidder remedies is to 
compel a procuring entity to comply with the procurement rules or to get a remedy for breach 
of the rules. Conversely, a contract dispute is primarily initiated to compel a procuring entity 
to comply with the terms of contract or to get a remedy for breach of the terms. The forum for 
bidder remedies depends on the applicable law within a jurisdiction. The forum may be the 
procuring entity or its designated officer; an administrative review body; or (subsequently) an 
ordinary or administrative court. Contract disputes are usually entertained in the first instance 
by ordinary courts, where alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, such as 
negotiation, fails. However, in some cases contract disputes could be brought before an 
administrative review body. This is not known to be obtainable in Nigeria and South Africa, 
but it is obtainable elsewhere. For instance, in the United States, a contractor whose contractual 
claim is rejected in whole or in part by the relevant procuring entity may elect to file an appeal 
against such decision with the procuring entity's Board of Contract Appeals.111  
                                                          
109 Lees (2002) PPLR 142. 
110 138. 
111 The Board of Contract Appeals is an independent, adjudicatory body established within the department or 
agency, staffed by a number of specially qualified administrative judges (e.g., the Armed Services Board of 
Contract Appeals, which is the largest of the agency boards). 
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A bidder remedies system is in most cases governed by public procurement legislation, 
and only in some cases by administrative law, contract and tort/delict.112 In many common law 
jurisdictions, procurement decisions of public entities become reviewable on the grounds of 
administrative law principles only where there is a public law element113 in the decision, or 
there is a statutory provision upon which one can predicate the review.114 A contract dispute 
resolution is generally governed by the law of contract;115 and the application of administrative 
law principles to contract disputes is rare and largely inconsistent. For example, while some 
decisions of South African courts are to the effect that the principles of administrative law 
apply to post-award or contract disputes, others are to the contrary.116 The procedure adopted 
by each of the dispute resolution mechanisms depends on the law governing each of them and 
also the procedural rules of the forum. Relief available in bidder remedies are largely targeted 
at protecting the opportunity or right of the bidder to compete according to the rules and to win 
the contract award; or in some cases, to compensate it for the denial of that opportunity or right. 
                                                          
112 This is the case in South Africa and Nigeria, as would be discussed later. See Quinot State Commercial Activity 
3-5; Quinot (2009) TSAR 436 439; Quinot (2011) PPLR 195. See also Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board 
EC 2007 3 SA 121 (CC) para 21. 
113 Whether a public law element is present will depend partly on the nature of the decision; as stated in R v 
Derbyshire CC ex parte Noble 1990 ICR 808 819 (per Woolf LJ): “[T]he approach which the courts now adopt 
… is to look at the subject-matter of the decision which it is suggested should be subject to judicial review and by 
looking at the subject-matter then come to a decision as to whether judicial review is appropriate”. See R v Lord 
Chancellor ex parte Hibbit and Saunders 1993 COD 326; R (on the application of Gamesa Energy UK Limited) 
v The National Assembly for Wales 2006 EWHC 2167 QBD (Admin) para 58-61; R (on the application of Menai 
Collect Ltd) v Department of Constitutional Affairs 2006 EWHC 724 (Admin). See also Quinot (2009) TSAR 438-
439. 
114 Arrowsmith (1990) LQR 277; Quinot (2009) TSAR 438-439; S Bailey “Judicial Review of Contracting 
Decisions” (2007) Public Law 444 448; C Hoexter “Contracts in Administrative Law: Life after Formalism?” 
(2004) SALJ 595; H Woolf, J Jowell & A Le Sueur De Smith’s Judicial Review 6 ed (2007) 140-143. 
115 In the form of legislation and general principles of contract derived from case laws. 
116 In Government of the RSA v Thabiso Chemicals 2008 ZASCA 112 para 18 the court held, per Brand JA, thus 
“I do not believe that the principles of administrative law have any role to play in the outcome of the dispute. 
After the tender had been awarded, the relationship between the parties in this case was governed by the principles 
of contract law”. Contrast with the decision in Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v Owner of MV Snow 
Crystal 2008 (4) SA 111 (SCA) para 21: “An organ of state which is empowered by statute to contract is obliged 
to exercise its contractual rights with due regard to public duties of fairness. … Even when it is clear that an 
organ of state has in fact entered into a contract, it may still be difficult, depending on the circumstances, to 
determine where the line is to be drawn between, on the one hand, its public duties of fairness and on the other its 
contractual obligations, or indeed the extent to which the two may overlap, if at all.” (Emphasis added). See also 
Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services CC 2001 (3) SA 1013 (SCA) para 18; Steenkamp NO v 
Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 (3) SA 151 (SCA) paras 11 and 12; Logbro Properties CC v 
Bedderson NO 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA); Zimport Water Service CC v Minister of Public Works, Director-General 
Department of Public Works v Chairperson Bid Adjudication Committee (37169/06 & 41073/06) [2008] 
ZAGPHC 82. See further G Quinot “Public procurement” (2008) 3 Juta’s Quaterly Review of South African Law 
para 2.1; and, Quinot (2011) PPLR 201.  
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Relief available in contract dispute are targeted at protecting the right of the contractor to 
perform the contract in accordance with the terms, and to make gains according to the terms of 
contract. In fact, there are remedies, such as specific performance, which are generally only 
obtainable from contract disputes.117 However, injunctive relief may be available in both 
mechanisms to prevent unlawful actions or breach of contract.118 A bidder remedies system 
does not extend to resolving breaches of concluded contracts; that is within the remit of the 
contract dispute resolution system.  
There may be a mixture of bidder remedies and contract dispute in a particular review 
proceeding, particularly in jurisdictions where concluded contracts are reviewable. For 
instance, in South Africa and Nigeria, a bidder can apply to a review authority to set aside a 
concluded contract; notwithstanding that a contractor had begun to execute the contract and 
has incurred expenses.119 In such cases, the contractor may defend the validity of the procuring 
entity’s decision to award and conclude the contract with it; and may alternatively claim from 
the procuring entity for reimbursement of contract expenses or for part-payment of the contract 
sum on quantum meruit basis.120 Defending the validity of the contract is within the ambit of 
bidder remedies; claiming for expenses and contract sum is an aspect of contract dispute. 
However, instead of mixing both claims, the contractor may choose to only defend the contract 
validity and if the contract is upturned, it may then sue in contract to recover contract expenses 
or part of contract sum. It can also sue for damages for delict or tort of negligence, on the 
ground that the contract was set aside owing to the wrongful or negligent procurement decision 
or action of the procuring authority.121  
                                                          
117 Specific performance is “the rendering, as nearly as practicable, of a promised performance through a judgment 
or decree” or it is “a court-ordered remedy that requires precise fulfilment of a legal or contractual obligation 
when monetary damages are inappropriate or inadequate”. See Garner Black’s Law Dictionary 1529. See also 
LSDPC v Nigerian Land and Sea Foods Ltd (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt 244) 653; and, Mpange v Sithole (07/7063) 
[2007] ZAGPHC 202. 
118 See Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Nelson [1936] 1 K.B 209; M v Home Office [1994] 1 A.C. 377. See also 
Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement 1364; Pachnou (2000) PPLR 63.  In certain cases, it may be deemed 
that there is an implied contract governing the contract award procedure. See Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd 
v Corporate Officer of the House of Commons (1999) 67 Cons. L.R 1; (2000) 2 L.G.L.R. 372, QBD; also 
Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement 1385.   
119 See Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, EC 2007 3 SA 121 (CC); Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd 
v Eastern Cape Province 1999 (1) SA 324. The Nigeria administrative review forum has powers to cancel 
concluded contracts and has exercised these powers in a number of unreported cases (on file with author). 
120 Quantum meruit literally means “as much as it has earned”. See Bernardy v Harding (1855) 8 Ex. 822; Warner 
& Warner v F.H.A [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt 298) 148 176; and Ruslyn Mining & Plant Hire v Alexkor (91710) [2011] 
ZASCA 218. 
121 As was claimed, albeit unsuccessfully, in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, EC 2007 3 SA 121 (CC). 
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(ii) Relevance of distinguishing the systems 
Distinguishing bidder remedies from contract dispute is relevant in determining whether res 
judicata will apply in a fresh suit to claim remedies by a contractor whose contract has been 
set aside through bidder remedies brought by way of a judicial review. The plea of res judicata 
prohibits the court from enquiring into a matter already adjudicated upon. It ousts the 
jurisdiction of the court.122 The basis of the plea is that there must, in the public interest, be an 
end to litigation.123 Relevant to the plea is also the well-established principle of law, which 
applies to both civil and criminal cases: that no one ought to be sued twice on the same ground 
or for the same cause of action.124 The invalidated procurement procedure or the voided 
contract is the cause of action in the bidder remedies proceedings, of which the contractor was 
a party. The contractor’s fresh litigation to claim remedies in contract would have been 
arguably caught up by res judicata if not for the fact that bidder remedies proceeding (even if 
in the same court) relates to a different issue and is also a distinct specie of legal action from 
the contract dispute. Thus, in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board,125 the contractor that 
won and signed a contract was a party in a bidder remedies proceeding126 brought against the 
procuring entity by way of judicial review before the High Court of South Africa, which 
eventually set aside the contract owing to irregularities in the bidding process. The court 
allowed the contractor to bring before it a fresh suit against the procuring entity for breach of 
the contract and for delict; since the earlier review case did not stand as res judicata against 
hearing the contractual and delictual claims.127 
  
                                                          
122 Bassil v Honger 14 W.A.C.A. 569 at 572. See Odadhe v Okujani (1973) 11 S.C. 343 353; Ukaegbu v Ugoji 
[1991] 6 NWLR (Pt 196) 127; and, NASASA Cellular (Pty) Limited v South African Post Office Limited (57471/07) 
[2010] ZAGPPHC 90; Boshoff v Union Government 1932 TPD 34 349; and, Kommissaris van Binnelandse 
Inkomste v Absa Bank Bpk 1995 (1) SA 635 (A). 
123 It is expressed in the Latin maxim: "Interest Rei publicae ut sit finis litium". See Akanbi v Alao (1989) 3 NWLR 
(Pt 108) 118 140; and, PGP Body Corp Administration CC v The Trustees of the body Corporate Club Kerkira 
(AR 403/11) [2012] ZAKZPHC 81. 
124 It is expressed in the latin maxim: "nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa". 
See Chief Adomba v Odiese (1990) 1NWLR (Pt 125) 165 178, 1 SCNJ 118; and Oshoboja v Amuda [2009] Vol 
12 (Pt I) MJSC 96. See also State v Basson [2004] ZACC 13; 2005 (1) SA 171 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 620 (CC). 
125 EC 2007 3 SA 121 (CC). 
126 In Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province 1999 (1) SA 324 (Ck HC).   
127 Even though the court entertained the matter, the claims however were not granted; and the appeals to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and further to the South African Constitutional Court failed.  
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(iii) Bidder remedies and contract dispute resolution: similarities 
However, there are similarities between a bidder remedies and contract dispute resolution 
mechanisms as they relate to public procurement. Both mechanisms help to maintain the 
objectives of transparency, fairness, competition, and integrity in the overall government 
procurement system.128 In both mechanisms, a government or a public entity is always a party. 
Both mechanisms rely on evidence to make decisions. Bidder remedies and contract dispute 
cases are both civil proceedings, therefore claims by parties are proved on preponderance of 
evidence.129 Thus, evidence adduced in proof of any claim made in both proceedings need not 
be proved beyond reasonable doubt; except where the complainant raises a criminal allegation, 
such as fraud.130  
In determining who wins the case, the forum in both mechanisms will have regard to 
whether evidence is admissible, relevant, credible, conclusive or more probable than that 
adduced by the other party.131 The review forums in both mechanisms normally give written 
decisions with reasons, in accordance with the doctrine of natural justice and procedural 
fairness, which demand that judicial or quasi-judicial decisions shall be with reason and made 
available to the parties in writing.132 These written decisions serve as the basis for appeals to 
an appellate authority (where available), as precedent for subsequent proceedings, and as 
guidance to members of the public procurement community. 
(iv) Conclusion 
In bidder remedies proceedings, it is the decisions that the review forum has powers to give 
and the effect of the decisions (whether binding or advisory) that constitute remedies for an 
aggrieved bidder. These remedies are usually stipulated in the enabling legislation. Apart from 
                                                          
128 Lees (2002) PPLR 142. Also, see generally, Schooner (2001) Am U L Rev 627; which discusses the importance 
of external monitoring of the procurement process by the contractor community through litigation. 
129 That is, evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition 
to it; in other words, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proven is more probable than not. 
See Garner Black’s Law Dictionary 1301. See also Akintola v Solano [1986] ANLR 395; and, Aegis Insurance 
Company Ltd v Consani NO (6/95) [1996] ZASCA 66, 1996 (4) SA 1 (SCA), [1996] 3 All SA 547 (A).  
130 See Nwobodo v Onoh [1984] 1 SCNLR 1; Nigerian Spannish Engineering Co Ltd v Ndukas Ezenduka [2002] 
28 WRN 146; Davy v Jarret (1877) 7 Ch. D 473 489 per Thesiger, J. 
131 See Mogaji v Odofin (1978) 4 S.C at 91; Akanni v Odejide (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 218) 827 at 858 paras. E-H, 
(2004) 9 NWLR (Pt. 879) 575; and Aegis Insurance Company Ltd v Consani NO (6/95) [1996] ZASCA 66; 1996 
(4) SA 1 (SCA); [1996] 3 All SA 547 (A). 
132 Wade Administrative Law (1977) 757-58. See also Recommendations of Sir Frank’s Committee on 
Constitution and Working of Administrative Tribunals in England (1955). 
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this, the forum may make decisions based on its inherent powers.133 It is more effective where 
the decision of a review forum is binding on the parties and only subject to appeal within 
stipulated time. Elements that make a bidder remedies system effective are considered in 
section 2 4 below. The decisions that the review body is empowered to make may depend on 
the objectives which the bidder remedies system aims to achieve.134 
2 3 2 2  Objectives and effects of bidder remedies  
(i) The objectives 
There are various purposes that a bidder remedies system may be set up to achieve. These may 
include: ensuring compliance with procurement rules by correcting identified breaches and 
deterring potential breaches; protecting the interest of bidders at risk of or adversely affected 
by breach of procurement rules;135 fostering bidders’ confidence in the public procurement 
system; and, maintaining the integrity of the system.136 The objective(s) of a remedies system 
may be considered by a review forum in deciding which available remedy it will give to an 
aggrieved bidder.137 Where the objective of the remedies system is primarily to uphold the 
procurement rules, the forum will be inclined towards granting remedies that prevent and 
correct breaches, such as interim measures and set-asides.138 Where the protection of aggrieved 
                                                          
133 Inherent powers doctrine is a principle that allows courts to deal with diverse matters over which they are 
thought to have intrinsic authority, such as making rules of procedures of the court. See Garner Black’s Law 
Dictionary 853. 
134 S Arrowsmith “Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules: Legal Remedies in the Court of Justice and the 
National Courts” in S Arrowsmith (ed) Remedies for Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules (1993) 49; 
Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 98. 
135 See Pachnou (2000) PPLR 63; Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 98; Gordon (2006) Pub. Cont. L.J 430; Marshall et 
al (1991) Hofstra Law Review 6 n 17. See also Guide to Enactment, ch VIII, para 2, 228; para 10 230. The 
European Court of Justice had mentioned the objective of protecting bidders’ right as an objective of the EU 
Remedies Directives in C-45/87R Commission v Ireland (Dundalk) [1987] E.C.R. 1369; C-194/88R Commission 
v Italy (La Spezia) [1988] E.C.R. 5647; C-272/91R Commission v Italy (Lottomatica) [1992] E.C.R. I-4367; C-
3/88 Commission v Italy (Re Data Processing) [1989] E.C.R. 4035; C-87/94R Commission v Belgium (Walloon 
Buses) [1994] E.C.R. I-1395. 
136 Guide to Enactment, ch VIII, para 2, 228; Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 308. 
137 As stated by the US General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals, thus: "(T)he purpose of the 
protest process is to assure that in federal agency procurements, not only are vendors treated fairly, but also- of 
greater importance in crafting relief- that the agency ultimately makes an award against the bid or proposal that 
is most advantageous to the United States.”: SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc. GSBCA No. 10864-P, 91-1 B.C.A. 
(CCH) 23 464, 117,718 (1990) (Emphasis added). See also Pachnou (2000) PPLR 63; Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 
98. See further GPA art XX (7) (a). 
138 Pachnou (2000) PPLR 63 
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bidder’s rights is a primary objective it may tend towards awarding generous compensational 
remedies, such as damages.139 
 Granting redress to protect the rights of aggrieved bidders is critical to the sustenance 
of the remedies system, since it is the bidders that initiate the review proceedings. 
Notwithstanding that a procuring entity which wishes to nullify its wrong procurement decision 
may do so by applying to an administrative review body or a court,140 such review process is 
rare and may not be deemed as a bidder review properly so called. The Guide to Enactment 
identified that a bidder remedies system helps to make procurement law to “an important 
degree self-policing and self-enforcing”.141 This is because it provides an avenue to litigate for 
bidders that have a natural interest in monitoring procuring entities’ compliance with the 
procurement rules. In an attempt to protect their rights or to remedy the injury caused by breach 
of procurement rules, bidders act as “private attorney generals” to enforce compliance.142 As 
noted by Marshall et al: 143 
“The notion that private parties should be encouraged to litigate to advance public goals 
that coincide with their private interests has long been recognized in areas such as 
antitrust, securities law and derivative actions”.  
Where redress is adequate to motivate bidders to initiate a challenge, the risk of facing 
increased litigation may dissuade procuring entities from infringing the rules. On the other 
hand, the reduction of infringements owing to the deterrence effect of the enforcement regime 
will lead to the respect of bidders’ rights under the law.144 Thus, the objectives of enforcing 
compliance and protecting aggrieved bidders’ rights are linked. 
If a bidder does not commence a challenge, a review forum will not interfere with the 
procurement process. Ordinarily, a procurement process involves only the procuring entities 
                                                          
139 63; J-M Fernández-Martín The E.C. Public Procurement Rules: a Critical Analysis (1996) 179-203. 
140 Municipal Manager: Qaukeni Local Municipality v FV General Trading [2009] 4 All SA 231 (SCA) 23: “a 
public body may not only be entitled but also duty bound to approach a court to set aside its own irregular” 
decisions. See TBP Building & Civils v the East London Industrial Development Zone [2009] JDR 0203 (ECG); 
Casalinga Investments CC t/a Waste Rite v Buffalo City Municipality [2009] JDR 0299 (EL); Zimport Water 
Service CC v Minister of Public Works (37169/06 & 41073/06) [2008] ZAGPHC 82, 60–61; Premier, Free State 
v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA) 36. See also Quinot “Enforcement of Procurement Law” 
(2011) PPLR 202. 
141 Chapter VIII, para 2, 228. 
142 Scanwell Lab., Inc. v Shaffer 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
143 Marshall, et al (1991) Hofstra L Rev 4.See also JC Coffee Jr “Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: the 
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions” (1986) 
86 Colum L Rev 669.  
144 Pachnou (2000) PPLR 64. 
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and the bidders. Without the moderating power of the review authority unwholesome practices 
are likely to ensue.145 Apart from this, bidder remedies generally act as a deterrent against 
various forms of corrupt practices in public procurement. A survey of bidders by the American 
Bar Association in 1989 showed that “a large majority of respondents said they believed the 
existence of the Board protest forum provides a deterrent to improper or illegal agency 
activities”.146 This is more pronounced where supporting elements are present, such as right of 
quick access to procurement records and information, well-informed and competitive suppliers, 
collaboration between the review authority, and an anti-corruption body in the state, among 
others.  
Providing for bidder remedies contributes to boosting bidders’ confidence in the public 
procurement system.147 Bidding for contract involves spending valuable business time and 
money in obtaining bid documents, preparing the tender, and submitting it. Bidders would want 
to be sure that their business time and money will not be wasted in a tendering process that is 
not conducted according to rules. If the bidders are not confident that they will get fair treatment 
in the tendering process, a significant number of them may abstain from the process, thereby 
limiting competition. Naturally, bidders do not expect that procuring entities will always follow 
the procurement rules; what is important is that anytime there is a breach of rules that there is 
an opportunity for redress. The more effective the remedies regime the more confident the 
bidders will be to participate in that procurement system.148 As pointed out by International 
Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO (ITC):149   
“Accessible and efficient review channels enhance the reputation of a procurement 
system as being fair, objective and competitive- and one in which bidders will 
participate, thus nurturing a competitive environment”.  
(ii) Factors adverse to the objectives 
                                                          
145 For the situation in Kenya before the establishment of its bidder remedies system see: Akech “Governance of 
Public Procurement in Kenya” (2006) J of Intl Law & Politics 849; see also Udeh (2013) PPLR 184. 
146 Cited in R Marshall, M J Meurer & J-F Richard “Curbing Agency Problems in the Procurement Process by 
Protest Oversight” (1994) 25 (2) RAND Journal of Economics 297 300. 
147 See OECD-DAC/World Bank, Methodology for Assessment of National Procurement Systems (“MAPS”) 
(2006) 15; Gordon (2006) Pub. Cont. L.J 430-431. 
148 Gordon (2006) Pub. Cont. L.J 430-431.  
149 ITC, Elements of a Modern Legal Framework for Public Procurement: the UNCITRAL Model law on 
Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services (module from Modular Learning System on International 
Purchasing and Supply Management for Public Sector) 20. 
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Nevertheless, there are factors that may undermine the objectives of establishing a bidder 
remedies system, and in effect weaken its effectiveness. The two most significant of these 
factors are unwillingness by bidders to take advantage of the right of review, and, the refusal 
or neglect of procuring entities to comply with the decision of the review authority.  
There are various causes of bidders’ unwilling to initiate a review proceeding, 
depending on the jurisdictions. However, about seven factors have been identified as the 
common causes.150 One is ignorance of the existence of such review rights, especially in 
jurisdictions where the right was hitherto not available. Two, is the high cost of pursuing the 
review, particularly in jurisdictions where the review process necessarily involves 
representation by legal practitioners, and multiple appeals are allowed. Three, is where there 
are procedural difficulties surrounding review proceedings. These difficulties may be due to 
observance of strict procedural rules, and the imposition of stringent legal requirements for 
obtaining remedies. Four, is that there may be the fear of retaliation from the affected procuring 
entity. Five, is a history of a low level of success and uncertainty in obtaining remedies from 
challenge proceedings.151 Six, is where there is a culture of aversion to litigation and finally, 
where there are other effective mechanisms for getting redress for wrongs done in procurement 
proceedings.  
On the other hand, the refusal or neglect by the procuring entities to comply with the 
decisions of the review body may be due to: the body’s low level of standing in the government 
structure, review body’s lack of authority to enforce its decisions, and vagueness of terms and 
timeframes for decision making by the review body.152 These are discussed further in relation 
to the jurisdictions under study in chapters 5 to 7. 
 (iii) Adverse effects of bidder remedies 
A bidder remedies system may also have some adverse effects. For example, a disruption of 
the procurement process may arise through the speculative instigation of review proceedings 
by aggrieved bidders;153 or where review proceedings are allowed to last for an indefinite 
length of time; and, where multiple appeals of review decision are permitted by law. The 
                                                          
150 See Zhang (2007) PPLR 325 333-337; and Pachnou The Effectiveness of Bidder Remedies ch 8 s 2, for a 
detailed discussion on causes of suppliers’ unwillingness to initiate challenge proceedings. 
151 See the empirical research findings of Pachnou Effectiveness of Bidder Remedies 190, 346 on the subject, in 
relation to the UK and Greece. See also Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 117. 
152 See MAPS 39-41. 
153 Arrowsmith Government Procurement 305. See also Marshall et al (1991) Hofstra Law Review 58 68; Zhang 
(2007) PPLR 338. 
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disruption is more severe where procurement proceedings are suspended pending 
determination of the review process; or, where concluded contracts are allowed by law to be 
set aside. Disruption of the procurement process may cause economic losses or hardship for 
both the government and the successful bidder (where it has acted by reason of the award or 
contract), and also for the general public that are to be beneficiaries of the procurement.154 
Moreover, where substantial damages or compensation can be awarded to bidders against a 
procuring entity, it translates to direct loss of public funds, which would have been utilized for 
the public good.155 In order to avoid a challenge, procuring entities may become unduly hesitant 
in taking decisions, to the detriment of efficient procurement;156 and may be willing to negotiate 
a compromise with a bidder that threatens a challenge. This may further lead to corruption, 
circumvention of competition, and double standards.157 However, the adverse consequences of 
a bidder remedies system will to an extent depend on the characteristics of the procurement 
regulatory framework, in particular whether their provisions are clear.158 How this relates to 
Nigeria and South Africa are analysed in chapter 4. 
 Considering the adverse effects that a bidder remedies system is likely to have on a 
government, a successful bidder and the public at large, it is necessary to weigh their interests 
against those of an aggrieved bidder if a remedies system is to meet the ends of justice. In other 
words, there ought to be a balance between the objective of protecting the rights of aggrieved 
bidders and maintaining an efficient public procurement system that delivers needed goods, 
works and services in a cost-effective and timely manner.  
2 3 2 3  Components of a bidder remedies system 
The aim here is to briefly set out the general components that commonly make up a bidder 
remedies system. This is a background for the later analysis of the structure of the bidder 
remedies systems of Nigeria and South Africa. 
                                                          
154 See Arrowsmith et al, Regulating Public Procurement 774; Zhang (2007) 339. 
155 J M Fernández Martín The EU Public Procurement Rules: A Critical Analysis (1996) 214. See also Zhang 
(2007) PPLR 339. 
156 Marshall et al (1994) RAND Journal of Economics 297-317; Zhang (2007) PPLR 337. See also European 
Commission The Single Market Review; Sub-series III: Dismantling of Barriers Vol 2, Public Procurement 
(1997) 147. 
157 Marshall et al (1994) RAND Journal of Economics 298 300; Pachnou The Effectiveness of Bidder Remedies 
402; Zhang (2007) PPLR 337-338. 
158 Arrowsmith et al, Regulating Public Procurement 760. See also A Brown, “Effectiveness of Remedies at 
National Level in the Field of Public Procurement” (1998) 4 PPLR 89 93. 
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 A bidder remedies system ought to have the following structural elements: enabling 
legislation, causes of action (matters subject to review), locus standi, review forum(s) and their 
jurisdictions, remedies or powers of the forum, time limits for various aspects of the review, 
practice and procedure and standard of review. These matters are briefly discussed below.   
 (i) Enabling legislation: It is preferable to establish bidders’ right to procurement 
challenge by legislation. Even though, as seen above,159 in the absence of enabling statutes 
some jurisdictions have recognized the rights of bidders to judicial review of contract award 
decisions,160 such judicial review has limitations that make it inadequate as a remedy for 
bidders. Some of the limitations of review rights founded solely on case law include, one, the 
uncertainty of the extent of the right and remedies. Two, there is a wide discretion by the court 
to grant or refuse traditional judicial review remedies, such as certiorari or mandamus.161 Three, 
there is a limited applicability of some of these remedies where the public body sued is held to 
have exercised a discretional power or duty and not a mandatory duty.162 Four, judicial review 
ordinarily involves stringent legal and procedural hurdles. Finally, except as otherwise 
provided by a legislation, there is a lack of specific timeframe for granting judicial review 
remedies. On the other hand, legislation is usually clear and definite in providing for review 
rights and remedies. It is preferable for such legislation to be a statute instead of a subsidiary 
legislation. This is because a bidder remedies system established by a statute is more secure 
than the one by a subsidiary legislation. Subsidiary legislation can easily be amended or 
repealed (thereby modifying or truncating the remedies system) by a single authorized person 
                                                          
159 2 2 2. 
160 As such decisions were regarded as an administrative action. 
161 For example, mandamus is a discretionary remedy which the court may refuse to grant even where a public 
duty sought to be compelled is owed, and it will not be issued where other adequate remedies exist. See Sutherland 
Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; Ex parte Wall, No. 1061381 (Ala. October 5, 2007); see also Young 
v Judicial Service Commission [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt 1091) 1; R v All Saints, Wigan 1 App. Cas. 611, 620; 
Commissioner for Local Government Lands & Settlement v Kaderbhai (1931) A.C. 652, 660; The Queen v 
Minister of Lands & Survey (ex parte The Bank of the North) (1963) 2 All N.L.R. However, it is trite law that 
where a court or judge is given the discretion to make or refrain from making an order such discretion must be 
used judicially; see Fawehinmi v Akilu (1) (1987) 2 NSCC 1265. 
162 See Triggs v Staines UDC (1969) 1 Ch. 10; CBN v System Application Products Nigeria (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt 
911) 152; see also Secretary of Education and Science v Tameside MBC (1976) 3 All E.R 665 (H.L); Padfield v 
Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997, [1968] UKHL 1, [1968] 1 All ER 694, [1968] 2 WLR 924; R v 
Northumberland Quarter Sessions ex . Williamson (1965) 2 All E. R. 87 (1965) 1 W.L.R. 700. 
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or an agency, without recourse to the rigours of legislative process, which an amendment or 
repeal of a statute entails.163  
(ii) Causes of action: Every bidder remedies system ought to provide for matters that 
are subject to review. In other words, the circumstances, actions or decisions that may give rise 
to challenge proceedings should be clearly stated by or known in law. This is because there 
should be a limit to litigation and there ought to be appropriate causes of action. All matters 
subject to review involve non-compliance of a decision or action of the procuring entity with 
the provisions of the procurement law. But it is not all non-compliant actions or decisions that 
may attract a remedy. Some jurisdictions provide for additional elements, which shall be 
present for the non-compliant actions or decisions to attract a remedy. Such additional elements 
may include proof by the claimant that it suffered or risks suffering loss or damage due to the 
breach.164 There are jurisdictions that provide for matters that are not reviewable, such as 
defence procurement, concluded contracts and the choice of procurement method.165 Matter(s) 
exempted from review ought to be minimal, if at all; and, should only be those where the 
benefits of review are outweighed by the cost or effects of review. 
 (iii) Right to initiate a bidder remedies proceeding: This is generally not open to all 
members of the public, and the law may imply or expressly stipulate those that may apply for 
review. It is usually only bidders or potential bidders that are regarded as possessing the right 
to bidder remedies.166 Where the right is merely founded on case law, as in jurisdictions that 
regard contract award as an administrative act subject to judicial review, the right to sue is 
determined by common law principles of locus standi. This entails that a person who seeks a 
remedy in court against an administrative action must show that it is directly affected by that 
action. There must be an assertion of right by such a person, which is peculiar or personal, and 
                                                          
163 See Udeh (2013) PPLR 185, for comments on the situation that existed in Kenya when its Exchequer and Audit 
(Public Procurement) Regulations 2001 was the enabling legislation for its supplier review system, before the 
enactment of its Public Procurement Act 2005. 
164 See UNCITRAL Model Law art 64(1). 
165 The 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law does not exclude any matter from review. However, the 1994 version, in 
art 62(2), excluded six matters (effectively five) from review; viz.: (a) choice of procurement method; (b) decision 
backed by law to limit procurement proceedings on the basis of nationality; (c) decision to reject all tenders, 
proposals, offers or quotations before acceptance where the tender documents stipulate that they could be so 
rejected; (d) a refusal by the procuring entity to respond to an expression of interest in participating in request-
for-proposals proceedings; (e) an omission to include information relating to reference to applicable legislation in 
solicitation documents.  
166 Most international procurement regimes extend the right to initiate a challenge to interested suppliers or 
contractors. See UNCITRAL Model Law art 64; Guide to Enactment, ch VIII B para 2 at 234; Directives 
2007/665/EC) art.1; GPA art XVIII(1).  
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that right must have been infringed or there is a threat of such infringement.167 It is crucial to 
define or limit those with review rights to prevent a disruptive increase in procurement 
litigation.168 
(iv) The forum: The following forums were identified in section 2 3 1 above as 
possibilities for entertaining bidder remedies: the procuring entity itself, a higher administrative 
body or a special agency with power to entertain such reviews, or a court.169 A challenge before 
the procuring entity itself or a higher administrative body or a special agency is referred to as 
administrative review. A challenge before a court of law could be referred to as judicial 
recourse or judicial enforcement. Judicial recourse may be brought by way of an ordinary 
writ/summons procedure, by judicial review or an appeal.170 It is important that the appropriate 
form of recourse is known, since the form will determine the procedures that shall apply and 
the remedies that may be sought and obtained. To illustrate this, five remedies are generally 
available in a review action (except where legislation provides the contrary): (a) certiorari or a 
set-side, to quash a decision already made; (b) prohibition, to restrain an authority from 
carrying out a decision which is unlawful; (c) mandamus, to compel an authority to make a 
lawful decision, or to carry out a public duty; (d) an injunction, normally used like prohibition 
to prevent unlawful action; and (e) a declaration, by which the court declares that particular 
conduct is unlawful.171 Conversely, remedies in an appeal will include pronouncing on the 
correctness of the decision appealed against, substituting the decision appealed against, or 
upholding the decision, and giving consequential orders.172 However, the effect of the various 
remedies available in a review may be the same for similar remedies in an appeal. Furthermore, 
a challenge proceeding may involve combining a writ procedure alongside a review 
                                                          
167 Adesanya v President, Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981) 1 All NLR 1, (1981) 2 NCLR 358; Fawehinmi v 
Inspector-General of Police (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt 767) 606 689; Olawoyin v Attorney-General, N.R. (1961) All 
NLR 269 270, (1961) 2 SCNLR 5; Shibkau v Attorney-General of Zamfara State [2010] 10 NWLR (Pt 1202) 312. 
168 Guide to Enactment, commentary 2 on art 64 
169 It is usually the ordinary court. However, recourse may be to an administrative court, such as in Zimbabwe; 
see Zimbabwe Public Procurement Act s 77; J Zowa, N Machingauta & P Bolton “The Regulatory Framework 
for Public Procurement in Zimbabwe” in G Quinot & S Arrowsmith (eds) Public Procurement Regulation in 
Africa (2013) 200 204. 
170 Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 312. See also Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 96-
97 105 110. 
171 Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 96. On how these remedies are applied in Kenya see Udeh (2013) PPLR 198-199. 
172 See Cupero Nig Ltd v Fed Ministry of Water Resources Suit no. FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. See also Logios v 
Custodian of Enemy Property NLR [XIX] 34; Taofeek Alao v African Continental Bank Ltd (2000) 6 SC (Pt I) 
27. 
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application, where court’s rules of procedure permit.173 This combination is employed where 
damages (generally not a judicial review remedy) is intended to be sought in conjunction with 
judicial review remedies.174  
Depending on a system in question, judicial recourse may be the only relief available 
to an aggrieved bidder.175 It may be an alternative to administrative review or a relief for a 
bidder dissatisfied with the outcome of an administrative review.176 The decision arising from 
a judicial recourse may not be subject to an appeal; or it may entail further appeal(s) to a higher 
court, depending on the jurisdiction. It is regarded as ideal that where a review before a 
procuring entity exists, further review or appeal should lie to an administrative or judicial body 
independent of the procuring entity.177 States may have one or all of the aforementioned forums 
for handling a bidder challenge. In jurisdictions where there are two or three strata of challenge, 
it is usually required that before a forum at the top of the hierarchy (such as a court) can 
entertain a challenge, the case must have been heard by the forums below. This is in accord 
with administrative law principle that internal remedies ought to be exhausted before judicial 
review can be sought.178 Each forum may have different remedies that it may grant to the 
aggrieved party. 
(v) Remedies available: The remedies that a review forum may grant in the course or 
as a result of a bidder’s challenge depends on the power vested in that forum by the enabling 
law. It is usual for the power of a review body to include corrective actions, such as requiring 
a procuring entity that has acted in breach of the law to act in a compliant manner. Suspension 
of the affected procurement proceedings may be part of the remedy that could be obtained from 
the review body, or legislation may make it automatic on filing of a complaint. Remedies may 
also include grant of financial awards to the aggrieved bidder, where the bidder has suffered 
injury or loss. This financial award may be in the form of damages or compensation. The extent 
                                                          
173 For example, the English Supreme Court Act 1981(as amended by Civil Procedure Act 1997) s 31(4). See 
Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 96.  
174 Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 97 104-105. 
175 As is obtainable in Namibia (by virtue of general principles of administrative law and law of contract and 
tort/delict). See S K Amoo & S Dicken “The Regulatory Framework for Public Procurement in Namibia” in G 
Quinot & S Arrowsmith (eds) Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (2013) 123 129; Zowa et al “Zimbabwe” 
in Public Procurement Regulation 204. See also Quinot “Enforcement of Procurement Law” (2011) PPLR 312. 
176 In Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 312, seven of the nine African countries 
reviewed provided for judicial recourse following administrative review. 
177 UNCITRAL Model Law, arts 64 & 67. See also MAPS, sub-indicator 10(e).  
178 See Plasket, R in Reed v Master of the High Court of SA [2005] 2 All SA 429 (E) OP 436A; Kasunmu v Shitta-
Bey [2006] 17 NWLR (Pt 1008) 372. See also PAJA s 7(2); Guide to Enactment, VIII A para 34 235. 
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of financial claims that can be made and recovered will depend on the legal systems involved. 
In some jurisdictions, the forum may even have powers to set aside an already concluded 
contract, where the award process did not comply with the law.179 However, owing to the 
adverse effect of a set aside, the review of concluded contracts is prohibited or limited in some 
jurisdictions.180 As discussed above,181 to strike a balance between the interests of aggrieved 
bidders and the successful bidder, procurement systems may provide a mandatory standstill 
period to forestall the hasty signing of a contract with intention to circumvent review. This 
standstill period is effective between the notice of award of contract and the conclusion of 
contract, to enable aggrieved bidders to challenge the procurement proceedings before contract 
signing.182 Other safeguards include: 
• suspending the procurement proceedings once a complaint is made so that no further 
steps are taken towards awarding and signing the contract; 
• prohibiting the signing of the affected contract once the procurement proceedings in 
question has been challenged; 
• fixing conservative time-limits within which to conclude review process, to remove the 
pressure to conclude contract owing to the need for the procurement. 
(vi) Procedural rules: The procedural rules of a review forum may be provided by the 
procurement legislation or another legislation, or made by the forum in the exercise of their 
inherent powers. Some of the procedural rules include: time-limits for bringing a complaint 
before the various forums; time-frames for hearing and disposing of a case; giving of notice to 
parties; and, the standard of review. For judicial review, the courts usually have elaborate 
general procedural rules for their proceedings.  
                                                          
179 Concluded contracts can be set aside by a bidder review forum both in South Africa and Nigeria, as would be 
discussed in chapter 5. 
180 For example, Kenya: Public Procurement Act s 167(4)(c). The EU Remedies Directive 89/665/EEC (as 
amended by Directive 2007/66/EC), art 2(7), directs that member states may provide that “after the conclusion of 
a contract in accordance with the Directives, the powers of the body responsible for review procedures shall be 
limited to awarding damages to any person harmed by an infringement. 
181 2 3 2 1. 
182 See for example UNCITRAL Model Law arts 2(r) and 22(2); preamble 4-11 18 to the EU Directive 
2007/66/EC; the EU Remedies Directive 89/665/EEC (as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC) art 2a(2). 
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2 4 What constitutes an effective bidder remedies system?  
2 4 1 Introduction 
Since the core of this study relates to the “effectiveness” of the bidder remedies systems of 
South Africa and Nigeria, it is pertinent to consider the question: what constitutes an effective 
bidder remedies system? Effectiveness here refers to the characteristics of a bidder remedies 
system in relation to meeting certain standards. This section considers the elements that may 
act as the standards with which to measure effectiveness.  
2 4 2 Effectiveness in context  
Several papers have been written and numerous judicial pronouncements made on the EU legal 
principle of effectiveness as it applies to public procurement, particularly its remedies or 
enforcement regimes.183 It is accordingly necessary to distinguish effectiveness of remedies 
under EU jurisprudence from effectiveness under general procurement remedies system. The 
principle of effectiveness is one of the general principles of EU law that governs enforcement 
of EU obligations, which includes adherence to EU procurement rules.184  Put simply, it 
requires that remedies for enforcement must be effective. Both the EU Remedies Directives 
and the Utilities Remedies Directives185 state that remedies must be “effective”.186 However, 
“effective” is not defined by the legislative texts; thus, it is left for judicial and scholarly 
interpretation. It has been held to mean that procedural conditions laid down by national law 
may not be applied if their effect is to render “practically impossible or excessively difficult 
the exercise of rights conferred by [EU] law.”187 It might mean that the remedies system as a 
                                                          
183 See for example, Pachnou (2000) PPLR 55; A Amull “The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU 
Law: An Unruly Horse?” (2011) 36(1) E L Rev 51; M Oder “Requirements of Effective Remedies Prior to the 
Conclusion of a Contract: A Note on the Judgment of the Court of Justice in Commission v Spain (Case C-
444/06)” (2008) 5 PPLR NA212-215; Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 114-116; S Arrowsmith “The Community's Legal 
Framework on Public Procurement: The Way Forward at Last?” (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 13; F 
Snyder “The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques” (1993) 
56 Modern law Review 24; Arrowsmith “Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules” in Remedies 49. A few of the 
relevant cases include: Alcatel Austria AG v Bundesministerium fürWissenschaft und Verkehr (Case C-81/98) 
[1999] E.C.R. I-7671; C-60/90 and C-9/90 Francovich v Italy [1992] E.C.R. I-5357; C-14/83 Von Colson v Land 
Northeim Westfalen [1984] E.C.R. 1891; C-106/77 Administrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA 
[1978] E.C.R. 629. 
184 The other general principle is non-discrimination. See C-33/76 REWE v Lanwirtschaftskammer Saarland 
[1976] E.C.R. 1989; C-45/76 Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergevassen [1976] E.C.R. 2043; C-179/84 Bozetti 
v Invernizzi [1985] E.C.R. 2301. 
185 Directive 92/13 (as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC) 
186 See recital 7 of the Remedies Directive and recital 10 of the preamble of the Utilities Remedies Directive. 
187 Unibet London Ltd v Justitiekanslern(C-432/05) [2007] E.C.R. I-2271; [2007] 2 C.M.L.R. 30 [43]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
44 
 
whole should constitute an effective system for upholding EU procurement policy; for 
example, by providing a sufficient deterrent to breaches, and for the correction of breaches 
where this is not outweighed by other interests.188 Arrowsmith189 points out that: “It might, in 
addition require that effective protection be given to the interests of individual contractors who 
are adversely affected by a breach of the rules.”  
That the review or remedies must be “effective” may further cover a whole range of 
issues related to national enforcement of EU procurement rules, such as access to the courts, 
rules of evidence, time limits and types of redress that must be available, in particular relating 
to the issue of damages.190 The EU’s principles of effectiveness is quite broad as it covers 
several matters of overall EU law enforcement. However, some aspects of it relate to the 
general perspective of elements of an effective bidder remedies system.  
On the general perspective of effectiveness of a remedies system, the UNCITRAL 
Model Law is adopted here as the standard. The rationale is that the Model Law is a successful 
benchmark for legal reform in procurement and supports the harmonization of procurement 
regulation internationally.191 The Guide to Enactment states that the Model Law contains 
provisions aimed at ensuring “an effective challenge mechanism”;192 but does not explain what 
that entails. Nonetheless, one can glean from the Model Law and the Guide to Enactment what 
may constitute an effective bidder remedies system. The literal interpretation of “effective” is 
also employed in aid of this construction exercise.  
                                                          
188 Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 98. 
189 98. 
190 98 & 115; Pachnou (2000) PPLR n34.The Remedies Directives, art 2, provide that the remedies available for 
enforcement of EU procurement rules shall include: the award of interim measures, the setting aside of decisions, 
and the award of damages. 
191 Guide to Enactment pt I A para 5, 2. See also C Nicolas “A Critical Evaluation of the Revised UNCITRAL 
Model Law Provisions on Regulating Framework Agreements” (2012) 2 PPLR 19 19. For commentary on the 
status and impact of the Model Law see generally S Arrowsmith “Public Procurement: An Appraisal of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law as a Global Standard” (2004) 53(1) ICLQ 17; and, R Hunja “The UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services and its Impact on Procurement Reform” in S 
Arrowsmith & A Davies (eds) Public Procurement: Global Revolution (1998) ch 5 (although the commentaries 
relate specifically to the 1994 version, they are still largely relevant). 
192 Chapter VIII A para 4, 228. The UNCAC art 9(1)(d) also refers to “An effective system of domestic review, 
including an effective system of appeal” (emphasis added) for enforcing compliance with procurement rules. The 
GPA art XVIII (1) provides for the establishment of an “effective procedures enabling suppliers to challenge 
alleged breaches of the Agreement or a failure to comply with a Party's measures implementing this Agreement” 
(Emphasis added). 
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2 4 3 Elements of an effective bidder remedies system 
The “elements of an effective mechanism”, that the Guide to Enactment refers to are 
discoverable from the Guide.193 For instance, there is a commentary in the Guide that “[a] key 
characteristic of an effective challenge mechanism is that it strikes the appropriate balance 
between, on the one hand, the need to preserve the interests of suppliers and contractors and 
the integrity of the procurement process and, on the other hand, the need to limit disruption of 
the procurement process.”194 Another commentary is that “allowing disclosure to the suppliers 
or contractors that presented submissions of the relevant parts of the record at the time when 
the decision to accept a particular submission has become known to them is to give efficacy to 
the right to challenge.”195 The principles contained in the above commentaries are adapted here 
as part of the elements of effectiveness. Additional elements are suggested by this work, 
derived from the literal interpretation of “effective”. A thing is “effective” if it produces the 
result that is wanted or intended.196  
The key issues that ought to be addressed in designing a bidder remedies system, as 
presented by Gordon,197 are related to the elements of effectiveness treated in this study.  The 
issues include: where in the government is the protest forum located; how broad is the forum's 
jurisdiction; who has standing to protest; what are the time limits at the forum; what evidence 
does the forum have before it in reaching its decisions; is the procurement put on hold during 
the protest; how difficult is it for a protester to win; what power does the forum have to provide 
meaningful relief if it finds that the protest is justified. These issues are here subsumed within 
the elements of effectiveness and analysed by this study, as they relate to the Nigerian and 
South African bidder remedies.  Nevertheless, the elements of effectiveness extend beyond the 
issues raised by Gordon. The issues focus on the design of the review forum(s).198 Whereas, 
the elements of effectivess relate to the design of the whole remedies system.    
The elements of an effective bidder remedies system are as follows:  
• Bidders have a general right to challenge an act or decision of a procuring entity; 
                                                          
193 Chapter VIII A para 8, 228-229. 
194 Chapter VIII A para 18, 231. 
195 Guide to Enactment, commentary on Model Law art 25, para 7, 96 (emphasis added). 
196 A S Hornby Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 7 ed (2005), 469 “effective”. 
197 Gordon (2006) Pub. Cont. L.J 427. See also G Musila "The Right to an Effective Remedy under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 442 446-449; Sir Dawda 
Jawara v The Gambia 147/95-149/96 paras 31-35, 38-39.  
198 433-444. 
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• there are no unlawful acts or decisions in a procurement procedure that are exempt from 
challenge; 
• bidders have right of prompt access to related procurement records; 
• at least, a body to hear a challenge as a first step and a further body to hear an appeal 
as a second step; 
• the possibility of intervention without delay by the body; 
•  the body has power to suspend or cancel the procurement proceedings and to prevent 
in normal circumstances the entry into force of a procurement contract while the dispute 
remains outstanding; 
• the body has power to implement other interim measures, such as giving restraining 
orders and imposing financial sanctions for non-compliance; 
• the body has power to award damages; 
• challenge proceeds swiftly within a reasonably short period of time, which should be 
measured in terms of days and weeks in the normal course; 
• decisions of review body are binding; 
• decisions/remedies given can be easily enforced by a fast and simple mechanism; 
• the objectives and interests involved are balanced; 
• disadvantages of challenge mechanism, such as disruption of the procurement, are 
minimal.  
Each of the above elements has integral components that make for an effective bidder remedies 
system. These elements are used in subsequent chapters to comparatively assess the 
effectiveness of the bidder remedies systems of South Africa and Nigeria. 
2 5 Other enforcement mechanisms  
A bidder remedies system is the foremost199 but not the only mechanism for monitoring and 
enforcing public procurement rules. Others include: investigation and review by government 
oversight bodies exercising an audit or control function; public complaints mechanism, such 
as ombudsmen systems; and, in the context of a trade regime, supervision by the trade 
organisation or other state parties to the trade agreement, in other words, supra-national or 
                                                          
199 Guide to Enactment Ch VIII para 2 228: it makes the systems to “an important degree self-policing and self-
enforcing”. 
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inter-governmental oversight mechanisms.200 Where a law provides that a certain breach of 
procurement rules amounts to an offence, prosecution of a suspected offender (who may 
include bidders and officials of procuring entities) by law enforcement agencies, is also a form 
of enforcement of procurement rules. While a bidder challenge addresses breaches of rules and 
procedures only at the instigation of bidders, the other oversight mechanisms may deal with 
infringements where bidders choose not to take action. These mechanisms can also address 
systemic issues, such as widespread corruption in procurement processes; for instance, 
collusion amongst bidders and procuring entities to circumvent competition or bypass 
procurement rules. The secondary enforcement mechanisms are usually accessible to any 
member of the public, or the members of supra-national or inter-governmental organizations.201 
Bidders involved could also invoke these secondary mechanisms. Bidders usually take this 
course where bidder challenge is not or no longer available for them; or where they do not want 
their identities revealed; thereby using the mechanism as an indirect way of reviewing the 
procurement proceedings concerned.202 
 These secondary mechanisms are mainly directed at giving effect to the provisions of 
procurement regulations and improving the system in general, and not at giving remedies to a 
particular bidder. Notwithstanding, there are instances where an aggrieved bidder may find it 
preferable to invoke the oversight mechanism instead of applying for a review. An instance is 
where the bidder does not have standing to apply for review for various reasons, such as: being 
out of time for bringing a complaint; and, not coming within the definition of a person that can 
exercise a right to review (for example, a supplier who did not bid in that procurement, as is 
the case in certain jurisdictions).203 Another instance is where a bidder review does not apply. 
An example is where a contract has been concluded, in a jurisdiction that does not permit the 
review of concluded contracts.204 Another example is where the breach relates to a matter that 
is not subject to review; for instance, in a jurisdiction where a procuring entity’s choice of 
procurement method is not challengeable.  
Remedies that may derive from the national institutional enforcement mechanisms may 
even be more far-reaching than those obtainable from a bidder challenge. Some of the common 
                                                          
200 See Zhang (2007) PPLR 341-347; Marshall et al (1991) Hofstra Law Review 29-32. 
201 See Udeh (2013) PPLR 202, as this relates to Kenya. 
202 Udeh (2013) PPLR 202. 
203 202. 
204 Such as Kenya; see Udeh (2013) PPLR 202. 
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remedies obtainable under this head include: debarment of offending bidders;205 nullification 
of the procurement proceedings and cancelling a concluded procurement contract. The national 
oversight institutions usually have powers to investigate allegations of illegalities and fraud in 
public procurement; and if an offence has occurred, the relevant authority may commence 
prosecution.  Where a breach of procurement rules constitutes an offence, such a case will be 
handled as a criminal matter. This criminal law aspect of public procurement law enforcement 
may be necessary in jurisdictions where corruption is significant.  
 The secondary enforcement mechanisms have their limitations, and a few are 
mentioned here. The powers (tantamount to remedies) exercisable by oversight bodies are 
usually discretionary. In other words, the relevant authorities generally may not be compelled 
to exercise the powers or grant the remedies.206 In addition, most aspects of these mechanisms 
are not adjudicatory in nature; and, may therefore not require certain procedural safeguards, 
such as allowing representations from parties aggrieved by the procurement in question. In 
most cases, the investigation findings cannot be challenged where a person does not agree with 
them.207 Conversely, findings made in an adjudicatory process are generally reviewable by a 
court or tribunal on appeal. Where the mechanism is one relating to criminal offence, the 
burden of proving a procurement-related offence (beyond reasonable doubt) is higher than that 
required in a challenge proceeding. In effect, an act which may be proved as a breach, giving 
rise to a remedy, in a challenge proceeding, may escape sanction or correction in the case of a 
criminal trial as a result of stricter burden of proof. Finally, findings and recommendations of 
some investigating entities, such as ombudsmen, are often not directly enforceable in law, but 
are only reported to other public entities, such as a legislature, for further action. The issues 
raised here that are relevant to South Africa and Nigeria are addressed in detail in chapter 8. 
2 6 Analysis and Conclusion  
As seen above,208 the objectives of regulating public procurement stand better chances of being 
actualized where there are enforcement mechanisms within the procurement system. The effort 
by many African countries to enact procurement legislation in itself may have begun to alter 
                                                          
205 See generally Williams-Elegbe Corruption in Public Procurement; S Williams “The Debarment of Corrupt 
Contractors from World Bank-Financed Contracts” (2007) 36(3) PCLJ 277, for a detailed discussion on 
debarment in public procurement. 
206 Mandamus may not be granted to compel the performance of a discretionary power. See R v Marshland Smeeth 
and Fen District Commissioners [1920] 1 K.B. 155 [165] and R v London (Mayor) 3B & Ad.254.†.  
207 An exception is where a person indicted by the finding is being tried on the strength of it.  
208 2 2 4. 
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the perception and conduct of actors (state, state officials, contractors and suppliers) in relation 
to public procurement. Flowing from this, it could be postulated that adherence to procurement 
law can be achieved by developing the capacity of the actors to follow the law, for example 
through training. This postulation derives from the Normative and Managerialism theories of 
compliance.209 Normative theories argue that compliance with law is more as a result of the 
normative power of rules to alter the perception of people as to what is acceptable behaviour.210  
Its focus is on the persuasive power of norms, legal obligations and ideas. Managerialists posit 
that instances of non-compliance with law or norms are often inadvertent, and arise from a lack 
of capacity or resources, ambiguous commitments and provisions, and time lags between 
commitment and performance.211 
However, these normative and managerialist approaches, if solely applied towards 
actualizing the provisions of procurement regulations, will arguably not do as much as would 
be needed to sustain an effective public procurement system. This is because procurement 
involves financial or pecuniary benefits to the actors (especially for bidders), either legitimately 
or illegitimately; and it is apparently difficult, in the absence of enforcement, to get people to 
comply with rules that constrain their liberty of making financial gains.212 In most instances, it 
is bidders eager to win contracts that induce officials of procuring entities to act improperly, in 
breach of procurement rules.213 In addition, procurement regulations usually demand 
accountability from state officials and also limit their discretion. Enforcement is needed to 
actualize the demands for accountability and the limitation of discretion, since people do not 
easily relinquish their convenience and privileges. Furthermore, even where breach of law is 
                                                          
209 Normative theories of compliance embody other distinct theories, one of which is managerialism. 
Managerialism was developed by Abram and Antonia Chayes. 
210 See Kleinfeld (2011) Yale L.J Online 293; TR Tyler & SL Bladeo Cooperation in Groups: Procedural Justice, 
Social Identity, and Behavioural Engagement (2000); TM Franck “Legitimacy in the International System” (1988) 
82American J Int’l L 705; MJ Gilligan “Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International 
Criminal Regime” (2006) 40 International Organization 935-967. 
211 See A Chayes & A Chayes “On Compliance” (1993) 47(2) Int’l Org 175; A Chayes & A Chayes The New 
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreement (1995); J Urpelainen “Enforcement and 
Capacity Building in International Cooperation” (2010) 2:1 International Theory 32–49; GW Downs, DM Rocke 
& PN Barsoom “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation” (1996) 50 Int’l Org 379. 
212 D Zaelke, D Kaniaru, & E Kružíková (eds) Making Law Work: Environmental Compliance & Sustainable 
Development (2005)57; P Verboon & M van Dijke “A Self-Interest Analysis of Justice and Tax Compliance: How 
Distributive Justice Moderates the Effect of Outcome Favorability” (2007) 28 Journal of Economic Psychology 
704–727. 
213 Williams-Elegbe Corruption in Public Procurement 31; S Rose-Ackerman Corruption and Government: 
Causes, Consequences, Reform (1999) 64; T Soreide Corruption in public procurement: Causes, Consequences, 
Cures (2002) ch 3. 
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not deliberate, enforcement helps to identify or draw attention to the breach, so that the 
inadvertence or other cause(s) of the breach may be subsequently addressed. This background 
supports the establishment of a bidder remedies system as a mechanism for enforcing public 
procurement regulation. 
This study henceforth focuses on the Nigerian and South African public procurement 
systems, particularly the bidder remedies regimes; and assesses them against the elements of 
effectiveness set out above.214  
                                                          
214 2 4 3. 
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Chapter 3  
The Public Procurement Systems 
3 1 Introduction  
This chapter presents an overview of the public procurement systems of Nigeria and South 
Africa. It focuses on the thematic and structural aspects of these systems and how they affect 
the respective bidder remedies regimes. This provides a background for the direct consideration 
of the remedies regimes in subsequent chapters. 
3 2 Procurement structures and related themes 
3 2 1 Scope of procurement 
The attempt here is to identify the transactions that are regarded in both jurisdictions as falling 
within the ambit of public procurement, as it is these transactions that are generally subject to 
procurement regulations and its enforcement mechanisms. To identify these transactions, it is 
relevant to determine what constitutes the subject-matter of procurement in these jurisdictions; 
and whether public procurement includes selling and letting of assets by government. 
3 2 1 1 Subject-matter of procurement  
In Nigeria, “public procurement” means “the acquisition by any means of goods, works or 
services by the government.”1 This is similar to the definition in the UNCITRAL Model Law.2 
As the “acquisition” may be “by any means”, it arguably includes purchase, lease and rental 
from suppliers by the government. This interpretation is supported by the Guide to Enactment 
to the Model Law,3  which accords the same scope to “acquisition”. However, acquisition of 
“special” goods, works and services involving Nigerian defence or security is not subject to 
public procurement regulation and its enforcement mechanism, except where the President 
consents.4 
                                                          
1 PPA, s 60 (emphasis added). 
2 Article 2(j). 
3 P 44, commentary on art 2 of the Model Law, para 3. 
4 PPA 15(2). “Special” arguably refers to hard defence materiel or weapons and ammunition; not civil items that 
may be procured for security organizations or the military. It may also refer to items whose acquisition should not 
be made public, to protect defence/security interest and secret. See S William-Elegbe “The Reform and Regulation 
of Public Procurement in Nigeria” (2012) 41(2) PCLJ 339 347; Udeh & Ahmadu “Nigeria” in Procurement 
Regulation 155. 
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In South Africa, public procurement is also known as “supply chain management 
(SCM)”;5  nevertheless, SCM includes disposal of public assets.6 Section 217(1) of the South 
African Constitution mentions “procurement”, and alludes that it is “where an organ of state… 
contracts for goods and services”. “Services” used in that section includes “works”.7 This view 
is supported by M5 Developments (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v CC Groenewald NO,8 where the court 
referred to the procurement of housing construction as “services”; similar to what the procuring 
entity termed it in the related bid documents.9 Furthermore, many South African bidder 
remedies cases arise from works procurement.10 Similar to Nigeria, the South African 
constitutional provision above indicates that contracting for goods and services from suppliers 
by organs of state may be by any means, including purchase, rent and lease. Conversely, South 
African defence procurement is generally subject to public procurement regulation and its 
enforcement mechanism.11 
3 2 1 2 Selling and letting of assets 
(a) Introduction 
Public procurement, as defined by relevant legislation, do not encompass selling and letting of 
assets by government (also referred to as disposal).12 The UNCITRAL Model Law and the 
                                                          
5 This term was introduced by the National Treasury since 2003 when it promulgated the Regulations in Terms of 
the Public Finance Management Act 1999: Framework for Supply Chain Management 2003 in GG 7837 of 5-12-
2003. 
6 Regulation 16A3.1, Treasury Regulations Notice R225 in GG 27388 of March 15, 2005, under the PFMA. 
7 Bolton “South Africa” in Procurement Regulation 189. “Works” was mentioned in the Preferential Procurement 
Regulations 2011 (GN R 501 in GG 34350 of 08-06-2011), example regs 1(s), 3(a) & (c); but omitted in the 2017 
version (GN R 32 in GG 40553 of 20-01-2017), similar to the constitution that regards “services” as including 
“works”. 
8 [2009] ZAWCHC 3. 
9 Paragraphs 4 & 9 of judgment. 
10 Examples: City of Cape Town v South African National Roads Agency Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 74; Ibuyile 
Development Consortium v Premier of Western Cape [2012] ZAWCHC 204; Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v 
City of Cape Town [2010] ZASCA 169; 2011 (2) SA 90 (SCA); Indo Contractors CC v TFMC (Pty) Ltd [2009] 
ZAKZDHC 20.  
11 Bolton “South Africa” in Procurement Regulation 192; S Williams “The Development of Defence Procurement 
Policy in Nigeria and the Case for Reform” (2005) 3 PPLR 153 176. See Steradian Consulting  
(Pty) Limited v Armaments Corporation of South Africa Limited [2011] ZAGPPHC 99. The Armaments 
Corporation of South Africa Limited (Armcor) Act 51 of 2003, s 4(2)(e), empowers Armcor to establish and 
manage South African defence procurement system, subject to s 217 of the Constitution. 
12 The UNCITRAL Model Law, art 2(j), defines “public procurement” as “the acquisition of goods, construction 
or services by a procuring entity” (emphasis added).  See 3 2 1 2 (b) and (c) below, for related references to 
Nigerian and South African legislation on the subject-matter. See also art 1(2) of both the EU Procurement 
Directives and the Utilities Directives. S Wehmeier (ed) Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary 7 ed (2005) 1158 
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GPA neither referred to nor provided for disposal of government assets.13 According to Quinot 
and Arrowsmith, procurement in its broadest sense ends at the performance or termination of 
a procurement contract.14  However, procurement legislation of many African countries, 
including Nigeria and South Africa,15 regulate disposal of public assets to various extents. This 
may be in recognition of the relationship between disposal and the life cycle of the things 
procured. The extent to which Nigerian and South African procurement legislation and its 
enforcement mechanisms apply to disposal of public assets is examined below.  
(b) Nigeria  
Public procurement, as defined under Nigerian law is distinct from selling or letting of assets 
by the government.16 The PPA emphasises this by referring to selling or letting of government 
assets as “disposal of public property”; and, by providing distinct methods/procedures for 
disposal in a separate chapter x. Furthermore, PPA’s regulation of disposal is limited, as it is 
subject to the Public Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act 1999; which, 
among others, regulates the selling of shares of government enterprises.17 The review or 
enforcement mechanism under the PPA applies to disposal; but only with respect to the rules 
and procedures on disposal stipulated by the PPA or the regulations or guidelines made 
pursuant to the PPA.18 Thus, it does not extend to aspects of disposal provided under any other 
legislation. 
(c) South Africa 
There are divergent opinions on whether “contracts” or “procurement” as expressed in section 
217 of the South African Constitution covers selling and letting of assets by government. 
                                                          
defined procurement as “the process of obtaining supplies of something, especially for a government or an 
organization.”  
13 Also, the Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers 2016, and OECD/DAC MAPS.  
14 G Quinot & S Arrowsmith “Introduction” in G Quinot & S Arrowsmith (eds) Public Procurement Regulation 
in Africa (2013) 1 1. See also Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement 1; Arrowsmith et al Regulating Public 
Procurement 1-2.  
15 Also, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. 
16 PPA s 60.  
17 PPA s 55(1). The Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (Establishment, etc) Act 2005, regulates 
the granting of concessions and engaging in public private partnership by the Federal Government towards 
infrastructural development in Nigeria.  
18 PPA s 54 (1). 
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Penfold & Reyburn19 argued that it does not, as “procurement” is defined by the UNCITRAL 
Model Law as the acquisition of goods, construction and services (by government). Bolton has 
consistently argued that it does; positing that the contrary would be an “unfortunate exclusion”, 
as the principles20 that the section provides will consequently not apply to selling and letting 
of assets.21 However, a literal interpretation of the section appears not to support the latter 
argument, as the clause: “when an organ of state …contracts for goods or service”: in section 
217(1), indicates that the government is the party accepting the goods and services and not the 
party offering them. Also, section 217(1) when read in context with section 217(2)(a), which 
states in part “…a procurement policy providing for categories of preference in the allocation 
of contracts”,22 indicates that the transaction envisaged is where government awards contracts 
and pays money to suppliers; and not where it sells or lets assets and makes money from it.  
Furthermore, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (to express one thing implies the 
exclusion of another) may apply, as selling and letting of assets by government is not 
mentioned or clearly implied in the section; in addition, the context of the section arguably 
supports the exclusion.23 In apparent recognition of this distinction, the Public Finance 
Management Act No 1 of 1999 as amended (PFMA) and the Treasury Regulations,24 provide 
separately for selling or letting of public assets and public procurement. For example, while 
section 76(1)(k) provides that the National Treasury must make regulations or issue instructions 
                                                          
19 G Penfold & P Reyburn “Public Procurement” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (2003) 25-28. Also, G Quinot “The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa, Phoebe Bolton” 
(2007) 16 PPLR 464 466. 
20 “[A] system which is: equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.” 
21 Bolton “South Africa” in Procurement Regulation 189-190; P Bolton “Public Procurement System in South 
Africa” (2007-2008) 37 Pub Cont L J 781 784-785; P Bolton The Law of Government Procurement in South 
Africa (2007) 67-68; P Bolton “Overview of the Government Procurement System in South Africa” in K V Thai 
(ed) International Handbook of Public Procurement (2008) 357 364. She supported her argument with the 
definition of procurement as “[T]he process which creates, manages and fulfils contracts relating to the provision 
of supplies, services or engineering and construction works, the hiring of anything, disposals and the acquisition 
or granting of any rights and concessions.” by R Watermeyer “Project Synthesis Report: Unpacking Transparency 
in Government Procurement – Rethinking WTO Government Procurement Agreements” in CUTS Centre for 
International Trade, Economics and Environment Unpacking Transparency in Government Procurement (2004) 
1 3. However, the definition does not indicate which party is offering the subject-matter and which is accepting it 
(which is the crux of the argument). 
22 Emphasis added. 
 23 On the maxim, see R Dickerson The Interpretation and Application of Statutes (1975) 234-235; E Mureinik 
“Expression Unius: Exclusio Alterius?” (1987) 104 SALJ 264. See also Colquhoun v Brooks (1883) 21 Q.B.D. 52 
65; Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) 37G; National Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Mohamed NO [2003] ZACC 4 (CC), 2003 (1) SACR 561; Peoples' Democratic Party v Independent National 
Electoral Commission (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt 626) 200. 
24 See regulations 16A6 (procurement) and 16A7 (disposal of public assets). 
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applicable to departments, concerning selling and letting of public assets; a separate section 
76(4)(c) makes that regulatory function discretionary with respect to procurement. Also, 
Treasury Regulations 16A6 and 16A7 provide separately for procurement and disposal of 
public assets, respectively.   
Notwithstanding that it will be beneficial if the principles of section 217 are applied to 
disposal of public assets, decided cases indicate that the “system” envisaged by the section 
does not generally cover such transactions; although there is one (obiter) that expressed a 
contrary view. In Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd25 it 
was contended that a grant of a permit over a land by government to an operator to develop an 
Industrial Development Zone, being contractual, falls within “contracts” as expressed under 
section 217(1) of the Constitution; and thus, necessitates compliance with the principles under 
the section. The court dismissed the argument, holding that issuing of a permit does not 
constitute contracting for goods or services as contemplated in section 217.26 In CSHELL 271 
(Pty) Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality, Oudtshoorn Municipality v CSHELL 271 (Pty) Ltd,27 the 
Court was unequivocal that:  
“There is a difference between the disposal of property and the procurement of goods 
and services.”  
Thus, that section 217 does not apply to disposal public assets. However, a legislation may 
validly adopt the principles of section 217 to apply to disposal, as argued in the next paragraph. 
In Giant Concerts CC v Rinaldo Investments (Pty) Ltd,28 the Constitutional Court held that the 
applicant’s argument that section 217 of the Constitution applies to a contract by an organ of 
state to sell land did not help applicant’s standing to challenge the sale.29 However, Binns-
Ward J in SA Metal & Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town30 opined (obiter)31 that 
section 217 covers disposal of assets by organs of state. Since this was obiter and CSHELL was 
decided later by the same court, the latter position (in CSHELL) must be read as authoritative.  
                                                          
25 [2008] ZAECHC 195; 2009 (5) SA 661 (SE). 
26 This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court; see Offit Enterprises 
(Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZACC 20, 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC), 2011 (2) BCLR 
189 (CC).  
27 [2012] ZAWCHC 25, [2012] 3 All SA 527 (WCC) para 36. 
28 [2012] ZACC 28, 2013 (3) BCLR 251 (CC). 
29 Paragraph 57. 
30 (9440/2010) [2010] ZAWCHC 442 fn 2.  
31 Made in passing, and was not in issue. 
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Nonetheless, Treasury Regulations, 16A3.2 (a), provides that the principles under 
section 217 of the Constitution shall apply to SCM (which includes disposal of public assets). 
This would not be regarded as unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) s 217, on itself, 
does not extend to selling and letting of assets by government; but, a legislation may validly 
adopt those altruistic principles under s 217 for other public activities, such as selling and 
letting of assets; (2) besides, the regulation only mentions the principles (fair, equitable, 
transparent, competitive and cost effective) without referring to s 217 of the constitution. 
However, the principles will only apply to selling and letting of asset by bodies that the 
Regulations apply to;32 not to that of all public bodies. Also, by virtue of section 14(5) of 
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA),33 the policies that apply to 
procurement in the municipalities and their entities apply to selling or letting of public assets. 
Furthermore, the review mechanisms provided under regulation 16A9.3 of the Treasury 
Regulations, and regulations 49 and 50 of the Municipal Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
Regulations under the MFMA,34 apply both to procurement and selling and letting of assets. In 
contrast, under the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act No 5 of 2000 (PPPFA) and 
the Preferential Procurement Regulations 2017,35 the procurement preference point systems 
prescribed do not apply to the sale and letting of government assets.36 It may be concluded that 
selling and letting of government assets is not generally regarded as procurement in South 
Africa. Procurement policies and its enforcement mechanism apply to disposal only to the 
extent prescribed by legislation. This is practically similar to the Nigerian system as seen 
above.   
3 2 2 Procurement at the tiers of government 
There are three tiers of government in Nigeria and South Africa; referred to as federal, states 
and local governments in Nigeria;37 and national, provinces and local governments (or 
municipalities) in South Africa.38 The existence of tiers of government in both jurisdictions 
affects the scope of their bidder remedies regimes. 
                                                          
32 See Reg 1.2. 
33 Regulates the financial affairs of local governments/municipalities 
34 Notice R868 in GG 27636 of May 30, 2005 
35 GN R 32 in GG 40553 of 20-01-2017, made in terms of s 5 of the PPPFA. 
36 Expressly exempted in para 20.1 of the Implementation Guide: Preferential Procurement Regulations 2011; but 
silent in the 2017 version. 
37 Sections 2 and 7 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended (CFRN). 
38 Section 40 of SA Constitution.  
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3 2 2 1 Nigeria: separate procurement regimes 
The tiers of government in Nigeria have separate procurement regimes, owing to certain facts. 
First, Nigeria is a federal system, where the federation and the states have partly autonomous 
governments, consisting of separate executive, legislature and judiciary.39 Second, the federal 
and states governments exercise power and control over their respective public funds.40 
Expenditures from public funds by these governments are as provided in their separate annual 
budgets, authorised respectively by an Appropriation Act of the National Assembly and 
Appropriation Law of each State House of Assembly.41 Third, the tiers of government have 
separate public procurement regulatory regimes. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the bidder 
remedies system established by the federal government does not extend to states’ procurement. 
In fact, currently, only a few states have established a functional bidder remedies system.42 The 
federal bidder remedies system operates in the states, but only as it affects federal agencies 
situate in the states. The local governments have public funds and powers to award contracts 
towards discharging their functions;43 however, their financial management is regulated by 
laws made by the respective states.44 Thus, the public procurement regulatory frameworks of 
the states usually apply to the local governments within the states.  
The states’ procurement regulatory frameworks are largely adapted from the defunct or 
current federal procurement regimes.45 For example, many states that have not enacted their 
public procurement laws rely on Financial Instructions or circulars adapted from the old federal 
Financial Regulations and related circulars. This is partly owing to a national policy to 
harmonise public expenditure management in Nigeria. Nevertheless, there is still no uniformity 
in the public procurement regulation and bidder remedies systems at the federal and state levels 
in Nigeria.46  
                                                          
39 CFRN, ss 2(2), 4-6. Nigeria is made up of 36 states.  
40 Sections 80-83 and 120-123 CFRN.  
41 Sections 81 (2) and 121(2). 
42 Most states have legislatively provided for procurement challenge mechanisms, but are yet to establish the 
organizational structure required to operationalize the mechanism. 
43 Set out in 4th schedule, CFRN; see particularly paras 1(f) & (h), and 2.  
44 S 7(1). See Attorney-General of Lagos State v Attorney-General of the Federation [2005] 1 MJSC 1. 
45 Udeh & Ahmadu “Nigeria” in Procurement Regulation, 143. World Bank, Nigeria Country Procurement 
Assessment Report (CPAR) Vol II (2000) 6.   
46 See William-Elegbe (2012) PCLJ 340. 
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3 2 2 2 South Africa: uniform procurement regime 
In South Africa, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres 
of government, which are distinctive, yet interdependent and interrelated.47  
Regulation of public procurement is significantly uniform within each tier of South 
African government; but not uniform vertically across the tiers, except the PPPFA and section 
217 of the Constitution that apply to all the tiers. For example, the PFMA applies to the national 
and provincial governments; while the MFMA applies to all the municipalities. Consequently, 
there is a uniform bidder remedies system across the municipalities, as there is at the national 
and provincial levels.48  
Besides, there is a fair measure of regulatory uniformity across the tiers in certain 
respects. First, the South African Constitution empowers the national legislature to establish a 
national treasury; and to prescribe measures to ensure both transparency and expenditure 
control in all spheres of government, by introducing uniform treasury norms and standards, 
among others.49 Second, the national treasury has mandate over all tiers of government to 
enforce compliance with the measures prescribed.50 Third, the budgetary powers of provincial 
government may be regulated, to an extent, by national legislation.51 Lastly, South Africa’s 
core public procurement statutes52 apply to all tiers of government.   
3 2 3 Decentralised procurement systems 
The public procurement system of South Africa, as well as that of Nigeria, is largely 
decentralised. A decentralised public procurement system is one in which government or public 
bodies are each empowered to award their own procurement contracts. Conversely, a 
centralized procurement system is one in which a specific government body is empowered to 
procure for all other government bodies.  
                                                          
47 SA Constitution s 40. 
48 Respectively by virtue of reg 49 (read with reg 50) of the Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations 
and s 62 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (“the Systems Act”); and of reg16A9.3 of 
the Treasury Regulations.  
49 Section 215(1).  
50 Section 215(2). 
51 Section 226(4).  
52 The Constitution s 217, and the PPPFA. 
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Nigerian federal government does not procure through a central Tenders Board. Rather, 
each federal entity is responsible for its own procurement,53 and is liable to provide bidder 
remedies for breaches in its conduct of procurement. In most states, each government body has 
powers to award procurement contracts that are within certain monetary thresholds. 
Nevertheless, in some of  these states, a central Tenders Board awards all contracts whose 
monetary value are above the award threshold of individual government bodies.54 Even in the 
latter case, the government body in need of the procurement may still be involved in some 
aspects of the procurement, such as signing the contract agreement and handling contract 
management.55 In a challenge proceeding against such procurement, the government body may 
be joined with the Tenders Board as defendants. In the local governments, the Local 
Government Council, the local government Tenders Board, or the accounting officer (usually 
the local government Chairman or Secretary) may award contracts within certain thresholds. 
These authorities can be made defendants in review proceedings, where obtainable. 
In South Africa, national and regional government entities have powers to establish and 
procure through their internal procurement systems.56 They may also, at least in theory, procure 
through the State/Provincial Tender Boards, which are central procuring entities.57 Although it 
was previously observed that Provincial Tender Boards at the provinces were being 
dismantled;58 it appears that a central procuring entity is about re-emerging, as the South 
African President revealed that: “[G]overnment has decided to establish a central tender board 
to adjudicate tenders in all spheres of government.”59 The main form of central tendering in 
South Africa is transversal contracts facilitated by the Treasury, in which contracting 
                                                          
53 However, where a government body has persistently or seriously breached procurement rules, there may be a 
temporary transfer of its procuring and disposal function to a third-party procurement agency or consultant- PPA 
s 6(1)(i)(iv). 
54 Members of State’s Tender Board are appointed by the state Governor. 
55 In some states (e.g. Anambra, Katsina), where a contract is within the award threshold of the Tender Board, the 
government body in need of the procurement may conduct the procurement proceedings up to evaluation and then 
make its recommendation to the Tender Board, which may award based on the recommendation. 
56 PFMA ss 38(a)(iii), 51(a)(iii). 
57 Established in terms of the STB Act; see also Reg 2, State Tender Board Act 1968: Amendment to Regulations 
of the State Tender Board Act in terms of Section 13 (2003). While there is currently no formal State Tender 
Board, central tendering is done by the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer within the National Treasury. 
58 Bolton “South Africa” in Procurement Regulation 181-182. 
59 State of the Nation Address by His Excellency Jacob Zuma, on the occasion of the Joint Sitting of Parliament, 
13-2-2014; <http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/2014-state-nation-address-full-speech> (accessed 21-6-
2017). Note that “adjudicate tenders” in the statement apparently refers to evaluation of tenders-  that is the sense 
in which the term is used in South African procurement system. 
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authorities from any tier of government collectively procure mutually-needed items;60 to obtain 
economy of scale and save procurement cost. The dual system of procurement in South Africa 
is to an extent similar to the system in some states of Nigeria as seen above. However, in the 
case of South Africa, it is not the monetary threshold of proposed contracts that determines 
which of the systems to procure through; instead the entities have discretion to choose from 
the two. Where a Tender Board is involved, it handles tender proceedings and conclusion of 
contracts, whereas the entity in need of the procurement handles contract administration.61 
Where this is the case, it may only be the Board (or its chairman) that may be the defendant in 
the related bidder remedies proceeding; as contract administration falls under contract 
dispute.62 A dual system is also obtainable at the municipal level. Each municipality and 
municipal entity may either handle its contract award through its supply chain management 
structure or through another organ of state.63 
As seen above, the type of procurement system that a state adopts may impact on bidder 
remedies regime of that state. Furthermore, in a decentralized procurement system, the 
complainant has to identify and challenge the government entity that conducted the 
procurement complained about. If the defendant can show that it was not involved in the 
procurement, it may be struck out from the suit on grounds of misjoinder of party. If it is the 
only party sued, the challenge may be dismissed.64 In a decentralised system, the burden of 
defending all challenge proceedings is not born by a single procuring entity. The result is that 
each entity may reasonably manage the number of review cases against it. Unlike the case of a 
central procuring entity, where there may be many bidder review cases at the same time, thus, 
                                                          
60 Treasury Regulations, reg 16.A6.5. Cases on transversal contract include: Stiegelmeyer Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
National Treasury of South Africa [2015] ZAWCHC 9, [2015] 2 All SA 110 (WCC); Butsana Textile Services 
CC v National Treasury (14166/07) [2015] ZAGPPHC 163; Sukuma Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Finance 
(3134/2007) [2007] ZAGPHC 286.  
61 RSA Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa: Initiative of the Ministry of Finance 
& the Ministry of Public Works Notice 691 of 1997, accessible at 
<http://www.gov.za/documents/download.php?f=187736> (accessed 21-6-2014). 
62 See for instance, Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board Eastern Cape 2007 3 BCLR 300 (CC); Chairman 
State Tender Board v Supersonic Tours (Pty) Ltd [2008] ZASCA, 2008 (6) SA 220 (SCA).  
63 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act No 56 of 2003, ss 110(2)(c), 111 & 112(1)(o). 
64 MEC for Safety & Security v Mtokwana [2010] ZASCA 88, 2010 (4) SA 628 (SCA); Crawford-Browne v 
Manuel (7390/2008) [2008] ZAWCHC 29; Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town [2010] ZASCA 
169; 2011 (2) SA 90 (SCA); see also Sapo v Sunmonu [2010] 11 NWLR (Pt 1205) 374. See Attorney-General of 
Kano State v Attorney-General of the Federation [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt1029) 164 on the need to identify and sue 
the proper party. 
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more challenging to manage. Although it may engage private attorneys, it will bear the payment 
of their fees. 
3 2 4 Procuring entities 
As seen in chapter 2, it is procuring entities that are almost always sued in bidder remedies 
cases. It is thus apposite to consider the status and kinds of procuring entities within the systems 
under review. 
3 2 4 1 Government procuring entities  
“Procuring entities” refers to government or public entities that are authorized to contract for 
good, works and services for theirs or others use; which are subject to applicable procurement 
regulations.65 These entities are either fully or substantially funded from public funds. They 
are legal personalities that can sue and be sued in their corporate names. It is this status that 
enables challenge proceedings to be instituted against procuring entities. However, in both 
jurisdictions, it is not unusual to find bidder remedies cases where the accounting officer or 
authority of a procuring entity is made a defendant.66 This is because these officers or 
authorities exercise supervisory powers over procurement within their respective entities, and 
are consequently accountable to that extent.67 As would be discussed in Chapter 5, in both 
jurisdictions, procuring entities or their accounting officers also act as bidder review forums or 
authorities for reconsideration of their own procurement decisions.   
All government bodies in Nigeria and South Africa are procuring entities, to the extent 
authorized. These include the legislature, executive, judiciary, and government ministries, 
departments, agencies, and enterprises, in all the tiers. In Nigeria, these bodies are procuring 
entities by virtue of PPA sections 15 and 60 (for federal); and by similar provisions of states’ 
procurement legislation (for states and local governments). In South Africa, it is by the 
                                                          
65 Generally, the state or its organs have capacity to contract, under enabling legislation or the common law 
prerogative of a state. See Minister of Home Affairs v American Ninja IV Partnership 1993 (1) SA 257 (AD). L 
Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 389. 
66 See for example A.C Egbe Nig Limited v Director General of Bureau of Public Procurement FHC 21-07-2010 
suit no FHC/B/CS/116/2010; The Chairman of the State Tender Board v Supersonic Tours (Pty) Ltd (389/07) 
[2008] ZASCA 56. 
67 PFMA ss 36, 38(1), 49, 51(1); PPA ss 16(22), 20. An accounting officer is, for a department, the head of a 
department; for a corporation or agency, it is the chief executive officer (“CEO”); and for a ministry, it is the 
Permanent Secretary (in Nigeria). An accounting authority is the board or controlling body of a public entity; or 
the CEO of the entity, where it has no board or controlling body.  
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combined effect of sections 217 and 239 of the Constitution, sections 3(1) of the PFMA, 
sections 1(iii) and 2(1) of the PPPFA; and section 3 of the MFMA.  
“Organs of state” is mentioned in section 217 of the South African Constitution, which 
are bodies that the procurement principles of the section apply to. Opinions about the bodies 
that fall within the term are considered below.  
3 2 4 3 “Organs of state”   
It has been argued that entities “exercising a public power or performing a public function in 
terms of any legislation”, are not organs of state with respect to applying section 217 of the 
Constitution; thus, that they are not subject to its principles.68 This is notwithstanding that 
section 239 defines “organ of state” to include any entity “exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of any legislation”. The rationale for the above view is 
that such entities are not organs of state “in the national, provincial or local spheres of 
government”, as stated by section 217.69 The argument implies that section 217 applies to only 
organs of state that carry out regular government operations, businesses or services within the 
national, provincial and local spheres; such as government ministries, departments and 
agencies. That excludes statutory institutions exclusively carrying out functions not directly 
related to governance; such as educational, training or research work.70 This argument is 
debatable. Firstly, section 239 is the definition section of the Constitution; thus, terms in section 
217 that are defined under section 239 must be interpreted accordingly. Secondly, section 217 
reference to organ of state “in the national, provincial or local spheres of government”, 
arguably only indicates that the section binds organs of state operating in or established by 
legislation made by any of the three tiers of government.71  
It was further argued that universities are not organs of state to which section 217 
applies.72 There are reasons to disagree with this view. First, according to section 239, “organ 
of state” includes “institution exercising a public power or performing a public function in 
terms of any legislation”; thus, universities are organs of state, as they exercise public powers 
and functions in terms of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997. However, this does not include 
                                                          
68 Bolton “South Africa” in Procurement Regulation 188. 
69 188. 
70 188. 
71 This perspective was alluded to in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 
(CC) para 33. 
72 Bolton “South Africa” in Procurement Regulation 188. 
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private universities, as they are not regarded as organs of state under s 51(1) of the Higher 
Education Act; and they normally do not use public funds for their procurement, to be subject 
to the requirements under section 217. Secondly, in Masakhane Security Services (Pty) Ltd v 
University of Fort Hare73 the court regarded the respondent-university as a procuring entity, 
which procurement regulations are subject to section 217.74 It held that: “[T]he respondent is 
an organ of state and therefore its actions and decisions are subject to review in terms of the 
Constitution.”   
Under section 239 of the South African Constitution, “organ of state…does not include 
a court or judicial officer”. However, this arguably does not exclude the judiciary as an organ 
of state for the purpose of section 217. Rather, considering the context, “court” as stated there 
refers to judges performing adjudicatory functions, not the judiciary as an institution. Thus, 
where the office of the Chief Judge, the Chief Registrar or a department of the judiciary awards 
contracts, it should be regarded as an organ of state subject to section 217, the applicable 
procurement regulations and bidder remedies mechanism.75  
3 2 4 4 “Private” procuring entities  
In Nigeria, where a procurement funded by at least 35 per cent contribution from the federal 
government is undertaken by a private organization, that organization is deemed a procuring 
entity, subject to applicable public procurement regulation and its enforcement mechanism.76 
An example is procurement by private joint venture partners of the federal government in the 
Nigerian oil sector.77  
There is no similar provision in South Africa. Consequently, a private organization 
funded to any degree by government may neither be subject to procurement regulation nor the 
bidder remedies. However, a limited liability company that renders a general service to the 
public and in which the government owns all the shares is regarded as an organ of state, whose 
procurement is subject to bidder remedies.78 For example, SITA, a private limited liability 
                                                          
73 [2012] ZAECBHC 9 para 16. 
74 The court considered the validity of the SCM policy of the university in relation to Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 and the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003. 
75 See MC Ching’anyi Mkandawire J. “The Duties and Responsibilities of the Registrars in a Modern Legal 
System” (2007) Southern African Judges Commission/Venice Commission Registrars’ Workshop 7. 
76 PPA, s 15(1)(b).  
77 However, there is only anecdotal evidence that the PPA is being applied to these procurements. See Udeh & 
Ahmadu “Nigeria” in Procurement Regulation 154-155, for other examples. 
78 Transnet Limited v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 2001 1 SA 853 (SCA). 
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company established by an Act of Parliament, is bound by section 217 of the Constitution and 
relevant procurement legislation, when it procures ICT for the government.79  
3 2 4 5 Exempted procuring entities  
No federal procuring entity in Nigeria is exempted from the application of procurement 
legislation and its bidder remedies; except when it undertakes defence/security procurement as 
discussed above. 
Relevant South African legislation permits the Minister or Treasury to exempt any 
public entity from the application of procurement legislation.80 It could be argued that no 
procuring entity is exempted from bidder remedies provided under the relevant legislation. 
First, bidder remedies are not contained in the PFMA and PPPFA, which empower the Minister 
to exempt organs of state from their provisions. Secondly, under the Treasury Regulations, it 
is regulation 16A that provides for bidder remedies, whereas it is regulation 16 provisions 
(public private partnership) that institutions may be exempted from. An implication of the 
foregoing is that exempted institutions under the PPPFA are liable to bidders’ challenge for 
their procurements, in so far as it does not border on the application of the legislative provisions 
that they are exempted from. 
3 2 5 Bidders 
It is apposite to consider the status of bidders and the extent of their participation in the 
procurement systems, for two reasons. First, challenge proceedings are initiated and sustained 
primarily by bidders. Secondly, access by interested bidders to the public procurement market 
enhances competition, which may increase the opportunity for invoking bidder remedies.   
3 2 5 1 Status of bidders  
In Nigeria and South Africa, bidders may be natural (individual) or artificial persons 
(companies or corporate entities), with capacity to enter into contract and to sue and be sued.81 
                                                          
79 State Information Technology Agency Act No 88 of 1998 (as amended) (SITA Act), s 24; SITA Act: General 
Regulations 2005 GN R 904 in GG 28021 of 23-9-2005 (SITA Regulations), regs 3.7 and reg 7.2. See Vox Orion 
v State Information Technology Agency (SOC) Ltd 2013 ZAGPPHC 444; New Dawn Technologies (Pty) Limited 
v Minister of Home Affairs 2012 ZAGPPHC 350; also, H R Computek (Pty) Ltd v State Information Technology 
Agency (Pty) Ltd [2014] ZAGPPHC 386 para 13. 
80 PFMA s 92; Treasury Regulation reg 16.10; PPPFA s 3. Many of the public entities listed in the PFMA were 
specifically exempted from the provisions of the PPPFA until 7-8-2012. 
81 PPA s 16(2); Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) C20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004, 
ss 37 & 38(1); South Africa’s Companies Act 71 of 2008 (as amended), s 19(1); also, G Lubbe & J  du Plessis 
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However, apart from consultancy contracts, government contracts are rarely awarded to 
individuals, as governments prefer to deal with companies owing to: a perceived higher risk of 
business relations with individuals; assumed better corporate behaviour and ethical conduct by 
companies;82 and, the opportunity to generate company income taxes apart from personal 
income taxes. Consequently, bidder remedies cases in both jurisdictions are largely instituted 
by corporate entities. 
3 2 5 2 Government enterprises  
Government enterprises in both jurisdictions may provide goods, works and services to other 
organs of government.83 It is required that where these government-owned enterprises 
participate in a competitive procurement process that they shall be subject to the same rules 
that apply to all competitors in accordance with the principle of fairness, equity, and 
competition.84 Thus, if a procuring entity procures from another organ of government through 
direct negotiation or any method, which is proven not to be competitive, transparent, fair, and 
cost-effective, a potential bidder may challenge the decision for violating applicable 
procurement legislation, such as section 16(1)(d-f) of the Nigerian PPA and section 217 of 
South African Constitution.85 However, procuring entities may be permitted by law to negotiate 
contracts with government enterprises instead of using competitive bidding; as obtainable in 
South African municipalities by virtue of Systems Act section 80(1). Nigerian procurement 
regulation has no similar provision; but, such may arise as routine intra-governmental 
relations.86 
                                                          
“Law of Contract” in C G van der Merwe & J du Plessis (eds) Introduction to the Law of South Africa (2004) 243 
250. 
82 There are usually administrative authorities that regulate and supervise the formation, management and 
dissolution of companies. In Nigeria and South Africa, it is the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) and the 
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), respectively. See s 7 of CAMA and s 187 of South 
Africa’s Companies Act.  
83 By PPA s 60 "Contractor or supplier" means any potential party to a procurement contract with the procuring 
entity and includes any corporation, partnership, individual, sole proprietor, joint stock company, joint venture or 
any other legal entity through which business is conducted” (emphasis added). See also PPA s 16(5). Systems Act 
s 80(1)(a) specifically mentions that services (broadly referring to goods, works and services) may be provided 
by “a municipal entity, another municipality or a national or provincial organ of State”. 
84 PPA S 16(1)(d)-(f); SA Constitution s 217(1); PFMA ss 38(1)(a)(iii), 51(1)(a)(iii), 76(4)(c); Treasury 
Regulation 16A3.2; Systems Act s 83(1)(a). See OECD/DAC Methodology for Assessment of National 
Procurement Systems (MAPS) (2006) 12; Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement 397-398. 
85 See Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v CEO, SASSA NO [2009] ZAGPPHC 169; CEO, SASSA NO v Cash 
Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd (90/10) [2011] ZASCA 13; [2011] 3 All SA 233 (SCA); 2012 (1) SA 216 (SCA). 
86 For example, Government agencies at the various tiers can negotiate residential housing development loan 
services with the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (federal government-owned) under the National Housing 
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Nevertheless, Systems Act section 80(1) does not support the view87 that South African 
organs of state at the local government level need not comply with section 217 of the 
Constitution when contracting municipal services to other organs of state. First, the South 
African Constitution, section 2, states that the “Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; 
law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled.” Consequently, the Systems Act, section 80(1), cannot derogate from the obligation 
to comply with section 217 of the Constitution, as that will be invalid.88 Secondly, section 80(1) 
of the Systems Act should be interpreted in harmony with or subject to section 217 of the 
Constitution, based on the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the non-application of sections 
83 and 84 of the Systems Act (which contains the principles of section 217 of the Constitution, 
and other provisions) to contracts for municipal services awarded to other organs of state, as 
stipulated by section 80(1), is permissible only to the extent that it does not detract from the 
constitutional obligation to comply with the section 217 principles. Consequently, where a 
municipality negotiates with another organ of government for service delivery as envisaged 
under the Systems Act, it must be competitive, at least to the extent that the contract is awarded 
at a competitive price, and also transparent, equitable, fair, and cost-effective.89 Thirdly, in 
Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v CEO, SASSA NO,90 the court rejected the argument that 
when an organ of state contracts with another organ for service delivery, it is the State providing 
for itself and accordingly obviates the need to apply the principles in section 217(1) of the 
                                                          
Fund. “Estate Development Loan” (2014) The Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria 
<http://www.fmbn.gov.ng/home/doc.aspx?mCatID=1194> (accessed 31-01-2015). Also, Nigeria National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), which is Nigeria’s state oil corporation, and Nigeria LNG Limited, 49% owned 
by Nigerian government, may negotiate engineering contracts with the National Engineering & Technical 
Company Limited (NETCO), a subsidiary company of NNPC. See M Thurber, I Emelife & P Heller “NNPC and 
Nigeria's Oil Patronage Ecosystem” in D G Victor, D R Hults & M C Thurber (eds) Oil and Governance: State-
Owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply (2011) 701 731.  
87 Bolton Government Procurement 192-193.  
88 Pursuant to s 172(1)(a), the courts “must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution 
is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.” See Tongoane v National Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs 
(CCT100/09) [2010] ZACC 10, 2010 (6) SA 214 (CC), 2010 (8) BCLR 741 (CC); Doctors for Life International 
v Speaker of the National Assembly (CCT12/05) [2006] ZACC 11, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC), 2006 (6) SA 416 
(CC). 
89 See CEO, SASSA NO v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd; [2011] 3 All SA 233 (SCA); 2012 (1) SA 216 
(SCA), particularly paras 13, 25-26. 
90 [2009] ZAGPPHC 169. 
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Constitution. It held that the section must apply in inter-organ of state procurement 
agreement.91  
3 2 5 3 Foreign contractors 
In addition to local contractors, foreign companies have access to the public procurement 
markets of Nigeria and South Africa. However, in Nigeria, national competitive bidding and 
restricted bidding methods, which involve invitation of bids from only potential or selected 
national contractors, are used for goods and works contracts below N100 million and N1 billion 
respectively.92 Contracts valued above these thresholds are to be procured through international 
competitive bidding (ICB), which entails advertising the tender invitation in an international 
publication and enlarging the minimum time for receipt of bids to enable international 
participation.93 Nevertheless, where ICB is used, a margin of preference as indicated in the 
bidding documents, may still apply in favour of local bidders or locally manufactured 
products.94 In South Africa, there is no distinction between international and national bidding;95 
meaning that foreign companies may bid for any public contract they are interested in, subject 
to the National Industrial Participation (NIP) Revised Guidelines 2013, the Preferential 
Procurement Regulations 2017 and the B-BBEE Act. Under regulation 8(2) and (4) of the 
Preferential Procurement Regulations, an organ of state must, in applicable cases in designated 
                                                          
91 Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court of Appeal, in CEO, SASSA NO v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd 
(90/10) [2011] ZASCA 13; [2011] 3 All SA 233 (SCA); 2012 (1) SA 216 (SCA), allowed the appeal against the 
decision of the High Court, it did not reverse the holding of the lower court on the application of s 217(1) of the 
Constitution to inter-organ of state procurement transaction. 
92 Set by the BPP pursuant to s 25(1) PPA; see FGN “Implementation of approved revised Thresholds for Service-
wide Application and Special Application to the Federal Ministry of Petroleum for Expenditure related to the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Procurement Methods and Thresholds of Application and the 
Composition of Tenders Boards” circular SGF/OP/I/S.3/VIII/57 of 11/3/2009 available at: < 
http://bpp.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_joomdoc&view=documents&path=Implementation+of+Approved+Re
vised+Threshold+for+Service+wide+Application+and+Federal+Ministry+of+Petroleum+and+the+Composition
+of+Tenders+Board+-+11th+Marc+2009.pdf> (accessed 14-10-2017).  
93 PPA s 25(2)(i); E Caborn & S Arrowsmith “Procurement Methods in the Public Procurement Systems of Africa” 
in G Quinot & S Arrowsmith (eds) Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (2013) 261 291. The 1994 
UNCITRAL Model Law, art 23, contained a broad distinction between national and international methods of 
procurement.  
94 PPA s 34. There is no evidence that the BPP has, in accordance with the PPA s 34 (4), set through regulations 
the limits and the formulae for the computation of margins of preference and determination of the contents of 
goods manufactured locally. See Udeh & Ahmadu “Nigeria” in Procurement Regulation, 145. For a general 
discussion on the use of public procurement for social or economic objectives in some African countries (including 
Nigeria and South Africa), see G Quinot “Promotion of Social policy through Public Procurement in Africa” in 
G Quinot & S Arrowsmith(eds) Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (2013) 370.  
95 Bolton “South Africa” in Procurement Regulation 195 fn 74. 
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sectors, and may, in sectors not so designated, include as a specific tendering condition, that 
only locally produced services or goods or locally manufactured goods with a stipulated 
minimum threshold for local production and content will be considered.96  
Where foreign contractors validly bid for contracts in both jurisdictions, the law 
requires, subject to applicable preference margins, that they shall be treated fairly and equally 
with local contractors.97  Furthermore, as would be discussed in chapter 5, the wrongful use of 
procurement methods and misapplication of preference by procuring entities are liable to 
bidders’ challenge.98 Foreign contractors’ participation in the procurement markets increases 
the potential number of bidders that may seek bidder remedies; and, equally, the existence of 
the bidder remedies may be an incentive for foreign contractors to participate in the markets, 
as it may enhance their confidence in the markets. 99 
3 3 Regulatory and other institutional frameworks 
There are institutions or authorities that play a vital role in supporting the operation of bidder 
remedies in Nigeria and South Africa. The foremost of these institutions may be the 
procurement regulatory or oversight bodies, whose functions complement the law enforcement 
role of bidder remedies. This section takes a cursory look at the procurement regulatory bodies 
and other institutions involved in the operation of bidder remedies in both jurisdictions. 
3 3 1 Nigeria’s Bureau of Public Procurement  
The Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) is the federal procurement regulatory body. Its 
functions that directly affect bidder remedies include:  
(i) formulating general policies and guidelines relating to public procurement;100  
(ii) certifying relevant federal procurement prior to the award of contract;101  
(iii) supervising the implementation of established procurement policies;102 
                                                          
96 Under the NIP, all public procurement with an imported content equal to or exceeding US$10 million or 
equivalent value are subject to an obligation on all the contractors to participate in some form of economic activity 
through any or a combination of the following key objectives: investment to raise production capacity and 
competitiveness in strategic sectors of the economy; export promotion; R&D collaboration; technology transfer; 
and acquisition. The B-BBEE Act is aimed at economic empowerment of hitherto disadvantaged black South 
Africans using, inter alia, public procurement. 
97 PPA s 16(1) d-f; SA Constitution s 217(1). 
98 PPA s 54(1); Preferential Procurement Regulations, reg 13. 
99 Zhang (2007) PPLR 330. 
100 Subject of the approval of the National Council on Public Procurement (NCPP); PPA s 5(a). 
101 PPA s 5(c). 
102 PPA s 5(d). 
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(iv) preventing fraudulent and unfair procurement and where necessary apply 
administrative sanctions;103 and 
(v) acting as a forum for procurement administrative review, discussed in detail in chapter 
5. 
Function (ii) of BPP, above, requires explication; the others appear to be self-explanatory. 
Certifying procurement entails submitting the comprehensive records of a bidding and 
evaluation exercise, to BPP before awarding the contract; following which BPP assesses the 
proceedings to ascertain compliance with applicable rules. If no breach is identified, BPP will 
issue a “certificate of no objection” to the procuring entity to award the contract to the 
successful bidder. If any procurement rule is identified to have been breached, the BPP will not 
issue the certificate. Rather, it will direct that corrective action be taken, and the contract will 
not be awarded until the breach is remedied. This is a form of pre-award audit, which may 
obviate the need for bidder remedies, where effectively applied. However, procurement 
certification applies only to contracts above stipulated thresholds; currently: N 100 million for 
goods and services, and N 1 billion for works.104 
 The BPP and its responsibilities were created by the PPA. It possesses a degree of 
independence and authoritative standing in Government to enable it to carry out its 
responsibilities, including procurement review, without interference.105 It is only some of its 
functions (bidder review is not inclusive) that are subject to the approval of the National 
Council on Public Procurement (NCPP). It has its own fund where money appropriated to it by 
the National Assembly is paid; and it charges this fund to meet all its expenditure.106 Adequate 
funding is necessary to ensure proper staffing and resources to keep the services of the 
regulatory body at the level of quality required.107 The head of the BPP is designated “Director-
General”, and occupies a sufficient level within the governance structure.108 The Director-
General enjoys security of tenure as he holds office for a term of 4 years, and may be re-
appointed for a further and last term of 4 years; and may only be removed from office at the 
                                                          
103 PPA s 5(n). This function is complemented by its power to recommend investigation of a procurement 
proceeding by a relevant authority, under PPA s 53. This function as a secondary remedy to bidder remedies is 
discussed in chapter 8.  
104 FGN circular SGF/OP/I/S.3/VIII/57 of 11-3-2009. 
105 PPA ss 3(2) & 6. See MAPS 24. 
106 PPA 12 (1) & (2).  
107 See MAPS 24. However, the existence of a fund for the BPP does not necessarily mean that the body is 
adequately funded or staffed.  
108 PPA 7(2). 
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instance of the President, on the basis of gross misconduct or financial impropriety, fraud, and 
manifested incompetence proven by the NCPP.109 
The body is not directly involved in carrying out procurement transactions of 
government and is not a member of procuring entities’ Tenders Boards or tender evaluation 
committees. This is aimed at avoiding any conflict of interest in the discharge of its 
procurement regulatory duties. Consequently, it may not be accused of being a judge in its own 
case in its handling of administrative review.110 However, BPP procures for its needs.111 In 
such circumstance, it could be regarded as a procuring entity against which a bidder remedies 
proceeding may be instituted; in which case the impartiality of the BPP as a review forum may 
become questionable. In addition, BPP is one of the agencies under the Presidency, and its 
Director-General regularly attends the Federal Executive Council (FEC) meetings.112 The FEC 
is a body of federal ministers, presided over by the President or the Vice-President.113 The FEC 
is currently the approving authority for the award of contracts valued at N1 billion and above.114 
It has been argued that the Director-General’s attendance of FEC meetings may subject him to 
political influence.115 Furthermore, it is debatable whether the BPP may be fit to adjudicate 
over review proceedings brought against a contract awarded or approved by the FEC, 
considering the likelihood of bias. However, a view in support of the Director-General’s 
attendance of FEC meetings is that it confers a high standing on him, enabling him to 
effectively perform his functions.116 The head of the regulatory body needs to be of sufficient 
level within the governance structure to exercise its authority and responsibilities without 
intimidation or interference by senior government officials.117 BPP’s status and functions 
substantially meet the standards of a procurement regulatory authority as recommended by 
                                                          
109 PPA 7(3) & (4). 
110 It is a trite principle of law that a person shall not be a judge in his cause; expressed in a Latin maxim: “nemo 
judex in causa sua” which is one of the two pillars of natural justice directed at curtailing likelihood of bias in 
handling judicial or quasi-judicial functions. See City and Suburban Transport (Pty) Ltd v Local Board Road 
transport, Johannesburg 1932 WLD 100 (Hoexter 2002B, 191); BTR Industries South Africa (pty) Ltd v Metal 
and Allied Workers’ Union 1992 (3) SA 673 (A); and, Royal Netherlands Harbour Works Company B v Sama 
(1991) 2 NWLR (Pt 171) 64; Egwu v University of Port Harcourt (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt 414) 419.  See also Bolton 
Government Procurement 223-227. 
111 PPA, ss 6(3) and 12(4)(f). 
112 The letterhead paper and the website of the BPP bears “The Presidency”. 
113 Constitution, ss. 144(5) and 148. 
114 FGN circular SGF/OP/I/S.3/VIII/57 of 11-3-2009. 
115 Public and Private Development Centre (PPDC) Implementing the Nigerian Procurement Law: Compliance 
with the Public Procurement Act 2007 (2011) 85. 
116 85. 
117 OECD-DAC MAPS 24. 
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MAPS.118 Some states in Nigeria have adopted procurement regulatory bodies similar to the 
BPP.119 
3 3 2  South African National Treasury 
The National Treasury is established under section 5 of the PFMA, and consists of the Minister 
of Finance, who is the head of the Treasury, and the national department or departments 
responsible for financial and fiscal matters.120 The National Treasury is the regulatory body on 
general public financial management in the national and provincial governments; and its 
authority extends also to the municipalities.121 Some of the functions of the National Treasury 
that directly relate to bidder remedies include: 
(i) promoting and enforcing transparency and effective management in respect of revenue, 
expenditure, assets and liabilities of departments, public entities and constitutional 
institutions;122 
(ii) investigating any system of financial management and internal control in any 
department, public entity or constitutional institution;123 
(iii) making regulations or issuing instructions to applicable institutions on framework for 
an appropriate procurement and provisioning system which is fair, equitable, 
transparent, competitive and cost-effective;124 
(iv) receiving and considering complaints regarding alleged non-compliance with the 
prescribed minimum norms and standards in the supply chain management system.125 
How function (ii) above constitutes a secondary remedy is discussed in chapter 8. It is pursuant 
to function (iii) that the Treasury Regulations126 were promulgated by the Minister. The 
Regulations provides for function (iv) above that constitutes the National Treasury into a 
review forum, as would be discussed in chapter 6. 
                                                          
118 23-25. 
119 These states include: Jigawa, Lagos, Cross River. 
120 As directed by the Constitution, s 216. 
121 MFMA, s 5 & 6. 
122 PFMA, s 6(1)(g). 
123 PFMA Act, s 6(2)(e). 
124 PFMA 76(4)(c); Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act s 168 (1). 
125 Reg.16A9.3 of the Treasury Regulations. 
126 And also, the Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations under MFMA, which provides for bidder 
remedies at the municipalities. 
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Within the National Treasury, there is a newly established Office of the Chief 
Procurement Office, specifically charged with procurement regulatory functions. It took over 
from previous Specialists Functions Division. The functions of the Office include: managing 
and maintaining the regulatory environment relevant to government procurement practices; and 
overseeing and monitoring government sector procurement practices to ensure compliance 
with the regulatory framework.127 
There are also Provincial Treasuries in the provinces, whose functions compliment the 
regulatory functions of the National Treasury. Although a bid adjudication panel is constituted 
by provincial procuring entities to award contracts, the Provincial Treasuries’ departmental bid 
committee must approve the proposed award before it is finally awarded to the selected 
bidder.128 This is similar to what obtains in Nigeria as seen above, with the same possibility 
that it may limit the need for bidder remedies, where effectively applied.  
The National and Provincial treasuries facilitate transversal term contracts.129 
Apparently the treasuries are directly involved in procuring such contracts. 130  Thus, it may 
not be free from possible conflict of interest, which may affect the exercise of its bid review 
powers. 
3 3 3 Other institutions and stakeholders 
Apart from the regulatory bodies considered above, other institutions and stakeholders that play 
important roles in the bidder remedies systems under review include:  
(i) the courts; 
(ii) anti-corruption authorities and ombudsmen; 
(iii) audit authorities; 
(iv) ministers;  
(v) intergovernmental organisations or external support agencies; and 
(vi) civil society organizations. 
                                                          
127 National Treasury “Divisions- Office of the Chief Procurement Office” National Treasury 
<http://www.treasury.gov.za/divisions/ocpo/> (accessed 14-10-2017). 
128 Tenderscan “Tendering in South Africa” (21-1-2011) Tendertopics 
<http://tendertopics.tenderscan.co.za/?page_id=227> (accessed 14-10-2017); see Treasury Regulation, reg 
16A6.2. 
129 Treasury Regulations, reg 16.A6.5.  
130 See SA National Treasury 2015 Public Sector Supply Chain Management Review (2015) 47. 
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3 3 3 1 The courts 
The court is the foremost forum for settling disputes and claiming relief for breaches of law. 
Bidders in Nigeria and South Africa may challenge procurement decisions or appeal 
procurement review decisions in the courts. The situation partly satisfies an element of 
effectiveness of bidder remedies: the existence of at least, “a body to hear a challenge as a first 
step and a further body to hear an appeal as a second step”. In both jurisdictions, there is a 
hierarchical judicial system and observance of the doctrines of stare decisis131 and 
independence of the judiciary.132 These courts have all the inherent powers and sanctions of a 
court of law; and their decisions are binding on all persons and authorities to which they 
apply.133 This satisfies the elements of effectiveness of bidder remedies that relate to remedial 
powers and decisions of a review body- this is explicated in chapter 7. 
In Nigeria, the highest court is the Supreme Court of Nigeria; followed by the Court of 
Appeal; the Federal High Court, High Court of the Federal Capital Territory and State High 
Courts, and other superior courts; after which there are several inferior courts.134 Appeals 
against administrative review may be instituted in the High Court; and may be further appealed 
up to the Supreme Court.  
In South Africa, there is the Constitutional Court, which is the highest court in all 
matters; followed by the Supreme Court of Appeal; then, the High Courts; and the Magistrate 
Courts and other inferior courts.135 Since procurement is a constitutional matter by virtue of 
section 217 of the Constitution, procurement cases may be pursued up to the Constitutional 
Court; but may not be pursued in the inferior courts since those courts do not have judicial 
review jurisdiction. 136 
                                                          
131 Which translated means that a lower court must at all times hold itself bound by the decisions of a higher court 
until they are seen to have been overruled. See Alao v NIDB (1999) 9 NWLR (pt 617) 103; Chedi v Attorney-
General of the Federation [2008] 1 NWLR (pt 1067) 166; and, Gauteng Province Driving School Association v 
Amaryllis Investments (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZASCA 237, [2012] 1 All SA 290 (SCA); and, Ex Parte Minister of Safety 
and Security: In Re S v Walters [2002] ZACC 6; 2002 (4) SA 613; 2002 (7) BCLR 663 (CC). See also: B Igwenyi 
Modern Constitutional Law in Nigeria (2006) 289; H R Hahlo & E Kahn The South African Legal System and its 
Background (1968) 214 
132 Nigerian Constitution, s 6(3), (5) & (6)(a); SA Constitution, ss 165 & 166. Also, see generally A Gordon & D 
Bruce “Transformation and the Independence of the Judiciary in South Africa” in Centre for the Study of Violence 
After the Transition: Justice, the Judiciary and respect for the Law in South Africa (2007) 1, available at 
<http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/paptjust.htm> (accessed 6-10-2014).  
133 Nigerian Constitution, s 6(6)(a) & (b); SA Constitution, ss 165(5), 172 & 173. 
134 Nigerian Constitution, s 6(4)(a) & (5) & chapter VII (the Judicature). 
135 SA Constitution (as amended- 17th), ss 166-170. 
136Quinot (2011) PPLR 198. The Constitutional Court has entertained numerous bidder remedies cases; some are 
cited in this work.  
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Judicial bidder remedies are discussed in chapter 7. 
3 3 3 2 Anti-corruption authorities and ombudsmen 
As seen in chapter 2, bidder remedies may deter and expose corruption in the procurement 
process; in addition to preventing and detecting breaches of procurement rules. Equally, the 
operations of anti-corruption authorities and ombudsmen vested with powers to investigate 
corruption or improper conduct in procurement may complement and act as secondary 
remedies, as would be discussed in chapter 8. It suffices here to present a framework of the 
related institutions. 
The main anti-corruption authorities in Nigeria are the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC).137 Nigeria’s national ombudsman is the Public Complaint 
Commission.138 The jurisdiction of these authorities extends to all organs and tiers of 
government of Nigeria.139 Any interested person, including bidders, procuring entities, the 
BPP, and Civil Society Organizations, could instigate any of the bodies to investigate suspected 
corruption or improper or unlawful conduct in procurement that fall within their mandate. Their 
investigation may lead them to prosecute or recommend the prosecution of 
suspects/offenders.140  
In South Africa, corruption in procurement, among other criminal matters, may be 
reported to the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), who is the head of the 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), or to an Investigating Director of the NPA.141 The 
NDPP may investigate or appoint an investigator to look into the matter; and he may prosecute 
or direct the prosecution of any person indicted, which could be a bidder or a procuring entity 
or their staff.142 There is also the Public Protector, which functions as the national 
                                                          
137 Established respectively by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act No 1 of 2004 
(EFCC Act); and, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act No 6 of 2003 (Corrupt Practices Act). 
138 Established by the Public Complaint Commission Act CAP P37 LFN 2004, s 1. 
139 EFCC Act, s 6(1)(c); Anti-Corruption Act, ss 10 & 11. Attorney-General of Ondo State v Attorney-General of 
the Federation (2002) 6 SC 1, (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt 772) 222. 
140 PPA, ss 19(b)(ii), 53(1) and (5), 60; Public Complaint Commission Act, ss 5 & 7(3); Corrupt Practices Act, 
s10(a); EFCC Act, s 7(m). 
141 SA Constitution, s 179(1); National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 (as amended) (NPA Act), ss 22(1), 
27 & 28. 
142 SA Constitution, s 179(2); NPA Act, s 22(2) & (3). 
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ombudsman.143 Its mandate includes ensuring integrity and general good governance in the 
management of public resources.144 The Constitution145  requires the Public Protector to:  
(i) investigate all complaints or allegations of improper conduct (in procurement 
and other areas) by public officials in all spheres of government (except court 
decisions),  
(ii) report on such improper conducts, and 
(iii) take remedial actions.  
The remedial actions of the above institutions that are relevant to bidder remedies are discussed 
in chapter 8. 
3 3 3 3 Audit authorities 
Audit is “[a] formal examination of an individual’s or organization’s accounting records, 
financial situation, or compliance with some other set of standards.”146 The outcome of an audit 
is a report containing findings on the matters examined, and recommendations on remedying 
any irregularities discovered. Audit of procurement transactions may expose contravention of 
procurement rules and lead to enforcement of the rules; thus, it has a relationship with bidder 
remedies. This relationship is further discussed in chapter 8. 
In both jurisdictions, there is internal and external audit of public procurement 
transactions. Internal audit is performed by the personnel of a procuring entity being audited 
and supervised by the entity’s accounting officer, as he is responsible for preventing 
unauthorized expenditure and ensuring that his entity complies with the law.147  
In Nigeria, the BPP performs external procurement audits and submits its reports to the 
National Assembly bi-annually.148 BPP’s audit focuses on procuring entities’ compliance with 
procurement rules. The Auditor-General of the Federation performs general external audit of 
public accounts (which includes procurement financing) of the Federation and all its ministries 
and departments, and courts.149 He also recommends external auditors to statutory bodies, 
which his audit powers do not extend to.150 His report is submitted annually to the National 
                                                          
143 Established by the SA Constitution, s 181(1)(a); and the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994, s 1A. 
144 Public Protector Constitutional & Legislative Mandate of the Public Protector (2010) 4. 
145 S 182 (1) & (2).  
146 Garner Black’s Law Dictionary 150. 
147 PPA, s 20; PFMA, ss 38-40. 
148 PPA, s 5(p). 
149 CFRN, s 85(2),  
150 Section 85(3) & (4). 
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Assembly to review whether public money was spent for the approved purpose and with due 
regard to efficiency, economy and effectiveness.151 There is a state Auditor-General that 
performs similar functions in each state.152 
The Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA)153 audits the accounts, financial 
statements and financial management of all national and provincial departments and 
administration and all municipalities; in addition to other functions prescribed by law.154 In 
practice, all central government entities are audited every year; and a full range of audits are 
performed, including systems audits, financial and compliance, procurement and performance 
audits, etc.155 His report, which must be made public, is submitted annually to the legislature 
for their oversight functions.156 Furthermore, he may be requested to investigate an irregularity 
in procurement process by the head of government institution; which he may undertake and 
thereafter submit his report to the requesting officer, among others.157 The audit functions of 
AGSA are more extensive than that of his Nigerian counterpart; however, the special 
procurement audit function of Nigeria’s BPP affects bidder remedies more directly, as will be 
considered in chapter 8.  In both jurisdictions, the Auditor-Generals have clear mandates and 
enjoy the independence commensurate with a supreme audit institution, as set by the 
International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI),158 to enable them to 
perform their functions effectively.159 The functions of these audit authorities as a secondary 
remedy shall be analysed in chapter 8. 
                                                          
151 Section 85 (5); OAUGF “Office of the Auditor General for the Federation” (2007) OAUGF 
<http://www.oaugf.gov.ng/> (accessed 15-10-2017). 
152 CFRN, s 125. 
153 Established by SA Constitution s 181 (1)(e); Public Audit Act No 25 of 2004 (PAA) s 2. 
154 SA Constitution, s 188 (1), (2) & (4). 
155 R Quist, C Certan & J Dendura Republic of South Africa Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
(2008) 23.  
156 SA Constitution s188 (3). 
157 PAA, s 5. See for example, AGSA Report of the Auditor-General of South Africa on an investigation into 
certain alleged procurement irregularities at the Department of Water Affairs (2010); available at 
<http://www.agsa.co.za/Documents/Valueaddingauditreports/Investigationsauditreports/tabid/180/id/376/Defaul
t.aspx > (accessed 15-10-2017). 
158 INTOSAI “Folder on SAI independence” (2006) INTOSAI 
<http://www.intosai.org/documents/intosai/general.html> (accessed 15-10-2017).  
159Quist et al Public Expenditure 23. See K Dye & R Stepenhurst Pillars of Integrity: The Importance of Supreme 
Audit Institutions in Curbing Corruption (1998); William-Elegbe “Corruption and Public Procurement” in 
Procurement Regulation 356. 
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3 3 3 4 Ministers 
In both jurisdictions, ministers are the political heads of ministries and departments; and they 
supervise the operations of government agencies.160 Although the ministers are not the 
accounting officers of their respective entities,161 they play the following roles that affect the 
operation of the bidder remedies systems: 
• Implementing or overseeing the implementation of the procurement decisions of their 
respective entities; 162 
• Approving relevant (procurement) decisions of the entities;163 
• Making regulations or policies that relate to or may affect procurement (including 
bidder remedies) by the entities.164 
However, in Nigeria, ministers’ power to make policies/regulations for their entities hardly 
extends to procurement, as the BPP is generally responsible for making federal procurement 
policies/regulations.165 The Minister of Finance plays special roles in both procurement 
systems. In Nigeria, he is the Chairman of NCPP; in South Africa, he is the Head of National 
Treasury. 
3 3 3 5 Intergovernmental organisations and external support agencies 
Nigeria and South Africa belong to intergovernmental organizations, and receive development 
assistance from external support agencies (ESAs) or international donors, some of whose 
procurement regulatory regimes may apply to their funded public procurements within these 
jurisdictions. Examples of ESAs that provide official development assistance to Nigeria and 
South Africa include: the World Bank; European Union (EU); United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID); United Nations’ agencies, such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).  
                                                          
160 See CFRN s 148 (1); Federal Civil Service Rules (Nigeria) 2008 (FCS Rules) rule 160201(a) &(c); and, 
“executive authority” in section 1, PFMA (SA). 
161 See 3 2 4 1 above. 
162 See PPA s 22(5); PFMA ss 63(2) & 64. 
163 See PFMA s 54(2)(b) & (d); FCS Rules 160201(c). 
164 See FCS Rules 160201(c); and PFMA s 64. Also, various legislation establishing public bodies in both 
jurisdictions confer regulation-making powers on ministers, which may relate to procurement. For example, the 
Minister of Public Service and Administration, pursuant to SITA Act s 23, made the SITA Regulations, which 
regulates SITA’s procurement, and confers procurement review powers on the Minister (reg 6).  
165 PPA s 5(1). 
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South Africa has been a WTO member since 1 January 1995 and a member of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since 13 June 1948. However, South Africa 
is not a party to the GPA; thus, is not bound by its provisions, including its requirements on 
challenge procedures.166 South Africa is a member of Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and a party to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). However, 
SADC does not have a government procurement-specific agreement; and, government 
procurement is specifically excluded from SACU’s 1969 and 2002 Agreements.167 
Nevertheless, the recent free trade agreement between SACU, SADC, the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Eastern African Community may later lead to a 
government procurement obligation that may impact member-states’ procurement systems, 
considering that COMESA has its Procurement Regulations 2009.168 The Regulations grant 
right to suppliers to challenge breach of the Regulations. Similarly, Nigeria is a member of the 
WTO, but not a party to the GPA; thus, the limitation to the application of the GPA to Nigeria’s 
procurement system is similar to what obtains for South Africa. Also, Nigeria belongs to the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, ECOWAS does not have 
any rule or project on member-states’ government procurement.169  
Unlike the case of membership of intergovernmental bodies, the partnership of Nigeria 
and South Africa with ESAs has direct implications for their procurement systems, including 
their bidder remedies regimes. A survey by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 2008 reveals that donors use their own procurement systems or 
procedures for their funded projects in Nigeria.170 For example, procurement under the Water 
Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform Programme (WSSSRP), co-funded by EU/UNICEF in 
Nigeria, is subject to the procurement rules of the ESAs. In South Africa, some donors continue 
to use their own procurement systems according to an OECD 2011 survey; and between 2005 
and 2010, the percentage of aid that made use of South Africa’s procurement systems reduced 
                                                          
166 Under art XVIII. See C McCrudden Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement, & Legal 
Change (2007) 273. However, for an assessment of South Africa’s social policy in procurement against the 
approach to public procurement prescribed by GPA see Bolton & Quinot “Social Policies in Procurement” in The 
WTO Regime on Government Procurement 459. 
167 R Kirk & M Stern “The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement” (2003) 57 Africa Region Working 
Paper 1 11.  
168 See Bolton “South Africa” in Procurement Regulation 180 n 10. 
169  Udeh & Ahmadu “Nigeria” in Procurement Regulation 142. 
170 OECD Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: Making Aid More Effective by 2010 (2008) 41-7. 
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from 44 per cent to 30 per cent.171 This is despite Nigeria’s, South Africa’s and some of their 
donors’ participation172 in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005 and Accra Agenda 
for Action 2008 (AAA), wherein donors commit to use country systems and procedures to the 
maximum extent possible.173 Progress on donors’ use of countries procurement systems has 
been disappointing;174 thus considering ESA’s procurement regime/enforcement vis-à-vis 
partner countries’ regimes/enforcement is apposite. 
Although donors may agree to use the countries’ procurement structures for their 
funded projects, they may still insist on applying their own procurement regulations. For 
example, the World Bank-financed projects are regulated by the Bank’s Procurement 
Regulations for IPF Borrowers 2016 (World Bank Procurement Regulations); and the 
borrower’s procurement rules/procedures may be used only if the Bank agrees.175 The use of 
donors’ procurement rules may result in a multiple bidder remedies regime within the 
jurisdictions, which may affect the domestic remedies system,176 as would be considered in 
chapter 5. 
3 3 3 6 Civil society organizations 
There are various civil society organisations (CSOs) in Nigeria and South Africa that are 
involved in supporting enforcement of procurement regulation, which complements bidder 
                                                          
171 OECD Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration– vol II Country Chapters 
(South Africa) (2011) 12. 
172 See OECD “Countries, Territories and Organisations Adhering to the Paris Declaration and AAA” OECD < 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/countriesterritoriesandorganisationsadheringtotheparisdeclarationandaaa.
htm#> (accessed 01-02-2015) 
173 Paragraphs 21; 8 & 15 respectively. However, they recognize that use of country’s systems may be infeasible, 
in which case participating donors commit to establish measures that strengthen instead of undermining the 
systems.  
174 A La Chimia “Donors’ Influence on Developing Countries’ Procurement Systems, Rules, Markets: A Critical 
Analysis” in G Quinot & S Arrowsmith (eds) Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (2013) 219 253-254. 
OECD/DAC Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration (2011) 3 15. 
175 Paragraph 2.4(b).  However, the World Bank has been one of the major promoters of countries’ procurement 
systems. It launched the Pilot Program for Use of Country Procurement Systems in 2008, involving 20 
participating countries; but owing to criticism of its implementation, it appears to have been abandoned. La Chimia 
“Donor’s Influence” in Procurement Regulation 253; C Palla & J Wood “The World Bank’s Use of Country 
Systems for Procurement: A Good Idea Gone Bad?” (2009) 27(2) Development Policy Review 215. See S William-
Elegbe “The Changes to the World Bank’s Procurement Policy and the Implications for African Borrowers” 
(2014) 1 APPLJ 22 27-29; S William-Elegbe “The World Bank's Influence on Procurement Reform in Africa” 
(2013) 21(1) AJICL 95-119; and, generally S William-Elegbe Public Procurement and Multilateral Development 
Banks: Law, Practice and Problems (2017). 
176 Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Procurement Regulation 316. On the influence of donors on African 
procurement regulations, see La Chimia “Donor’s Influence” in Procurement Regulation 219. 
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remedies. “CSOs” refers to the set of institutions and organizations that inter-phase between 
the state, the business world, and the family.177 They broadly include: nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations, peoples’ organizations, community-
based organizations (CBOs), civic clubs, trade unions, gender groups, cultural and religious 
groups, charities, social and sports clubs, cooperatives, environmental groups, professional 
associations, academic and policy institutions, consumer organizations, and the media.178 
In Nigeria, certain named CSOs form part of the prescribed membership of the NCPP, 
which is the statutory body responsible for considering and approving policies on public 
procurement, among others.179 Furthermore, two credible CSOs’ representatives are statutorily 
required to be invited to observe federal procurement processes.180 The two categories of CSOs 
to be invited are: (i) a recognized private sector professional organization whose expertise is 
relevant to the particular goods or service being procured; and (ii) non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) working in transparency, accountability and anti-corruption areas.181 It is 
assumed that the representative of the professional organisation would employ his expertise to 
assess whether the procurement specifications and requirements would result in the 
procurement of goods and services that meet the industry’s standards and regulations, and 
engender fair competition. A breach in the standard or regulation for the items being procured 
could be detected by the observer with the relevant expertise. The other observer representing 
a relevant NGO would focus on detecting corrupt practices and violation of procurement rules.  
Where any breach is identified, the CSO-observers can report to any relevant agency or 
body for remedial actions,182 and to their own organizations. There are three major legal 
limitations to the role of CSO-observers. First, the observers are not entitled to observe the bid 
examination and evaluation exercises.183 Secondly, they do not intervene in the procurement 
                                                          
177 U Essia & A Yearoo “Strengthening Civil Society Organizations/Government Partnership in Nigeria” (2009) 
4 (9) International NGO Journal 368. See AO Ikelegbe “State, Civil Society and Sustainable Development in 
Nigeria.” (2013) 7 CPED Monograph Series 1 5-6. 
178 Essia & Yearoo (2009) International NGO Journal 368. Ikelegbe (2013) CPED Monograph Series 8-9. 
179 PPA s 2. Concerning the current state/status of the NCPP, see KT Udeh “Nigerian National Council on Public 
Procurement: Addressing the Unresolved Legal Issues” (2015) 2 APPLJ 1. 
180 PPA s 19(b). Some states have adopted this as a legislative requirement or as a standard practice. See for 
example: Lagos State Public Procurement Law 2 of 2011, s 28(b); Anambra State Public Procurement Law 2011, 
21(b); Jigawa State Due Process Guidelines 2014, para 4.6. 
181 PPA s 19(b)(i) & (ii). 
182 Such as the BPP, EFCC, ICPC and PCC. 
183 PPA s 32(8). However, CSO-observers may have access to records of bid examination and evaluation after the 
contract award- s 28(2)(a). 
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process.184 Thirdly, they have no right to institute bid review proceedings, based on their 
findings.185  
In South Africa, there is no statutory role given to CSOs in procurement; 
notwithstanding, some CSOs still support the enforcement of procurement rules. For example, 
Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) publicizes findings from government audit 
reports in press releases and radio talk shows to demand remedial actions from agencies against 
identified breaches.186 PSAM publishes a scorecard measuring the comparative compliance of 
various provincial agencies with public finance laws.187 Also, a report of the Public Protector’s 
investigation on an alleged improper procurement identified Ndifuna Ukwazi (a CSO) as one 
of the complainant.188 Furthermore, CSOs often participate in procurement litigations in South 
Africa; for example, Corruption Watch acted as Amicus Curiae in AllPay Consolidated 
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO of SASSA (No 2)189 and in Economic Freedom Fighters 
v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National 
Assembly.190 Also, Black Sash Trust was an applicant in Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social 
Development191 the follow-up litigation to AllPay (No 2). 
CSOs’ role of reporting procurement breaches and its impact on procurement 
enforcement within the jurisdictions are discussed further in chapter 8. 
3 4 Conclusion and analysis 
The discussion on procurement structures and themes are essential in comparatively assessing 
the bidder remedies systems under review. It may be worthwhile to give concluding analysis 
on these two issues presented above: 
(a) the uniformity or variance in the procurement regimes at the tiers of government; and  
(b) the impact of membership of intergovernmental organizations on the remedies systems. 
                                                          
184 PPA s 19(b)(ii). 
185 PPA s 54(1). 
186 V Ramkumar Expanding Collaboration Between Public Audit Institutions and Civil Society (2007) 4 & 5. 
187 4 & 5. 
188 Public Protector Yes, we Made Mistakes!: report on a investigation into the alleged improper procurement of 
communication services by the Department of the Premier of the Western Cape Provincial Government 1-6-2012 
Report no 1 of 2012/13, 5. 
189 [2014] ZACC 12. 
190 [2016] ZACC 11. 
191 [2017] ZACC 8, 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC), 2017 (3) SA 335 (CC). 
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3 4 1 Uniform or variant procurement regimes  
As seen above, a major difference in the procurement structures of Nigeria and South Africa is 
that while the tiers of government in the latter have a largely uniform procurement regime, the 
former operates separate procurement regimes at the various tiers. These situations have 
implications for the remedies systems under review.  
First, for South Africa, the administrative review forums (treasuries) at the national and 
provinces, and the municipalities, apply the same procurement legislation.192 This may lead to 
a uniform review practice and procedures in South African bidder remedies system. Nigeria’s 
PPA is applied only by federal review forums and to federal procurements. Thus, a uniform 
procurement review practice and procedure apply at the federal level; while, the bidder 
remedies systems of the various states differ. 
Secondly, procurement review decisions of South African courts would easily become 
nation-wide judicial precedents, since in all cases it is the same legislation that the courts 
interpret. This is notwithstanding that there may be divergent interpretation of the courts or 
review forums on the purport of the legislation.193 Since there is no uniform regime at the 
various tiers, decisions of Nigerian courts on federal procurement reviews may not constitute 
judicial precedent for states procurement reviews, except for states that have domesticated the 
federal procurement law.  
Thirdly, South African bidder remedies regime has a nation-wide application; thus, 
suppliers or their legal representatives only need to be conversant with the same regime to 
pursue a review at the various tiers. Whereas, for Nigeria, with variant remedies regimes, 
suppliers would have to ascertain and follow the regime applicable in each government.  
Although it appears that the uniform remedies regime of South Africa has more 
advantage than its Nigeria counterpart, it could be argued that since various tiers of Nigerian 
government have powers to establish their own bidder remedies regimes, such could be more 
responsive in addressing related peculiarities in each domain. For instance, it may be easier for 
                                                          
192 These include Treasury Regulations; Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations; the Systems Act. 
193 For examples, South African courts have given divergent interpretation to s 62of the Systems Act on whether 
disappointed bidders fall within the category of persons covered by the provision. See Jicama 17 (Pty) Ltd v West 
Coast District Municipality 2006 (1) SA 116 (C); Loghdey v Advanced Parking Solutions CC 2009 (5) SA 595 
(C); Total Computer Services (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Manager, Potchefstroom Local Municipality 2008 (4) SA 
346 (T). Contrast with Loghdey v City of Cape Town (Case 100/09) 20-1-2010; and CC Groenewald v M5 
Developments [2010] ZASCA 47. See also G Quinot “Public Procurement” (2010) 1 JQR para 2 1; and Quinot 
(2011) PPLR 196. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
83 
 
a particular government to review or amend its regime in response to emerging local 
circumstances than where all tiers of government apply one regime. 
3 4 2 Membership of intergovernmental organizations  
The membership of Nigeria and South Africa in intergovernmental organizations does not 
directly impact upon their bidder remedies systems for reasons noted above. However, if 
Nigeria and South Africa were to be signatories to procurement rules of intergovernmental 
organizations, such as the GPA and COMESA Procurement Regulations, some of the 
implications for the remedies systems could be that: (1) the grounds for review may be enlarged 
to include the breach of the intergovernmental procurement rules; (2) it may lead to increase in 
number of review cases before the domestic forums as bidders from the member-states may 
invoke reviews pursuant to the intergovernmental rules; (3) the intergovernmental regime may 
establish a parallel review forum; and (4) the bidder remedies systems may have to adjust to 
conform to certain requirements of the intergovernmental procurement regulations. 
 In the next chapter, there shall be an analysis of the countries’ procurement regulatory 
frameworks as they affect the respective bidder remedies systems.  
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Chapter 4 
The Evolving Public Procurement Regulation and Remedies Systems 
4 1 Introduction  
Having seen the importance of public procurement regulation to the operation of a bidder 
remedies system and vice versa,1 this chapter examines the procurement regulatory regimes of 
Nigeria and South Africa. There will, first, be a look at the periods when the countries’ 
procurement systems were scarcely regulated, and the impact on bidder remedies.  Secondly, 
there will be an examination of the structure and content of the current procurement regulatory 
regimes as they relate to bidder remedies. Thirdly, certain characteristics of these regulatory 
regimes that may affect the respective bidder remedies systems are identified and appraised. 
The relationship between the regulatory regimes and relevant elements of bidder remedies 
effectiveness is analysed in the concluding section. 
4 2 Historical development of the regulatory regimes 
As indicated above, there were periods when various aspects of public procurement were not 
regulated in Nigeria and South Africa (pre-2007 and 1997 respectively), before the current 
detailed regulation of public procurement. Those periods are examined to illustrate the point 
earlier made,2 that bidder remedies would hardly apply to any aspect of procurement not subject 
to regulation. It also affords one a ground for speculating on what may obtain in relation to 
bidder remedies in jurisdictions where public procurement is barely or not regulated; while 
exemplifying the reform that could be undertaken in such jurisdictions. Moreover, examining 
the legal histories is relevant to understanding the regulatory regimes, as aspects of past legal 
developments remain embedded in contemporary law and society.3  
4 2 1 Nigeria 
4 2 1 1 Pre-2007 regulatory regime 
There was no statutory regulation of public procurement in Nigeria until 04-07-2007.4 During 
that period, extant Financial Regulations (FR), issued by the Minister of Finance,5 stipulated 
                                                          
1 In chapter 2. 
2 In 2 2 2. 
3 J Phillips “Why Legal History Matters” (2010) 41 VUWLR 293 295; OW Holmes The Common Law (2004) 1. 
4 The period in focus is from 01-10-1960 when Nigeria gained independence.  
5 Pursuant to Finance (Control and Management) Act 1958 Cap F26 LFN 2004, s 4. 
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the composition of Tender Boards for each procuring authority and the limits of their powers, 
but did not prescribe tender procedures. For example, there was no provision in the FR for: bid 
advertisement, rules on procurement methods, bid evaluation criteria, etc.6 The FR is 
essentially an internal set of rules on financial and accounting procedures of the Federal 
Government, addressed to public officers.7 Government circulars were also issued by the 
Minister to supplement or alter the FR.8 Flouting the FR’s and circulars’ directives was a 
criminal offence.9  
At the time under review, states in Nigeria had their respective procurement systems, 
which adapted the Federal procurement regulatory regime,10 notwithstanding its deficiencies. 
These deficiencies and how they impacted on bidder remedies are analysed below. 
4 2 1 2 The deficiencies 
(a) Subjective discretion 
The FR largely left public procurement process to the subjective discretion of the Tender 
Boards.11 Discretion is “subjective” where the enabling legislation provides no criteria against 
which the decision-maker's choices can be measured.12 The existence of discretion itself limits 
judicial control of the related administrative decision since the essence of discretion is to confer 
some flexibility on the decision-maker.13 Moreover, “the doctrine of ultra vires is impotent” in 
reviewing subjective discretion.14 Thus, reviewability of these subjective discretionary 
                                                          
6 World Bank Nigeria Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) vol I (2000) 7. 
7 Preface to the Federal Financial Regulations 2009 GN 291 in GG 72 of 27-10-2009. 
8 An example is circular No F15775 of 27-6-2001 “Policy Guidelines for Procurement and Awards of Contracts 
in Government Ministries and Parastatals”. Related circulars may also be issued by other authorities, including 
the Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation and the Head of Civil Service of the Federation. 
9 Such as criminal insubordination. See Federal Republic of Nigeria v Olabode George LSHC 26-10-2009 suit 
no ID/71c/2008. 
10 Nigeria CPAR vol I 5. 
11 5. 
12 RC Austin “Judicial Review of Subjective Discretion- at the Rubicon, Whither Now?” [1975] 28 Current Legal 
Problems 150 150; M Ginsburg “Discretionary Power in the General Welfare Assistance Act of Ontario” (1987) 2 J 
L & Soc Policy 1 21. See also D Galligan Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures 
(1997) 258-266; Arrowsmith Government Procurement and Judicial Review. 
13 CH Koch Jr “Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion” (1985-1986) 54 Geo Wash L Rev 469 471. Exercise 
of administrative discretion was once regarded as not reviewable: MA Fazai “Judicial Review of Administrative 
Discretion: Anglo-American Perspectives” (1985) 9 Trent L J 23 23. 
14 Austin [1975] Current Legal Problems 150. See Fazai (1985) Trent L J 25; and, Secretary of Education and 
Science v Tameside MBC (1976) 3 All ER 665 (H.L); Padfield v Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997, [1968] 
UKHL 1, [1968] 1 All ER 694. 
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procurement decisions under the FR was limited; in addition to the fact that the common law 
controls of discretion were rarely utilised.15 
(b) Limited cause of action 
Since various aspects of public procurement were not regulated, cause of action16 for 
administrative or judicial review could hardly arise in those aspects as there was no rule to 
breach, except a few applicable common law principles.17 For example, evaluation criteria were 
not prescribed; thus, a bidder would have no ground to challenge any criteria used. 
(c) FR not secure 
The Minister may revise or repeal the FR as he deemed fit.18 Thus, provisions of the FR and 
the limited review grounds that their breach may have afforded subsisted at the Minister’s 
pleasure. 
(d) FR unpublicised and procurement records inaccessible 
The FR and the related circulars were not publicised.19 This presumably made suppliers 
uncertain about the prevailing procurement rules. Such uncertainty is a major disincentive to 
taking legal action.20 The situation was compounded by the provisions of the Official Secrets 
Act 196221 and bureaucratic bottlenecks, which restricted public access to public information. 
Without access to procurement records, bidders could hardly prove breaches of procurement 
rules. 
                                                          
15 See para (e) below. 
16 Cause of action is the entire set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable action. It is the fact or combination 
of facts which gives rise to a right to sue, and consists of two elements: (1) the wrongful act of plaintiff which 
gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, and (2) the consequent damage. See Savage v Uwaechia (1972) 1 All 
NLR (Pt 1) 251 257; Oduntan v Akibu (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt 685) 446 1463 paras C-E; Truter v Deysel [2006] 
ZASCA 16, 2006 (4) SA 168 (SCA) paras 15-18. See further F Nwadialo Civil Procedure in Nigeria 2 ed (2000) 
23-31; MM Loubser Extinctive Prescription (1996) 80 para 4 6 1; and the authorities cited in both books. 
17 See 2 2 2 above. 
18 The extant FR was revised in 2000 and 2009. 
19 See Williams-Elegbe (2012) PCLJ 341. 
20 Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 117; D Pachnou “Bidder's Use of Mechanisms to Enforce EC Procurement Law” 
(2005) 5 PPLR 256 258-259; Pachnou Effectiveness of Bidder Remedies 156; Zhang (2007) PPLR 335. See G 
Quinot (2009) TSAR 443-444.  
21 Cap O3 LFN 2004, ss 1& 9; s 1 made obtaining or transmitting of a classified matter an offence, while s 9 
definition of “classified matter” gave the government a wide ambit to classify documents in order to restrict access 
to them. Although the Nigerian Constitution, s 39(1), guarantees the right to receive information, s 39(3) validates 
laws reasonably justifiable in a democratic society that imposes restriction on government officials to give or 
receive certain information. Thus, the Official Secrets Act was not invalidated by s 39(1). However, there is now 
a Freedom of Information Act 2011 that has modified the operation of the former Act. 
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(e) No statutory bidder remedies 
The FR did not vest review rights and concomitant remedies on bidders.22 Consequently, 
suppliers could only pursue narrow common law remedies available in contract, tort or 
administrative law; which were further narrowed by the limited procurement rules.23 This 
situation, in addition to the substantial time and cost of litigation, may have acted as 
disincentives to bidders’ pursuit of the available common law remedies.24  
To address the above deficiencies, the Nigeria CPAR of 199925 recommended some 
reforms. 
4 2 1 3 Regulatory reforms 
The reforms recommended were numerous;26 but those relevant here include:  
(a) the enactment of a public procurement law based on the UNCITRAL Model Law 
1994; and  
(b) the establishment of a public procurement regulatory body whose function shall 
include acting as a review forum to deal with complaints from bidders. 
The Federal Government in response enacted the Public Procurement Act (PPA) in 2007, based 
on the UNCITRAL Model Law.27 It introduced far-reaching reforms, among which included 
the establishment of the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), whose functions includes acting 
as an administrative review forum on procurement complaints. The PPA is comprehensive, and 
the overarching statute on Nigeria’s federal procurement.28 Notwithstanding, there is an extant 
FR,29 which, among others, contains provisions on public procurement (mostly restating the 
                                                          
22 Nigeria CPAR vol I 5. 
23 See 2 2 2; also, Williams-Elegbe (2012) PCLJ 341. 
24 358; Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Procurement Regulation 313; O Oko “Seeking Justice in Transitional 
Societies: An Analysis of the Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria” (2005) 31 Brook J Int’l L 9 39–
41; Pachnou (2005) PPLR 258-259; Pachnou Effectiveness of Bidder Remedies 284-285; Zhang (2007) PPLR 
336. Only few cases on public procurement were known to have arisen in Nigeria before the enactment of the 
PPA. They include CBN v System Application Products Nigeria Limited (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt 911) 152; Federal 
Republic of Nigeria v Olabode George LSHC 26-10-2009 suit no ID/71c/2008). 
25 Undertaken jointly by the World Bank and the Nigerian Government. 
26 Contained in Nigeria CPAR vols I and II. 
27 UNCITRAL “Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services (1994)” 
(2015) UNCITRAL 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model_status.html> 
(accessed 15-10-2015). 
28 PPA ss 15, 16(23). 
29 Financial Regulations 2009 GN 291 in GG 72 of 27-10-2009. 
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PPA).30 However, its procurement provisions are subject to the PPA.31  There is a brief review 
of the PPA in 4 3 2 1. 
As will be seen immediately below, South Africa has a similar procurement regulatory 
history with Nigeria, in terms of deficiencies of the past regulatory regime and support by the 
World Bank towards reforming it. 
4 2 2 South Africa  
4 2 2 1 Pre-1997 regulatory regime 
The year 1997 was when the 1996 Constitution, which stipulated regulatory principles of public 
procurement, came into effect.32 Prior to 1997,33 public procurement was centralised and 
various aspects of it were not regulated, notwithstanding the existence of the State Tender 
Board Act (“STB Act”),34 which was intended to regulate public procurement and disposal of 
government assets.35 Rather than prescribing procurement procedures; the Act merely 
established the State Tender Board (Board),36 with powers to centrally undertake full 
procurement and disposal functions for the state, as it deemed fit.37 Thus, procurement 
procedures were entirely determined by the Board. Furthermore, the Minister of Finance had 
powers, pursuant to sections 4(1)(h) and 13 of the Act, to make regulations to confer more 
powers on the Board and to achieve the objects of the Act. Consequently, regulations were 
made to extend the powers of the Board; for example, to debar contractors that defaulted on 
                                                          
30 Chapters 29-31.   
31 PPA ss 15, 16(23); FR 2009 reg 2312. 
32 On 04-02-1997.  
33 The period in focus here is from 1961 when South Africa became a republic under the Constitution of South 
Africa Act 32 of 1961.  
34 Before this were the Exchequer and Audit Act 21 of 1911, replaced by Act 23 of 1956; and regulations made 
in terms of the Acts. However, regulation of public procurement under these Acts and their Regulations were 
similar to that under the STB Act. See SP Le Roux de la Harpe Public Procurement Law: A Comparative Analysis 
LLD thesis UNISA (2009) 249-268. 
35 See the long title. 
36 It also in s 2A empowered the Finance Minister to establish the Regional (Provincial) Tender Boards for the 
Provinces. 
37 Section 4. Its procurement function was only subject to s 4(1)(a) of the Armament Act 87 of 1964 (repealed in 
1968 by the Armaments Development and Production Act 57 of 1968); and its disposal function was subject to 
any Act that may be made. However, the Armament Act never constrained the procurement powers of the Board, 
neither did any Act limit its disposal powers. 
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contract execution or that acted corruptly.38 However, the Minister never made related 
regulations on procurement procedures. 
Other pre-1996 legislation that had provisions that related to procurement included the 
National Supplies Procurement Act 89 of 1970, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act 200 of 1993 (the Interim Constitution),39 and Auditor-General Act 12 of 1995.40 National 
Supplies Procurement Act empowered the Minister of Trade and Industries, whenever he 
deems necessary or expedient for the security of the Republic, to undertake procurement 
without recourse to the Board and on such conditions as he may deem fit.41 The Interim 
Constitution mandated that government procurement shall be regulated by an Act and 
provincial laws, providing for a procurement system that shall be fair, public, competitive, and 
handled by independent and impartial tender boards that record and provide reasons for their 
decisions.42 In Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board,43 it was held that the above 
constitutional provisions did not constitute procurement rules; rather, they were only directives 
to the relevant legislatures to establish the system envisaged through statutes. Nevertheless, it 
was opined that the constitutional provisions could be read into the STB Act and to that extent 
enforceable by review or interdict.44 The provisions did not contribute much to bidder remedies 
as the Interim Constitution lasted for three years characterised by political and legal transition; 
which did not allow sufficient time to utilize the minimal opportunity for remedies that they 
provided.45 The Auditor-General Act empowered the Auditor General to certify that 
satisfactory management measures have been taken to ensure that resources are procured 
economically and utilised efficiently and effectively.46  
The deficiencies of this regulatory regime and its impact on bidder remedies are 
considered below. 
                                                          
38 Amendment to Regulations of the State Tender Board Act in Terms of Section 13, 2003 (STB Regulations), reg 
5(a). 
39 Repealed by SA Constitution, s 242. 
40 Repealed by s 53 of the Public Audit Act. 
41 Section 2a. See World Bank South Africa Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) vol II (2003) 7. 
42 Section 187(1)-(4). 
43 [2001] ZASCA 51 paras 17-19, 22. 
44 Paragraph 26. 
45 The court in Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board (698/98) [2001] ZASCA 51 did not accept that 
the provisions supported a claim for delictual damages premised on an allegation that the Tender Board failed to 
appraise the plaintiff’s tender independently and impartially. 
46 Section 3(4)(d) 
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4 2 2 2 The deficiencies 
(a) Wide discretion, limited cause of action 
As seen above, the centralised procuring authorities had wide and subjective discretion in 
undertaking virtually all their procurement and disposal functions. This limited the 
reviewability of procurement decisions, as was the case in Nigeria. Equally, the lack of 
procurement regulation had constrained cause of action to pursue procurement review. This is 
illustrated by the fact that bidder remedies cases rarely arose in this jurisdiction within this 
period,47 compared to the plethora of cases following post 1997 regulation of public 
procurement proceedings.48  
(b) No statutory review right 
No pre-1997 legislation vested review right on bidders. Thus, the only recourse for aggrieved 
bidders was the restricted common law remedies (usually cumbersome and costly);49 
constrained even further by the limited legislative regulation of procurement.50 
(c) Legislative constraints 
The STB Act limited bidders’ review right by providing that the Board may, without giving 
reasons, accept or reject any offer for the conclusion of a procurement contract.51 Moreover, 
the Board’s proceedings and decisions were kept confidential, with disclosure at the sole 
discretion of the Board.52 Absence of such reasons denied aggrieved bidders the grounds upon 
                                                          
47 Such cases found by the author are: (1) 3D ID Systems (Pty) Ltd (liquidated) review application at the High 
Court, in 1994 against the Cape Provincial Administration (defunct) for fraudulently awarding tender to Nisec 
CC, which metamorphosed into Minister of Finance v Gore NO [2006] ZASCA 98, [2006] SCA 97 (RSA); (2) a 
1995 case challenging an award for not complying with advertised tender conditions, which metamorphosed into 
Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO [2002] ZASCA 135, [2003] 1 All SA 424 (SCA); (3) Olitzki Property 
Holdings v State Tender Board [2001] ZASCA 51, which involved a judicial review application  in 1995/1996 
challenging a procurement decision, based on the procurement and fundamental rights provisions of the Interim 
Constitution.  
48 Author found over 500 decided bidder remedies cases. These are in addition to unreported administrative review 
cases.  
49 Bolton Government Procurement 310; Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace Jr Regulating Public Procurement 
752.  
50 See 2 2 2; de la Harpe Public Procurement 268; Pretoria North Town Council v A.1 Electric Ice-Cream Factory 
(Pty) Ltd 1953(3) SA 1 (A).  
51 Section 4(1)(d).  
52 Public Affairs Research Institute The Contract State: Outsourcing & Decentralisation in Contemporary South 
Africa (2014) 13-15; de la Harpe Public Procurement Law 268. 
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which to challenge the Board’s decision, such as the ground of reasonableness.53 and, 
nondisclosure of procurement information hampered identification of infringement. However, 
this statutory constraint was removed 3 years to the end of this period by the Interim 
Constitution, section 187(2) that mandated that reasons for procurement decisions shall be 
given upon request to an interested person.  
Also, the STB Regulations stipulated that the Board may accept an offer which does 
not comply with the tender conditions set out in a tender invitation,54 and it was not obliged to 
award a tender to the lowest bid.55 These further diminished the already limited bidders’ right 
at common law. If not for the Regulations,56  it could have been regarded that there was an 
implied contract to consider the tender based on the advertised tender conditions;57 secondly, 
the lowest bidder could have been entitled to sue for enforcement if invitation to bid stated that 
contract shall be awarded to the lowest bidder.58  
 (d) Enforcement rights restricted 
Although the regulatory regime provided for enforcement mechanisms other than bidder 
remedies, those mechanisms were hardly of benefit to suppliers. For instance, the STB 
Regulations59 empowered the Board to debar any supplier for a stipulated period for non-
performance of contract or corruption; however, its effect was not to correct the damage caused 
but to punish the debarred supplier.60 Also, the Board exercised subjective discretion in 
determining whether to debar or not; which means that the success of a supplier to judicially 
compel the Board to debar was slim.61   
                                                          
53 On how given reasons for decisions provides grounds for review see Bolton Government Procurement 19-20 
and Grinaker LTA Ltd v Tender Board (Mpumalanga) [2002] 3 All SA 336 (T). 
54 Reg 5(c). 
55 Reg 5(a). 
56 Tender/solicitation documents are to be read subject to the Regulations; Indiza Airport Management (Pty) Ltd 
v Msunduzi Municipality KNHC (SA) 16-11-2012 case no 374/12. 
57 Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO [2002] ZASCA 135, [2003] 1 All SA 424 (SCA); Blackpool and Flyde 
Aero Club v BC [1990] 1 WLR 1195. See also Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement 107-108; Craig 
“Developments in the Law of Tenders: Radical or Evolutionary Development?” (2003) 19 Const LJ 237. In 
Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd v The Corporate Officer of the House of Commons (2000) 2 LGLR 372, QBD, 
H Lloyd J. opined that legislative scheme is a crucial element in determining the content of an implied contract.  
58 Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust of Canada (CI) Ltd [1986] AC 207. See 2 2 2 above. 
59 Regulation 3(5)(a). 
60 Williams-Elegbe Corruption in Public Procurement 34; S Williams “The Use of Exclusions for Corruption in 
Developing Country Procurement: The Case of South Africa” (2007) JAL 51(1) 1 11-12. 
61 See fn 14 above. 
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Procurement certification by the Auditor-General under the defunct Auditor-General 
Act could have served to administratively enforce value for money; but it was not designed to 
offer remedies or protection to suppliers. First, audits are undertaken after the conclusion of 
procurement proceedings and contract; thus, it may only expose but not correct irregularities. 
Secondly, its focus was to certify that satisfactory management measures62 were taken, not that 
procurement procedures were followed. Besides, satisfactory managerial measures were not 
defined to enable one to determine whether they have been flouted. Thirdly, the prescribed 
audit functions were routine, thereby obviating the need for suppliers to instigate or compel the 
performance.  
The above situation neither protected contractors from unfair public procurement 
decisions nor supported an efficient procurement system. Generally, the pre-1997 regulatory 
regime was out of sync with: (1) the then emerging global standardization of public 
procurement regulation; and (2) the political transformation in South Africa in the 1990s geared 
toward administrative justice and fairness. This necessitated the law reforms seen below. 
4 2 2 3 Regulatory reforms 
The legal reforms that followed the political transformation of South Africa extended to public 
procurement; starting with the enactment of the 1996 Constitution, followed by several pieces 
of other procurement-related legislation that will be discussed in 4 3 below. A Task Force was 
set up in 1995, with technical and financial support from a World Bank IDF Grant,63 to 
recommend relevant procurement reforms. Its recommendations were contained in the 10 Point 
Interim Strategy (1996); and later, in the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform 
in South Africa.64 Among the recommendations were, that:65 
(a) a "National Procurement Framework" be enacted, prescribing uniform tender 
procedures, policies and control measures, and preference policies; and  
(b) a "National Procurement Compliance Office" be created to oversee and control the 
Framework's implementation.  The Office would replace the state and provincial 
tender boards, which would relinquish their functions to procuring organs of state. 
                                                          
62 These may include: market survey, budgeting, bookkeeping, and efficient stores management. 
63 US$ 487,000. See SA CPAR I 1. 
64 Notice 691 of 1997. Both documents provided the roadmap or template for procurement reforms in South 
Africa. 
65 Para 2.3.7. 
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However, the recommendations were not formalized and implemented in a comprehensive and 
coherent manner, as identified by the South African CPAR of 2003.66 Consequently, several 
Acts containing procurement related matters were enacted.67 Nevertheless, the deficiencies in 
the pre-1997 legislative regime have been addressed by the current legislative frameworks, as 
will be seen in 4 3 2 below. 
4 3 The current regulatory regimes 
This section first examines the various modes of regulating public procurement under the 
current regulatory regimes, and their implications for the remedies systems. Secondly, the 
current procurement legislative frameworks are reviewed, with a focus on the provisions that 
affect bidder remedies, especially as they address the deficiencies identified above. Pieces of 
legislation that touch upon public procurement in more indirect ways or that merely support 
bidder remedies, such as legislation on access to information, administrative justice, court 
procedures, etc., are not examined here. They will be treated at relevant parts in subsequent 
chapters.   
4 3 1 Structure of the regulatory frameworks 
4 3 1 1 Introduction  
The subtopic relates to the various hierarchy and modes of regulating public procurement in 
both jurisdictions. Considering these regulatory structures are relevant for various reasons. 
First, it indicates the extent to which public procurement is regulated in these jurisdictions; for 
as will be seen below, there are statutes on procurement that are less detailed, and then 
regulations and other regulatory instruments that supplement and detail the provisions of the 
former.68 Detailed procurement rules limit discretion of procuring officials;69 and may 
consequently enhance review grounds for bidders.  
Secondly, it is important that the various forms of the regulatory frameworks be 
differentiated, and their hierarchy firmly established to minimize inconsistencies in 
application.70 This is even more significant in jurisdictions with fragmented legislative 
                                                          
66 Vol I iii. This CPAR was a joint undertaken between the South African Government and the World Bank to 
study and analyse the public procurement system in South Africa existing as at 2001. 
67 The effects of this are discussed in 4 4 below. 
68 As suggested by the Guide to Enactment 49; and, OECD-DACMAPS 9.  
69 See Guide to Enactment 102. 
70 OECD-DACMAPS 9. 
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frameworks that are not structured in any systematic way, as is the case in South Africa.71 Also, 
the hierarchy of procurement rules contravened may determine whether a review authority may 
set aside the affected decision or allow it. For example, breach of any applicable constitutional 
or statutory rules will most likely result in a set aside of the decision.72 However, a breach of 
an administrative (or procedural) provision may escape set aside, depending on: (1) whether 
the enabling legislation contemplated that such breach should attract nullification of the 
affected decision, and (2) the materiality of the breach.73 Furthermore, the stability of different 
regulatory provisions and of the entire systems depends on where in the hierarchy of the legal 
frameworks the different provisions are contained.74 For instance, statutory provisions are more 
stable, as they are only amendable by parliamentary process, whereas regulations and others 
lower in hierarchy are easily modifiable by administrative authorities. 
 The procurement regulatory frameworks in both jurisdictions are in the form of statutes, 
subordinate legislation, other regulatory instruments and case law, as presented below. 
4 3 1 2 Statutes 
The Public Procurement Act (“PPA”) is the only Nigerian federal procurement statute. 
Conversely, there are several statutes directly regulating public procurement in South Africa, 
which include: the Constitution, the Public Finance Management Act (“PFMA”), the Local 
Government: Municipal Finance Management Act (“MFMA”), the Preferential Procurement 
                                                          
71 Quinot (2011) PPLR 194. See also 4 4 2 below. 
72 Nigerian Constitution s 1(1) & (3); Osimene v Commissioner for Agriculture, Water Resources and Rural 
Development [2003] 22 WRN 125; SA Constitution, ss 2 &172(1)(1): the courts “must declare that any law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.” See Allpay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO of SASSA [2013] ZACC 42, 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) paras 72, 
98; Tongoane v National Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs [2010] ZACC 10, 2010 (6) SA 214 (CC), 
2010 (8) BCLR 741 (CC); Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly [2006] ZACC 11, 
2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC), 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC). 
73 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO of SASSA [2013] ZACC 42 paras 28-30, 62, 72, 98: 
overruled the treatment of materiality in CEO, SASSA NO v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZASCA 
13, [2011] 3 All SA 233 (SCA), 2012 (1) SA 216 (SCA) para 28. See Nokeng Tsa Taemane Local Municipality v 
Dinokeng Property Owners Association [2010] ZASCA 128 para 14; Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil 
Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd 2010 (4) SA 359 (SCA). The principle referred to and the authorities are from 
South Africa. However, a related principle that apply to Nigeria, and to an extent, South Africa, is that where the 
administrative or procedural provision is merely directory, not mandatory, the non-compliance shall not be invalid 
or attract a set aside. See O' Reilly v Macknian (1983) 2 AC 237 275H -237 276A; UNTH Management Board v 
Nnoli [1994] 8 NWLR (Pt 363) 376; CEO, SASSA NO v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZASCA 13 
para 28; contra: Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO of SASSA [2013] ZACC 42, 2014 (1) 
BCLR 1 (CC) para 30. 
74 OECD-DACMAPS 9. 
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Policy Framework Act (“PPPFA”), the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 
of 2003 (“B-BBEE Act”), the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (“the Systems Act”), 
and the STB Act. The fact that two or more statutes apply to the same subject-matter does not 
necessarily mean that there is a conflict. However, the provisions of these South African 
statutes do not always clearly align.75 In the event of a conflict, the provisions of the specific 
as opposed to the general legislative provisions shall prevail.76 Also, there is a presumption in 
law that a latter statute superseded a former statute where a conflict arises.77 These legal 
principles are applicable in resolving inconsistencies among pieces of procurement legislation. 
The statutes are analysed respectively under 4 3 2 and 4 3 3 below. 
4 3 1 3 Subordinate legislation  
Subordinate procurement legislation within these jurisdictions is in the form of regulations, 
instructions notes, and practice notes.  
(a) Regulations  
These are promulgated by authorised persons (such as a Minister) or bodies (such as the BPP 
or the National Treasury), by virtue of an enabling statute, to provide detailed rules that will 
apply to related matters, or to generally give effect to the enabling statute. Regulations follow 
directly after statutes in hierarchy, and where there is a conflict between the two, statutes 
(particularly the enabling statute) prevail.78 There are currently two federal procurement 
regulations in Nigeria issued by BPP, viz. Public Procurement (Consultancy Services) 
                                                          
75 Quinot (2011) PPLR 194. See 4 4 2. 
76 Pursuant to the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant (meaning: universal things do not detract from 
specific things). P St J Langan Maxwell on the interpretation of statutes 12 ed (1976) 196; L Du Plessis Re-
Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 72-73. See Sidumo v The Rustenburg Platinum Mines 2006 (2) SA 311 S (CC); 
Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau [2014] ZACC 18, 2014 (8) BCLR 930 (CC), 2014 (5) SA 69 
para 78. See also Ibori v Ogboru [2004] 15 NWLR [Pt 895] 154; Matari v Dangaladima [1993] 3 NWLR (Pt 281) 
266. 
77 By virtue of the maxim lex posterior priori derogate or leges posteriors priorers contrarias abrogant (meaning 
subsequent laws repeal prior enacted laws to the contrary). I Currie & J De Waal (eds) The New Constitutional 
and Administrative Law 34; J De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) 170; Du Plessis Re-
Interpretation 72-73. New Modderfontein Gold Mining Co v Tvl Provincial Administration 1919 AD 367 397; 
Joseph v City of Johannesburg [2009] ZACC 30, 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC), 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) para 66; Olu of 
Warri v Kperegbeyi [1994] 4 NWLR (Pt 339) 416; Governor of Kaduna State v Kagoma (1982) All NLR 162 
173. 
78 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2005] ZACC 14, 2006 (8) BCLR 872 (CC), 2006 (2) 
SA 311 (CC) paras 677 790; Van Rooyen v The State [2002] ZACC 8, 2002 (5) SA 246, 2002 (8) BCLR 810 paras 
202, 210; INEC v Balarabe Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt 806) 72, (2003) 1 SCNJ 1. 
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Regulations 2007 and Public Procurement (Goods and Works) Regulations 2007.79 
Procurement related regulations in South Africa include: Treasury Regulations, Municipal 
Supply Chain Management Regulations, and Preferential Procurement Regulations. These 
regulations have provisions on bidder remedies that are analysed below. 
(b) Instruction and practice notes  
These are subordinate legislation peculiar to South Africa, issued by the National Treasury, in 
the form of an official memo addressed to accounting officers/accounting authorities and heads 
of provincial treasuries, given them directives and addressing contemporary (and usually 
urgent) policy or practice matters.80 They are issued pursuant to section 76(4)(c) of the PFMA. 
They may be considered lower in hierarchy than regulations since the latter are promulgated 
and guide all parties involved in procurement. Thus, in the case of a conflict between the two 
the latter may prevail. Practice/instruction notes are relevant to bidder remedies since they 
regulate procurement practices and procedures and may be relied upon to challenge procuring 
entities’ non-compliant decisions. For example, in Sgananda Consulting (Pty) Ltd v Mnambithi 
FET College,81 the unsuccessful bidder who had been called by the Bid Evaluation Committee 
to clarify its bid relied upon a clause: “Requests for clarification and the bidder’s responses 
should be made in writing.”: in an Instruction Note, to challenge the tender award. The court 
however held that the clause was not a prescriptive direction as it used the term “should”, but 
rather a guide to good practice.82  There is currently no instruction/practice note that deals 
directly with bidder remedies. 
4 3 1 4 Policy instruments  
These include: guidelines (also guides), procurement manuals, circulars and standard bidding 
documents (SBDs).83 They are issued mostly by procurement regulatory bodies, such as the 
Nigerian BPP and the South African National Treasury, to supplement or operationalize 
                                                          
79 Government Notice nos 78 & 79 respectively. 
80 See for example, Practice Note on Prohibition of Restrictive Practices:  Certificate of Independent Bid 
Determination: Standard Bidding Document of 21-07-2010; Instruction Note on Enhancing Compliance 
Monitoring and Improving Transparency and Accountability in Supply Chain Management of 31-05-2011. The 
use of practice/instruction notes was mention in G Quinot “The Role of Quality in the Adjudication of Public 
Tenders” (2014) 17(3) PER/PELJ 1109 1121-1122, and in P Bolton “Grounds for Dispensing with Public Tender 
Procedures in Government Contracting” (2006) 9(2) PER/PELJ 1 6. 
81 (4329/14) [2014] ZAKZPHC 28 (20-5-2014).  
82 Paragraph 12-13. 
83 On the role of subordinate procurement legislation or instruments see OECD-DAC MAPS 16-19. 
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specific aspects of the law or to establish or implement policies. The issuance is largely in 
exercise of incidental or inherent powers of administration, not pursuant to express statutory 
provisions. Apart from the SBDs that are mainly directed at suppliers, the other instruments 
are issued to direct and guide government officials and organisations.84 Thus, they may be 
considered as lower in hierarchy than the aforementioned subordinate legislation, where there 
is a conflict. Although they may not be regarded as legislation in the strict sense, they guide 
conduct, and a supplier or a procuring entity may rely on at least some of them to claim a right 
or establish an obligation, or to challenge or defend a procurement decision or action, 
respectively. Thus, they indirectly affect bidder remedies. The various kinds are briefly 
examined below. 
(a) Guidelines (guides) and manuals  
These are an important implementation tool that can help provide procurement officials with 
information that incorporates the law, policy and procedures and helps turn policy into 
practice.85 Examples include, for Nigeria: Procurement Procedures Manual for Public 
Procurement in Nigeria 2011;86 for South Africa: Implementation Guide: Preferential 
Procurement Regulations 2017, and, Supply Chain Management: A Guide for Accounting 
Officers/Authorities 2004.87  
(b) Government circulars  
They are used to disseminate procurement policy information and directives within government 
circles, by relevant authorities, particularly the procurement regulatory bodies in both 
jurisdictions.88 They are addressed to and intended to guide actions of government officials and 
organisations; however, procurement related circulars are increasingly being published on the 
website of BPP and the National Treasury.89 It is unclear whether a procuring entity’s or its 
official’s non-compliance with a circular directive could be a sole ground for a bidder to seek 
                                                          
84 OECD-DAC MAPS 16.  
85 OECD-DAC MAPS 18. 
86 Issued by BPP. 
87 They are issued by the National Treasury. Accessible at 
<http://www.treasury.gov.za/divisions/ocpo/sc/Guidelines/default.aspx> (accessed 15-10-2017) 
88 In Nigeria, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation also issues procurement related circulars on behalf 
of the Federal Executive Council. 
89 See <http://www.bpp.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=146&Itemid=799> and 
<http://www.treasury.gov.za/divisions/ocpo/sc/Circulars/> (both accessed 15-10-2017) respectively. 
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to review and invalidate a procurement decision.90 Considering the opinion of the court in 
Sgananda Consulting (Pty) Ltd v Mnambithi FET College,91 it is arguable that circular 
directives are not, in a technical sense, prescriptive; and that they are internal administrative 
instructions not intended to confer rights on suppliers.92 It is even more so in Nigeria, as the 
PPA provides that a complaint/challenge can arise where there is a breach of the Act, or any 
regulations or guidelines made under it or the provisions of bidding documents.93 Thus, 
government circulars are not mentioned; although it is arguable that “guidelines” may be 
deemed to include circulars. The UNCITRAL Model Law, art 64(1), mentions only non-
compliance with the law itself as ground for challenge; however, the regulations made pursuant 
to it could be deemed as part of the law. For South Africa, its procurement legislation does not 
mention any regulatory texts or instruments whose contravention will sustain a 
complaint/challenge; the Treasury Regulations only mentions “non-compliance with the 
prescribed minimum norm and standards”,94 which may arguably include circular directives.  
(c) Standard Bidding Documents (SBDs)  
In both jurisdictions, SBDs are documents issued by the respective procurement regulatory 
agencies, through the procuring entities, to bidders to adapt in preparing their bids. They 
contain documentation and clauses that govern the bidding process and are incorporated into 
the resultant contracts.95  Thus, they confer rights and obligations on bidders and procuring 
entities to the extent that their breach is a clear ground for a review.96 Note that as earlier 
                                                          
90 In Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO, SASSA (2014) (1) SA 604 (CC), 2014 (1) BCLR 
1 (CC), [2013] ZACC 42 para 38, the court held that “The Circular and the Request for Proposals, read together 
with the constitutional and legislative procurement provisions, thus constituted the legally binding and enforceable 
framework within which tenders had to be submitted, evaluated and awarded. (Emphasis supplied).  
91 [2014] ZAKZPHC 28 (20-5-2014). 
92 In Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd [2005] ZASCA 90, 2008 (2) 
SA 638 (SCA), [2005] 4 All SA 487 (SCA) para 12, the court held that it was unnecessary to attach weight to or 
rely on an internal government document entitled ‘Conditions Pertaining to Targeted Procurement’, as reliance 
should rather be on the requirement of the PPPFA. 
93 Section 54(1). 
94 Reg 16A9.3. 
95 BPP has produced about five sets of SBDs available at BPP’s website. Practice Note No SCM 1 of 2003 referred 
to SBDs produced by the National Treasury. 
96 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO, SASSA (2014) (1) SA 604 (CC), 2014 (1) BCLR 1 
(CC), [2013] ZACC 42 para 38: “The Request for Proposals, all the appended documentation and the proposal in 
response thereto, read together, formed the basis for the formal contract…”  The review sought and the decision 
of court in CBN v System Application Products Nigeria Limited (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt 911) 152 were based on the 
provisions of the bidding documents. See also Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics 
(Pty) Ltd [2005] ZASCA 90, 2008 (2) SA 638 (SCA) paras 13-14. 
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mentioned, the PPA, section 54(1), specifically states that breach of bidding documents is a 
ground for challenge/review. 
4 3 1 5 Case law 
Principles of contract, tort/delict, administrative and constitutional law, rules of interpretation, 
and court procedural rules, developed by the courts are applied in procurement review. 
Procurement legislation may imply or prescribe judicial review of procurement decisions, but 
it generally leaves the courts to apply the procedures, laws, principles and remedies already 
known to it.97 Consequently, the decisions of courts on procurement review have clarified, 
modified or supplemented the provisions of procurement legislation.98 As noted earlier, 
Nigerian and South African courts share a common law heritage; so they apply largely similar 
case law principles in entertaining procurement litigation. Distinctions may however exist in 
some instances, including the use of terminologies, as seen below.  
 It is apposite to mention a few of the applicable case law principles that are frequently 
applied in procurement review cases in these jurisdictions. They are listed below (with a few 
bidder remedies cases and related literature in support), without attempting to discuss how they 
apply to procurement review, as that is undertaken in subsequent chapters. 
• Contract: invitation to treat, offer and acceptance, incorporating documents by 
reference, etc.99 
• Tort/delict: vicarious liability, damages for fraud and misrepresentation, etc.100 
• Administrative Law: principles of public duty, public policy, invalidity, ultra vires, 
procedural unfairness, unreasonableness; mistake of fact; mandamus; 
interdict/injunction (South Africa/Nigeria); set aside; etc.101 
                                                          
97 See Guide to Enactment 235 para 35, 237. 
98 For example, Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v CEO, SASSA NO [2009] ZAGPPHC 169 established that s 
217 of the SA Constitution applies in inter-organ of state procurement; Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry 
of Water Resources FHCAbj 12-6-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/867/11 61-62 held that since PPA s 1(1) has 
established the NCPP, it is deemed to be in operation notwithstanding that it is yet to be inaugurated.  
99 CBN v System Application Products Nigeria Limited (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 911) 152 (generally); AllPay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO, SASSA (No 2) [2014] ZACC 12 para 56 (incorporation of 
documents). 
100 Minister of Finance v Gore NO 2007 (1) SA 111 (SCA) (generally); on damages see Transnet Limited v 
Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Limited 2005 (1) SA 299 (SCA); South African Post Office v De Lacy 2009 (5) SA 255 
(SCA) paras 2-5. See also Quinot (2011) PPLR 204-205. 
101 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) paras 54 55(a) 99 (public 
policy); Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO, SASSA (2014 (1) SA 604 (CC) paras 42-43 
88 (unreasonableness, procedural fairness), 17 20 26 56 (invalidity, public policy); Eskom Holdings v The New 
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• Constitutional law: doctrine of vagueness, unconstitutionality, etc.102 
• Evidence: assessment of evidence, affidavit evidence, etc.103 
• Procedural law: Ripeness, fair hearing, modes of commencing proceedings, locus 
standi, costs, judgment enforcement, etc.104 
• Principles of interpretation: rules/maxims of interpretation.105 
Since hierarchy of legislation was considered above, a relevant issue is where decided cases on 
bidder remedies stand vis-à-vis legislation. Generally, statutory provisions can alter or override 
existing case law.106 However, based on judicial precedent, a subsisting judicial interpretation 
given to a statutory provision is regarded as the purport of that provision, even if its wordings 
indicate the contrary.107 Also, by judicial review, a court can declare a statutory provision 
unconstitutional and therefore void; or declare a subordinate legislation invalid for 
                                                          
Reclamation Group 2009 (4) SA 628 (SCA) para 11 (set aside); Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 
[2001] ZASCA 51 paras 26 31 38-39 (interdict); Chairman, STB v Digital Voice Processing (Pty) Ltd; Chairman, 
STB v Sneller Digital (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZASCA 202 paras 1 34-36 (mistake of facts); Cupero Nigeria Limited v 
Federal Ministry of Water Resources Abj FHC/Abj/CS/867/11 12-6-2012 74-76 (injunction, set aside). See also 
C Forsyth & E Dring “The Final Frontier: the Emergence of Material Error of Fact as a Ground for Judicial 
Review” in C Forsyth, M Elliot, S Jhaveri, M Ramsden & A Scully-Hill (eds) Effective Judicial Review: A 
Cornerstone of Good Governance (2010) 245 250-257; and generally Quinot (2011) PPLR 193; Quinot (2009) 
TSAR 436; Quinot (2008) Stell LR  101. 
102 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO, SASSA (2014 (1) SA 604 (CC) paras 41 87-88 93 
98(3) (vagueness, unconstitutionality). 
103On evidence generally: Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO, SASSA (2014 (1) SA 604 
(CC) 44 94 98(5). Affidavit evidence: Indiza Airport Management (Pty) Ltd v Msunduzi Municipality (374/12) 
[2012] ZAKZPHC 74, [2013] 1 All SA 340; CBN v System Application Products Nigeria Limited (2005) 3 NWLR 
(Pt. 911) 152. 
104 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO, SASSA (2014 (1) SA 604 (CC) 26 (fair hearing), 
97 (cost); Sgananda Consulting (Pty) Ltd v Mnambithi FET College [2014] ZAKZPHC 28 (20-5-2014) paras 24-
25 (locus standi); ripeness: Chairman, STB v Sneller Digital (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZASCA 202 paras 16-23; Integrated 
Remediation Limited v Federal Ministry of Environment Abj FHC/Abj/CS/841/2010 14/11/2012. See also C 
Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 518-520, and Baxter Administrative Law 720. 
105 Some were earlier discussed. 
106 O Ogbu Modern Nigeria Legal System 3ed (2013) 138; Hon Lord Justice Elias The Rise of the 
Strasbourgeoisie: Judicial Activism and the ECHR paper presented at the Annual Lord Renton Lecture of Statute 
Law Society held at Institute of Advanced Legal Studies London, 25-11-2009 1-2 at 
<www.statutelawsociety.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/EliasLectureSLS24.11.09FINAL.doc> (accessed 
15-10-2017). 
107 Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: In Re S v Walters [2002] ZACC 6; 2002 (4) SA 613; 2002 (7) BCLR 
663 paras 55-61. See RWM Dias Jurisprudence 5 ed (1985) 126-132; AO Yusuff “Legal Reasoning in 
Legislation” in A Sanni (ed) Introduction to Nigerian Legal Method (2006) 197 231-232. However, Lord Diplock 
had cautioned in Carter v Bradbeer (1975) 3 All ER 158 161, that the ratio decidendi of a judgment as to the 
meaning of particular words in a particular statutory provision should not have more than a persuasive influence 
on a court which is called on to interpret the same words appearing in some other statutory provision. 
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contravening the constitution or enabling legislation.108 These further illustrate the importance 
of case law to the bidder remedies systems and to procurement law enforcement generally, as 
will be considered in subsequent chapters. 
4 3 2 Review of relevant legislation  
4 3 2 1 Nigeria  
4 3 2 1 1 The Public Procurement Act  
The PPA is the first public procurement statute in Nigeria, and has become a model for the 
states in the federation wishing to enact their own procurement laws. As an Act, alterable only 
by the National Assembly, it establishes a significantly secure public procurement and bidder 
remedies systems. The public procurement policy objectives of Nigerian federal government 
are captured by section 16(1)(d)-(f) thus:  
“[A]ll public procurement shall be conducted . . . in a manner which is transparent, 
timely, equitable for ensuring accountability and conformity with this Act and 
regulations deriving therefrom; with the aim of achieving value for money and fitness 
for purpose; in a manner which promotes competition, economy and efficiency”.  
The above largely corresponds with the procurement objectives suggested by the 1994 
Model Law,109 which many national procurement systems have adopted. The relationship 
between procurement policy objectives and bidder remedies was discussed in 2 2 3. 
The PPA contains 61 detailed sections divided into thirteen parts, covering all the stages 
of the procurement cycle. The Act applies to all procurement of goods, works and services 
undertaken by the Federal Government and its agencies; and any other body that undertakes a 
project funded by up to 35 per cent contribution by the Federal Government.110 Such 
procurement must be carried out in strict adherence to the provisions of the Act and its 
regulations.111 Only minimal discretion is allowed procuring entities and their officials, as it 
                                                          
108 Igwenyi Modern Constitutional Law 85-92; BO Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa: The Role of 
Courts in Government (1977) 229; van Staden “The Role of the Judiciary in Balancing Flexibility and Security” 
(2013) 30 De jure 470 483-486. INEC v Alhaji Balarabe Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt 806) 72, (2003) 1 SCNJ 1; 
Van Rooyen v The State [2002] ZACC 8, 2002 (5) SA 246 paras 88 95 & 158. 
109 The preamble. 
110 Section 15(1).  
111 Section 16(23). 
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establishes detailed rules (in mandatory terms: “shall”, “must”) for organising, planning and 
implementing procurement. The discretion allowed is objective as the Act and its regulations 
stipulate criteria or conditions for its exercise. For example, open competitive bidding is the 
default procurement method;112 alternative methods may be used but subject to the conditions 
stipulated.113 Another example is that domestic preference may be accorded to local suppliers 
or locally manufactured or sourced items where international competitive bidding is used;114 
however, there are rules on the limits and the formula for the computation of margins of 
preference and determining eligibility.115   
Having largely eliminated subjective discretion in the conduct of procurement, the PPA 
has enhanced reviewability of procurement decisions.116 Furthermore, providing detailed rules 
that apply to all federal procurement and requiring strict adherence to these rules have enlarged 
possible cause of action in procurement challenge.117 For example, in Cupero Nigeria Limited 
v Federal Ministry of Water Resources118 the plaintiff successfully challenged the award of 
contract by the defendant to another bidder on the ground that the award was not to “the lowest 
evaluated responsive bid”, as stipulated by the PPA.119  
The PPA grants bidders a general right to challenge acts or decisions of procuring 
entities, by sequential administrative and judicial reviews before respective forums; 120 which 
is similar to what the UNCITRAL Model Law provides.121 These levels of review are examined 
in detail in chapters 5 to 7.  
In addition, the Act grants public access to the comprehensive procurement proceeding 
records;122 similar to the Model Law.123 Access to records is further enhanced by the Freedom 
                                                          
112 Section 16(1)(c). 
113 Part VII. On procurement methods in Nigeria, see Williams-Elegbe (2012) PCLJ 249-253, Udeh & Ahmadu 
“Nigeria” in Procurement Regulation 157-158. For an overview of procurement methods in some African 
countries (including Nigeria and South Africa), see Carborn & Arrowsmith “Procurement Methods” in 
Procurement Regulation 261-307.  
114 Sections 34(1) & (3) and 49(2). 
115 Sections 34(2)&(4) and 49(2). Public Procurement (Consultancy Services) Regulations 2007, reg 119; Public 
Procurement (Goods and Works) Regulations 2007, reg 106. 
116 See 4 2 1 2 (a). 
117 See 4 2 1 2 (b). 
118 FHCAbj 12-6-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. 
119 Sections 16(17), 24(3), 32(2) & (3), 33. 
120 Section 54. 
121 Article 64(1). 
122 Sections 16(14), 38(1) & (2). Also, s 16(12) provides for a10 years period of retention of procurement 
proceeding records; similar to UNCITRAL Model law art 25(1) & (5).  
123 Article 25(2) & (3). 
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of Information Act 2011 (“FOIA”) that obliges public institutions to provide requested 
record/information within 7 days; extension where necessary shall not exceed 7 days.124 The 
global average timeframe for responding to information-access application is 15 working 
days.125 Under the PPA, right of access, following bid opening, is exercisable after acceptance 
of bid or termination of procurement proceedings.126 It is of similar effect with UNCITRAL 
Model Law, art 25(2) and (3). Furthermore, a disclosure of procurement proceeding records 
prior to award of contract may be ordered by a court.127 The foregoing facilitate exercise of 
bidders’ review right, as bidders rely on procurement records to identify irregularities and 
prove their cases. Also, publicizing of the PPA has enhanced suppliers’ awareness about their 
statutory review right, resulting in increase of procurement challenge cases.128  
The Act does not exempt any public procurement decision from review, in consonance 
with the current Model Law.129 The Act thus improved upon the 1994 Model Law that was 
operative when the PPA was enacted, as it had exempted certain matters from challenge.130 
Exempting any aspect of procurement from challenge excludes the law-enforcement role of 
suppliers in that aspect.131 Notwithstanding, the regulations made pursuant to the Act prescribe 
exemptions; presented below, and argued to be ultra vires and thus invalid to the extent of their 
inconsistency with the PPA.  
4 3 2 1 2 The Public Procurement Regulations 2007  
The Public Procurement (Consultancy Services) Regulations 2007 (“Consultancy 
Regulations”), and Public Procurement (Goods and Works) Regulations 2007 (“Procurement 
Regulations”) were made in 2007; but did not receive the publicity and circulation accorded 
                                                          
124 Sections 4&6.  
125 Open Society Institute Transparency & Silence: A Survey of Access to Information Laws and Practices in 
Fourteen Countries (2006) 176. 
126 Section 32(8). This apparently is to forestall: (a) prejudicing the legitimate commercial interests of bidders; (b) 
impeding fair evaluation/competition. See UNCITRAL Model Law art 25(4)(a). 
127 Section 38(3). The same effect arises from combined reading of UNCITRAL Model Law art 25(3) & (4). 
128 As indicated by the number of administrative review cases filed annually before the BPP, which received 49 
cases between July-September 2014: 
<http://www.bpp.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_joomdoc&view=documents&path=3RD+QTR+Petitions+July
+-+Sept+2014.pdf> (accessed 15-10-2017). This is apart from the cases before procuring entities and courts. 
129 Guide to Enactment 82 & 230.  
130 Article 52(2). There were criticisms against the exemptions. See J Myers “Commentary on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Procurement” (1994) 22 IBL 253 255. 
131 See 2 3 2 3 (ii). 
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the PPA132  The Regulations provide further detail to the procurement rules and procedures. 
Examples of detail not provided by the PPA that are contained in the Regulations include: 
guidelines for setting technical selection criteria in request for proposal; standard contents of 
terms of reference.133 Some others include eligibility criteria for government-owned enterprises 
to bid; procedure for evaluating margins of preference; etc.134 The Regulations’ provision of 
additional procurement rules offers more review grounds, as procurement decisions would 
have to be assessed against these rules. For example, any reasonable formula adopted by the 
procuring entity for evaluating margins of preference would be valid if there are no related 
rules; but with the Regulations, procuring entity must either adopt the formula stipulated, or 
risk a challenge. 
However, the provisions of the Regulations135 on bidder remedies do not add to the 
bidder remedies framework established by the Act; rather they conflict with or detract from the 
framework in two ways. They: (1) exempted matters from review; and (b) re-enacted the PPA’s 
provision on review right in a restrictive manner. These and other related issues are treated 
respectively below. 
4 3 2 1 2 1 Exempted matters 
The matters exempted are: 
(a) choice of procurement method;  
(b) rejection of all bids; 
(c)  returning a bid unopened because it was received after the submission deadline; and 
(d) rejection of bids for not being signed and/or accompanied by a valid bid security (if 
required) or submitted by a bidder who was not prequalified. 
Exemption (a) above is the most objectionable, considering its implications and the 
criticisms against a similar exemption in the 1994 Model Law.136 This exemption creates a 
legal loophole for the unlawful use of restrictive procurement methods, including direct 
procurement. The only safeguard against such is the exercise by BPP of its oversight functions 
                                                          
132 The BPP had in 2008 conducted a nation-wide public enlightenment programme on the provisions of the PPA; 
but the programme did not feature the Regulations. See BPP “BPP Embarks on National Sensitization” (2008) 
Public Procurement Journal 3. However, the regulations are published in the official government gazette and 
currently published on the BPP website: www.bpp.gov.ng.  
133 Consultancy Regulations 62, 48 & 53 respectively.  
134 Goods & Works Regulations reg 10 and annex 2, respectively. 
135 Consultancy Regulations regs 18-22, 31-35; Goods & Works Regulations regs 17-21. 
136 Article 52(2). Myers (1994) IBL 255. 
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to enforce compliance, discussed in chapter 8. However, compliance with public procurement 
rules will be more effective where interested suppliers can challenge the improper use of 
procurement methods.  
Instead of exempting (b)-(d) above from challenge, the review forum should be allowed 
to hear and summarily dismiss the application for lacking merit, if the law has not been 
breached by the action complained about.137 The Regulations should not single out those 
conforming procurement actions for exemption, as a bid rejected for not including required 
documentation, such as tax clearance, is in the same category as (b)-(d) exemptions above. 
Furthermore, it is ultra vires for the Regulations to exempt matters from challenge since the 
enabling legislation (PPA) did not expressly or impliedly permit that. Relying on INEC v 
Balarabe Musa138 the offending provisions would be declared invalid if challenged. The 
summation of the Supreme Court’s decision in that case is that a subordinate legislation cannot 
prescribe additional conditions (or exemptions) to the exercise of a right granted by the 
enabling legislation. Notwithstanding, the Regulations may be deemed as subsisting until 
declared invalid through a judicial review, based on Madumere v Onuoha.139  
4 3 2 1 2 2 Restrictive re-enactment  
The Regulations140 re-enacted the PPA’s provisions on bidders’ review right thus:  
“Where a Bidder considers that its proposal has not been given appropriate attention 
and that it has or may suffer undue disadvantage due to a breach of an obligation in the 
selection procedure by a Procuring Entity with regards to the Act or these Regulations, 
the Bidder shall submit a complaint in writing…”141 
The above is restrictive, on four grounds, compared to the related provision of the PPA that 
reads thus: 
                                                          
137 That is what PPA s 54(4)(b) envisages; similar in effect to art 67(6)(a) & (b) of UNCITRAL Model Law. 
138 (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt 806) 72, (2003) 1 SCNJ 1. 
139 (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt 615) 422: “The law is that any legislation once made remains valid until declared invalid 
by a court of competent jurisdiction. To view it otherwise and let everybody be the judge of which is and which 
is not valid legislation and to act accordingly is to let anarchy loose upon the land.” 
140 Regulations 18 & 31 (Consultancy) (both regulations are in different parts of the Consultancy Regulations, but 
their provisions are the same); 17 (Goods & Work).  
141 Emphasis added. 
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“A bidder may seek administrative review for any omission or breach by a procuring 
or disposing entity under the provisions of this Act, or any regulations or guidelines 
made under this Act or the provisions of bidding documents.” 
The four grounds are briefly analysed as follows. 
(a) Under the Regulations, a bidder must prove that “its proposal has not been given 
appropriate attention”. This is restrictive compared to the Act that only requires “any 
omission or breach” of relevant law or rule, for that clause of the Regulations imposes 
an additional requirement or onus for accessing remedies on the review applicant. 
Besides, it may be difficult to prove the requirement because of its vagueness. 
(b) Proving a procuring entity’s breach of legal obligation is not sufficient to claim remedy 
under the Regulations; the complainant-bidder must prove actual or possible suffering 
of “undue disadvantage”, which arguably attracts a higher burden of proof than proving 
suffering of damage/injury.142 The Act does not require such.   
(c)  The Regulations limit reviewable breach to those occurring “in the selection 
procedure”; whereas the PPA makes actionable any breach or omission of applicable 
rules. The aforementioned phrase under the Regulations is comparatively restrictive, 
since a breach occurring outside the selection procedure (for example, during 
procurement planning stage) may not be actionable. Whereas, under the PPA such 
breach would be actionable, since every stage of procurement is covered.143    
(d) The Regulations omits breach of provisions of bidding documents as a ground of 
review.  
It suffices to conclude here that where there is a conflict between the Regulations and the PPA 
the PPA shall prevail. 
4 3 2 1 2 3 Other issues 
Two other issues are worth mentioning in respect of the Regulations. First, the Regulations 
were made by BPP without the approval of the NCPP as required by the PPA.144 This is owing 
to the non-inauguration of the NCPP since commencement of the Act till date.145 It is a ground 
                                                          
142 Which could be read into s 54(1) of PPA. 
143 See 7 3 1 below. 
144 Sections 2(b), 5(a). 
145 Udeh & Ahmadu “Nigeria” in Procurement Regulation 149; Williams-Elegbe (2012) PCLJ 348; AJ Osuntogun 
“Procurement Law in Nigeria: Challenges in Attaining its Objectives” (2012) 4 PPLR 139 149-152. 
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to invalidate the whole Regulations if subjected to judicial review; for the courts are likely to 
hold that there was non-observance of a mandatory procedural requirement of the enabling 
Act.146 However, they may be deemed as being in force until declared invalid by the court.147 
 Secondly, there are inconsistencies in the content and application of the Regulations. 
(1) There is a repetition of regulations 18-22 (on bidder remedies) as 31-35 in the Consultancy 
Regulations. Notwithstanding, it is innocuous in legal effect. (2) The SBDs reference to the 
Regulations is misleading: the title and date of the Regulations are not mentioned (they just 
refer to: “Regulations for Goods and Works” and “Regulations for the Selection of Consulting 
Services”), and a few regulation numbers cited are incorrect.148  
In Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources149 the bidding 
document adapted from the SBDs did not cite the title and year of the Regulations. In addition, 
it incorrectly referred to regulations 23-27 instead of 17-21 (on bidder remedies). Owing to the 
resultant uncertainties, the court refused to apply the Regulations in determining the case.150  
The Regulations should be revised to align them with the PPA.  
4 3 2 2 South Africa  
4 3 2 2 1 The Constitution  
The provisions of the Constitution that are directly related to public procurement regulation 
and its enforcement mechanism are sections 217, 33 and 32, in order of their relative 
importance. The application of section 217 to South African procurement and bidder remedies 
systems was discussed in chapter 3. The principles of the section, that the system must be “fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective”, constitute South Africa’s procurement 
policy objectives;151 which are largely similar to those of Nigeria. The relationship between 
these objectives and bidder remedies, discussed in 2 2 3, was given expression in Chief 
Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency NO v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) 
Ltd;152  where the court held that once a “system” with the attributes contemplated in section 
                                                          
146 See Ajuta v Agene (2002) 1 NWLR (pt 748) 300 CA; Ojong v Duke (2003) 14 NWLR (pt 481) 618 CA. See 
also Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Industry Training Board v Aylesbury Mushrooms Ltd [1972] 1 All 
ER 280, [1972] 1WLR 190. 
147Madumere v Onuoha (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 615) 422. 
148 See for example Standard Bidding Document for the Procurement of Goods 2011, Notice to Users Para 2 p i. 
149 FHCAbj 12-6-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. 
150 73-74. 
151 See Bolton “South Africa” in Procurement Regulation 179; Bolton Government Procurement 40-59. 
152 [2011] 3 All SA 23 (SCA) para 15.  
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217(1) is established by means of legislation or regulation, the question whether any 
procurement is “valid” must be answered with reference to the legislation or regulation.153 
However, this does not mean that contracts shall be concluded without regard to section 
217(1).154 
Quite relevant to bidder remedies is section 33(1), which is furthered by PAJA. It 
provides that: 
“Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.”155 
This, in addition to the fact that public procurement is regarded as an administrative action 
under South African law,156 confers a general right of challenge on bidders against 
procurement decisions that are unlawful, unreasonable and procedurally unfair. However, 
South African courts have opined that a cause of action for judicial review of administrative 
action ordinarily arises from the provisions of PAJA and not directly from section 33 of the 
Constitution.157 Application of relevant provisions of PAJA to procurement challenge is 
considered in subsequent chapters.  
Section 32 provides for right of access to information; which the Promotion of Access 
to Information Act 2 of 2000 (“PAIA”) gives effect to. PAIA158 allows a 30 days response time 
(extendable by another 30 days) to an information-access request; a timeframe longer than the 
                                                          
153 See TEB Properties CC v MEC, Department of Health and Social Development, North West [2011] ZASCA 
243 para 14. See also Quinot (2009) TSAR fn 73. The PFMA, the Treasury Regulations and other legislation 
reviewed below are the legislation contemplated in s 217(1): see TEB Properties CC v MEC, Department of Health 
and Social Development, North West [2011] ZASCA 243 para 15. 
154 TEB Properties CC v MEC, Department of Health and Social Development, North West [2011] ZASCA 243 
para 31. See also Eastern Cape Provincial Government v Contractprops 25 (Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 142 (SCA) para 
8; Municipal Manager: Qaukeni Local Municipality v F V General Trading CC 2010 (1) SA 356 (SCA) para 11. 
155 Furthermore, s 33(2) enshrines the right to written reason for an adverse administrative action. 
156 Quinot (2011) PPLR 192, 195; Quinot State Commercial Activity 162. See also Umfolozi Transport (Edms) 
Bpk v Minister van Vervoer en Andere 1997 2 All SA 548 (SCA); Transnet Ltd v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 
2001 1 SA 853 (SCA); Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo 
Province [2007] ZASCA 165; 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA) para 4. 
157 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg [2009] ZACC 28, 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC), 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) para 73; 
Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2005] ZACC 14, 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC), 2006 (8) BCLR 
872 (CC) paras 95-7; and Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs [2004] ZACC 15; 2004 
(4) SA 490 (CC), 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) paras 25-6. 
158 Sections 25&26.   
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global average.159 Notwithstanding, section 32 and PAIA facilitate the identification of 
irregularities and adducing of evidence in exercise of bidders’ review right.160 
4 3 2 2 2 The PFMA and its Regulations 
The PFMA regulates financial management in the national and provincial governments; and 
provides for the responsibilities of persons entrusted with financial management in those 
governments. Sections 38(1)(a)(iii) and 51(1)(a)(iii) mandate the accounting officers and 
accounting authorities of the institutions to which the Act applies161 to ensure that the 
respective bodies have and maintain an appropriate procurement and provisioning system 
which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. This echoes s 217 of the 
Constitution, and may be viewed as not directly conferring a right on suppliers. However, the 
system thus established may be measured and reviewed against the principles of this section.162 
 As will be discussed in chapter 8, section 38(1)(g) is relevant to the criminal aspect of 
procurement rule enforcement, as it mandates accounting officers on discovery of any 
unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure, to immediately report, in writing, 
the particulars of the expenditure to the relevant treasury; and in the case of irregular 
expenditure involving the procurement of goods or services, also to the relevant tender board. 
Section 76(4)(c) authorized the issuance of the Treasury Regulations 2005, which 
contains further provisions on SCM (procurement and disposal of state assets). Regulations 
16A9.3 is important to bidder remedies as it obliges national and provincial treasuries to 
establish a mechanism for considering complaints relating to SCM; that will recommend 
remedial actions where non-compliance is established. This, prima facie, guarantees bidders, 
at an administrative level as a first step, the exercise of a general right to review, without 
exemption.  
Below are other provisions of the Regulations that are relevant to bidder remedies. 
(a) Obliging accounting officers or accounting authorities to: 
                                                          
159 For a detailed analysis of the PAIA see Bolton Government Procurement 238-250, and S Roling Transparency 
and Access to Information in South Africa: An Evaluation of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 
LL.M thesis Cape Town (2007). 
160 At common law there was no general right of access to information: C Hoexter “The Current State of South 
African Administrative Law” in H Corder & L Van de Vijver (eds) Realising Administrative Justice (2002) 55; 
Baxter Administrative Law 235; Bolton Government Procurement 238. However, the right is critical to review; 
see E Atwood & M Trebilcock “Public Accountability in an Age of Contracting Out” (1996) 27(1) The Canadian 
Business LJ 1 11. 
161 See ss 1 & 3. The Minister may exempt any of the institutions from any specific provisions of the Act: s 92.  
162 Refer to 4 3 2 2 1 and authorities in fns 148 & 149 above. 
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• enforce rules against abuse of the SCM system (including investigation, 
disqualification/debarment, cancellation of corruption-tainted contract, instigating 
prosecution);163 
• ensure the stipulation and disclosure of evaluation and adjudication criteria, and 
advertising of bids (a bidder may thus challenge their breach).164  
(b) Stipulating procurement methods and conditions for its use; rules and procedures for 
disposal and letting of state assets; and ethical standards for relevant officers.165 Their breach 
thus constitutes grounds for review.  
4 3 2 2 3 The PPPFA and its Regulations 
The PPPFA gives effect to the Constitutional provision that requires the prescription of a 
framework for the implementation of a preferential and affirmative procurement policy (also 
referred to as “horizontal policy”)166 in South Africa.167  Reading together sections 217(3) and 
2(1), of the SA Constitution and the PPPFA respectively, leaves one with the conclusion that 
it is compulsory for the bodies to which the Act applies to establish their related horizontal 
policy as prescribed under the Act and its Regulations.168 The Act applies to “organs of state” 
as defined under its section 1(iii). However, pursuant to section 1(iii)(f) of the PPPFA,169 the 
Preferential Procurement Regulations 2017170 has enlarged the scope of application of both 
legislation by subjecting all listed public entities171 to the prescribed preferential procurement 
system.172 However, the Minister has powers to exempt any of these institutions from all or 
any of the provisions of the Act.173 The PPPFA and the Regulations provide for conditions and 
                                                          
163 Regulations 16A9.1, 16A9.2. These enforcement mechanisms are discussed in chapter 8. 
164 Regulation 16A6.3 (b)&(c). 
165 Regulations 16A6.4, 16A6.1, 16A6.2, 16A7, 16A8. 
166 G Quinot “Promotion of Social Policy” in Procurement Regulation 370; A Arrowsmith & P Kunzlik (eds) 
Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law: New Directives and New Directions (2009) ch 1. 
167 See long title, and SA Constitution ss 217(2) & (3). 
168 See Bolton Government Procurement 269; Quinot “Promotion of Social Policy” in Procurement Regulation 
374. 
169 Empowers the Minister of Finance to recognise institutions (other than those specified) that the Act and its 
Regulations shall apply to. 
170 Regulation 2 (see its footnote), retained the inclusion, by the GN R501 in GG No 34350 of 08-06-2011, of 
public entities listed in schedules 2 and 3 of the PFMA as institutions to which the PPPFA. 
171Hitherto not covered. Bolton Government Procurement 267-269. On the impact of non-coverage of some public 
entities under the PPPFA and its 2001 Regulations (GN R 725 of 10-08-2001 in GG 22549), see Quinot 
“Promotion of Social Policy” in Procurement Regulation 394-395. 
172 395 (and the authorities cited there). 
173 Section 3. 
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formula for evaluating tenders that are subject to applicable preference point system.174 The 
2017 Regulations realigned its preferential procurement scheme with the black economic 
empowerment (BEE) strategy under the B-BBEE Act.175 The preference point system is aimed 
at using public procurement to protect or advance persons disadvantaged by past unfair 
discrimination; and to promote certain socio-economic goals.176 
 The PPPFA and the Regulations are relevant to the bidder remedies system. First, they 
have enlarged review grounds. A bidder entitled to the prescribed preferential policy has a right 
to challenge its non-observance by a procuring entity. In Manong Associates (Pty) Ltd v 
Eastern Cape Department of Road and Transport177 the complainant, which was entitled to a 
preferential procurement policy (a roaster system that ensured accelerated appointments of 
historically disadvantaged consultants) established by the procuring entity, challenged (albeit 
unsuccessfully) the award of contract to another bidder (not entitled to the policy) on the ground 
that the entity did not observe the policy. Furthermore, any bidder can challenge a wrongful 
application of the preferential policy. In RHI Joint Venture v Minister of Roads and Public 
Works, Eastern Cape178 an unsuccessful bidder was granted a set aside against an award on the 
grounds that the winning bidder was: (1) allocated points/weight twice (wrongful) for 
“expenditure on local labour and economy”; (2) allocated weight for being a “tenderer who 
had not been awarded a contract previously” (which was not disclosed as an award criterion).  
Secondly, Regulations 13, which penalizes fraudulent claim or obtaining of B-BBEE 
status, constitutes an enforcement of related procurement rules. 
4 3 2 2 4 The MFMA and its Regulations 
The MFMA regulates the fiscal and financial management of municipalities and municipal 
entities.179 It prescribes the minimum requirements, in accordance with the constitutional 
principles of public procurement, which the SCM regulatory systems at the local tier of 
                                                          
174 Section 2 and regs 4-7, 9 & 11. 
175 BEE refers to the comprehensive policy in South Africa aimed at redressing the inequalities caused by racially 
discriminatory practices under apartheid. On the public procurement dimension of this policy generally, see 
Bolton & Quinot “Social Policies in Procurement” in WTO Regime on Government Procurement 459. 
176 SA Constitution s 217(2); PPPFA s 2(d). See also Quinot “Promotion of Social Policy” in Procurement 
Regulation 394 & 396-397.  See also Bolton & Quinot “Social Policy in Procurement” in WTO Regime on 
Government Procurement 459. 
177 [2008] ZAEQC 2; 2008 (6) SA 434 (EqC). 
178 (769/02) [2003] ZAECHC 35 paras 27-33, 36-40 & 42. See also Sizabonke Civils CC t/a Pilcon Projects v 
Zululand District Municipality 2011 (4) SA 406 (KZP), [2010] ZAKZPHC 23. 
179 See long title and s 2 of Act. 
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government shall provide, which include: procurement procedures, bid documentation, 
advertisement, and contract management.180 Pursuant to section 168, the Minister promulgated 
the Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations.  
The Regulations provides detailed rules on procurement and disposal for the local 
governments, similar to the SCM provisions of the Treasury Regulations. Most importantly, 
regulation 49 vests on “aggrieved persons” a general right to administrative review against the 
procurement decisions or actions (without exception) of a municipality or municipal entity. It 
further provides the commencement time-frame, appointment of adjudicator(s), sequential 
reference to the provincial treasury and the National Treasury, etc.181 It does not specify the 
powers exercisable by the administrative adjudicator(s); but it indicates that he can “resolve” 
the complaint, which may be regarded as conferring on him powers to make corrective and 
binding review decisions.182  In addition, regulation 50(7) preserves the right to judicial review. 
A detailed analysis of the administrative review mechanism provided under the Regulations is 
undertaken in chapters 5 and 6.  
4 3 2 2 5 The Systems Act 
In addition to the MFMA and its Regulations, the Systems Act regulates provision of services 
by municipalities through service-providers/suppliers.183 Furthermore, section 62 vests a right 
of “appeal” on “a person whose rights are affected by a decision” of a municipality or its agent 
before designated appeal authorities; which have powers to confirm, vary or revoke an 
appealed decision.184 The Act prescribes time-frames for commencing and completing the 
appeal proceedings.185 
 However, issues have been raised as to how the review mechanisms under this Act and 
the SCM Regulations align; and the extent to which section 62 remedy applies to bidders.186 
These issues are addressed in chapter 5. 
                                                          
180 Chapter 11, pt 1. 
181 Regulation 50. 
182 Regulation 50(4). 
183 Sections 80-81, 83-84. 
184 Section 62(2). 
185 Section 62(1) & (5). 
186 Quinot PPLR (2011) 196-197. 
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4 4 Features of the regulatory regimes  
From the review of the legislation above, certain features of the regulatory regime, which may 
affect the bidder remedies systems, are identifiable.  These relate to the number, coherence, 
clarity and explicitness of the legislative frameworks; which are analysed below.   
4 4 1 Nigeria  
Only one statute (the PPA) regulates federal procurement. Its Regulations clearly come under 
it in precedence. Thus, there is no problem of identifying the law that will apply in any federal 
procurement case. The above feature results in coherence of the regulatory regime.187 Although 
it was identified above that certain aspects of the Regulations are inconsistent with the PPA, it 
does not effectively undermine this coherence as the supremacy of the PPA is clearly 
established. In addition, the provisions of the PPA on procurement rules and review 
mechanisms are generally clear. Furthermore, it does not direct authorities on the procurement 
procedures or system to establish, rather it explicitly establishes them. 
 The above state of the regulatory framework makes it easy for a reasonable person to 
ascertain when a rule or procedure has been breached, to pursue available remedies. 
Particularly, the explicitness of provisions ensures that there is certainty and uniformity in the 
application of procurement policies; which support the operation and effectiveness of the 
bidder remedies system.188 
 The converse is arguably the case for South Africa. 
4 4 2 South Africa  
As seen above, there are several pieces of legislation that constitute the public procurement law 
of South Africa. It has led to the fragmentation of South African procurement policy and 
management,189 which extends to the bidder remedies system.190 The procurement regulatory 
regime is “far from coherent or structured in any systematic way”.191 For example, the STB 
Act that established a centralised procurement system still exists alongside newer pieces of 
                                                          
187 This similarly obtains in states that have procurement laws. 
188 Arrowsmith et al, Regulating Public Procurement 760. Brown (1998) PPLR 93; Arrowsmith (1992) PPLR 
117; Pachnou (2005) PPLR 258-259; Zhang (2007) PPLR 335; Quinot (2009) TSAR 443-444. 
189 SA CPAR I 5. 
190 Quinot (2011) PPLR 195. 
191 194. 
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legislation that establish a decentralised system.192 Furthermore, there are even inconsistencies 
amongst the legislation. For instance, the STB Act193 allows the Board to accept or reject any 
tender without giving reasons, contrary to the Constitution and PAJA.194 Also, the review 
mechanisms under the Systems Act section 62 and the SCM Regulations 49 do not align.195  
The legislation largely gives direction to authorised heads of institutions to establish 
procurement systems, and merely prescribes the basic contents of the system; thereby allowing 
each entity to develop its own detailed rules and policy with legislation as guide. For example, 
the Treasury Regulations (which ought to give detail and effect to the PFMA) provides that 
relevant authorities must “develop and implement an effective and efficient supply chain 
management system in his or her institution”; and “ensure that bid documentation include 
evaluation and adjudication criteria”.196 In fact, regulation 16A9.3 only directs the treasuries to 
establish an administrative review mechanism. This leads to different interpretations and 
application of the broad directives.197  
The foregoing causes uncertainty, which is detrimental to the effectiveness of the 
remedies system. 
4 5 Conclusion and analysis 
This chapter will be concluded by highlighting how the old regulatory regimes were contrary 
to the elements of effectiveness, and how the new regimes to various degrees support the related 
elements. 
4 5 1 The old regimes vis-à-vis effectiveness 
The deficiencies of the old regimes with the elements of effectiveness are comparatively 
analysed below.  
                                                          
192 The repeal of the STB Act was recommended in 1997 by MoF Green Paper para 2.3.7 25. Notwithstanding, 
the Act is still extant almost 20 years after. Meanwhile, the Act needs amendment to reflect current realities32-
136. For example, s 4(1) still makes reference to the Armaments Act 87 of 1964 that no longer exists. 
193 Section 4(1)(d). 
194 Sections 33(1) & (2) and 5 respectively. The SA Law Reform Commission (SALRC) has recommended the 
review of the offending section to align it with the Constitution and PAJA: SALRC Legislation Administered by 
National Treasury (2011) 136. However, these statutes could still be read into the STB Act, pending its review. 
195 Quinot PPLR (2011) 196-197. 
196 Regulations 16A3.1 and 16A6.3(b).  
197 SA CPAR I 5. 
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(a) Wide discretion, grossly limited cause of action, absence of statutory provision on 
procurement review, procuring entities’ statutory power to withhold reasons for decision, all 
militated against bidders’ general right to procurement challenge. 
(b) Statutory and practical restrictions of access to government documents did not 
support bidders’ review right. 
(c) Although the courts within the periods could review procurement decisions in a 
manner that meet the elements of effectiveness relating to review forums and their powers; the 
absence of statutorily established bidder remedies and related administrative review forums 
limited those dimensions of effectiveness. For instance, court’s observance of strict procedures 
and their caseloads largely limit their ability to proceed swiftly within a reasonably short period 
of time. Conversely, administrative review forums could easily achieve this, and can also 
obviate the need for court litigation.  
4 5 2 Current regimes vis-à-vis effectiveness 
Owing to differences in the current regulatory regimes of Nigeria and South Africa, the analysis 
is undertaken separately. Note that the only elements of effectiveness considered here are those 
related to the legislative provisions reviewed above. 
4 5 2 1 Nigeria  
As seen above, the PPA grants bidders right to seek sequential administrative and judicial 
review of any omission or breach of relevant regulatory provisions by a procuring entity; and 
(with the FOIA) grants prompt access to procurement records. These satisfy the following 
elements: (a) bidders have a general right to challenge an act or decision of a procuring entity; 
(b) at least, a body to hear a challenge as a first step and a further body to hear an appeal as a 
second step; (c) there are no unlawful procurement acts or decisions exempted from review; 
and (d) bidders have prompt access to related procurement records. 
4 5 2 2 South Africa 
Section 33 of the Constitution (with PAJA), which confers a general right to administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, satisfies: (a) bidders’ general right to 
procurement challenge; and (b) non-exemption of any unlawful procurement acts or decisions 
from review. Section 32 of the Constitution and PAIA reasonably support the element of 
effectiveness requiring bidders’ prompt access to related procurement records. The relevant 
provisions of the Treasury Regulations, Municipal SCM Regulations, and the Systems Act 
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grant opportunity for bidders to pursue review at an administrative forum before accessing 
available judicial review. This satisfies the requirement for a body to hear a challenge as a first 
step and a further body to hear an appeal as a second step. 
 An examination of the procurement administrative review mechanisms of Nigeria and 
South Africa follows in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
The Bidder Remedies Systems: Internal Review 
5 1 Introduction 
Previous chapters had presented a general view of the public procurement systems and the 
regulatory frameworks of Nigeria and South Africa. As aforementioned, both systems provide 
for administrative and judicial challenge of procurement decisions; which aligns with the 
element of effectiveness requiring the existence of at least a body to hear a challenge as a first 
step and a further body to hear an appeal as a second step.  This chapter looks at the 
administrative review component, focusing on internal review.  
Meanwhile, it is fitting here to first examine certain general aspects of the bidder 
remedies systems, since they cut across administrative and judicial remedies. 
5 2 The remedies systems 
The general aspects examined below include the objectives of the remedies systems, and their 
essential features, such as: multiple regimes, multilevel and sequential recourse, and standstill 
period. 
5 2 1 Objectives of the systems 
It is relevant to consider the objectives of the Nigerian and South African remedies systems for 
two reasons. First, as seen in chapter 2, the review forums may consider these objectives in 
resolving procurement challenge. Secondly, similar to what obtains under the UNCITRAL 
Model Law,1 the objectives of these remedies systems are not explicit; thus, effort has to be 
made to glean them from legislation and judicial opinions.  
The dual objectives of protecting the rights of bidders, and ensuring respect for the 
substantive procurement rules (under which correcting existing breaches and deterring future 
breaches could be subsumed), largely co-exist in both systems. This is deduced from the 
judicial authorities2 and relevant legislation. For example, Nigeria’s PPA, section 54, 
                                                          
1 Also, the GPA art XVIII, and the EU Remedies regime. See Pachnou (2000) PPLR 63-64. 
2 On Nigeria, see Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC Abuja 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11, 71; and, on South Africa, the dictum of Moseneke DCJ in Steenkamp NO v Provincial 
Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) para 29; contra Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, 
Eastern Cape 2006 3 SA 151 (SCA) para 30. See also Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement 308, 
and, Quinot (2008) 1 Stell LR 104. 
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empowers a bidder to seek review for any omission or breach of procurement rules. South 
African Treasury Regulations, 16A9.3, directs that a mechanism be established to consider 
complaints regarding alleged non-compliance with procurement rules; and that remedial 
actions (including criminal prosecution) are taken against non-compliance. Systems Act 
section 62 empowers a person whose rights are affected by a decision of a municipality’s 
delegated authority to appeal against that decision. Although, it could be argued that the 
protection of the rights of persons affected by a municipality’s decision is the focus of Systems 
Act, section 62, and Municipal SCM Regulations, regulation 49;3 it is presumed that only 
decisions repugnant to regulations and standards would be reviewable. Nonetheless, South 
African courts have in a number of cases held that challenge mechanisms are primarily aimed 
at protecting public interest (including the integrity of the procurement system).4  
 As these objectives are only deducible from legislation and case law, determining which 
shall be accorded more weight where the need arises would be left to the discretion of the 
review forums.5 For example, where more weight is accorded to protection of bidders’ right, 
the forum may be inclined to granting damages to the aggrieved bidder. Whereas, if focus is 
on upholding the procurement rules, the forum may be more inclined to granting preventive 
and corrective remedies, such as interim measures and set aside. 
5 2 2  Multiple remedies regimes 
As noted in chapter 3, some donor organisations insist on the use of their procurement rules, 
some of which contain complaints mechanisms, for projects they fund in Nigeria and South 
Africa. Examined here is whether this practice may result in parallel challenge mechanisms or 
proceedings.6 
5 2 2 1 Domestic and donor regimes 
The World Bank Procurement Regulations 2016 and the EU’s Procurement and Grants for 
European Union External Actions: a Practical Guide 2016 (“PRAG”), are examined here 
                                                          
3 They mention right of aggrieved person to appeal or complain against the municipality’s decision, without 
indicating that such is directed at remedying unlawful/non-compliant decisions. 
4 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 3 SA 151 (SCA) para 30; AllPay Consolidated 
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO SASSA [2013] ZASCA 29; 2013 (4) SA 557 (SCA) paras 21 and 96, opinion 
upheld in AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO SASSA [2013] ZACC 42. See also Quinot 
(2008) Stell LR 104. 
5 Examined in ch 9. See Pachnou (2000) PPLR 63-64; Gordon (2006) PCLJ 430. See also Quinot “Supplier 
Remedies” in Public Procurement 309. 
6 See Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 315-316. 
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considering the quantum of development projects (governed by those instruments) funded by 
the respective organisations in both countries.7 They provide challenge mechanisms that are 
either independent of or integrated with the domestic remedies systems. 
5 2 2 2  Domestic regimes vis-à-vis World Bank Regulations 
An actual or potential bidder in a World Bank’s financed project may submit a procurement 
complaint to the Borrower or the Bank.8 Complaints must be submitted within the timeline or 
the standstill period prescribed by the Regulations.9 Where the Bank receives such complaints 
it forwards them to the Borrower for review.10 The Borrower must review and resolve the 
complaint within seven or fifteen business days from the receipt of the complaint.11 The 
decision of the reviewer is binding and final.12 It is only where the contract is subject to the 
Bank’s prior review that the Borrower is obliged to propose a remedial action to the Bank for 
its confirmation.13 Complaints other than those covered under Annex III of the Regulations are 
handled by the Borrower in accordance with the rules and procedures agreed with the Bank; 
which may include the domestic procurement review regime.14 
The Regulations did not specify which structure within the Borrower shall undertake 
the review prescribed under Annex III. Thus, the Borrower may use the structure provided 
under its procurement legislation. For Nigeria and South Africa, the reviewer may be the 
accounting officer or authority of the entity involved in implementing the project, in line with 
relevant national procurement legislation.15 This is tenable, as it is internal review that the 
Bank’s Regulations intended. These offices are well-suited to discharge this responsibility 
                                                          
7 The World Bank is financing 29 projects in Nigeria involving more than $10.5 billion; its lending programme 
in South Africa involves more than $18.75 billion. See The World Bank “Projects & Programs” (2017) The World 
Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/projects> and 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/projects> (accessed 18-10-2017).  Nigeria-EU cooperation 
has steadily expanded- the 10th EDF programme for Nigeria allocated €677 million for the period 2008-2013: The 
EU “Overview” (2017) Nigeria <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/nigeria_en> (accessed 18-10-2017). 
The EU remains South Africa’s largest development partner: The EU “Overview” (18-10-2017) Delegation of the 
European Union to South Africa 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/south_africa/projects/overview/index_en.htm> (accessed 18-10-2017). 
8 Paragraphs 3.26 to 3.31 and Annex XIII of the Bank’s Procurement Regulations   
9 Annex III para 3.1. 
10 Annex III para 3.9(a). 
11 Respectively for challenge against the terms of solicitation documents or an exclusion from the procurement 
process; or against the award process. Annex III para 3.1. 
12 Paragraphs 3.6 & 3.7(c). 
13 Annex III paras 3.2-3.5, 3.7(f)-(g) & 3.9(b). 
14 Paragraph 3.30. 
15 PPA ss 16(22), 20, 54(2) (Nigeria); PFMA ss 36, 38(1), 49, 51(1); Systems Act s 62(4) (SA).  
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since they exercise supervisory powers over the entity’s procurement. However, it is the rules 
and procedures prescribed by the Bank’s Regulations that the reviewer must apply. The Bank’s 
procurement challenge mechanism under Annex III is independent of the domestic remedies 
system. Thus, the decision is not subject to the systems’ administrative review or judicial 
recourse. 
5 2 2 3  Domestic regimes vis-à-vis EU PRAG 
The PRAG prescribes procurement procedures that apply to all EU external actions financed 
from its general budget and the European Development Fund (EDF); except where the 
European Commission (EC) has authorised the contracting authority/country to use its own 
procurement award procedures.16 
Paragraph 2.4.15.1 entitles aggrieved bidders to submit complaints to the contracting 
authority, which may be the EC, or the beneficiary-country. If the EC is the contracting 
authority, the EC officer that took the contested decision shall within 15 working days treat the 
complaint and give a decision; which is appealable to the relevant EC’s geographical director 
in headquarters.17 Conversely, no time-limit or procedure is provided for review where the 
beneficiary-country is the contracting authority. In this case, the beneficiary-country’s 
administrative review mechanism may apply.  
Also, paragraph 2.4.15.3 of the PRAG entitles an aggrieved bidder to file an “ordinary 
action”; which contextually is a reference to judicial recourse. If the EC is the contracting 
authority, the action shall be before the EU General Court, in accordance with the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union.18 This action could proceed without first exhausting 
this EC’s administrative review.19 Where the beneficiary-country is the contracting authority, 
the judicial recourse shall be in accordance with conditions and deadlines prescribed by 
applicable national legislation. In this case, administrative remedies shall first be exhausted in 
accordance with applicable Nigerian and South African legislation.20   
                                                          
16 Paragraph 1.1.  
17 Paragraph 2.4.15.1 In addition, any EU citizen or resident may complain to the European Ombudsman against 
any maladministration (in procurement) by any EU institutions: para 2.4.15.2. 
18 Paragraph 2.4.15.3. 
19 Paragraph 2.4.15.3 states: “[A bidder] may also file ordinary actions” (emphasis added); and para 2.4.15.1 
(which provides for administrative reconsideration) states that it is “without prejudice to other remedies”. 
20 See 5 2 3 below. 
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5 2 2 4  Parallel and divergent? 
The complaint mechanisms under the World Bank’s Guidelines and the EU PRAG may not 
result in duplicate and divergent remedies systems in Nigeria and South Africa,21 owing to two 
factors. Firstly, the World Bank and EU PRAG clearly provide when and how the domestic 
remedies regimes shall apply to procurement funded by the respective organisations. Secondly, 
it is these organisations’ rules that generally apply to their funded projects. In that 
circumstance, they override the country’s procurement rules and remedies.22 Where a 
complaint is filed before a domestic forum contrary to the donors’ rules, the forum could 
decline jurisdiction;23 for the countries are bound by the loan/grant or funding agreement, and 
bidders are bound by the terms of bid, including the donors’ rules.24 
5 2 3  Multilevel and sequential recourse 
In both countries, administrative and judicial remedies are pursued before hierarchically 
designated forums; and remedies at a lower level must generally be exhausted before recourse 
to a higher level. This is based on the following.  
(a) The strict rule that internal remedies must be exhausted before recourse to the 
courts;25 unless “exceptional circumstances” justify bypassing internal remedies for a judicial 
review.26 However, there are South African cases where judicial review applications, not 
merely interim interdict,27 were allowed; notwithstanding that administrative remedies 
(particularly, Systems Act section 62 appeal) were not exhausted.28 This is apparently due to 
the respondents’ failure to raise objection. 
                                                          
21 See Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 316-317, on the problem of duplicate and 
divergent remedies systems that may result from the application of the procurement rules of donor or 
intergovernmental bodies to their funded national procurement. 
22 World Bank Regulations paras 1.2; and PRAG para 1.1.  
23 Contra: Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 316. 
24 See CBN v System Application Products Nigeria Limited (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 911) 152; and Allpay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO of SASSA 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) paras 38. 
25 See (Nigeria): Ofscon Nig Ltd v Min of Niger Delta Affairs FHC 21-03-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/315/2011; 
A.C Egbe Nig Limited v DG BPP FHC 21-07-2010 suit no FHC/B/CS/116/2010; (South Africa): PAJA s 7(2)(b); 
Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality [2014] ZAECGHC 
55, [2014] 3 All SA 560; Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs 2009 (2) BCLR 1192 (CC) Paras 35-40, 46-49; 
South African Municipal Workers Union v City of Cape Town [2005] ZAWCHC 39 para 163. 
26 PAJA s 7(2)(c). 
27 Allowable before internal remedies are exhausted, to maintain status quo. 
28 See Compass Waste Services (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson Northern Cape Tender Board [2005] ZANCHC 4, [2005] 
4 All SA 425 (NC); Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Chairman of the Tender Committee [2007] ZAFSHC 136; 
Alexander Maintenance and Electrical Services CC v Nyandeni Local Municipality [2012] ZAECMHC 10. 
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(b) Legislation stipulating a sequence of review or appeal. The Nigerian PPA stipulates 
that procurement challenge is first to the procuring entity; then to the BPP; and from the BPP 
to the Federal High Court.29 The Constitutions of Nigeria30 and South Africa31 respectively 
stipulate how appeals shall lie from one court to another. This is significant, as procurement 
cases could be pursued up to the respective countries’ highest courts. 
5 2 4 Standstill period 
No Nigerian or South African legislation provides for a standstill period. This is arguably a 
lacuna, considering that a standstill period forestalls the execution of contract which may 
prejudice a review.32 However, the lacuna appears innocuous owing to two factors in both 
jurisdictions. Firstly, when a challenge application is filed, the procurement may be suspended 
automatically or by order of the forum, pending the determination of the case.33 Secondly, 
concluded contracts can be reviewed and invalidated.34 
Nonetheless, it is preferable to provide for a standstill period, as review of concluded 
contracts entails additional complications and costs.35 Besides, where the contract obligations 
are nearly-fully or fully performed, procurement review becomes impracticable and 
academic.36  
Interestingly, certain procurement practice and decisions of courts in South Africa 
could set up a standstill period. Some municipalities usually notify bidders that awards would 
not become effective until the expiry of the 21-day period allowed for bringing appeals under 
                                                          
29 PPA, s 54(2), (3) & (7). 
30 Chapter VII, see particularly “appellate jurisdiction” of the courts. 
31 Chapter 8. 
32 See 2 3 2(v) above; Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement 318-319. On the rationale for 
introducing a mandatory standstill period in EU procurement law see PrieB & Friton “Designing Effective 
Challenge Procedures” in WTO Regime on Government Procurement 511 526-528. 
33 Discussed in 5 3 9, 6 8, and 7 8. 
34 See Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 318; Quinot PPLR (2011) 202-203. Also, 
Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC Abuja 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11; Eskom Holdings v The New Reclamation Group 2009 (4) SA 628 (SCA); Allpay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO of SASSA [2013] ZACC 42. 
35 Discussed further in chapter 9. See Guide to Enactment to Model Law 232 para 20.  
36 See SA: Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd [2005] ZASCA 90, 2008 
(2) SA 638 (SCA), [2005] 4 All SA 487 (SCA) paras 25, 27-30; Aurobindo Pharma (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, 
State Tender Board [2010] ZAGPPHC 51 para 7; Sebenza Kahle Trade CC v Emalahleni Local Municipal Council 
& Another [2003] 2 All SA 340 (T). Nigeria:  Badejo v Federal Ministry of Education (1996) 8 NWLR (part 464) 
15 40-41; Ogbonna v President Federal Republic of Nigeria (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt 504) 281 187. 
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section 62 Systems Act.37 This becomes binding as a term of the award. Its weakness is that 
municipalities may easily jettison the practice, since they are not obliged to it. This leads to 
uncertainty about its application,38 which is allayed when municipalities enshrine this standstill 
in their SCM policy.39 In Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape,40 the 
Constitutional Court held that a successful bidder should wait to see if the award will not be 
challenged before carrying out the contract. According to Quinot,41 this effectively results in, 
or at least judicially sanctions, a standstill period between award of the tender and the expiry 
of the timeframe for judicially challenging the award.42 The weakness of this is that the period 
of standstill is not specified; also, it is not aimed at avoiding conclusion of contract before 
review. 
Having looked at the above general aspects of the remedies systems, attention is now 
turned to the core of this chapter- administrative review, with focus on internal review. 
5 3 Internal Administrative review 
Procurement administrative review in Nigeria and South Africa takes two forms: internal and 
external review. Internal review is examined here, while external review is treated in the next 
chapter. 
Internal review in both countries entails a procuring entity receiving and considering 
complaints against its procurement decisions or actions, with a view to correcting identified 
breaches, as required by law. The UNICITRAL Model Law43 provides for the same; which it 
refers to as “reconsideration”.44 Under the GPA45 it is a discretionary first step to resolve 
complaint by “consultation” between the aggrieved supplier and the procuring entity.46  
                                                          
37 See Syntell (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town [2008] ZAWCHC 120; Total Computer Services (Pty) Limited v 
Municipal Manager Potchefstroom Local Municipality [2007] ZAGPHC 239; 2008 (4) SA 346 (T) para 62. 
38 As seen in Loghdey v City of Cape Town (100/09) [2010] ZAWCHC 25. 
39 See The City of Cape Town’s Supply Chain Management Policy 2013 clause 245. 
40 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) paras 51-52. 
41 G Quinot “Worse than Losing a Government Tender: Winning It” (2008) 19 Stellenbosch Law Review 101, 
113-114; and Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 318-319.  
42 A maximum of 180 days after notification of the decision under s 7(1) PAJA, but it may be extended either by 
agreement of parties or by the court in terms of s 9 PAJA. 
43 Articles 64(2) & 66. 
44 See also, EU Directive 2007/66/EC of 11/12/2007 (Remedies Directive) art 1(5). 
45 Article XVIII (2). 
46 See Zhang (2009) PPLR 201 109; Dalby “Remedies for Infringement” in Public Procurement in Europe 248. 
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Also, internal review mechanism may be established as a corporate policy by entities 
which legislation on internal review does not cover. Such existed in some states of Nigeria,47 
before related legislation was made. A few South African national entities provide this internal 
remedy, as the legislation on internal review applies only to local governments.48  The 
following are shortcomings of this form of internal review:  (a) it is not obligatory for the 
procuring entity to review; (b) the remedies are not binding, since it is not a legal right; except 
the solicitation/bid document includes the review as a term of bid.49  Since this mechanism is 
limited and peculiar to each entity concerned, the outline above suffices here. 
The components of internal review in Nigeria and South Africa, such as the applicable 
laws, the forum, available remedies, among others, are examined below. Some of these 
components are compared with related elements of effective remedies systems. 
5 3 1 Enabling legislation 
This subsection reviews the legislative provisions that establish the respective internal review 
mechanisms, to identify the scope of the review right created.  
5 3 1 1 Nigeria 
The PPA, section 54(2) established internal review for Nigeria’s federal procurement system. 
It provides that: 
 “A complaint by a bidder against a procuring or disposing entity shall first be submitted 
in writing to the accounting officer (of the procuring entity) …”50 
This unequivocally makes internal review the first recourse for an aggrieved bidder. 
Consequently, the higher review forums could refuse to entertain a challenge if the bidder had 
failed to explore internal review.51  
                                                          
47 Include: Jigawa, Cross River, and Kano. 
48 For example, Transnet (a national corporation), provides for lodging complaints to the Chief Procurement 
Officer (for contracts below R5,000,000); or to the independent Procurement Ombudsman (for contracts above 
R5,000,000), according to its Procurement Ombudsman Terms of Reference 2010 (available at 
<http://www.transnet.net/Pages/Ombudsman.aspx> accessed 21-10-2017). 
49 See Ultimate Heli (Pty) Limited v Chairperson: Transnet National Authority Acquisition Council (80163/2014) 
[2014] ZAGPPHC 931 18; Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO of SASSA 2014 (1) BCLR 
1 (CC) paras 38 & 40; and CBN v System Application Products Nigeria Limited (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 911) 152. 
50 Emphasis added.  
51 Ofscon Nig Ltd v Min of Niger Delta Affairs FHC 21-03-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/315/2011; A.C Egbe Nig 
Limited v DG BPP FHC 21-07-2010 suit no FHC/B/CS/116/2010. 
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5 3 1 2 South Africa  
Section 62 of Systems Act and regulation 49 of the Municipal SCM Regulations established 
the South African internal review mechanisms. These laws, as noted in 5 3 1 above, apply only 
to local governments; thus, these mechanisms do not extend to national and provincial 
governments’ procurement.  
5 3 1 2 1 Municipal Systems Act, section 62 
Section 62(1) provides that: 
“A person whose rights are affected by a decision taken by a political structure, political 
office bearer, councillor or staff member of a municipality in terms of a power or duty 
delegated or sub-delegated by a delegating authority to the political structure, political 
office bearer, councillor or staff member, may appeal against that decision by giving 
written notice of the appeal and reasons to the municipal manager within 21days of the 
date of the notification of the decision.” 
An “appeal against that decision to… the municipal manager” clearly established internal 
review mechanism within the municipalities (procuring entities). Until the decision of the High 
Court in Loghdey v City of Cape Town,52 it was taken for granted that the above provision 
afforded unsuccessful tenderers the right to internal appeal against the award decision of a 
municipality’s delegated authority.53  In Loghdey,54 the court relied on Reader v Ikin55 to hold 
that there was no viable appeal remedy under section 62 for an unsuccessful tenderer, as the 
appeal was only for “the person who has asked or applied for the decision in question”. Relying 
on Reader was erroneous, since that case was a complaint by a neighbour against the 
municipality’s grant of a building permit to an applicant; where the court held that section 62 
appeal was only available to the applicant (for instance, if the permit was denied); not the 
complainant who was a third party to the application. Conversely, an unsuccessful tenderer is 
not a third party to the award proceedings. 
                                                          
52 (100/09) [2010] ZAWCHC 25. 
53 See Quinot (2011) PPLR 196. Also, Jicama 17 (Pty) Ltd v West Coast District Municipality 2006 (1) SA 116 
(C); Total Computer Services (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Manager, Potchefstroom Local Municipality 2008 (4) SA 
346 (T); Syntell (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town [2008] ZAWCHC 120 (13 March 2008); Loghdey v Advanced 
Parking Solutions CC 2009 (5) SA 595 (C). 
54 Paras 33 & 34, fn 23.  
55 2008 (2) SA 582 (C) para 32. 
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However, a later decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in CC Groenewald v M5 
Developments56 held that section 62 appeal is available to unsuccessful tenderers. In CC 
Groenewald, it was expressly stated in the award notification that the award was subject to a 
21-day appeal period and that a contract would be concluded after that period had lapsed; 
whereas in Loghdey, the award notification did not contain such condition. Notwithstanding, it 
is submitted that those facts do not constitute viable grounds for distinguishing the two 
judgments.57 First, in Loghdey, a condition similar to the aforementioned one in CC 
Groenewald was contained in the municipality’s Supply Chain Management Policy (“SCMP”) 
and in the conditions of tender.58  The SCMP and the conditions of tender are deemed 
incorporated into the award notification and binding on all the parties, as held by the 
Constitutional Court in Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO of SASSA.59 
Secondly, in Loghdey, the court regarded such condition as merely informative and immaterial 
in determining whether a right of appeal existed, thus: 
“To attach to such decision (award) a note that it is subject to appeal is not to derogate 
from its finality.”60 
Thirdly, the decision in CC Groenewald did not regard the reference to section 62 appeal in 
the award notification as what entitled an unsuccessful tenderer to appeal.  
Thus, it is opined that exercising a right of internal appeal under section 62 does not 
depend on whether a reference to it is made in the award notification.61 
In the recent DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality,62 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal regarded, as a matter of course, that a municipality’s unsuccessful tenderer is 
entitled and in fact obligated to exhaust section 62 appeal before resorting to judicial review.63 
                                                          
56 [2010] ZASCA 47 para 21. 
57 Contra Quinot (2011) PPLR 197. 
58 See Loghdey v City of Cape Town (100/09) [2010] ZAWCHC 25 paras 16, 18.1 (particularly fn 15), 23, 28, and 
32. 
59 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) paras 38 & 40. See P Volmink “Legal Consequences of Non Compliance with Bid 
Requirements” (2014) 1 APPLJ 41 45. 
60 Paragraph 32. See also paras 29-31. Notwithstanding, it had accepted the distinction made by the court of first 
instance between Lodhgey and Syntell (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town [2008] ZAWCHC 120 on the issue of making 
an award subject to appeal period in the award notification. 
61 Supported by Quinot (2011) PPLR 197. 
62 [2015] ZASCA 146 paras 23-25. Also in Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City 
Metropolitan Municipality [2014] ZAECGHC 55; [2014] 3 All SA 560 (ECG) paras 72, 73, 79(3)(2). 
63 Pursuant to PAJA s 7 (2).  
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It is advised that aggrieved tenderers in a municipality’s procurement process should 
first file section 62 appeal (and probably an interdict application);64 before proceeding to 
judicial review, if the appeal is refused or they are unsatisfied with the outcome. 
5 3 1 2 2 Municipal SCM Regulations, regulation 49 
 This provides that a local government’s: 
“supply chain management policy … must allow persons aggrieved by decisions or 
actions taken … in the implementation of its supply chain management system, to lodge 
within 14 days of the decision or action a written objection or complaint to the 
municipality or municipal entity against the decision or action”  
Although the above vests aggrieved persons with a right to internal review,65 it does not 
establish the implementing mechanism. It only directs municipalities and municipal entities to 
establish such through its SCM policy. The court in Total Computer Services (Pty) Limited v 
Municipal Manager Potchefstroom Local Municipality66 noted that: “regulation 49 imposes a 
duty which is directory rather than mandatory and is of limited internal effect”. Thus, 
municipalities’ SCM policy is the instrument for giving effect to the Regulations’ directive.67 
This is discoverable upon reading together regulations 49 and 50, particularly the clauses 
stating that the SCM policy must “allow” complaints and “provide for” its resolution.68  
Where the SCM policy gives effect to regulation 49, suppliers could pursue related 
complaints.69 Conversely, where a municipality fails to promulgate the policy, this supplier’s 
review right may remain inchoate. 
Another factor that limits suppliers’ exercise of this right is regulation 50(7) that 
provides that:  
“This regulation must not be read as affecting a person’s rights to approach a court at 
any time.” 
                                                          
64 See 5 3 9 2 1 for rationale. 
65 See Quinot, (2011) PPLR 195-197. 
66 [2007] ZAGPHC 239; 2008 (4) SA 346 (T) para 72. 
67 See DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] ZASCA 146 16. 
68 In Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board [2001] ZASCA 51 paras 17-19, 22- the court held that 
section 187 of the South African Interim Constitution, which mandated that government procurement shall be 
regulated by laws providing for a procurement system that meets certain standards, was only a directive to the 
legislature to make laws with such provisions. 
69 See Total Computer Services (Pty) Limited v Municipal Manager Potchefstroom Local Municipality [2007] 
ZAGPHC 239; 2008 (4) SA 346 (T) paras 71-72. 
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This means that a bidder need not exhaust this internal remedy before applying for judicial 
review; notwithstanding PAJA section 7(2)(a),70 for it gives effect to exhaustion of internal 
remedies only as provided by the enabling law. A fortiori, the administrative law principle of 
exhaustion of internal remedies is likewise overridden; for legislation displaces common law.71  
Also, Systems Act section 62 appeal obviates the usefulness of regulation 49. First, 
both relate to municipalities’ internal remedies. Secondly, regulation 49 remedy is undefined 
and inferior to that of section 62.72 Thirdly, being a statute, the application of Systems Act takes 
precedence over the Regulations.73 No case decided in terms of regulation 49 was found. 
However, there are cases of objection brought in terms of some municipalities’ SCM policy 
(made pursuant to regulation 49).74  
5 3 2 Exempted matters 
As noted earlier,75 essentially no procurement matter is exempted from review in both 
jurisdictions. Although regulations 21 (Good and Works Regulations) and 22 (Consultancy 
Regulations) exempt matters such as selection of procurement method from review, that may 
be regarded as inoperative for various reasons given in 4 3 2 1 2 above, which includes that the 
Regulations is null and void for its inconsistency with the principal legislation (the PPA). This 
supports effectiveness of the bidder remedies systems. 
 However, South African courts76 have interpreted Systems Act section 62(3) to mean 
that section 62 appeal cannot succeed if it will result in a revocation or variation of a right that 
has accrued from the appealed decision. This effectively exempts unconditional award or 
concluded contracts from appeal.77 Section 62(3) states that: 
                                                          
70 See DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] ZASCA 146 para 20. 
71 See Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2005] ZACC 14 para 97; also, C Hoexter 
“Administrative Action in the Courts” (2006) Acta Juridica 303 313. 
72 See 5 3 8 2 below. 
73 See Quinot PPLR 196. 
74 Examples: Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Platjie Municipality [2008] ZANCHC 6; [2008] 4 All SA 168 
para 10; Total Computer Services (Pty) Limited v Municipal Manager Potchefstroom Local Municipality [2007] 
ZAGPHC 239; 2008 (4) SA 346 (T) paras 28, 34 & 71; Indiza Airport Management (Pty) Ltd v Msunduzi 
Municipality [2012] ZAKZPHC 74; [2013] 1 All SA 340 (KZP) paras 4, 7-11. 
75 2 3 2 3 (ii) and 4 3 2. 
76 See Loghdey v City of Cape Town [2010] ZAWCHC 25 para 33; Loghdey v Advanced Parking Solutions CC 
2009 (5) SA 595 (C); Lohan Civil-Tebogo Joint Venture v Mangaung Plaaslike Munisipaliteit 508/2009 (O) 
[2009] ZAFSHC 21. See also City of Cape Town v Reader (719/2007) [2008] ZASCA 130, 2009 (1) SA 555 
(SCA) paras 25, 31.  
77 See Quinot, (2011) PPLR 197. 
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“The appeal authority must consider the appeal, and confirm, vary or revoke the 
decision, but no such variation or revocation of a decision may detract from any rights 
that may have accrued as a result of the decision.” 
Notwithstanding that the above judicial interpretation appears settled; there are reasons 
to reconsider it. First, subsection 3 should   not   be   read   in   isolation, but in the context of 
other provisions of section 62.78 The primary purpose of the section is to provide remedies; 
which include confirming, varying or revoking the challenged decision (rights would have 
usually accrued). Thus, the aforementioned interpretation undermines the essence of section 
62;79 which arguably cannot be the intention of the legislature- for the purpose of a law ought 
to be given effect rather than defeating it.80 As Blackstone puts it: “One part of the statute must 
be so construed by another, that the whole may, if possible, stand.”81 Secondly, the 
interpretation ignores that the word may, which was used to qualify the notion of not detracting 
from an accrued right, should be regarded as connoting a permissive not mandatory 
requirement.82 It is significant that while “may” was used in the foregoing, the same subsection 
used “must”, which is indicative of a mandatory requirement,83 to qualify the consideration of 
the appeal. Thus, section 62(3) should be interpreted to mean that where a right has accrued 
from a decision, the appeal authority has discretion to decide whether the decision should be 
left undisturbed or be reviewed.84 For example, where a contract is virtually fully executed, the 
award decision may not be varied or revoked;85 where it has just been awarded, decision may 
be reviewable. This accords with what obtains generally in judicial review. 
                                                          
78 See South African Police Service v Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union [2011] ZACC 21, 2011 (6) SA 1 
(CC), 2011 (9) BCLR 992 (CC) para 30; Botha v Rich N.O [2014] ZACC 11, 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) para 35. 
79 This was acknowledged in Loghdey v City of Cape Town [2010] ZAWCHC 25 paras 32 & 33. See Quinot, 
(2011) PPLR 197. 
80 Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. See Rex v Cotterill (1817) 1 B & Ald 81; The Beta (1865) 3 Moo PCC NS 23 
25; and FAR Bennion Bennion on Statute Law (1990) 117-118. 
81 W Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) i 64. 
82 See Botha v Rich N.O [2014] ZACC 11, 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) para 35; South African Police Service v Public 
Servants Association [2006] ZACC 18; 2007 (3) SA 521 (CC). It is however acknowledged that, in appropriate 
circumstances, courts construe the word “may” as mandatory: see Wade & Forsyth Administrative Law 8 ed 
(2000) 239. 
83 See Botha v Rich N.O [2014] ZACC 11, 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) para 35. See also Y Kim Statutory Interpretation: 
General Principles and Recent Trends a CRS Report for Congress (2008) 9. 
84 The municipalities had been exercising this discretion, as the court in Loghdey v City of Cape Town [2010] 
ZAWCHC 25 para34 acknowledged, but disallowed.  
85 Chairperson - Standing Tender committee v JFE Sapela Electronics [2005] 4 ALL SA 487 (SCA) paras 27-29; 
Sebeza Kahle Trade v Emalahleni Local Municipal Council [2003] 2 ALL SA 340 (T) 348. 
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5 3 3 Cause of action 
The focus here is to identify the facts/elements that must be proved by a complainant to be 
entitled to the remedies under the respective laws.  
5 3 3 1 Nigeria 
Cause of action for procurement challenge under the PPA is discoverable from section 54(1) 
that provides that: 
“A bidder may seek administrative review for any omission or breach by a procuring 
or disposing entity under the provisions of this Act, or any regulations or guidelines 
made under this Act or the provisions of bidding documents.”86 
The only element that a complainant needs to prove to claim internal remedy is that the 
procuring or disposing entity has caused or allowed an omission or breach, contrary to the 
provisions of: the PPA, subsidiary legislation made pursuant to the Act, or bidding documents. 
This is unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law that only mentions the breach of the primary 
legislation. Nevertheless, it may be argued that the primary legislation incorporates such 
subsidiary legislation (and the bidding documents), as they are made in terms of the primary 
legislation. A breach of legislation other than the ones mentioned may not be actionable under 
this review mechanism. For example, if a procuring entity refuses a bidder access to requested 
information, contrary to the FOIA,87 the bidder should rather pursue the remedies provided 
under that Act instead of those under the PPA.  
Unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law and the EU Remedies Directive 2007/66/EC,88 the 
PPA does not require complainants to prove that they suffered or may suffer loss or injury 
because of the alleged breach or omission.  Therefore, such breaches are actionable per se. This 
is similar to what obtains under the GPA’s review procedure.89 The implications of the 
foregoing are that: (i) the complainant bears a lower burden of proof; (ii) it enhances the right 
to sue; (iii) it focuses more on enforcing compliance with procurement rules than redressing 
injury for non-compliance; and (iv) it permits complaints that would have ordinarily been 
rejected for not disclosing actual or anticipated damage or injury. For example, an unsuccessful 
                                                          
86 Emphasis added. 
87 The PPA also contains provisions on access to information; but they are not as extensive as those under the 
FOIA. 
88 Article 64(1), and art 1(3), respectively. 
89 Article XVIII(1). 
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bidder could secure a review of an award decision where there has been a breach of rules; 
notwithstanding that the bidder is not eligible to win the award. The PPA’s provision on who 
can seek a review however limits this wide cause of action, as discussed in 5 3 5 below. 
5 3 3 2 South Africa 
Cause of action for internal review differs slightly in the applicable South African legislation, 
as seen below. 
5 3 3 2 1 Section 62 
Under section 62(1), a person whose “rights are affected” by the decision of relevant authorities 
can appeal against it. Thus, the complainant only needs to prove that his rights are affected by 
the decision. This is akin to the provision of the UNCITRAL Model Law,90 requiring that the 
complainant has suffered or may suffer loss or injury owing to the decision. Unlike under the 
Nigerian PPA, an appealed decision may not necessarily be in breach of the Systems Act. For 
example, unsuccessful tenderers are entitled to requested information and reasons for 
procurement decision;91 and may appeal under section 62 when such request is refused;92 
notwithstanding that the Act does not provide for such right to information/reason. Also, a 
demand to tenderers to extend their bid validity period, although not contrary to law, could be 
appealable under section 62 if tenderers’ rights are affected. 
5 3 3 2 2 Regulation 49 
Here, a complainant only needs to prove that he is aggrieved by a decision or action taken in 
implementing the municipality’s SCM system. “Aggrieved” in law refers to “having legal 
rights that are adversely affected; having been harmed by an infringement of legal rights”.93 
                                                          
90 Article 64(1).  
91  Pursuant to PAIA s 11 and PAJA s 5.  
92 Despite PAIA s 74. See Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Plaatje Municipality [2008] ZANCHC 73 paras 10 
& 25. Also, Chairperson – Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics [2005] 4 ALL SA 487 (SCA) 
para 26; SMEC South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Mangaung Metro Municipality [2013] ZAFSHC 106 para 15.  
93 Garner Dictionary 77. See Ex Parte Sidebotham (1879) 14 Ch D 458 (CA) 465; Neuhaus v The Master of the 
High Court 1932 SWA 30 32; De Hart NO v Klopper and Botha NNO 1969(2) SA 91(T); C P Smaller (Pty) Ltd 
v The Master 1977(3) SA 159(T) 163E-164A. Francis George Hill Family Trust v South African Reserve Bank 
(259/90) [1992] ZASCA 50; 1992 (3) SA 91 (AD); [1992] 2 All SA 137 (A). Contra: Attorney-General of the 
Gambia v N'jie (1961) 2 All ER (PC) 510-511C. 
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This is essentially similar to the cause of action under the UNCITRAL Model Law and section 
62 Systems Act.94 
5 3 4 Who may initiate review proceedings? 
The focus here is ascertaining who is entitled or has locus standi to apply for the internal 
remedies under the relevant legislation.95 The element of an effective bidder remedies system 
relevant under this subheading is: bidders have a general right to challenge an act or decision 
of a procuring entity. 
5 3 4 1  Nigeria 
Section 54(1) PPA provides that it is a bidder that may seek administrative review. A bidder 
is not defined by the PPA. However, it defines a “contractor and supplier” as: 
“[A]ny potential party to a procurement contract with the procuring entity and includes 
any corporation, partnership, individual, sole proprietor, joint stock company, joint 
venture or any other legal entity through which business is conducted”.96 
This is similar to article 2 (t) of the UNCITRAL Model Law:  
“Supplier or contractor” means, according to the context, any potential party or any 
party to the procurement proceedings with the procuring entity” 
However, the context in which “bidder” is used in the PPA indicates that it means a contractor 
or supplier that actually submitted a bid.97 Thus, it may be argued that only those that submitted 
bids are entitled to remedies under the PPA. This limits the ostensible wide cause of action for 
review application under the PPA.  
However, a supplier or contractor who had a potential interest to bid but was excluded, 
owing for example to wrongful use of restrictive procurement method, may argue that it could 
apply for review. First, since the PPA does not exempt choice of procurement methods from 
review, it is arguable that the legislative intention is for contractors excluded by a wrongful use 
                                                          
94 Contra Quinot PPLR 196. 
95 See ch 2, 2 3 2 3 (iii). 
96 Section 60 (emphasis added).  
97 See for example PPA s 16, particularly subss 6-8, & 24. 
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of procurement method to challenge it. Secondly, no decided authority has established that only 
bidders are entitled to review.  
5 3 4 2  South Africa 
Right of internal review under the applicable South African legislation is wider than what 
obtains under the Nigerian PPA.  
Under section 62(1) of Systems Act, right to “appeal” is vested on a “person whose 
rights are affected by a decision taken” by a municipality’s delegated authority.98 A “person” 
is wider than “supplier/contractor” or “bidder/tenderer”.99 The appellant need not be an 
unsuccessful or potential bidder; provided he establishes that his rights are affected.100 Thus, a 
resident whose rights are affected by a municipality’s procurement decision is arguably entitled 
to appeal; however, South African courts have held to the contrary.101  
Right of review under regulation 49 is for “persons aggrieved by decisions or actions 
taken”; which is equivalent to that under section 62(1) Systems Act. However, regulations 49 
review is strictly procurement related; thus section 62 appeal is wider in scope.102  
5 3 5 The forum 
The composition and nature of the body or the person authorised within or by the procuring 
entity to entertain reviews are examined here. 
5 3 5 1  Nigeria  
The internal review authority is the accounting officer of the procuring entity.  An accounting 
officer is the person charged with the line supervision of the conduct of all procurement 
processes of the entity; in ministries, it is the Permanent Secretaries, and in extra-ministerial 
departments and corporations, it is the Director-Generals or officers of co-ordinate 
responsibility.103 The accounting officer is also the chairman of the entity’s procurement 
                                                          
98 See Lohan Civil-Tebogo Joint Venture v Mangaung Plaaslike Munisipaliteit [2009] ZAFSHC 21. 
99 See Garner Dictionary 1257 “person”. 
100 Note limitations discussed in 5 3 1 2 1above.  
101 See Loghdey v City of Cape Town (100/09) [2010] ZAWCHC 25. Reader v Ikin 2008 (2) SA 582 (C) at para 
32; City of Cape Town v Reader [2008] ZASCA 130; 2009 (1) SA 555 (SCA); which was cited with approval in 
Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association v Harrison (CCT 18/10) [2010] ZACC 19, 2011 (2) BCLR 121 
(CC), 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC). See also Quinot PPLR 196-197. 
102 See Quinot PPLR 196. 
103 PPA ss 20(1) & 60; 16(21) & (22). 
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planning committee, and its tender board, which is an approving/awarding authority for 
contracts within certain thresholds.104  
 As the accounting officer is clearly a judge in his own case, he may be biased.105 
However, the maxim nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in his own cause), 
may not invalidate this mechanism. First, the mechanism is essentially an opportunity for the 
procuring entity to reconsider and possibly correct its decision. Secondly, the Nigerian 
Constitution106 allows such administrative review, provided: (1) it permits the person whose 
rights and obligations may be affected to make representations before the authority gives its 
decision, and (2) the decision of the authority is not final.107  
5 3 5 2  South Africa 
5 3 5 2 1 Section 62 
Section 62 appeal is entertained by various review forums within the municipality, depending 
on the officer/office that made the challenged decision.108  
When the appeal is against a decision taken by: 
(a) a staff member other than the municipal manager- the municipal manager is the appeal 
authority; 
(b) the municipal manager- the executive committee or executive mayor is the appeal authority, 
or, if the municipality does not have an executive committee or executive mayor, the municipal 
council is the appeal authority; 
(c) a political structure or political office bearer, or a councillor- 
(i) the municipal council is the appeal authority where the council comprises less than 
15 councillors; or  
(ii) a committee of councillors who were not involved in the decision and appointed by 
the municipal council for this purpose is the appeal authority where the council 
comprises more than14 Councillors.” 
                                                          
104 PPA ss 17, 21(2); FGN circular SGF/OP/I/S.3/VIII/57 of 11-3-2009 4. 
105 On the general problem of lack of independence and impartiality of procuring entity’s internal review see: 
Zhang (2009) PPLR 211; Gordon (2006) PPLR 433; A Reich International Public Procurement Law: The 
Evolution of International Regime on Public Purchasing (1999) 226. 
106 Section 36(2). 
107 See 5 3 8 1 and 5 3 9 below. 
108 See Systems Act s 62(4). 
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Section 62 appeal may not apply against a decision of a municipal council. First, section 
62 does not establish an appeal authority for decisions of municipal councils. Secondly, the 
decisions of municipal councils are generally not subject to section 62 appeal; considering that: 
(1) it is only decisions taken in terms of a delegated or sub-delegated power or duty that are 
subject to the appeal; (2) a municipal council does not exercise delegated or sub-delegated 
power, as it is the delegating/ultimate authority for the municipality.109 Besides, a municipal 
council cannot delegate its own procurement role;110 which is to enter into the related service 
delivery agreement,111 after procurement procedure and award has been completed by the 
relevant delegated authorities.112  
Although the appeal authorities above are structured hierarchically, a higher appeal 
authority cannot review the appeal decision of a lower one.113 The structure of the forums 
engenders independence and less likelihood of bias, than what obtains under the Nigerian 
system. First, each appeal authority under section 62 is higher in authority than the 
offices/officers subject to its jurisdiction. Secondly, the forums are not composed of the 
offices/officers that took the challenged decision. 
5 3 5 2 2 Municipal SCM Regulations 
According to regulation 50 (1), an independent and impartial person not directly involved in 
the municipality’s or municipal entity’s SCM processes, appointed by the municipality’s 
accounting officer, shall be the review authority. Essentially, the person must not be a staff of 
the municipality or municipality entity. The arrangement in Sgananda Consulting (Pty) Ltd v 
Mnambithi FET College,114 where the procuring entity appointed a retired judge as the review 
authority is arguably envisaged. 
As argued above,115 regulation 50(1) did not establish the forum; it only directs that a 
municipality or municipal entity’s SCM policy shall establish it. 
                                                          
109 Systems Act 59(1). 
110 Systems Act s 59(1)(a). 
111 In terms of section 76(b). 
112 Such as a municipal manager, a tender evaluation committee and tender adjudication committee (both 
committees’ decisions are subject to the municipal manager’s appeal authority). See Total Computer Services 
(Pty) Ltd v Municipal Manager, Potchefstroom Local Municipality 2008 (4) SA 346 (T) paras 9-10; and CC 
Groenewald v M5 Developments [2010] ZASCA 47 paras 7-10. 
113 See facts of Total Computer Services (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Manager, Potchefstroom Local Municipality 2008 
(4) SA 346 (T); and CC Groenewald v M5 Developments [2010] ZASCA 47. 
114  [2014] ZAKZPHC 28 para 3 (J). Note however that the case did not involve the Municipal SCM Regulations. 
115 5 3 1 2 2. 
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5 3 6 Lodging complaints and the timeframe 
The issues examined here are: timeframe for applying for review, implications of applying out 
of time, and whether extension of time is permitted. 
5 3 6 1  Nigeria  
A complainant-bidder must apply for review within fifteen working days from the date he first 
became aware of the circumstances giving rise to the complaint or should have become aware 
of the circumstances, whichever is earlier.116 Thus, time begins to run from the earliest date the 
complainant-bidder had any actual, constructive, implied or imputed notice of the breach.117 
For instance, unsuccessful bidders are expected to access the record of the procurement 
proceeding shortly after the notice of award, to possibly identify any breach and seek a review 
within time.118 Failure to do this does not keep time from running; this ensures vigilance and 
expeditiousness amongst bidders. The UNCITRAL Model Law enshrines constructive notice 
of breach, as it does not refer to bidders’ awareness of breach, rather it stipulates periods for 
submitting a challenge application.119  
 There is no provision for extension of this timeframe. Therefore, an accounting officer 
may reject a complaint filed out of time, for non-compliance with a condition precedent.120 
Complaints rejected on that ground shall not be entertained by the external review forum 
(BPP); as the PPA stipulates that the internal review shall be exhausted before external 
review.121 If the BPP entertains it, the procuring entity or the successful bidder can object.122 It 
would be presumed that complaints are filed within time;123 thus, the review authority or a 
successful bidder is responsible for objecting to a complaint filed out of time. However, where 
a complaint is submitted first (erroneously) to the BPP, it usually transfers it to the accounting 
                                                          
116 PPA s 54(1)(a). 
117 On definition of the various forms of notice, see Garner Dictionary 1164; Animashaun v Olojo (1990) 10 SCNJ 
43, (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt.154) 111. 
118 See PPA s 38(2)(b) on access to procurement records. 
119 Article 66(2). 
120 See Oshevire v British Caledonian Airways Ltd (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt 163) 507; Fayemi v Local Government 
Service Commission, Oyo State [2005] 6 NWLR (PT. 921). 
121 Section 54(2), (2)(c) and (3). 
122 PPA s 54(7). 
123 Evidence Act 2011 s 168(1). 
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officer.124 The practice is defensible, and it may be deemed that the internal review time, if still 
available, stopped running when the BPP received the complaint.125 
5 3 6 2  South Africa 
Under section 62 of Systems Act, the affected person is required to lodge an appeal within 21 
days of the notification of the decision being challenged.126 Time begins to run when the person 
had actual notice of the decision. However, such notification may reach the affected person in 
any manner and from whomever, not necessarily from the delegated authority.127 Written 
notice is not required; and notification need not be accompanied with reason for decision for 
time to run.128 These do not violate the right to fair administrative action under the 
Constitution129 and PAJA.130 However, where an aggrieved person requests reason for decision 
before deadline for filing appeal, time may be deemed to stop running until the reason is 
furnished.131 
 No authority may extend the time when it lapses.132 Thus, an appeal lodged out of time 
is void, entitling a successful bidder to raise objection and the municipality to reject the appeal.  
Section 62 is similar to Nigeria’s PPA on the subject-matter under consideration; except 
that the scope of notice required for review application time to start running is wider in the 
former. 
Under Regulation 49, the aggrieved person shall lodge the complaint within fourteen 
days following the defective decision or action.133 This timeframe is more definite than those 
considered above, since it does not depend on the notice or awareness of the decision or action 
                                                          
124 From author’s observation in the course of involvement in related procurement challenge cases. 
125 Accords with Nigeria’s judicial and civil service practice; see for example Federal High Court Act Cap F12 
LFN 2004 s 22; FOIA s 5.  
126 Systems Act s 62(1). 
127 Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality [2014] 
ZAECGHC 55, [2014] 3 All SA 560 paras 40-43. Notice obtained from the municipality’s website suffices. 
128 Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality [2014] 
ZAECGHC 55, [2014] 3 All SA 560 para 40. 
129 Section 33(2). 
130 Section 5(1). 
131 Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality [2014] 
ZAECGHC 55, [2014] 3 All SA 560 para 45; Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Plaatje Municipality [2008] 
ZANCHC 73 para 25; Chairperson – Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics [2005] 4 ALL SA 
487 (SCA) para 26. 
132 Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality [2014] 
ZAECGHC 55, [2014] 3 All SA 560 para 73. 
133 Municipal SCM Regulations reg 49. 
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to start running- this is akin to article 66(2) of UNCITRAL Model Law.  This necessitates extra 
vigilance by suppliers, as certain decisions or actions of a municipality may not be 
communicated or accessible until this time lapses. Moreover, the time is shorter than that 
provided by the Systems Act. However, section 62 timeframe will prevail over that of 
regulation 49, as the latter is a subsidiary legislation.134 Nonetheless, the High Court had 
interpreted the fourteen days as only a prescriptive minimum period; thus, an SCM policy can 
validly prescribe a longer period.135 A complaint pursuant to regulation 49 filed outside the 
time prescribed by the regulation or a municipality’s SCM policy may be void; although it 
could still be entertained as a section 62 appeal, if time for that has not also elapsed.136  
Generally, not providing persons entitled an opportunity to submit review application 
within the stipulated time constitutes invalidity (Nigeria) or procedural unfairness (South 
Africa), liable to judicial review.137 
5 3 7 The proceedings 
Examined here are: suppliers’ access to procurement records for purpose of procurement 
review, the procedures and timeframes for completion of review. 
5 3 7 1 Nigeria 
(a) Access to information  
Bidders’ right of review or response thereto is enhanced by their right of access to 
comprehensive records of the procurement proceeding, within seven days after effectively 
applying for them.138 This time limit may only be extended for another seven days where the 
application entails gathering a large number of records or where consultation is required to 
grant access, which may not reasonably be completed within the original time limit.139 The 
time limit is relatively prompt.140 Access to information is enhanced by provisions that judicial 
                                                          
134 See also Quinot (2011) PPLR 197. 
135 Total Computer Services (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Manager, Potchefstroom Local Municipality 2008 (4) SA 346 
(T) para 71. 
136 See Total Computer Services (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Manager, Potchefstroom Local Municipality 2008 (4) SA 
346 (T) paras 68 & 71. 
137 See Total Computer Services (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Manager, Potchefstroom Local Municipality 2008 (4) SA 
346 (T) para 74. 
138 PPA, s 38(2) & (3) and FOIA s 4(a).  
139 FOIA s 6. 
140 The global average is fifteen working days: Open Society Institute Transparency & Silence: A Survey of Access 
to Information Laws and Practices in Fourteen Countries (2006) 176, available at 
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review against denial of access shall be determined summarily and that wrongful denial 
constitutes an offence.141 The foregoing corresponds with the element of effectiveness relating 
to prompt access to related procurement records. 
(b) Review procedure 
A complaint must be in writing and submitted to the relevant accounting officer.142 The 
accounting officer, in private, considers the complaint with the facts or records available to 
him. He may not invite representation from the other bidders; as the PPA does not require that. 
However, where the review decision may affect the civil rights and obligations of any bidder, 
representation from the bidder(s) should be invited.143 By practice, representations are by 
written submissions, not oral hearing. The accounting officer may delegate some aspects of the 
review responsibility to an officer within the entity, to enable him meet review deadline. 
However, he will still in any circumstance be responsible for issuing the review decision, in 
writing.144 
(c) Review timeframe 
The accounting officer has fifteen working days following receipt of a complaint to make his 
decision.145 This corresponds with the element of effectiveness requiring that a review forum 
shall have the ability to proceed swiftly within a reasonably short period of time.  
5 3 7 2 South Africa 
5 3 7 2 1 Section 62 appeal 
(a) Access to information  
The Systems Act grants bidders equal and simultaneous access to information relevant to the 
bidding process.146 In addition, an information requester is entitled to access to records of a 
public body within 30 days after submitting request, pursuant to PAIA, sections 11, 18 and 
                                                          
<https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/transparency-and-silence-survey-access-information-
laws-and-practices-14-countries> (accessed 21-10-2017). 
141 FOIA ss 7(5), 21. See JM Ackermann & IE Sandoval-Ballesteros ‘The Global Explosion of Freedom of 
Information Laws’ (2006) 58 Administrative Law Review 85 118. 
142 PPA s 54(2). 
143 See the Constitution s 36(2); also 5 3 5 1above. 
144 PPA ss 54(2)(b), 16(21) & (22). See also 5 3 8 1below. 
145 PPA s 54(2)(b). 
146 Section 83(1)(b). 
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25.147 This response time could be extended by another 30 days.148 If access is denied, a 
requester may within 60 days appeal internally to a relevant authority.149 The authority has 30 
days following receipt of the appeal to give decision.150 The requester, if aggrieved, may within 
30 days apply for judicial review, which has no definite conclusion time.151 Furthermore, 
tenderers can request written reasons for procurement decision, within 90 days of becoming 
aware of the decision; and the entity shall respond within 90 days.152 The cumulative time for 
accessing requested information or reason for administrative decision in South Africa is quite 
long compared to the global average.153 It does not align with the element of effectiveness 
requiring prompt access to related procurement records. Actually, the 21 days allowed for 
lodging appeal may elapse before required information/records are accessed.  
However, access to information should be granted to tenderers earlier than PAIA’s 
maximum allowable time as a matter of right, according to the court in Actaris South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v Sol Platjie Municipality.154 Also, if a tenderer applies for reasons for procurement 
decision, the time for lodging section 62 appeal will begin to run from the date the reasons 
were received.155 Besides, a tenderer may lodge an appeal based on information from a third 
party;156 this however is speculative and not generally advisable. 
(b) Review procedure 
Section 62 appeal is initiated by the affected tenderer giving written notice of appeal with 
reasons/grounds to the Municipal Manager.157 A tenderer’s letter requesting information on the 
tender process, which discloses an intention to lodge an appeal, does not serve as a notice of 
appeal.158 The municipal manager must promptly submit the appeal to the appropriate appeal 
                                                          
147  Also, SA Constitution s 32. 
148 PAIA s 26. 
149 PAIA s 74, 75(1)(a). See s 1 for definition of “relevant authority”. 
150 PAIA s 77(3). 
151 PAIA ss 78 & 79. 
152 PAJA s 5(1) & (2). See South African Constitution s 33; Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd 
v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality [2014] ZAECGHC 55, [2014] 3 All SA 560 para 41. 
153 See fn 134. Roling Transparency & Access to Information 49. 
154 [2008] ZANCHC 6; [2008] 4 All SA 168 para 25. See also Roling Transparency & Access to Informaion 50, 
Open Society Institute Transparency & Silence 183 & 185. 
155 See 5 3 7 2 1.  
156 See Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Platjie Municipality [2008] ZANCHC 6; [2008] 4 All SA 168 para 
10; where appeal was based on rumour. 
157 Subsection (1).  
158 Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality [2014] 
ZAECGHC 55, [2014] 3 All SA 560 para 14 & 50. 
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authority identified in 5 3 5 2 1 above.159 An appeal authority must commence consideration 
of the appeal within six weeks of receiving it.160 The consideration involves examining the 
objections raised; reviewing the tender process and documentation; obtaining opinions of 
officials that conducted the tender process; where necessary, seeking legal advice; and 
requesting written representations from the affected tenderer(s).161 CC Groenewald v M5 
Developments162 indicates that only tenderers who appealed shall be heard (against the 
municipal authority and the successful tenderer). Thus, the appeal authority shall not reconsider 
all the tenders or hear all the tenderers.163  
(c) Review timeframe 
The appeal authority is required to give a decision within a reasonable period.164 Thus, there 
is no definite timeframe for completion of the appeal. In this circumstance, the appeal authority 
may not act with a sense of urgency towards determining the appeal within days or a few weeks. 
For example, the appeal in CC Groenewald v M5 Developments165 took nine months to be 
finalised. This timeframe does not correspond with the element of effectiveness requiring the 
ability to proceed swiftly within a reasonably short period of time, in terms of days and weeks. 
The element entails providing definite timeframe (specified days or weeks) for review. Section 
62(5) did not stipulate a definite timeframe; thus, it permits the lengthening of proceeding, as 
in CC Groenewald v M5 Developments above. 
5 3 7 2 2 Regulation 49 
(a) Access to information 
The Municipal SCM Regulation does not provide for access to procurement information; 
however, PAIA could be relied upon as obtained under the Systems Act.  
(b) Review procedure 
Regulation 49 review is commenced by a written objection or complaint to the municipality or 
municipal entity against the procurement decision or action concerned. Following this, the 
municipality’s accounting officer submits the complaint to the adjudicator described in 5 3 5 2 
                                                          
159 Systems Act s 62(2). 
160 Systems Act s 62(5). 
161 See CC Groenewald v M5 Developments [2010] ZASCA 47 paras 13-17. 
162 [2010] ZASCA 47 paras 24-25. 
163 This, according to CC Groenewald v M5 Developments [2010] ZASCA 47 paras 24-25, is to save time.  
164 Section 62(5). 
165 [2010] ZASCA 47 para 11. 
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2 above. The review procedure will most likely be similar to that of the Systems Act appeal; 
although the adjudicator is at liberty to adopt any procedure that he deems fit.166 The accounting 
officer or any official he designates assists the adjudicator in performing its functions; which 
could include providing required facilities and relevant records.167  
(c) Review timeframe 
According to regulation 50(4), the adjudicator shall strive to promptly resolve the complaint, 
and submit related report to the accounting officer. Thus, no definite timeframe is provided 
within which to complete the review. This is similar to what obtains under the Systems Act 
appeal discussed above- the views expressed there also apply here. However, an aggrieved 
bidder may refer the complaint to the provincial treasury if the complaint is not resolved after 
60 days.168 
5 3 8 Available remedies and enforcement 
The extent to which the various internal review forums may intervene in procurement 
proceedings and redress breaches, and whether these correspond with the elements of 
effectiveness that relate to remedies are considered here. These elements include: (a) decisions 
of review forum are binding; (b) the possibility of intervention without delay by the forum; (c) 
the forum has power to suspend or cancel the procurement proceedings and to prevent the entry 
into force of a procurement contract while the dispute remains outstanding; (d) available 
remedies meet the system’s needs; and (e) decisions/remedies given can be easily enforced by 
a fast and simple mechanism.  
5 3 8 1 Nigeria 
The accounting officer decides the corrective measures to be taken if any, including the 
suspension of the procurement proceedings where he deems necessary.169 Making suspension 
discretionary is defensible, since the execution of contract does not foreclose a review. Besides, 
the review timeframe is quite short; thus, the accounting officer can intervene without delay in 
the procurement proceedings. Corrective measures generally involve making right what is 
wrong in the challenged procurement;170 and may specifically include: stopping, varying or 
                                                          
166 Deducible from Municipal SCM Regulations reg 50(1) (b) & (4). 
167 Municipal SCM Regulations reg (3)(c). 
168 Regulation 50(5). 
169 PPA s 54(2)(b). 
170 See Garner Dictionary 396 “corrective”. 
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overturning the challenged procurement decision or action. Monetary compensation is not a 
remedy under the PPA. Although, “corrective measures” may be interpreted to include the 
power to award compensation;171 the interpretation does not align with the general tenor of 
remedies provided under the PPA.172 Besides, it is most unlikely that awarding compensation 
would be an option for the accounting officer, considering regulatory and budgetary controls 
to expenditure.173 
 The accounting officer’s decision is authoritative,174 being the highest procurement 
decision-maker and highest office holder within the procuring entity (except for ministries, 
where the ministers are the highest political office holders and the accounting officers are the 
highest ranking civil servants).175 The review decision will be easy to implement, since it is a 
reconsideration of the procurement decision/action taken or supervised by the accounting 
officer himself; and the implementation is undertaken internally. The available remedies and 
the enforcement correspond with all the related elements of effectiveness identified above. 
5 3 8 2 South Africa 
5 3 8 2 1 Section 62 appeal 
The appeal authority can “confirm, vary or revoke” the challenged procurement decision.176 It 
cannot refer the decision back to the decision-maker for reconsideration;177 and does not have 
power to suspend the procurement proceeding. However, filing an appeal automatically 
suspends the proceeding, to prevent the entry into force of a contract.178 This suspension is 
critical considering that concluded contracts may not be appealable under section 62.179  
Notwithstanding, it is advisable for the aggrieved bidder to apply for interdict to prevent 
execution of the contract while the appeal is pending; as the procuring entity may ignore the 
                                                          
171 Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 329. 
172 See PPA s 54(4)(b). 
173 See for example CFRN 1999 s 80. 
174 PPA ss 16(22).54(2)(b). 
175 See PPA s 20.  
176 Section 62(3). 
177 CC Groenewald v M5 Developments [2010] ZASCA 47 para 27. 
178 Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Platjie Municipality [2008] ZANCHC 6; [2008] 4 All SA 168 (NC) para 
27; Loghdey v City of Cape Town [2010] ZAWCHC 25 para 1; Chairperson - Standing Tender committee v JFE 
Sapela Electronics [2005] 4 ALL SA 487 (SCA) paras 25 and 26. See also SCM Policy (City of Cape Town) 
clause 245. 
179 Systems Act s 62(3). See 5 3 2 above and authorities cited there. 
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suspending effect of the appeal. It may be impractical to overturn a completed or nearly-
completed contract even if the award was invalid.180 
 Decisions of the appeal authority are binding. However, its intervention is not 
expeditious as seen in 5 3 7 2 1(c) above. The appeal authority is a higher authority within the 
procuring entity than the procurement decision-maker; thus, its decisions will be readily 
followed. Also, being an internal mechanism, implementing review decision will be fast and 
simple. The remedies under section 62 appeal align with the related elements of effectiveness; 
but are undermined by exemption of unconditional award and concluded contracts from appeal, 
and the uncertainty about the applicability of the appeal to unsuccessful tenderers.181 
5 3 8 2 2 Regulation 49 
No definite remedies are provided for regulations 49 review; the review authority is only 
enjoined to “strive to resolve” the objections and complaints.182 It may be argued that the 
review authority under regulation 49 may exercise the powers available under section 62 of 
Systems Act, being a statute applicable to municipalities.183 However, according to DDP 
Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality,184 its powers do not include correcting or 
setting aside the Municipality’s decision. 
 Similar to section 62 appeal the review authority’s decisions are binding- it resolves the 
complaints.185 However, its intervention is not expeditious,186 and suspension of procurement 
proceeding is outside its remit. Implementing the review decisions may not be as easy as 
obtains under the System Act, as the review authority does not implement its decision; rather 
it refers it to the accounting officer for implementation. The review authority’s appointment 
may be terminated on completion of review and he will be unable to follow up his decision to 
ensure implementation. Besides, he does not have any form of coercive powers. Enforcement 
of review decision thus depends on the goodwill of the accounting officer. Effectiveness of the 
remedy under this mechanism is weakened by its indefiniteness, its dependent enforcement 
                                                          
180 Chairperson - Standing Tender committee v JFE Sapela Electronics [2005] 4 ALL SA 487 (SCA) paras 26-
29; Sebeza Kahle Trade v Emalahleni Local Municipal Council [2003] 2 ALL SA 340 (T) 348. See also Olitzki 
Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA) para 1265F-H. See Quinot PPLR (2011) 198. 
181 See 5 3 1 2 1 and 5 3 2 above. 
182 Regulation 50 (4). 
183 See Quinot PPLR (2011) 196. Contrast: P Bolton “Municipal Tender Awards and Internal Appeals by 
Unsuccessful Bidders” (2010) 13 (3) PELJ 56 73. 
184 [2015] ZASCA 146 18.  
185 Regulation 50(4). 
186 Regulation 50(4). 
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mechanism and other factors identified in 5 3 1 2 2 above. Moreover, in DDP Valuers (Pty) 
Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality,187 it was held that Regulation 49’s review falls short of an 
internal remedy (to be exhausted) under section 7(2) of PAJA. 
5 3 9 Right of appeal/further review 
The multilevel remedies systems of Nigeria and South Africa are enabled by law entitling 
bidders to appeal review decisions, as presented below. 
5 3 9 1 Nigeria 
An aggrieved bidder can appeal to the BPP where:188 
(a) the accounting officer does not make a decision within the prescribed review period; 
(b) the bidder is not satisfied with the decision of the accounting officer. 
5 3 9 2 South Africa 
Under Systems Act section 62, no right to appeal the review decision is provided. However, it 
is an inherent administrative law right to apply for judicial review of the appeal decision,189 
having exhausted the internal remedies.190  
 An affected bidder who has applied for review under regulation 49 has right to appeal 
to the provincial treasury, if: 
(a) the complaint is not resolved within 60 days of filing; or 
(b) no response is received from the municipality or municipal entity within the 60 days.191 
  
                                                          
187 [2015] ZASCA 146 18 & 20.  
188 See PPA s 54(2)(c) and (3); and ch 6. 
189 See ch 7; CC Groenewald v M5 Developments [2010] ZASCA 47 paras 2, 17, 27. 
190 See Quinot PPLR (2011) 200, 202; Quinot State Commercial Activity 162-163; Bolton Government 
Procurement 18-19 (and the authorities cited there); Eskom Holdings v The New Reclamation Group 2009 (4) SA 
628 (SCA) para 11. See also PAJA s 7(2)(b); Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City 
Metropolitan Municipality [2014] ZAECGHC 55, [2014] 3 All SA 560. 
191 Municipal SCM Regulation reg 49(5)(a) & (b). See ch 6. 
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5 4 Summary of basic features of the internal administrative review regimes 
A summary of the basic features of the internal review mechanisms in both systems are set out 
in the table below. 
Features  Nigeria South Africa 
Enabling 
legislation  
PPA, section 54(2) 1. Section 62 of Systems Act. 
2. Regulation 49 of the Municipal 
SCM Regulations: given effect 
through municipals’ SCM policy. 
Exempted matter None Unconditional award or concluded 
contracts (section 62) 
Cause of action An omission or breach, 
contrary to the provisions of: 
the PPA, subsidiary legislation 
made pursuant to the Act, or 
bidding documents. 
Rights adversely affected by 
procurement decision. 
Right to institute 
review 
Actual and potential bidders in 
the challenged procurement. 
Any person whose rights are affected 
by the municipal’s procurement 
decision. 
Forum  Accounting officer (AO) of the 
procuring entity. 
 
 
 
  
1. Municipal Manger, Executive 
Committee/ Executive Mayor, 
Municipal Council, or Committee of 
Councillors (section 62). 
2. An independent and impartial 
person appointed by the 
municipality’s accounting officer. 
(regulation 49). 
Commencement 
timeframe 
Within fifteen working days 
from the date the complainant 
1. Within 21 days of the notification 
of the decision being challenged 
(section 62). 
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had actual or implied notice of 
the breach. 
2. Within fourteen days following the 
challenged decision or action 
(regulation 49). 
Access to 
information/record 
Within seven days after 
effectively applying for the 
information. May be extended 
for another seven days (FOIA) 
Within 30 days after effectively 
applying for the information. May be 
extended for another 30 days 
(PAIA). 
The proceedings 
and timeline 
Written complaint or 
representation submitted to the 
AO, for consideration and 
decision within fifteen 
working days following 
receipt of complaint. 
1. Written notice of appeal with 
reasons/grounds to the Municipal 
Manager, who promptly submits to 
the appropriate reviewer that must 
commence the review within six 
weeks of receiving it and give 
decision within a reasonable period 
(section 62). 
2. Written objection or complaint 
submitted to the municipality or 
municipal entity, to present to the 
adjudicator for consideration and 
prompt resolution (regulation 49). 
Available remedies 
and enforcement  
Corrective measures, which 
may include: suspending, 
stopping, varying or 
overturning the challenged 
procurement decision/action. 
Decision implemented by the 
entity. 
1. Confirm, vary or revoke the 
procurement decision (section 62). 
Decision implemented by the entity.  
2. Resolution of the complaints (may 
not include correcting or setting aside 
the Municipality’s decision). AO 
may implement decision (regulation 
49). 
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Right of further 
review/appeal 
Right of appeal to the BPP, if 
decision is not given within 
deadline or is unsatisfactory.  
1.  right to judicial review (section 62 
and regulation 49). 
2. Appeal to provincial treasury if no 
decision is given within 60 days after 
complaint (regulation 49) 
 
5 5 Conclusion and Analysis 
As seen above, the internal review mechanisms of Nigeria and South Africa are similar in a 
few respects; such as: their jurisdiction is limited to procurements of a particular tier of 
government;192 they are compulsory first forum; review is by considering written submission 
of parties; review decisions are binding and appealable. Dissimilarities exist in most other 
aspects. The mechanisms in their own way largely meet the relevant elements of an effective 
remedies system. However, prompt access to procurement information and ability of review 
forum to proceed swiftly and intervene expeditiously in procurement proceedings are lacking 
in the South African mechanisms. Besides, the uncertainty about the right of unsuccessful 
tenderers to section 62 appeal; the practical exemption of unconditional award and concluded 
contracts from section 62 appeal; and the unviability of regulation 49 mechanism are also set-
backs to the effectiveness of South Africa’s internal review mechanisms. This buttresses that 
the design of the remedies mechanisms affects their effectiveness, in this case adversely. 
Although, Nigeria’s mechanism scores more on elements of effectiveness, it is less independent 
and impartialitial owing to the constitution of the forum.  
 South Africa may consider adopting the short response time to information-request 
provided under the Nigerian FOIA,193 which is 7 days, extendable by another 7 days. To do 
this, South Africa will amend the PAIA to abridge its response time, which is currently 30 days, 
extendable by another 30 days.194 This is in view of the importance of access to records in 
exercising review right. Also, the effective exemption of unconditional awards or concluded 
contracts from the appeal under the Systems Act,195 justifies such abridgement of time, so 
bidders could prmptly obtain records to commence the appeal before an award or contract. 
 The external administrative review mechanisms are considered in the next chapter. 
                                                          
192 Nigeria: federal government; South Africa: municipalities. 
193 Section 4(a) & 6. See 5 3 7 1(a) above. 
194 Sections 11, 18, 25 & 26. See 5 3 7 2(a) above. 
195 As seen in 5 3 2 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
149 
 
Chapter 6 
External Administrative Review 
6 1  Introduction  
External administrative review is a procurement challenge, or an appeal against an internal 
review, before an administrative authority that is external to and independent of the procuring 
entity whose procurement decision is being challenged. External review could be a first 
instance review or a follow-up to an internal review. 
The components of external review in Nigeria and South Africa, such as the applicable 
laws, the forum, available remedies, among others, are examined below. Some of these 
components are compared with related elements of effective remedies systems and relevant 
international legislation.1 
6 2 Enabling laws 
6 2 1 Nigeria 
Section 54(3) of the PPA establishes external review right, by providing that if: 
“The bidder is not satisfied with the decision of the accounting officer, the bidder may 
make a complaint to the Bureau…”2 
 This external review is thus in the form of a second stage administrative review of the 
challenged procurement decision; or an appeal against a procuring entity’s internal review 
decision. As seen earlier,3 it is not permissible to pursue this external review without first 
exhausting the internal review.4 Conversely, the UNCITRAL Model Law,5 on which the 
Nigerian PPA is based, permits external review as a first-instance challenge; apart from being 
pursuable as an appeal against an internal review decision or indecision. This is possible 
                                                          
1 The UNCITRAL Model Law art 67; GPA XXVIII (3) provide for external administrative review. see also EU 
Remedies Directive art 2(9). 
2 “Bureau” refers to the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP); see 3 3 1 above. 
3 5 3 1 1 above. 
4 PPA s54(2); Ofscon Nig Ltd v Min of Niger Delta Affairs FHC 21-03-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/315/2011; 
Integrated Remediations Limited v Federal Ministry of Environment FHC 14-11-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/841/2010; A.C Egbe Nig Limited v DG BPP FHC 21-07-2010 suit no FHC/B/CS/116/2010.  
5 Articles 66(4) & (7) & 67(1). See also GPA art XVIII (2) & (5). 
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because internal review is optional under the international legislative framework;6 unlike the 
PPA.7  
Making internal review a mandatory first recourse, as obtained in Nigeria, aligns with 
the principle of exhaustion of internal remedies.8 Also, bypassing internal review may 
unnecessarily burden the external administrative or judicial review forum with cases that would 
have been satisfactorily resolved by the procuring entity, at an earlier and less disruptive stage 
and with lower costs.9 On the other hand, making internal review optional allows a supplier 
that is sceptical about getting remedy from the procuring entity, probably owing to likelihood 
of bias, to straightaway seek redress before an independent administrative or judicial review 
body.10 
6 2 2 South Africa 
The Municipal SCM Regulations 50(5) and (6), and the Treasury Regulations 16A9.3, provide 
for external administrative review of procurement decisions of municipalities, and of provincial 
and national governments, respectively. These are considered below.  
6 2 2 1 Municipal SCM Regulations 
Regulation 50(5) provides that a procurement challenge against a municipality may be referred 
to the relevant provincial treasury if: 
(a) an internal review under regulation 50(1) and (4) is not resolved within 60 days; or 
(b) no response on the internal review is received from the municipality or municipal 
entity within 60 days. 
Furthermore, regulation 50(6) provides that: 
“If the provincial treasury does not or cannot resolve the matter … [it] may be referred 
to the National Treasury for resolution.” 
The above constitutes a two-stage external review. The complaint to the provincial 
treasury is not an appeal against the internal review decision; and a complaint to the National 
                                                          
6 UNCITRAL Model Law art 66(1) and Guide to Enactment commentary 11 to ch VIII of Model Law 230; GPA 
XVIII (2). Conversely, the EU Remedies Directive art 1(5) permits member states to require the person concerned 
to first seek review with the contracting authority. In this case, external review or judicial review may only be 
pursued as a 2nd stage review. 
7 Section 54(2). See 5 3 1 1 above. 
8 See 5 2 3 above. 
9 See Guide to Enactment commentary 11 to ch VIII of Model Law 230. 
10 See Udeh (2013) PPLR 187-188 for further support for bypassing internal review. 
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Treasury is not an appeal against the review decision of the provincial treasury. Rather, in both 
cases, it is a complaint against the municipality’s original procurement decision, owing to the 
failure of the initial review forum to resolve the complaint. The internal review under regulation 
50(1) and (4) is a precursor to the external review; and, the weaknesses of the internal review 
mechanism, seen earlier,11  militate against these external review options. 
6 2 2 2 Treasury Regulations 
Regulation 16A9.3 (a) provides that the National Treasury and each provincial treasury must 
establish a mechanism to receive and consider complaints regarding alleged non-compliance 
with the prescribed minimum norms and standards on supply chain management (“SCM”).12 
This mechanism is intended to resolve complaints against procurement decisions of 
departments, constitutional institutions and public agencies of provincial and national 
governments only, as prescribed by regulation 16A2.1. Considering the context of 
regulation16A9.3 (a) and (b), which refers to “consider complaints”13 and “remedial 
measures”, the regulation generally envisages an external review, not a mere administrative 
investigation.14 Since the National Treasury is a procuring entity under a transversal term 
contract,15 this mechanism may constitute an internal review for the Treasury’s procurement. 
In this latter case, the Treasury will not be deemed as independent.  
Similar to the internal review provision of the Municipal SCM Regulations,16 regulation 
16A9.3 (a) only directs that a mechanism for procurement review be established. It does not 
provide guidance on how the mechanism would operate.17 Thus, until the mechanism is 
established, the review cannot be pursued; neither would it constitute an “internal remedy” that 
would be exhausted before recourse to judicial review, as contemplated by section 7(2) of 
PAJA.18 The mechanism apparently refers to the organisational structure and procedures for 
the review. The Kwazulu Natal Provincial Treasury has established such mechanism;19 but the 
                                                          
11 5 3 1 2 2. See also 6 11 2 below. 
12 Heading to regulation 16A9 reads “Avoiding abuse of supply chain management system”.  “SCM” is discussed 
in 3 2 1 1 above. 
13 Contextually connotes adjudication. 
14 The Treasury also has powers to investigate procurement proceedings- discussed in chapter 8. 
15 See 3 2 3 above. 
16 See 5 3 1 2 2 above. 
17 See also Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Procurement Regulation 312. 
18 See DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] ZASCA 146 18. 
19 Through the Bid Appeals Tribunal Practice Note No SCM-07 of 2006. 
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National Treasury is yet to. Although there is the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, it is 
currently not conducting external review. This is a major weakness of this review option.  
6 3 Cause of action 
The factual situations that entitle a person to external review under the various aforementioned 
laws are examined here. 
6 3 1 Nigeria 
The cause of action required for external review under section 54(3) of the PPA is largely the 
same as required for the internal review; as the former is an appeal from the latter. In other 
words, the complainant must, first, adduce facts which establish that the procuring entity made 
an omission or took an action or decision that contravened the PPA, any applicable regulations 
or guidelines, or the provisions of bidding documents.20 Secondly, the complainant must 
establish that it initially submitted a complaint to the procuring entity’s accounting officer, but 
was not satisfied with the decision given, or, that the accounting officer failed to give a decision 
within prescribed deadline.21  
Examples of facts which severally constitute the first element of the cause of action 
include: a procuring entity using a procurement method other than the one prescribed by the 
guidelines; using evaluation criteria different from those stated in the solicitation/bidding 
documents; awarding contract to a bidder other than the lowest evaluated responsive bidder.22  
Once it is proved that a provision of the applicable regulatory frameworks was breached, the 
complainant will not need to prove that he suffered any injury or damage resulting from the 
breach.23 If the complainant had exhausted internal review, filing for external review will be 
deemed as dissatisfaction with the internal review decision or indecision, and fulfilment of the 
second element. The BPP’s Standard Operating Procedure: Administrative Review (2015)24 
requires confirmation that there was recourse to internal review; but does not require the 
complainant to disclose grounds for his dissatisfaction with the internal review decision. 
                                                          
20 Section 54(1). See 5 3 3 1 above; also, BPP Standard Operating Procedures for Enforcement and Compliance 
(Abridged Version: Administrative Review) 2007 para 7(b). 
21 See PPA s 54(2), (2)(c) and (3). 
22 See for example Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC Abuja 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. 
23 PPA s 54(1). See also 5 3 3 1 above. 
24 Paragraphs 3 and 7 respectively. 
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The two elements ought to be established for a complainant to be entitled to external 
review remedies. Notwithstanding, it has been observed that the external review forum 
occasionally entertains review cases that were not first submitted for reconsideration to the 
accounting officers.25 Such isolated cases may be administratively convenient and acceptable 
to the parties; yet they contravene section 54(2) of the PPA and forestall the opportunity for a 
resolution at a less disruptive internal review stage. However, the BPP generally refers 
complaints, that were not submitted for internal review, to the accounting officers concerned.26 
6 3 2 South Africa 
6 3 2 1 Municipal SCM Regulations 
It is essentially the same cause of action required for internal review under this regulation that 
is required for the external review.27 In other words, a complainant only needs to prove that he 
is aggrieved by a decision or action taken in operating the municipality’s SCM system. This 
entails that the complainant must have been harmed or some of its legal rights were adversely 
affected by the challenged decision or action. An example is where a contracting authority 
unlawfully excluded the complainant from the bidding process. 
6 3 2 2 Treasury Regulations 
What entitles a person to pursue a review under regulation 16A9.3 (a) is to allege non-
compliance with the minimum SCM norms and standards prescribed by the Treasury 
Regulations. The complainant would have to identify the particular facts in the procurement 
decision or action that constitute the non-compliance. For example, these would constitute non-
compliance: (a) a procuring entity accepts a bid where the supplier has outstanding tax 
obligations;28 (b) using a procurement method not approved by the National Treasury for such 
contract value.29 
                                                          
25 From the author’s observation from handling procurement review cases. 
26 See 5 3 6 1 above. 
27 See 5 3 3 2 2 above. 
28 See reg 16A9.1(d). 
29 See reg 16A6.1. 
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6 4 Who may initiate review proceedings? 
The extent to which a bidder may exercise a general right to challenge an act or decision of a 
procuring entity before the respective external review forum is examined here.  
6 4 1 Nigeria 
As seen above, a bidder that pursued internal review under section 54(2), but is not satisfied 
with the procuring entity’s review decision or its indecision may apply for external review.30 
However, any other bidder in the challenged procurement may validly apply for external 
review; especially one who is adversely affected by the internal review decision. An example 
is a successful bidder whose contract award was rescinded by the internal review. It is assumed 
that the procuring entity will hardly have cause to apply for external review, since its 
accounting officer would usually not make a review decision that the procuring entity will not 
accept. 
6 4 2 South Africa 
6 4 2 1 Municipal SCM Regulations 
Generally, it is a complainant or respondent(s) in an earlier internal review instituted in terms 
of regulation 49 that may initiate an external review under regulation 50(5) and (6). The 
municipality’s accounting officer may also refer the matter to the provincial treasury if the 
independent adjudicator31 is unable to complete the internal review within the stipulated 60 
days.32 Similarly, the provincial treasury may refer a procurement complaint before it to the 
National Treasury, if it cannot resolve the matter.33 
6 4 2 2 Treasury Regulations 
The persons that are entitled to file complaints under this regulation are not specified. However, 
it may be construed that the right to submit complaints is limited to only persons with direct 
interest in the procurement process; that is, actual and potential bidders. This aligns with the 
rule of locus standi applied by South African courts;34  which holds that a person who claims 
                                                          
30 Section 54(3). 
31 See 6 3 2 1 . 
32 See reg 50(5)(a).  
33 See reg 50(6). 
34 See Cabinet of Transitional Government for Territory of South west Africa v Eins [1988] ZASCA 32; [1988] 2 
All SA 379 (A) 19-27; Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties Ltd 1933 AD 87 101; 
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relief in respect of any matter must, as a general rule, establish that he has a direct interest in 
that matter, and not merely the interest which all citizens have.  
6 5 The forum 
The nature and composition of the external bodies authorised to entertain administrative 
reviews in Nigeria and South Africa are examined here, vis-à-vis the model provided under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. The Model Law emphasises that this body should be independent;35 
which contextually means “independence from the procuring entity rather than independence 
from the government as a whole and protection from political pressure.”36 An administrative 
body that has the authority to approve certain actions or decisions of or procedures followed 
by the procuring entity, or to advise it on procedures, is not regarded as independent.37 
Independence is important as a practical matter; for if the review lacks independence, a further 
challenge to the court would likely result, causing lengthy disruption to the procurement 
process.38 
6 5 1 Nigeria 
As earlier hinted in chapter 5, appeals from the procuring entity’s reconsideration go to the 
BPP, Nigeria’s federal procurement regulatory agency. The general nature and composition of 
BPP were discussed in chapter 3. 39  However, specific issues related to its review functions 
and independence in the foregoing context are analysed here.  
 The BPP’s Certification and Compliance Monitoring (CCM) Department and a 
committee comprised of the management staff handle the Bureau’s review functions.40 The 
Director/Deputy Director of the department assigns an official to review specific cases and 
write a report; after which the committee considers the report and takes further actions;41 
examined in detail at 6 7 1 below. This arrangement affects the nature of BPP’s review 
                                                          
Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 390; Geldenhuys and Neethling v Beuthin 1918 AD 426 441; Ex 
parte Mouton 1955(4) SA 460 (A) 463 H. 
35 Chapter VIII. 
36 Guide to Enactment commentary 24 on chapter VIII at p 233.  
37 Commentary 24. An independent body envisaged by the Model Law is somewhat akin to Kenya’s Public 
Procurement Administrative Review Board, a special administrative body whose exclusive competence is 
entertaining procurement administrative review. See Udeh PPLR (2013) 187-188; Quinot “Supplier Remedies” 
in Procurement Regulation 311. 
38 Commentary 24. 
39 3 3 1. 
40 BPP SOP: Administrative Review paras 2, 3, 9, 15. 
41 BPP SOP: Administrative Review para 2, 3 and 5. 
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proceedings.  Assigning the task of initial assessment of the complaint to an officer that is not 
easily identifiable to the public may reduce the chances of reaching out to and influencing the 
officer.42  
The BPP’s review may be affected by its function of certifying certain value of 
procurement, for compliance with applicable rules before procuring entities could award the 
contract.43 The BPP would likely be biased towards upholding the procurement it had initially 
certified as compliant.  This perception may reduce the confidence of some aggrieved bidders 
in the BPP’s review of such cases. It may have led some bidders to undertake judicial review; 
sometimes even without exhausting the administrative reviews- resulting in the dismissal of 
such suits.44  
Nevertheless, the BPP is independent of procuring entities and is not directly involved 
in their procurement proceedings; which is an advantage to the external review. Note however 
that the BPP purchases for its own needs. Procurement complaints in such instance would lie 
to the BPP’s Director General in the form of internal review,45 pursuable subsequently to the 
Federal High Court. 
6 5 2 South Africa 
The external review forums under the Municipal SCM Regulations and the Treasury 
Regulations are the same; they are the National Treasury and the various provincial treasuries. 
The only distinction is that under the Municipal SCM Regulations, appeals lie from a provincial 
treasury to the National Treasury; whereas, under the Treasury Regulations, complaints go 
either to the National Treasury or Provincial Treasury, depending on whether the respondent 
is a national or provincial procuring entity. The general nature and composition of the National 
Treasury, and some aspects of provincial treasuries, were discussed in chapter 3.46 However, 
                                                          
42 Public procurement is regarded as susceptible to corruption. See Williams-Elegbe Corruption in Public 
Procurement 25; Williams-Elegbe “Corruption and Public Procurement in Africa” in Public Procurement 
Regulation 345-347; and generally, Soreide Corruption in Public Procurement; S Kelman Procurement and 
Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance (1990); F Anechiarico 
& J Jacobs The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control makes Government Ineffective (1996) ch 
8. 
43 See PPA s 5(c), and FGN circular SGF/OP/I/S.3/VIII/57 of 11-3-2009; also 3 3 1 above. 
44 See Ofscon Nig Ltd v Min of Niger Delta Affairs FHC 21-03-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/315/2011; A.C Egbe 
Nig Limited v DG BPP FHC 21-07-2010 suit no FHC/B/CS/116/2010. 
45 Thus, susceptible to all issues inherent in this form of review, including forum’s lack of independence. 
46 3 3 2. 
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specific issues that relate to their review functions and independence in the foregoing context 
are analysed below. 
The Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) is the presumptive organisational 
structure within the National Treasury for the external review, as it is responsible for South 
African SCM policy monitoring and compliance.47 Some provincial treasuries have 
organisational structure vested with external review function; for example, the Gauteng 
Department of Finance: Treasury Division.48 The KwaZulu Natal Bid Appeal Tribunal, 
established in terms of Treasury Regulations 16A9.3, is another example; and it has entertained 
some related cases. However, the OCPO is yet to handle cases brought pursuant to the 
Municipal SCM Regulations 50(6) and the Treasury Regulations 16A9.3.49 This may be owing 
to the weaknesses of these review mechanisms, identified above.50   
The treasuries are independent of contracting authorities and generally do not 
participate directly in their procurement; except when the National Treasury facilitates 
transversal term contracts and when provincial treasuries approve contracts awards or 
recommendations.51  
6 6  Lodging complaints and the timeframe 
The issues examined here include: timeframe for applying for external review, implications of 
applying out of time, and whether extension of time is permitted.  
6 6 1 Nigeria 
Appeal to the BPP must be made within ten working days from the date of communication of 
the internal review decision.52 This timeframe arguably offers the bidder ample time to prepare 
and submit his appeal. It may be argued that for this time to start running, the internal review 
decision must be communicated formally by the procuring entity; for example, through a 
written notice of the decision.53  However, if the aggrieved bidder becomes aware of the 
                                                          
47 SA National Treasury 2015 Public Sector Supply Chain Management Review (2015) 6. 
48 See Gauteng Provincial Government: Supply Chain Management Policy Model (2015/2016) para 19.2. This 
paragraph is an adaptation of the Municipal SCM Regulations 50(5) and (6),   
49 This is according to an email response from the OCPO on 5-11-2016 to an enquiry from the author.  
50 6 2 2. 
51 See 3 2 3 and 3 3 2 above. 
52 PPA 54(3). 
53 A party to an adjudicatory proceeding is generally entitled to a formal communication of the decision: CFRN 
1999 s 294(1). 
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decision through a reliable but informal means,54 he need not wait for a formal communication 
before filing the appeal. The fact that the timeframe depends on communication of the 
procuring entity’s internal review decision confirms that BPP’s review is intended only as a 
second instance review. That is why the submission timeframe for external review under the 
PPA is structured differently from the one under the Model Law,55 which permits external 
review as a first recourse. 
 The PPA does not allow for extension of appeal submission time. Thus, an appeal 
brought outside the stipulated time may be rejected by the BPP. However, it has been observed 
that the BPP is not strict on enforcing timeline for lodging appeals.56 It would rather, redress 
identified breach of procurement rules notwithstanding that related appeal is filed outside 
time.57 
6 6 2 South Africa 
The Municipal SCM Regulations and the Treasury Regulations do not specify a timeframe 
within which to refer a complaint to the relevant treasuries. A complaint may thus be referred 
to these forums at any time deemed reasonable by the applicant and acceptable by the forums. 
Since it is not time-bound, applicants may not feel compelled to promptly lodge complaints. 
This is a major weakness of these external review options. However, the treasuries or the 
procuring entities (specifically, the municipalities under the Municipal SCM Regulations) may 
stipulate relevant timeframes through issuing Practice Notes or SCM policy, respectively. For 
example, the KwaZulu Natal provincial treasury practice note prescribes the submission of 
complaints within five working days from the notification of award.58 
6 7 The proceedings 
The procedures and timeframes for completing external review proceedings are examined here. 
The element of effectiveness assessed is the ability to proceed swiftly within a reasonably short 
period of time, which should be measured in terms of days and weeks in the normal course. 
                                                          
54 Such as where a staff of the procuring entity tells him of the decision. See the South African case, Evaluations 
Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality [2014] ZAECGHC 55, [2014] 
3 All SA 560 paras 40-43, where similar view was held by the court.  
55 Article 67(2). 
56 Author’s observation of review proceedings. 
57 It may be deemed that such review decision was taken pursuant to BPP’s general procurement investigative and 
enforcement powers under PPA s 53(4), which is not time-bound; discussed in detail in chapter 8. 
58 Practice Note No SCM-07 of 2006 para 3.2. 
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The extent of suppliers’ access to procurement records in both jurisdictions, which is relevant 
here, was discussed in chapter 5.  
6 7 1 Nigeria 
(a) Review procedure 
A complaint is submitted to the BPP by the complainant-bidder in the form of a formal written 
petition; which must indicate: (1) the procuring entity and the procurement proceeding 
petitioned against; (2) the alleged breach of relevant legislation; and (3) that the complaint has 
been copied to the procuring entity concerned.59 The complaint is usually accompanied by 
supporting documents. The claims need not and is usually not supported by affidavit, as the 
law of evidence is relaxed in this proceeding.60 
On receiving the complaint, the BPP writes the procuring entity to suspend any further 
action on the procurement until the matter is settled.61 It will direct the procuring entity to 
furnish it with the comprehensive records of the affected procurement, and to reply in writing 
to the petition within five working days, if the entity is situated within the Federal Capital 
Territory (FCT) Abuja, and 15 working days, if it is situated outside the FCT.62 The CCM 
Department will conduct (through an official appointed for the task) an initial assessment of 
the complaint and afterward reports to the committee, which will adopt a common position on 
the complaint.63 Before taking any decision on a complaint, the BPP shall notify all interested 
bidders (those that participated in the affected procurement) of the complaint; and, may take 
into account representations from them.64 However, BPP had in some cases failed to notify 
interested bidders; and the court invalidated the affected review decision when appealed.65 
 Where the BPP deems fit, it may hold a right of reply meeting with the complainant 
and the procuring entity (interested bidders, especially the successful bidder, may be invited) 
to resolve the dispute. The meeting is usually for the parties to resolve identified conflicting 
facts or issues relating to the challenged procurement. Except in exceptional circumstances, 
                                                          
59 BPP SOP: Administrative Review para 7. 
60 See Nigerian Evidence Act 2011 s 256(1). 
61 PPA s 54(4)(a). 
62 PPA s 54(4)(a) and (5); BPP SOP: Administrative Review para 8. 
63 BPP SOP: Administrative Review para 5. 
64 PPA s 54(5). 
65 See for example Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC Abuja 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. 
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each complaint is entitled to only one right of reply meeting.66 Each party is given a fixed time 
to speak or present additional documents on its complaint or rebuttal.67 Afterwards,68 the BPP 
will make a binding decision, stating its reasons and remedies granted, if any; and will 
communicate it in a letter to the parties.69 It relies on the parties’ written representations, 
supporting documents or records, and deliberations during the meeting (if held).70  
(b) Review timeframe 
The decision of BPP has to be made within 21 working days after receiving the complaint.71 
This aligns with the ability to proceed swiftly within a reasonably short period of time.  
However, there have been concerns about whether the BPP could complete within 
deadline, the review of several cases that may simultaneously come before it.72 Actually, the 
BPP has completed numerous review cases within the deadline; while in numerous others, its 
review lasted beyond the prescribed time.73 Although extending reviews beyond the deadline 
is contrary to the PPA; parties usually acquiesce and abide by BPP’s review decision,74 instead 
of proceeding on appeal to the court. Parties may do so to avoid the long and costly process of 
court action.  
                                                          
66 BPP SOP: Administrative Review para 16. 
67 BPP SOP: Administrative Review paras 17-20. Lawyers may not be involved in the proceedings; however, the 
complaints and rebuttals are usually covertly written or guided by lawyers. 
68 Within seven working days of the right of reply meeting, if held. 
69 PPA 54(6); BPP SOP: Administrative Review para 25. See 6 8 below. 
70 BPP SOP: Administrative Review para 27. 
71 PPA 54(6). 
72 See A Eyo “Public Procurement Law in Ghana and Nigeria: Comparative Assessment of the Public Procurement 
Acts and the Lessons for Procurement Reform” (2011) unpublished paper presented at Public Procurement 
Regulation in Africa Conference hosted by the Centre for Human Rights 
Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, 26-10-1990 (copy on file with author) 
73 See BPP “3rd Quarter 2014 Petition” 
<http://www.bpp.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_joomdoc&view=documents&path=3RD+QTR+Petitions+July
+-+Sept+2014.pdf > (accessed 22-10-2017). For example, s/n 4, 7 & 8, therein show petitions that were still 
ongoing as at the time of publishing the report, which apparently was 3 months or more after the petitions 
commenced. Completing review cases within deadline calibrated in days is a challenge that review forums in 
other jurisdictions face; see Udeh (2013) PPLR 193. 
74 On effect of acquiescence as an estoppel, see Halsbury's Laws of England 4th ed para 1473 pg 994: “The term 
(acquiescence) is however properly used where a person having right, and seeing another person about to commit 
or in the course of committing an act of infringing upon that right, stands by in such a manner as really to induce 
the person committing the act and who might otherwise have abstained from it, to believe that he assents to its 
being committed, a person standing by cannot afterwards be heard to complain of the act.” See also Fagbemi v 
Aluko (1968) 1 All NLR 233 237; Kayode v Odutola (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt 725) 659 679. 
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6 7 2 South Africa 
(a) No review procedure and timeframe 
Both regulations under consideration do not stipulate any procedural rules or timeframes for 
their respective external review provisions. Moreover, related procedures have not emerged 
from practice, since the weaknesses of these external review options discourage recourse to 
them. Notwithstanding, procedures could be established for the review proceedings, as 
suggested below, if these external review options are to be made viable.  
(b) Establishing procedures and timeframes 
Procuring entities’ SCM policy documents or the treasuries’ administrative regulatory 
instrument, such as instruction or practice notes,75 could be used to prescribe procedures and 
timeframes for both review options. In the very unlikely case that an external review 
application in terms of any of the regulations is submitted, the review procedure could involve 
the relevant treasury calling for or relying on the submitted procurement documents. It could 
further invite written responses from the procuring entity involved; even from any bidder that 
may be affected by the review decision. The reviewing treasury would thus give its decision 
by considering the claims vis-à-vis documentation and representations submitted.  The decision 
would be communicated in writing to the parties involved.76 It is advisable that the review 
timeframe be a reasonably short period of time, within days and weeks. An example is the 
KwaZulu Natal Provincial Treasury Practice Note on Bid Appeal Tribunal,77 which prescribed 
fourteen working days for the finalisation of its external review proceedings. 
6 8 Available remedies and enforcement 
The extent to which the various external review forums may intervene and redress breaches in 
procurement proceedings, and whether these satisfy the elements of effectiveness that relate to 
available remedies are considered here. The relevant elements include: (a) the possibility of 
intervention without delay by the body; (b) the body has power to suspend or cancel the 
procurement proceedings and to prevent in normal circumstances the entry into force of a 
procurement contract while the dispute remains outstanding; (c) the power to implement other 
interim measures, such as giving restraining orders and imposing financial sanctions for non-
                                                          
75 See 4 3 1 3 (b) above. 
76 See PAJA s 5. 
77 Practice Note No SCM-07 of 2006 paras 3 & 6. 
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compliance; (d) the power to award compensation if intervention is no longer possible; (e) 
decisions of review body are binding; (f) available remedies meet system’s needs; and, (g) 
decisions/remedies given can be easily enforced by a fast and simple mechanism. 
6 8 1 Nigeria 
On receiving a complaint, the BPP is statutorily required to intervene without delay by ordering 
the suspension of further action on the challenged procurement until its review is completed.78 
The suspension prevents the entry into force of the procurement contract while the dispute is 
on-going; although the PPA does not exclude concluded contracts from review. Besides, in 
practice, the BPP could suspend the award or performance of a procurement contract. This falls 
within the ambit of its power to suspend “further action” by the procuring entity.79 Unlike the 
Model Law,80 the PPA does not allow BPP the discretion to refrain from suspending or to lift 
a suspension on consideration that urgent public interest requires the procurement proceedings 
or the contract to proceed. This rather automatic suspension is not ideal, since discretional 
suspension provides a balance between the right of bidders/contractors and the public interest 
in timely provision of certain services. 
On reviewing the procurement, the BPP may either dismiss the complaint for lack of 
merit or grant the following remedies:81 
(i) prohibit the procuring entity from taking any further action; 
(ii) nullify in whole or in part an unlawful act or decision made by the procuring or 
disposing entity; 
(iii) declare the rules or principles that govern the subject matter of the complaint; and 
 (iv) revise an improper decision by the procuring or disposing entity or substitute its 
own decision for such a decision. 
As earlier noted,82 the PPA does not provide for payment of compensation to bidders. 
This is akin to the position of South African courts, which refuse to grant damages to bidders 
against a contracting entity that breached procurement rules, except the entity acted in bad 
                                                          
78 PPA s 54(4)(a). 
79 Williams-Elegbe (2012) PCLJ 361. 
80 Article 67(3) and (4). 
81 PPA s 54(4)(b). 
82 5 3 8 1 above. 
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faith.83 Argument supporting the disallowance of award of compensation/damages is presented 
in the next paragraph, and further in chapters 7 and 9. 
Remedy (i) above may perpetually restrain the procuring entity from acting on the 
challenged procurement; unlike initial suspension of procurement proceedings that only lasts 
till the conclusion of review. This remedy may give rise to the BPP assigning the conduct of 
that procurement to another authority.84 It also has the same effect as the power to implement 
other interim measures, such as giving restraining orders.85 But, as seen above, the BPP does 
not have power to impose financial sanctions for non-compliance. This is acceptable, as 
imposition of financial sanctions on procuring entities or awarding compensation to bidders 
may be counter-productive, as it detracts from scarce public funds,86 which Nigeria’s 
procurement rules are primarily intended to protect (value for money).87 Moreover, financial 
sanctions will hardly act as deterrence for non-compliance, as it is the government that pays, 
not the offending official(s).  
Remedy (ii) above is akin to the power to cancel the offending procurement 
proceedings, which is part of effectiveness.88 Remedy (iv) is broad, as it enables the BPP to 
make any decision it deems suitable for each case to substitute the procurement decision. 
Generally, the above external review remedies correspond with those prescribed by the Model 
Law.89  
The BPP’s remedies are binding; and enforceable by a fast and simple mechanism. The 
mechanism includes: (1) withholding the certification required by the government to pay for 
contracts of certain value;90 (2) applying administrative sanctions (including, the temporary 
transfer of the procurement functions of the procuring entity to an agency or consultant);91 and, 
                                                          
83 Discussed in detail in ch 8. Meanwhile, see Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) 
SA 121 (CC); Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA); and Malan J.’s remarks 
in Digital Horizons (Pty) Ltd v SA Broadcasting Corporation (2008/19224) [2008] ZAGPHC 272 (08-09-2008); 
Quinot (2008) Stellenbosch Law Review 101; Quinot (2011) PPLR 204; and, Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in 
Public Procurement Regulation 329.  
84 See PPA s 6(1)(i)(iv). 
85 See element (c) in 6 8 above. 
86 See Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 330; Quinot (2011) PPLR 204-205. 
87 See PPA s 16(1) (d)-(f); Udeh & Ahmadu “Nigeria” in Procurement Regulation 143-144. See also Quinot & 
Arrowsmith “Introduction” in Public Procurement Regulation 8; Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement 
2-5; Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace Regulating Public Procurement 15, 28-31.   
88 See element (b) in 6 8 above. 
89 Article 67(9). 
90 PPA ss 5(c) & 6(1)(b).  
91 With the approval of the National Council on Public Procurement; see PPA ss 5(n) and 6(1)(i). 
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(3) involving relevant law enforcement authorities.92 Also, the BPP can report a procuring 
entity that fails to comply with its review decision to the Federal Executive Council,93 to use 
political pressure to compel compliance. Besides, where a procuring entity refuses to comply 
with the decision of BPP, an interested bidder may proceed to the Federal High Court to compel 
the entity to act accordingly.94 
The remedies above arguably meet system’s needs, as they can adequately correct 
breaches in procurement and protect bidders’ rights. In addition, they largely match the relevant 
elements of effectiveness as seen above. 
6 8 2 South Africa 
6 8 2 1 Municipal SCM Regulations 
The Regulations does not indicate the remedies that the treasuries may grant and the remedies 
under section 8 of PAJA do not apply in this circumstance, as they relate exclusively to judicial 
review. However, regulation 50(6) refers to “resolve/resolution” of the matter by the treasuries; 
which arguably entails exercising powers incidental to their regulatory functions to redress 
breaches in procurement. Such may include stopping, varying or overturning the challenged 
procurement decision or action; but would hardly include award of compensation.95 Also, it 
could mean that the treasuries may adopt a conciliatory approach between the contracting 
authority and the interested bidder(s) towards addressing the complaint. Notwithstanding, these 
external review options do not constitute effective bidder remedies,96  considering their 
weaknesses,97 and that the legislation does not have provisions that correspond to the relevant 
elements of effectiveness under 6 8 above. 
                                                          
92 See for example PPA s 53 particularly subs (5). 
93 See Constitution ss 144(5) & 148 for composition of the FEC. See 3 3 1 above for relationship between BPP 
and FEC. 
94 See Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC Abuja 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. 
95 See Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 329; Quinot (2008) Stellenbosch Law 
Review 101; Quinot (2011) PPLR 204-205. See also, Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 
2007 (3) SA 121 (CC); Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA); and Malan J.’s 
remarks in Digital Horizons (Pty) Ltd v SA Broadcasting Corporation (2008/19224) [2008] ZAGPHC 272 (08-
09-2008). 
96 See DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] ZASCA 146 18 & 20; and, Bolton (2010) 
PELJ 73. 
97 Particularly as seen here and in 6 7 2 above. 
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6 8 2 2 Treasury Regulations 
The National Treasury and each provincial treasury are directed only to make 
recommendations of “remedial actions” to be taken if there is non-compliance with any 
procurement norms and standards; including recommending criminal proceedings against 
alleged corruption, fraud or other offences.98 The weaknesses of the remedy available under 
this regulation are that: (1) the mechanism for review would have to be put in place first before 
a review proceeding and its decision may arise; (2) the review decision is given as a 
recommendation; (3) thus, it is not automatically binding and enforceable; (4) the regulation 
does not identify who the recommendation is to be made to and what the recommendation will 
give rise to; and, (5) it does not identify the available remedies.  
However, it is arguable that “remedial actions” to be recommended, is wide enough to 
incorporate any reasonable action that will redress the non-compliance. This may include: 
suspending the procurement proceedings, cancelling the contract, re-awarding the contract; but 
may not include award of compensation, as argued under the Municipal SCM Regulations 
above. Although not stated, the recommendation may most likely be made to the accounting 
officer of the contracting authority, pursuant to regulations 16A9.1 and 16A9.2; or to a higher 
authority.99 These regulations vest the accounting officer with powers to, among others: take 
all reasonable steps to prevent abuse of the supply chain management system; reject a bid from 
an offending bidder; and cancel a procurement contract which bidding process was marred by 
irregularities. 
Where the requisite review mechanism is established, and a recommendation is made, 
it would most likely be followed, considering the authoritative position of the treasuries.  
As currently provided, the external review options under the Treasury Regulations do 
not constitute effective remedies owing to the inherent weaknesses.100 
6 9 Right of appeal 
In Nigeria and South Africa, appeals from the external review forums can be made to courts of 
competent jurisdiction, to the extent permitted by relevant laws. Such judicial recourse is not a 
full appeal but a review proceeding. For Nigeria, it is by virtue of section 54(7) of the PPA.  
                                                          
98 Regulations 16A9.3(b). The criminal aspect is discussed in ch 8. 
99 The KwaZulu Natal Province Bid Appeal Tribunal makes recommendation to the Members of the Executive 
Council for Finance and Economic Development: Practice Note SCM-07 of 2006 para 6.1(b). 
100 See DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] ZASCA 146 18 & 20; and, Bolton (2010) 
PELJ 73. 
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In the case of South Africa, although it is not expressly provided under the two 
regulations, suppliers have inherent right to judicial review of the challenged procurement 
decisions; as they are subject to general principles of administrative law.101 In fact, the review 
options under both regulations need not be exhausted before recourse to judicial review, as they 
do not constitute effective internal remedies.102  
 A detailed look at judicial recourse in both jurisdictions is undertaken in the next 
chapter. 
6 10 Summary of basic features of the external administrative review regimes 
A summary of the basic features of the external review mechanisms in both systems are set out 
below. 
Features  Nigeria South Africa 
Enabling legislation  PPA section 54(3) 1. Municipal SCM Regulations 
50(5) and (6) 
2. Treasury Regulations 16A9.3 
Cause of action 1. An omission or breach, contrary 
to the provisions of: the PPA, 
subsidiary legislation made 
pursuant to the Act, or bidding 
documents. 
2. Internal review decision is 
unsatisfactory, or, the AO failed to 
give a decision within deadline. 
1. Rights adversely affected by 
procurement decision 
(Regulations 50(5) and (6)). 
2. Non-compliance with the 
minimum SCM norms and 
standards prescribed by the 
Treasury Regulations 
(Regulations 16A9.3). 
Right to institute 
review 
1. A complainant not satisfied 
with internal review decision. 
2. Bidder(s) adversely affected by 
the internal review decision. 
1(a) A complainant or 
respondent(s) in an earlier 
internal review instituted in 
terms of regulation 49 
(Regulations 50(5) and (6)). 
                                                          
101 Quinot State Commercial Activity 162; Quinot (2011) PPLR 195. See CC Groenewald v M5 Developments 
[2010] ZASCA 47 paras 2, 17, 27. 
102 See DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] ZASCA 146 18 & 20; also, Bolton (2010 ) 
PELJ 73. 
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(b) Municipal AO or the 
Provincial Treasury, if internal 
review is not resolved within a 
period. 
2. Actual and potential bidders 
(Regulations 16A9.3). 
Forum  The BPP National Treasury and the 
various provincial treasuries 
Commencement and 
timeframe 
Within ten working days from the 
date of communication of the 
internal review decision. 
Not specified by the 
Regulations; however, a 
Practice Note or SCM policy 
may specify a timeframe. 
Review proceeding 
and timeframe 
1. Written complaint and reply 
(with supporting documents) by 
the parties are considered in-
camera by a committee of BPP 
officials. The committee may hold 
a meeting between the parties to 
resolve issues. 
2. BPP gives a written decision, 
with reason, within 21 working 
days after receiving the complaint. 
No prescribed procedure and 
timeframe; however, a Practice 
Note or SCM policy may 
prescribe the procedures and 
timeframe. 
Available remedies 1. Suspend the procurement 
proceeding. 
2. Prohibit the procuring entity 
from taking any further action. 
3. Nullify in whole or in part an 
unlawful procurement action or 
decision. 
1. Not specified (Regulations 
50(5) and (6)). 
2. Recommendation of remedial 
actions made (Regulations 
16A9.3). 
(Ineffective) 
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4. Revise or substitute an 
improper procurement decision. 
(Effective) 
Enforcement 1. Withholding No Objection 
Certification for the procurement. 
2. Applying administrative 
sanctions. 
3. Involving relevant law 
enforcement authorities. 
Not definite; however, where 
resolution or recommendation is 
made, it may be complied with. 
Opportunity for 
further review 
Judicial review Judicial review 
 
6 11 Analysis and Conclusion  
6 11 1 Nigeria external review mechanism: systematised and effective 
The external review mechanism discussed above, as well as the previously considered internal 
review, apply only to Nigerian federal government procurement. However, many states in the 
federation model their administrative review mechanisms on the federal mechanism. This is 
because the procurement legislation of these states is adapted from the federal PPA.103  Thus, 
most states provide for internal review by the procuring entity, followed by external 
procurement review by their respective public procurement regulatory agencies, as obtained at 
the federal level. However, these states’ bidder remedies systems are not as active as that of 
the federal; apparently owing to the lower volume of contracts in the states, the lower 
competition for these contracts, and the less keenness of state contractors to pursue available 
remedies. Notwithstanding, these states’ bidder remedies systems enjoy solid legislative 
foundation similar to the federal; what remains is invoking it. 
 Both the internal and external review mechanisms established by the PPA are well 
structured, with provisions for the essential components of a bidder remedies system.104 The 
internal review dovetails into the external review; as without the former the latter would 
                                                          
103 See 4 3 2 1 1 above. 
104 See 2 3 2 3 above for the components of a bidder remedies system. 
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generally not arise;105 and the route (timeframe and minimum procedures) from the former to 
the latter are clearly defined. They are effective internal remedies that must be exhausted before 
recourse to the courts.106 
As seen above, the external review mechanism substantially aligns with all the relevant 
elements of an effective bidder remedies system. Particularly, the remedies available under this 
mechanism are sufficiently broad and effective to protect bidders’ right and enforce compliance 
with public procurement rules. The sizeable number of procurement review cases handled at 
this administrative stage,107 compared to the few that proceed to the courts,108 lends credence 
to the above favourable assessment. 
Although, there are impediments to the effectiveness of this mechanism; they are quite 
minimal. The BPP’s involvement in certifying contracts of certain value is, as seen above,109 
adverse to the independence of BPP in review proceedings; yet, it is not significant to diminish 
the effectiveness of the review. The BPP lack of discretion to refuse suspension of a challenged 
procurement proceeding, though disadvantageous, is mitigated by the brevity of the suspension 
period (21 working days).110 Besides, the BPP, although mandatorily directed to order the 
suspension,111 could in practice refrain from doing so for various reasons, including necessity 
or exigency. Without such suspension order the procurement can lawfully proceed despite the 
review process. As posited above, the disallowance of compensation and financial sanctions 
against the procuring entity in breach is supportable and aligns with local economic and social 
realities. However, it may be tenable to award damages where the procurement decision is 
tainted with bad faith, corruption or fraud; or where the only available remedy is damages. 
Currently the BPP does not publish its review decisions.112 This frustrates public access to 
the decisions, which could, among others, serve as precedent for determining subsequent 
review cases and assessing the viability of proposed ones.    
                                                          
105 See 5 2 3 above. 
106 See Ofscon Nigeria Ltd v Min of Niger Delta Affairs FHC Abuja 21-03-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/315/2011; 
Integrated Remediations Limited v Federal Ministry of Environment FHC 14-11-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/841/2010; A.C Egbe Nig Limited v DG BPP FHC 21-07-2010 suit no FHC/B/CS/116/2010. 
107 From BPP’s document showing details and status of the petitions which it received from July-September 2014, 
in author’s file. 
108 From available information from the registry of the Federal High Court headquarters, Abuja. 
109 6 5 1. 
110 PPA s 54 (4)(a) and (6). 
111 PPA s 54(4)(a). 
112 Kenya’s Public Procurement Administrative Review Board, which is a procurement administrative review 
forum, established by Kenya’s Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2005 (modelled on the UNCITRAL Model 
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6 11 2 South African external review options: unsystematic and weak 
A combination of the Municipal SCM Regulations and the Treasury Regulations, makes 
external procurement review available at all tiers of South African government. However, the 
external review under the Municipal SCM Regulations remains inchoate until the major 
weaknesses of its precursor, the internal review under regulation 49,113 are addressed. This is 
because the external review right under the Municipal SCM Regulations is exercised as an 
appeal from the internal review forum under the Regulations. Thus, until the internal review 
mechanism is operative (through a municipal’s SCM policy framework) the external review 
under the Regulations remains in limbo.  Similarly, the external review under the Treasury 
Regulations remains inchoate until the respective treasuries (as done by the KwaZulu Natal 
Provincial Treasury) establish its implementing mechanisms as directed by the Regulations.114 
Also, the inherent weaknesses of the external review options under both regulations, especially 
not having defined remedies and procedures,115 further render them ineffective and unviable.116 
 The Nigerian external review mechanism provides South Africa with useful lessons to 
rely on in restructuring its own mechanism. For example, the clear and effective remedies under 
Nigeria’s external review could be adopted. This requires making the requisite municipal SCM 
policy, and reviewing the Municipal SCM Regulations and the Treasury Regulations to 
enshrine such remedies.  
6 11 3 Conclusion 
The designs of the administrative review mechanisms in the two jurisdictions respectively 
affect their effectiveness. The Nigerian internal and external review mechanisms are well 
structured, as they possess the essential components of an effective bidder remedies system. 
Thus, many procurement review cases are resolved at these stages;117 this consequently saves 
valuable time and resources that would have been spent on judicial review. The incoherently 
structured or unsystematised design of the South African internal and external review 
                                                          
Law) comprehensively publishes its review decision on its secretariat’s website: <http://www.ppoa.go.ke/2015-
08-24-14-47-13/pparb-decisions> (accessed 22-10-2017). 
113 See 5 3 2 2 2 and 5 3 8 2 2 above. 
114 See 5 2 2 2 above. 
115 See 6 7 2 and 6 8 2 above. 
116 See DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] ZASCA 146 18 & 20. 
117 The BPP handles up to 50 procurement petitions in a quarter (BPP’s documents showing details and status of 
the petitions which it received at various periods of the years in issue, in author’s file). Whereas, only a handful 
of procurement review cases, from inception of the PPA (2007) till date (01-02-2018), have been found from the 
Registry of the Federal High Court (court with review jurisdiction over federal public procurement). 
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mechanisms undermines their effectiveness.118 As seen in 6 11 2 above, the structural 
weaknesses render the mechanisms inchoate, and act as disincentive to bidders from resorting 
to them. This has resulted in procurement review cases going frequently to the courts.119 Many 
of these cases would have been resolved at the less disruptive administrative review stages.  
Administrative review should be encouraged considering its advantages over judicial 
recourse. Some of these advantages are that: it is significantly less expensive and time-
consuming;120 it is less disruptive of the procurement process; it reduces the burden of cases 
on the courts, as some of the cases reviewed administratively may not proceed to court.121 
Notwithstanding, judicial recourse has its own exclusive advantages, enjoyed more in South 
Africa than in Nigeria, as would be seen in the next chapter. 
Having presented the Nigerian and South African internal review mechanisms in the 
previous chapter, the consideration of the countries’ external review mechanisms above 
concludes the discussion of procurement administrative review in both jurisdictions.  
The next chapter looks at the countries’ judicial remedies for breaches in public 
procurement. 
                                                          
118 See Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Procurement Regulation 311. 
119 See Nugent JA in South African Post Office v De Lacy 2009 (5) SA 255 (SCA) at [1]; Quinot (2011) PPLR 
198. 
120 Apart from the fact that cases last for several months and even years in court, there is also a right of appeal to 
different hierarchy of courts in both jurisdiction; as would be seen in the next chapter. 
121 In Nigeria, there is a significantly higher number of cases handled at administrative review stages compared to 
the number of procurement cases heard by the courts. 
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Chapter 7 
Judicial Remedies 
7 1 Introduction  
Judicial remedies entails seeking court’s intervention against breaches or grievances arising 
from public procurement proceedings or review. In Nigeria, judicial recourse necessarily takes 
the form of an appeal to the court from the external administrative review forum (the 
BPP/Bureau).1 Thus, judicial intervention is the last stage in Nigeria’s sequential bidder 
remedies system. In South Africa, it is largely in the form of direct judicial review;2 and, 
practically a discrete option to administrative review. For instance, pursuing administrative 
review under the Municipal SCM Regulations does not affect a person’s right to seek judicial 
redress at any time.3 Also, administrative review under the aforementioned regulation and the 
Treasury Regulations does not constitute internal remedies that must be exhausted before 
judicial review.4 However, in municipal procurement, where the internal appeal under section 
62 of the System Act applies, the court, as held in DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local 
Municipality,5 may require that the appeal must be exhausted before it intervenes.6 Yet, by 
virtue of section 7(2)(c) of PAJA, litigants could apply to be exempted from exhausting internal 
remedies. Direct judicial recourse has made court’s intervention in South African public 
procurement more active than it is in Nigeria.7   
                                                          
1 PPA s54(7); Ofscon Nig Ltd v Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs FHC(Abuja) 21-03-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/315/2011 26-27; Integrated Remediation Limited v Federal Ministry of Environment FHC(Abuja) 
14-11-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/841/2010 30-39; A.C Egbe Nig Limited v DG BPP FHC(Benin) 21-07-2010 suit 
no FHC/B/CS/116/2010.  See 6 2 1 above; Udeh & Ahmadu “Nigeria” in Procurement Regulation 152.  
2 Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Procurement Regulation 312 and 314; Quinot (2011) PPLR 200-203. 
3 Regulation 50(7). See 5 3 1 2 2 above; and DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] 
ZASCA 146 para 20. 
4 See DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] ZASCA 146 para 18; and, 5 3 1 2 2 above. 
5 [2015] ZASCA 146 paras 23-25. Also in Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City 
Metropolitan Municipality [2014] ZAECGHC 55; [2014] 3 All SA 560 (ECG) paras 72, 73, 79(3)(2). See 5 3 1 2 
1 above. 
6 See PAJA s7(2)(a). However, in Compass Waste Services (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson Northern Cape Tender Board 
[2005] ZANCHC 4, [2005] 4 All SA 425 (NC); Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Chairman of the Tender 
Committee [2007] ZAFSHC 136; and, Alexander Maintenance and Electrical Services CC v Nyandeni Local 
Municipality [2012] ZAECMHC 10, judicial review was allowed without prior exhaustion of Systems Act s 62 
appeal, notwithstanding that s 7(2)(c) of PAJA was not invoked. These cases predate the SCA’s decision in DDP 
Valuers case. 
7 See 6 11 1 above. Also, Nugent JA in South African Post Office v De Lacy 2009 (5) SA 255 (SCA) para 1; 
Quinot (2011) PPLR 198-201; and, Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Procurement Regulation 313-314. 
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With the above background, this chapter examines the components of the judicial 
recourse mechanism in both jurisdictions; such as the applicable laws, the forum, available 
remedies, among others. Some of these components are compared with the related elements of 
an effective remedies system. However, these systems are not compared with the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, as it does not prescribe procedures for judicial recourse. 
7 2 Enabling laws 
7 2 1 Nigeria 
The PPA, section 54(7), established bidders’ right to judicial recourse under the Nigerian 
federal procurement system, as follows:  
“Where the Bureau fails to render its decision within the stipulated time, or the bidder 
is not satisfied with decision of the Bureau, the bidder may appeal to the Federal High 
Court…”  
Thus, the right to seek judicial intervention in Nigerian federal procurement is derived 
from and governed by public procurement legislation;8 unlike in South Africa, as will be seen 
in 7 2 2 below. Prior to the PPA, suppliers had very limited right to judicial remedies against 
certain procurement decisions of government bodies, based on a few applicable common law 
principles of contract, tort or administrative law.9 At that time, recourse to court was direct.10 
Now, under the PPA, the right to judicial remedies has been enhanced, as any 
procurement decision contrary to the PPA or its regulations is actionable.11 However, judicial 
intervention now has to wait until the administrative reviews are exhausted.12 This does not 
violate the right to fair hearing and determination of civil rights by courts, under section 36(1) 
of the Constitution; since the courts’ jurisdiction becomes available after administrative review. 
                                                          
8 See Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC(Abuja) 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11; A.C Egbe Nig Limited v DG BPP FHC(Benin) 21-07-2010 suit no FHC/B/CS/116/2010. 
9 See 2 2 2 above. 
10 See CBN v System Application Products Nigeria Limited (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt 911) 152. 
11 2 2 2 above discusses how the existence of procurement regulation enhances bidder remedies. 
12 See Ofscon Nig Ltd v Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs FHC(Abuja) 21-03-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/315/2011 
26-27; Integrated Remediations Limited v Federal Ministry of Environment FHC(Abuja) 14-11-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/841/2010 33-35; A.C Egbe Nig Limited v DG BPP FHC(Benin) 21-07-2010 suit no 
FHC/B/CS/116/2010. 
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An aggrieved bidder who goes straight to court risks foreclosing his right to a remedy, as the 
time for administrative review may have elapsed when the suit is dismissed.13  
7 2 2 South Africa 
The right to judicial review of public procurement decisions is not provided in the public 
procurement legislation; rather, it is based on general administrative justice provisions in the 
South African Constitution and the PAJA. Section 33(1) and (2) of the Constitution 
respectively enshrines “the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair”; and, the right to be given written reasons where ones rights have been 
adversely affected by administrative action. Public procurement decisions by contracting 
authorities are regarded as “administrative action”.14  
On that premise, tenderers have the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair 
procurement process/decision; and, written reason where they are adversely affected. What is 
procedurally fair depends on the circumstances of each case.15 An example of a procedurally 
unfair procurement process is where award criteria are not disclosed to tenderers, resulting in 
vagueness.16 A lawful and reasonable procurement process is one that complies with applicable 
legislation or principles; where the decision taken is rational. Thus, procurement must be 
competitive, and eligible tenderers must be free to bid and be treated equally,17 by virtue of 
section 217 of the Constitution.18 A procurement decision is justiciable if it “adversely affects 
the rights of any person and has a direct external legal effect”.19 
                                                          
13 See Ogiamien v Ogiamien (1967)1 All NLR 191 208-209; Ukpe Orewere v Rev Moses Abiegbe (1974) 4 UILR 
(Pt 1) I 168 170; (1974) 9 SC; Williams Ladega v Shittu Durosimi (1978) 3 SC 91, (1978) All NLR 79 87; 
Registered Trustees of Ijeloju Friendly Union v Kuku (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt 189) 65 79; Agbogu v Agbogu (1995) 
1 NWLR (Pt 372) 411. 
14 See PAJA s1(i); Esorfranki Pipelines (Pty) Ltd v Mopani District Municipality [2014] ZASCA 21, [2014] 2 All 
SA 493 (SCA) paras 16-17; Eskom Holdings v The New Reclamation Group 2009 (4) SA 628 (SCA) para 11; 
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) para 21; Steenkamp NO v 
Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 (3) SA 151 (SCA) paras 11-12; Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson 
NO 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA) para 5-14; Transnet Ltd v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 853 (SCA) para11; 
Quinot (2011) PPLR 195 & 200; Quinot State Commercial Activity 162-163. 
15 PAJA s 3(2)(a).  
16 See Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social 
Security Agency (2014 (1) SA 604 (CC), 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC)) [2013] ZACC 51, [2013] ZACC 42 para 88. 
17 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security 
Agency 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC) para 60; Esorfranki Pipelines (Pty) Ltd v Mopani District Municipality [2014] 
ZASCA 21; [2014] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 17. 
18 And s 195(1): Total Computer Services (Pty) Limited v Municipal Manager Potchefstroom Local Municipality 
[2007] ZAGPHC 239, 2008 (4) SA 346 (T) 21. 
19 This forms part of the definition of “administrative action” under PAJA s 1(i). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
175 
 
To give effect to the aforementioned rights, section 33(3)(a) of the Constitution20 directs 
that national legislation “must provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, 
where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal”. In response, section 6(1) of PAJA 
provides that: “Any person may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the judicial 
review of an administrative action.” Based on this, tenderers have a right to the judicial review 
of public procurement decisions; provided they exhaust applicable internal remedies.21 On the 
whole, the courts’ power to review procurement decisions (administrative action) no longer 
flows directly from common law, but from the Constitution and PAJA.22 Nevertheless, courts 
still apply common law rules to review.23 
7 3 Scope of judicial remedies 
As seen in 7 2 above, the Nigerian PPA refers to an appeal to the court; while the South African 
Constitution and PAJA provide for judicial review of administrative action. The dividing line 
between an appeal and a review may sometimes be blurred;24 yet, there are still distinctions 
between the two,25 with practical implications. First, a court entertaining an appeal must hear 
the matter on the merits and could substitute its own determination for that of the original 
decision-maker.26 In judicial review, value judgments may be made, which will, almost 
inevitably, involve the consideration of the merits of the matter in some way or another. 
However, the judge does not enter the merits in order to substitute his/her own opinion on the 
correctness thereof; rather, it is to determine whether the outcome is rationally justifiable.27 
                                                          
20 Section 34 grants everyone access to courts for the fair hearing and resolution of any dispute by the application 
of law. 
21 PAJA s 7(2)(a). 
22 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affair [2004] ZACC 15, 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
23 See Quinot (2011) PPLR 195; Quinot State Commercial Activity 134-211. 
24 Baxter Administrative Law 306; JR de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003) 
387–388; Hoexter Administrative Law 106; Konyn v Special Investigating Unit 1999 (1) SA 1001 (TkH); 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA) para 31. 
25 See H Barnett Constitutional and Administrative Law 7ed (2009) 691-693. Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs [2004] ZACC 15, 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) 513 C-D para 45; Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 2007 (1) SA 576 
(SCA) 589 – 590 para 32; Emergency Medical Supplies and Training CC t/a EMS v Health Professions Council 
of South Africa [2011] ZAWCHC 393 paras 83-97. 
26 See Tickly v Johannes N.O 1963 (2) SA 588 (T) 593G-594A; Emergency Medical Supplies and Training CC 
t/a EMS v Health Professions Council of South Africa [2011] ZAWCHC 393 para 89; P Cane “Merits Review and 
Judicial Review- the AAT as Trojan Horse” (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 213. 
27 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1999 (3) SA 304 (LAC) para 36; Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
(Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration [2006] ZASCA 175, [2007] 1 
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Secondly, appeal and review are pursued on different grounds.28 Review grounds are narrower 
than appeal grounds.29 Thirdly, the standard of review in an appeal is higher than in a judicial 
review. For example, in judicial review, it is not required that a challenged decision must be 
substantively reasonable; whereas it may be warranted in an appeal.30  
 Having identified the nature of an appeal and judicial review, it is apposite to determine 
which applies to procurement judicial recourse within these jurisdictions. Also considered 
below are: the subject-matter of challenge (whether it is the original procurement decision or 
the administrative review decision); the stages of procurement subject to review; and, the pre-
conditions for pursuing judicial recourse. 
7 3 1 Nigeria 
The PPA’s reference to “appeal” in section 54(7) arguably indicates that the recourse to court 
arises as a further protest, following BPP’s administrative review; as the court does not actually 
treat procurement cases as an appeal.  In practice, the jurisdiction it exercises under section 
54(7) “is largely, if not strictly, one of review”.31 Also, the available remedies are essentially 
those derivable from review.32  However, as would be seen below,33 not all rules applicable to 
judicial review apply to proceedings arising from section 54(7). Furthermore, judicial recourse 
could take the form of a writ of summons proceeding instead of a review. 
The PPA does not specify whether it is the procurement or the administrative review 
decision that the court will review. However, in Ofscon Nigeria Ltd v Ministry of Niger Delta 
Affairs34 it was held that the role of the court under section 54(7) is to review the decisions, or 
                                                          
All SA 164 (SCA), 2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA) para 32, 47; C Hoexter “Standards of Review of Administrative 
Action – Review for Reasonableness”, in J Klaaren (ed) A Delicate Balance: The Place of the Judiciary in 
Constitutional Democracy – Proceedings of a Symposium to Mark the Retirement of Arthur Chaskalson (2006) 
68-69. 
28 See 7 4 below. Also, Emergency Medical Supplies and Training CC t/a EMS v Health Professions Council of 
South Africa [2011] ZAWCHC 393 para 94-97; Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA) para 32. 
29 Syntell (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town [2008] ZAWCHC 120 para 75. 
30 Trinity Broadcasting (Ciskei) v Independent Communications Authority of SA 2004 (3) SA 346 (SCA) para 20; 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA) para 32; Emergency Medical Supplies and Training CC t/a EMS v Health Professions 
Council of South Africa [2011] ZAWCHC 393 para 96. 
31 Ofscon Nigeria Ltd v Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs FHC(Abuja) 21-03-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/315/2011 
41. 
32 Discussed at 7 9 1 below. 
33 7 7 1. 
34 FHC(Abuja) 21-03-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/315/2011 40. 
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lack of it, of both the procuring entity and the BPP. Thus, the applicant can apply for the review 
of any or both decisions.  
Judicial intervention may be sought to review the original procurement decision instead 
of the administrative review decision in the following instances: (1) the review forum fails to 
give its decision within the review deadline; (2) the forum decides that it will not assume 
jurisdiction over the complaint; and (3) the applicant feels that the forum did not address the 
issues raised.35 The above is permissible, as what is involved is not an appeal (within courts) 
but a recourse to court after exhausting internal/administrative remedies.  
Every stage of procurement is subject to judicial review, provided there is a breach of 
the PPA or any applicable regulatory frameworks. Nevertheless, a supplier wishing to 
judicially challenge the planning phase of a tender process may grapple with establishing 
ripeness of the matter and locus standi. This is because plans may be tentative; and section 54 
proceeding is arguably accessible to those that participated in the challenged tender. Generally, 
disputes on contract administration are not covered under section 54. 
Apart from the requirement to exhaust administrative review, there is no precondition 
for pursuing judicial remedies.  The 30-day written notice that litigants must give to BPP before 
suing it, under section 14(1) of the PPA, does not apply to section 54(7) proceedings. First, 
section 14(1) relates to general court action against the BPP; while section 54(7) is exclusively 
on bidder remedies.36 Secondly, the 30-day pre-action notice conflicts with section 54(7), 
which requires that judicial recourse must commence within 30 days after BPP’s review 
deadline or decision. Thirdly, section 14(1) is subject and inapplicable to section 54(7). Non-
service of pre-action notice was a successful ground of objection in A.C Egbe Nig Limited v 
DG BPP,37 because the suit was neither brought under section 54(7) nor fulfilled its 
precondition. 
                                                          
35 See DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] ZASCA 146 para 7 & 26; Total Computer 
Services (Pty) Limited v Municipal Manager Potchefstroom Local Municipality [2007] ZAGPHC 239; 2008 (4) 
SA 346 (T) paras 34 & 76. Also, Waenhuiskrans Arniston Ratepayers Association v Verreweide 
Eiendomsontwikkeling (Edms) Bpk [2009] ZAWCHC 181; 2011 (3) SA 434 (WCC) paras 66 & 179; Sgananda 
Consulting (Pty) Ltd v Mnambithi FET College (4329/14) [2014] ZAKZPHC 28 para 4. 
36 See Aqua ltd v Ondo State Sports Council 1988 4 NWLR (pt 91) 622; PPDC v National Agency for Food and 
Drug Administration and Control FHC(Abuja) 15-12-2014 suit no FHC/ABJ/CS/760/13. 
37 FHC(Benin) 21-07-2010 suit no FHC/B/CS/116/2010. 
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7 3 2 South Africa 
The form of judicial intervention in South African public procurement is not left to conjecture, 
as section 33(3)(a) of South African Constitution and section 6(1) of PAJA expressly state that 
it shall be by judicial review. South African courts are generally not vested with appellate 
authority over executive decisions.38 Thus, the courts are only concerned with the legality of 
the tender process. They do not second-guess the contracting authority by imposing their views 
in the place of decisions lawfully made by the authority, however unpopular or ill-advised it 
might be regarded.39 Besides, not every slip in administration of tenders necessarily attracts 
judicial sanction.40 
In cases where direct judicial recourse applies, it is necessarily the original procurement 
decision that would be reviewed. Where administrative review was initially sought, judicial 
review may be pursued against the procurement decision,41 or the administrative review 
decision,42 or both. 43 The comments in 7 3 1 above on when judicial review may be sought 
against the original procurement decision apply here.  
Public procurement planning and award decisions are both subject to judicial review in 
South Africa. Procurement planning is usually challenged together with the award decision, as 
bidders normally identify irregular planning decisions only during award.44 Although rare and 
not quite clear, solely challenging planning decisions is possible.45 For example, in MEC for 
Education, Northern Cape v Bateleur Books (Pty) Ltd,46 the court reviewed a sole issue 
                                                          
38 City of Cape Town v South African National Roads Agency Ltd (SANRAL) [2015] ZAWCHC 135; 2016 (1) 
BCLR 49 (WCC); [2016] 1 All SA 99 (WCC); 2015 (6) SA 535 (WCC) para 8. 
39 City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2015] ZAWCHC 135, 2015 (6) SA 535 (WCC) para 8 214-216; Joubert Galpin 
Searle Inc v Road Accident Fund 2014 (4) SA 148 (ECP) para 59; South African National Roads Agency v The 
Toll Collect Consortium 2013 (6) SA 356 (SCA) para 27. See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) paras 45-48; C Hoexter “The Future of Judicial Review in South 
African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 SA Law Journal 484 501-502. 
40 Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZASCA 13, 2010 (4) 
SA 359 (SCA) para [21]. 
41 DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] ZASCA 146 para 7 & 26; Total Computer 
Services (Pty) Limited v Municipal Manager Potchefstroom Local Municipality [2007] ZAGPHC 239; 2008 (4) 
SA 346 (T) paras 34 & 76. 
42 CC Groenewald v M5 Developments [2010] ZASCA 47 para 2. 
43Waenhuiskrans Arniston Ratepayers Association v Verreweide Eiendomsontwikkeling (Edms) Bpk [2009] 
ZAWCHC 181; 2011 (3) SA 434 (WCC) paras 66 & 179; Sgananda Consulting (Pty) Ltd v Mnambithi FET 
College (4329/14) [2014] ZAKZPHC 28 para 4. 
44 See TBP Building & Civils v the East London Industrial Development Zone [2009] JDR 0203 (ECG Manong 
& Associates (Pty) Ltd v Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape (No 2) 2009 (6) SA 589 (SCA)). 
45 Quinot PPLR (2011) 201. 
46 [2009] ZASCA 33; 2009 (4) SA 639 (SCA); [2009] 3 All SA 127 (SCA). 
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concerning a contracting authority’s planned change from using previously participating 
suppliers to purchasing directly, without notice. It set aside the decision/plan for procedural 
unfairness; since the suppliers established that they had a legitimate expectation of continued 
participation and had consequently invested money. Nevertheless, as is the case in Nigeria, a 
suit solely challenging procurement planning will contend with establishing ripeness of matter 
and locus standi (to show what the interest is, in the absence of tender invitation and award 
decision).47 Likewise, bidder remedies do not apply to contract administration; as it falls under 
contract dispute resolution. 
 There is generally no special statutory precondition for instituting judicial review 
against procurement decision in South Africa. However, before seeking judicial review of a 
municipality’s delegated authority’s procurement decision, a bidder must exhaust the appeal 
under section 62 of Systems Act.48 The mere lapse of the time for exhausting the internal 
remedy neither satisfies the duty to exhaust nor constitutes a ground for exemption.49  
7 4 Grounds of review/trial 
Application for judicial remedies is limited to particular grounds provided by the relevant 
legislation. They essentially describe the way in which a decision-maker has contravened the 
law. Applicants must rely on these grounds. For Nigeria, the grounds are provided under 
section 54(1) of PPA. For South Africa, they are listed under section 6(2) of PAJA; and implied 
under section 33(1) and 217(1) of the Constitution. 
7 4 1 Nigeria 
The grounds for the original complaint apply to judicial recourse, since the proceeding is 
merely the last stage of the challenge. According to PPA section 54(1), a bidder may challenge 
any omission or breach of the Act or the applicable regulatory frameworks by a procuring or 
                                                          
47 Quinot PPLR (2011) 201. 
48 DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality [2015] ZASCA 146 paras 23-25; Evaluations Enhanced 
Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality [2014] ZAECGHC 55, [2014] 3 All SA 
560 para 75; Dengetenge Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sphere Mining and Development Company (Pty) Ltd 
2014 (3) BCLR 265 (CC) para 116. See, I Currie & J Klaaren The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
Benchbook (2001) 182. 
49 Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs 2009 (2) BCLR 1192 (CC) paras 46-49; Dengetenge Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Southern Sphere Mining & Development Company (Pty) Ltd 2014 (3) BCLR 265 (CC) paras 115-127; Evaluations 
Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality [2014] ZAECGHC 55, [2014] 
3 All SA 560 para 75. 
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disposing entity. The following are breaches and constitute grounds of review (an example of 
each is presented).  
• Lack of authority- an accounting officer awarding contracts in excess of prescribed 
threshold, contrary to PPA section 22.50 
• Bias- a procurement decision-maker having a direct or indirect interest in a bidder, 
contrary to PPA section 57(9)-(12). 
• Error of law- a procuring entity misapplying the award criteria, contrary to PPA 
sections 16(17), 24(3) and 60.51 
• Noncompliance with a mandatory and material procedure- failure to evaluate bids 
before award, contrary to PPA section 32. 
• Procedural unfairness- using evaluation criteria different from those in the solicitation 
documents, contrary to PPA section 32(1). 
• Unreasonableness- using restricted procurement methods based on unacceptable 
grounds, contrary to PPA sections 40 and 42.  
• Failure to take a decision- failure of BPP to give review decision within the deadline.52 
7 4 2 South Africa 
Applicable review grounds are listed in section 6 of PAJA, which subsumes those in sections 
33 and 217 of the Constitution. These grounds are presented below, with examples. 
• Lack of authority and unlawful delegation-53  an accounting officer awarding contract 
through a non-competitive process, without due approval.54  
• Bias-55  contracting authority awarding contract to a bidder who did not comply with 
bid specifications, while disqualifying some bidders on that ground.56  
                                                          
50 See Federal Republic of Nigeria v Olabode George FHC(Abuja) 26-10-2008 suit no ID/71c/2008 (tried before 
the PPA). 
51 See Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC(Abuja) 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. 
52 PPA s 54(7). 
53 Section 6(2)(a)(i) & (ii). 
54 Minister of Transport NO v Prodiba (Pty) Ltd [2015] ZASCA 38; [2015] 2 All SA 387 (SCA); National 
Treasury Instruction Note on Enhancing Compliance Monitoring and Improving Transparency and Accountability 
in Supply Chain Management of 11-05-2011 paras 3 9 3-3 9 4. 
55 Section 6(2)(a)(iii). 
56 Esorfranki Pipelines v Mopani District Municipality [2014] ZASCA 21; [2014] 2 All SA 493 (SCA). 
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• Failure to comply with mandatory and material procedure-57 bidders not given prior 
notification of a special scoring used during bid evaluation.58 
• Procedural unfairness-59 refusing an application to reconsider decision and awarding 
contract without observing a mandatory appeal period.60 
• Error of law-61 exercising the power to debar a contractor without fulfilling a 
requirement of law.62  
• Action taken for wrong reasons or considerations-63 contract not awarded to the lowest 
responsive bidder because it was previously awarded some on-going contracts.64 
• Irrationality and unreasonableness-65 awarding contract without competitive bidding 
unsupported by cogent reason.66   
• Unconstitutionality or unlawfulness-67 vague and contradictory evaluation criteria 
(contrary to principle of transparency under section 217 of the Constitution).68 
• Failure to take a decision-69 refusal to review an award decision following bidders’ 
application for reconsideration.70 
                                                          
57 Section 6(2)(b). 
58 Stiegelmeyer Africa (Pty) Ltd v National Treasury of South Africa [2015] ZAWCHC 9; [2015] 2 All SA 110 
(WCC). See also Total Computer Services (Pty) Limited v Municipal Manager Potchefstroom Local Municipality 
[2007] ZAGPHC 239; 2008 (4) SA 346 (T); CEO of South African Social Security Agency NO v Cash Paymaster 
Services (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZASCA 13; 2012 (1) SA 216 (SCA) para 28. 
59 Section 6(2)(c). 
60 Total Computer Services (Pty) Limited v Municipal Manager Potchefstroom Local Municipality [2007] 
ZAGPHC 239; 2008 (4) SA 346 (T); Chairman, State Tender Board v Supersonic Tours (Pty) Ltd [2008] ZASCA 
56. 
61 Section 6(2)(d). 
62 Chairman, State Tender Board v Supersonic Tours (Pty) Ltd [2008] ZASCA 56, 2008 (6) SA 220 (SCA); 
Sanyathi Civil Engineering & Construction (Pty) Ltd v eThekwini Municipality, Group Five Construction (Pty) 
Ltd v eThekwini Municipality [2011] ZAKZPHC 45; [2012] 1 All SA 200 (KZP). 
63 Section 6(2)(e)(i)-(vi). 
64 RHI Joint Venture v Minister of Roads and Public Works, Eastern Cape [2003] ZAECHC 23; Eskom Holdings 
Limited v New Reclamation Group (Pty) Ltd [2009] ZASCA 8; 2009 (4) SA 628 (SCA). 
65 Section 6(2)(f)(ii)&(h). 
66 See TEB Properties CC v The MEC, Department of Health and Social Development, North West [2011] ZASCA 
243; [2012] 1 All SA 479 (SCA). 
67 Section 6(2)(f)(i) and (i).  
68 Rainbow Civils CC v Minister of Transport and Public Works, Western Cape [2013] ZAWCHC 3; TEB 
Properties CC v The MEC, Department of Health and Social Development, North West [2011] ZASCA 243; 
Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province 2008 (2) SA 481 
(SCA) para17-18; Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics 2008 (2) SA 638 (SCA) 
para 14; Tetra Mobile Radio (Pty) Ltd v MEC, Department of Works 2008 (1) SA 438 (SCA) para 9. 
69 Section 6(2)(g), (3). 
70 Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Platjie Municipality [2008] ZANCHC 6; [2008] 4 All SA 168 (NC). 
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In addition to the aforementioned grounds, public procurement decisions may also be 
challenged for noncompliance with the overreaching constitutional requirement of legality.71 
For example, judicial review may be pursued on the grounds of unlawfully discriminatory 
effect of a procurement decision. 
The above grounds vest considerable potency on judicial review of procurement 
decisions. For instance, the standard of review for reasonableness is high. In many cases it 
entails an intensive scrutiny of administrative decisions, ranging from threshold rationality 
review to proportionality or a standard quite close to it.72 However, it does not generally entail 
the court substituting the decision with its own opinion.73 
7 4 3 Analysis 
The grounds of review under the South African judicial recourse differ from its Nigerian 
counterpart in certain respects. First, for South Africa, the grounds of review are generally 
listed by the PAJA; and are thus easy to identify and apply. Conversely, for Nigeria, the review 
grounds are gleaned from section 54(1) of PPA.  
Secondly, more grounds of review are provided under the South African judicial 
recourse than its Nigerian counterpart. For example, “action taken for wrong reason or 
consideration”74 and “unconstitutionality”, are grounds under the South African system, which 
do not exist under the Nigerian PPA. Unconstitutionality constitutes a ground because the 
South African Constitution enshrines certain fundamental public procurement principles;75 
while the Nigerian Constitution does not. Unconstitutionally enjoys an important status, as a 
procurement decision made in accordance with any legislation, which however contravenes a 
constitutional procurement principle,76 would be invalid on the grounds of 
unconstitutionality.77  
Thirdly, existence of more review grounds in South Africa creates more opportunity 
for review of public procurement decisions than is obtainable in Nigeria. For example, a party 
                                                          
71 City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2015] ZAWCHC 135; 2016 (1) 2015 (6) SA 535 (WCC) para 11. 
72 Quinot (2011) PPLR 201. See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) para 45; Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) para 108. 
73 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1999 (3) SA 304 (LAC) para 36; Bato Star Fishing v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 45. 
74 However, this is arguably similar to “unreasonableness”. 
75 Section 217. 
76 Such as preferential procurement under SA Constitution s 217(2). 
77 See SA Constitution s 2. 
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may bring a case, on grounds of unconstitutionality, to enforce the preferential/affirmative 
procurement principles enshrined in the South African Constitution;78 while such would not 
arise in Nigeria. 
7 5 Parties to suit 
This section identifies the persons that can sue and be sued in procurement litigation in both 
jurisdictions. This is critical, as it is only when the right parties are before a court that it can 
resolve the dispute validly.79 Also, it is these parties that will be bound by the outcome of the 
suit. The element of an effective bidder remedies system relevant under this subheading is: 
bidders have a general right to challenge an act or decision of a procuring entity. 
7 5 1 Nigeria 
Generally, it is only parties to an initial administrative review and the review forum (the BPP) 
that would be proper parties in the subsequent judicial recourse.80 This is because judicial 
recourse is only by way of appeal from BPP’s review. Although section 54(7) mentions that 
“the bidder may appeal”, it is reasonably assumed that standing is not limited to bidders, for 
three reasons. First, “the bidder” is mentioned because bidders are the focal parties of the 
review right under section 54. Secondly, right of appeal inherently extends to all parties to a 
proceeding that is subject to appeal.81 Thirdly, section 54(7) does not state that “only bidders” 
may appeal.82 The court in Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources83 
held that even if section 54(7) does not entitle all parties in the administrative review to judicial 
recourse, that they would exercise such right pursuant to section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution.84 
Thus, a plaintiff/applicant in a procurement judicial recourse may be any of the 
following. 
                                                          
78 See Manong Associates (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Department of Road and Transport [2008] ZAEQC 2; 2008 
(6) SA 434 (EqC); RHI Joint Venture v Minister of Roads and Public Works, Eastern Cape (769/02) [2003] 
ZAECHC 35 paras 27-33, 36-42; Sizabonke Civils CC t/a Pilcon Projects v Zululand District Municipality 2011 
(4) SA 406 (KZP), [2010] ZAKZPHC 23. 
79 E Ojukwu & C Ojukwu Introduction to Civil Procedure 2nd ed (2004) 71. 
80 However, a person who is affected by a review decision but was not a party may, with leave of court, appeal 
against the decision- Re: Madaki (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt 459) 143; Ifebuzor v Nwabeze (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt 560) 
148. 
81 See Akinbiyi v Adelabu (1956) SCNLR 109; Nabaruma v Offodile (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt 891) 599; Emeakayi v 
COP (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt 862) 158. 
82 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius would not apply. 
83 FHC(Abuja) 12-6-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/867/11 66-67. 
84 Provides matters to which judicial powers extend. 
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(a) An unsuccessful bidder- (i) who was not satisfied with the outcome of its review 
application to the procuring entity and the BPP;85 (ii) who obtained a remedy from the 
BPP, which the procuring entity failed to implement;86  
(b) A successful bidder, whose award was varied, suspended or nullified on review;  
(c) The procurement entity, which BPP’s review decision is adverse to; for example, its 
award is cancelled. 
Since bidders have a right to challenge, Nigerian procurement judicial recourse is 
effective in this regard. 
Civil society organisations (CSOs), as procurement observers,87 do not have right to 
judicial recourse under section 54 of PPA.88 Nevertheless, CSOs, relying on section 6(6)(b) of 
the Constitution,89 can sue procuring entities for decisions such as: preventing them from 
observing procurement proceedings or denying them access to procurement information.90  
The respondents in a procurement judicial recourse may be:  
(a) The BPP; 
(b) The procuring entity; and 
(c) The bidder that BPP’s decision favoured. 
It is critical to make the BPP a respondent, since it is the administrative review body 
whose decision is in issue; so that it can be directly bound by the order of court which may 
reverse its decision. Apart from the above respondents, any other unsuccessful bidder that 
participated in the review proceedings may be joined.91  However, it may be unnecessary and 
unwieldy to join uninterested unsuccessful bidders. 
                                                          
85 PPA s 54(7). 
86 See Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC(Abuja) 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. 
87 PPA s 19(b).  
88 KT Udeh “Social Accountability Mechanisms and Public Procurement Reform in Nigeria” in S N Nyeck Public 
Procurement Reform and Governance in Africa 235 243.  
89 Empowers courts to determine any question as to the civil rights and obligations of persons and authorities.  
90 Pursuant to PPA s 19(b) and the FOIA. See PPDC v National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and 
Control FHC(Abuja) 15-12-2014 suit no FHC/ABJ/CS/760/13; PPDC v Power Holding Company of Nigeria 
(PHCN) PLC FHC(Abuja) 1-3-2013 suit no FHC/ABJ/CS/582/2012; PPDC v The Hon. Minister of the FCT 
HCFCT 30-1-2014 suit no FCT/HC/CV/M/3057/13: available at <procurementmonitor.org/ppdc/what-the-court-
says/> (accessed 12-2-2017). 
91 See PPA s 54(5).  
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It is usual but wrong to make the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) a defendant, 
merely on the ground of being the Chief Law Officer of the Federation.92 First, it is generally 
not the Federal Government as an entity that is sued, but ministries and agencies that can sue 
and be sued.93 Secondly, the originating process usually does not contain any allegation and 
claim against the AGF to attach him with any question to answer. As a result, the AGF is 
usually struck out, for misjoinder. 
7 5 2 South Africa 
All persons mentioned under section 38 of the Constitution (on right to enforce the Bill of 
Rights) may apply for the judicial review of public procurement decisions; as public 
procurement is an administrative action,94 that must be just according to the Bill of Rights.95 
These persons include, anyone: 
(a) acting in their own interest; 
(b) acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
(c) acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
(d) acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members. 
However, it is usually unsuccessful (or potential)96 bidders that are applicants for 
procurement judicial review. Successful bidders whose awards were administratively reviewed 
and cancelled also feature as applicants.97 But unlike in Nigeria, parties to procurement judicial 
review would in most cases not come from an initial administrative review proceeding, owing 
to lack of effective internal remedy options in those cases.98  
                                                          
92 See Obyke Systems Consult Limited v Nigerian College of Aviation Technology Suit no: FHC/ABJ/CS/533/2008 
(Abuja) 15 Nov 2011; A.C Egbe Nig Limited v DG BPP FHC(Benin) 21-07-2010 suit no FHC/B/CS/116/2010; 
in Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC(Abuja) 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. 
93 Attorney General Kano State v Attorney General of the Federation [2007] 4 NWLR (pt 1029) 164. 
94 Quinot (2011) PPLR 192, 195; Quinot State Commercial Activity 162. See also Umfolozi Transport (Edms) Bpk 
v Minister van Vervoer en Andere 1997 2 All SA 548 (SCA); Transnet Ltd v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 2001 1 
SA 853 (SCA); Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo Province 
[2007] ZASCA 165; 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA) para 4. 
95 See Constitution ss 33, 34; also, PAJA ss 1(1) & 6(1). 
96 See MEC for Education, Northern Cape v Bateleur Books (Pty) Ltd [2009] ZASCA 33; 2009 (4) SA 639 (SCA); 
[2009] 3 All SA 127 (SCA). 
97TEB Properties CC v The MEC, Department of Health and Social Development, North West [2011] ZASCA 
243; Eastern Cape Provincial Government v Contractprops 25 (Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 142 (SCA). 
98 See 5 1 above. 
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Since bidders have a general right to review procurement judicial recourse in South 
Africa is effective in this regard. 
Furthermore, contracting authorities may apply for judicial review and the setting aside 
of their own irregular award decisions.99 This may be necessitated by three factors. First, they 
are duty bound not to submit to or enforce an unlawful contract.100 Secondly, an award 
establishes a valid contract between the contracting authority and the winning bidder until it is 
set aside by a court.101 Thirdly ensures certainty of the validity of a contract, where there have 
been ostensible failures in the procurement process.102  
The usual respondents in a procurement judicial review, where the unsuccessful bidder 
sues, are the contracting authority and the winning bidder. It may be unnecessary to join other 
unsuccessful, but uninterested, bidders. Where there was an initial internal review, the review 
authority could also be joined. And, a judicial review application by a contracting authority 
would necessarily be against the winning bidder.  
7 6 Forum 
7 6 1 Nigeria 
Section 54(7) of PPA vests jurisdiction on the Federal High Court (FHC) to review federal 
government procurement, after BPP’s review. This aligns with section 251(1)(r) and (p) of the 
Constitution,103 which confers exclusive original jurisdiction on the FHC for “any action or 
proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or 
administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies”; and for 
civil matters involving “the administration or the management and control of the Federal 
Government or any of its agencies”. 
                                                          
99 See Quinot (2011) PPLR 202; Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality v Asla Construction (Pty) [2016] 
ZAECGHC 55 para 5; Municipal Manager: Qaukeni Local Municipality v FV General Trading [2009] 4 All SA 
231 (SCA) para 23; TBP Building & Civils v the East London Industrial Development Zone [2009] JDR 0203 
(ECG); Casalinga Investments CC t/a Waste Rite v Buffalo City Municipality [2009] JDR 0299 (EL); Zimport 
Water Service CC v Minister of Public Works[2008] ZAGPHC 82 para 60-61; Premier, Free State v Firechem 
Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA) para 36. 
100 Municipal Manager: Qaukeni Local Municipality v FV General Trading [2009] 4 All SA 231 (SCA) para 23; 
Premier, Free State v Firechem Free State 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA) para 36; Casalinga Investments CC t/a Waste 
Rite v Buffalo City Municipality [2009] JDR 0299 (EL). 
101 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) para 26; Steenkamp NO v Provincial 
Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006(3) SA 151 (SCA) 24; Zimport Water Service CC v Minister of Public Works 
[2008] ZAGPHC 82 paras 39 & 98. See Quinot (2011) PPLR 202; Quinot TSAR 444-446. 
102 Quinot (2011) PPLR 202. 
103 And s 7(1)(r) & (p) Federal High Court Act 1973 (as amended) CAP F12 LFN 2004 (“FHC Act”). 
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The FHC is a High Court of Justice established by the Constitution104 and the Federal 
High Court Act 1973,105 as a federal superior court of record.106 Its civil proceedings are 
generally governed by the Federal High (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 (“FHC Rules”). The 
Court exercises jurisdiction throughout the Federation, and sits in various Judicial Divisions 
across the Federation.107  Generally, it is constituted by one judge of the court.108 
Since there is nothing in the PPA to the contrary, procurement review decision of the 
FHC may be appealed at the Court of Appeal, up to the Supreme Court.109 
The procedures and powers of the FHC are discussed below.110 
7 6 2 South Africa 
The High Court of South Africa is generally the court of first instance over public procurement 
disputes, by virtue of section 169(1) of the Constitution. The section vests the High Court with 
original jurisdiction over any constitutional matter,111 and any other matter not assigned to 
another court by an Act of Parliament. Public procurement is a constitutional matter, as it is 
enshrined under section 217 of the Constitution.112 Besides, section 7(4) of PAJA provides that 
until rules of procedure for judicial review made by the Rules Board for Courts of Law come 
into operation; proceedings for judicial review must be instituted in a High Court or (rarely) 
the Constitutional Court.  
However, the Rules of Procedure for Judicial Review of Administrative Action (PAJA 
Rules)113 while yet to come into force was reviewed and significant parts declared invalid in 
                                                          
104 Section 249. 
105 Section 1. 
106 Constitution s 6(3) & (5)(c). 
107 FHC Act s 19. 
108 Constitution s 253; FHC Act s 23. 
109 See 3 3 3 1 above.  
110 7 7-7 9. 
111 Except those the Constitutional Court has agreed to hear directly under section 167(6)(a); and, those assigned 
by an Act of Parliament to another court of a status similar to the High Court. 
112 See also s 167(7). 
113 GN R966 in GG 32622 of 09-10-2009, made in terms of PAJA s 7(3). 
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Lawyers for Human Rights v Rules Board for Courts of Law.114 This led to the Rule being 
abandoned. Thus, Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court still governs judicial review.115 
 The High Court is a superior court116 established by section 166(c) of the South African 
Constitution. It currently consists of nine judicial Divisions; each sitting and exercising 
jurisdiction in one or more places as prescribed by law or the Minister.117 When exercising its 
original jurisdiction, it is generally constituted by a single judge; and in certain cases by not 
more than three judges, referred to as “full court”.118 The full court may sit over appeals against 
procurement disputes decided by its single judge.119 Appeal against procurement review by a 
full court lies to the Supreme Court of Appeal, and may afterwards proceed to the 
Constitutional Court. 120 This is similar to what obtains in Nigeria, as seen above. 
Relevant procedures and powers of the High Court are discussed below.121 
7 7 The proceedings 
The issues examined here include: timeframes for commencing judicial recourse; implications 
of applying out of time; permissibility of extension of time; modes of commencement and 
duration of proceedings. Also examined is whether an administrative review application 
rejected for being out of time, could proceed to judicial review? 
                                                          
114 [2012] ZAGPPHC 54, [2012] 3 All SA 153 (GNP), 2012 (7) BCLR 754 (GNP). See SERAJ “PAJA Rules 
Found Unconstitutional” (01-04-2012) SERAJ Stellenbosch University 
<http://blogs.sun.ac.za/seraj/2012/04/01/paja-rules-found-unconstitutional/> (accessed 06-11-2017); G Quinot 
“New Procedures for Judicial Review of Administrative Action” (2010) 25 SA Public Law 646. 
115 Cases after Lawyers for Human Rights indicate that Rule 53 continues to apply. See for example: City of Cape 
Town v SANRAL [2015] ZAWCHC 135, 2016 (1) BCLR 49 (WCC), [2016] 1 All SA 99 (WCC), 2015 (6) SA 
535 (WCC) para 121; Airports Company South Africa Limited v Airport Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a Exclusive Books 
[2015] ZAGPJHC 154, 2016 (1) SA 473 (GJ), [2015] 3 All SA 561 (GJ) para 92; Tshiyombo v Members of the 
Refugee Appeal Board [2015] ZAWCHC 170, [2016] 2 All SA 278 (WCC) para 2.  
116 Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, ss 1 and 6(1). 
117 Section 6(1) & (3)(b)&(c). 
118 Section 14(1)(a) & (b).  
119 See City of Cape Town v Reader (719/2007) [2008] ZASCA 130 paras 1-3; Kungwini Local Municipality v 
Sekwanele Security Services (A354/08) [2009] ZAGPPHC 184; Evaluations Enhanced Property Appraisals (Pty) 
Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality [2014] ZAECGHC 55; [2014] 3 All SA 560 (ECG). 
120 See 3 3 3 1 above. 
121 7 7-7 9. 
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7 7 1 Nigeria 
7 7 1 1  Commencement  
According to the PPA, section 54(7), Judicial recourse must be commenced within 30 days 
after: the receipt of BPP’s review decision; or, the expiration of 21 working days stipulated for 
the BPP to deliver its decision. Receipt of BPP’s decision is necessary for time to start running 
under the first instance, as the BPP usually communicates its review decisions through 
letters.122  
 Judicial recourse commenced out of time is incompetent;123 and the PPA does not 
permit extension of the time. The contrary is the case in South Africa, as would be seen 
below.124 Arguably, where the BPP had rejected a complaint filed out of time; the court would 
not assume jurisdiction to hear the matter, even if commenced within 30 days of receiving 
BPP’s decision. This is because administrative review is condition precedent for judicial 
recourse. 
The aforementioned commencement time supersedes the three months stipulated for 
commencing judicial review by order 34 rule 4 of the FHC Rules. Also, the court’s power to 
extend time, under order 48 rule 4, does not apply to proceedings pursuant to section 54(7) of 
PPA. Furthermore, the three months limitation period under section 2(a) of the Public Officer 
Protection Act 1916,125  does not apply, as the time under the PPA is shorter. Likewise, 
section14(1) of the PPA, requiring litigants to serve a 30-day pre-action notice to BPP does not 
apply to section 57(7) proceedings, as argued in 7 3 1 above. 
7 7 1 2  Proceedings and duration 
Similar to the UNICTRAL Model Law, the PPA provides for judicial recourse but does not 
stipulate its procedures.  Hence, the court relies on the FHC Rules. The Rules do not provide a 
special procedure for procurement disputes; thus, the court adopts such procedure as it deems 
fit to do substantial justice between the parties.126 Since procurement judicial recourse is 
regarded as largely a form of judicial review,127 procedure for judicial review may be adopted. 
                                                          
122 PPA 54(6); BPP SOP: Administrative Review para 25. 
123 Integrated Remediations Limited v Federal Ministry of Environment FHC(Abuja) 14-11-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/841/2010 41-42. 
124 7 7 2 1. 
125 Chapter P 41 LFN 2004. 
126 FHC Act s 9(2). 
127 Ofscon Nig Ltd v Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs FHC(Abuja) 21-3-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/315/2011 41. 
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Under order the FHC Rules, order 34 rules 3 and 5, judicial review is commenced by motion 
or originating summons; after applicant has first obtained the leave of court.128 However, these 
modes are proper for cases involving only interpretation of law and documents.129 Judicial 
recourse involving disputed facts must commence by writ of summons.130 Here, leave of court 
required for judicial review would not apply, as suits by writ of summons are not regarded as 
an application by judicial review.131 
Suits by writ of summons involve exchanging pleadings with supporting documents 
and calling witnesses.132 Originating summons and motion involves reliance only on affidavit 
and copies of exhibits by parties.133 Proceeding in the former is elaborate but more sustainable. 
While proceeding in the latter is faster, but could be precarious. For example, where a suit by 
originating summons involves substantial disputed facts, the applicant must request the court 
to convert the suit to one by writ of summons and order parties to file pleadings and call 
witnesses.134 If the applicant/plaintiff fails to do so, the court may strike out the case for wrong 
commencement.135 However, where the court thinks that disputed facts in parties’ affidavit 
may be resolved only by cross-examining the deponents or relevant witnesses, the court may 
order such on its own initiative.136 The FHC has expressed preference for commencing judicial 
recourse by writ of summons.137 
Just as in administrative review proceedings, parties to judicial recourse (particularly 
bidders) have right of prompt access to related procurement records for evidence to support 
their cases, by virtue of Freedom of Information Act 2011 and PPA section 38(2)(b). 
There is no stipulated duration for judicial recourse proceeding. However, section 36(1) 
of the Constitution indicates that judicial proceeding should be within a reasonable time. 
                                                          
128 FHC Rules o 34 r 3(1). 
129 FHC Rules o 3 r 6. 
130 See Doherty v Doherty (1968) NMLR 241; NBN v Ayodele Alakija (1978) 9 & 10 SC 59; Pam v Mohammed 
(2008) 16 NWLR (pt 1112) 1.  
131 FHC Rules o 34 r 9(5). 
132 FHC Rules o 3 r 3, o 13. 
133 O 3 r 9(2); o 13 r 35(15).  
134 FHC Rules o 3 r 8; o 34 r 9(5). See Anatogu v Anatogu (1997) 9 NWLR (pt 519) 49; Famfa Oil Ltd v A G 
Federation (2003) 18 NWLR (pt 852) 453; Adebayo v Johnson (1969) 1 All NLR 176 191.  
135 See N A Williams v Hope Rising Voluntary Funds Society (1982) 1-2 SC 145; Revici v Prentice Hall 
Incorporated (1969) 1 All ER 772 774. 
136 See Falobi v Falobi (1976) 9-10 SC 1; Eboh v Oki (1974) 1 SC.179 189-190; Olu-Ibukun v Olu-Ibukun (1974) 
2 SC 41 48; Akinsete v Akindutere (1966) 1 All NLR 147 148. 
137 Ofscon Nig Ltd v Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs FHC(Abuja) 21-3-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/315/2011 43-
46. 
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Duration of proceeding depends on the general court system, the complexity of the case, and 
counsel. Procurement cases take up to a year or more. This is not indicative of the ability to 
proceed swiftly within a reasonably short period of time, within days or weeks. Yet, it does not 
necessarily eliminate the possibility of intervention without delay, as the court can grant interim 
reliefs.138  Nevertheless, it is argued in 7 11 below that stipulating duration of procurement 
judicial recourse is doable and preferable.  
7 7 2 South Africa 
7 7 2 1  Commencement 
Procurement judicial review, according to PAJA section 7(1), must be instituted without 
unreasonable delay and not later than 180 days: 
(i) after any applicable internal remedies proceedings have been concluded; or  
(ii) where no such remedies exist, after the person concerned was informed of the 
administrative action, became aware of the action and the reasons for it or should 
reasonably have become aware of the action and the reasons. 
In (ii) above, time begins to run when the applicant became or should have become 
aware of the award decision; not when he became aware of the irregularity of the decision.139 
This aligns with the public interest in the finality of administrative decisions and the exercise 
of administrative functions.  
Section 9 of PAJA permits extension of the above timeframe for a fixed period, by 
agreement of the parties,140 or by the court on application by the party concerned, where the 
interests of justice so require (referred to as “condonation”). The Court has discretion to grant 
condonation, upon a holistic consideration of all relevant facts,141 including: the degree of 
lateness, the explanation given, prospects of success, importance of the case; and the 
respondent’s interest.142  
                                                          
138 See 7 9 1 below. 
139 Aurecon South Africa (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape [2015] ZASCA 209, [2016] 1 All SA 313 (SCA), 2016 (2) SA 
199 (SCA) para 16. 
140 The court in City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2015] ZAWCHC 135, 2015 (6) SA 535 (WCC) para 15 fn 16, 
opined that the court may reject an agreement between the parties to extend the time, in appropriate circumstances, 
especially where third parties might be prejudicially affected. 
141 Condonation application must be supported by an affidavit- Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Chairman of the 
Tender Committee [2007] ZAFSHC 136 para 43. 
142 Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1962 (4) SA 531 (AD) 532 B-E; Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Chairman 
of the Tender Committee [2007] ZAFSHC 136 paras 43-45; City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2015] ZAWCHC 135 
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It is arguable that an application for internal remedies rejected for being out of time, may 
successfully proceed to judicial review; provided the commences within the 180 days’ 
timeframe or condonation is granted. This is based on PAJA, section 7(2)(c), that allows 
litigants to apply to be exempted from exhausting internal remedy. 
Outside the stipulated timeframe, a procurement decision, even though wrongful, would 
become unreviewable.143 This is because there is a public interest in the certainty and finality 
of administrative decisions.144   
7 7 2 2  Proceedings and duration 
According to Rule 53(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court, an application for judicial review of a 
(public procurement) decision shall be commenced by notice of motion; inviting the decision-
maker to show cause why such decision should not be reviewed and corrected or set aside. 
After receipt of the notice of motion, the decision-maker shall within fifteen days despatch to 
the court registrar the record of the challenged proceedings, together with such reasons as he 
is by law required or desires to give.145 He also notifies the applicant whether he shall oppose 
the review application.146 The registrar immediately makes the record available to the 
parties.147 Besides, the parties have a right of access to relevant public records and reason for 
administrative decision, under PAIA and PAJA, as discussed above.148  
The court determines the review based on the affidavits and documents filed by 
parties.149 This ordinarily makes the proceeding straightforward and saves time. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
paras 22 & 32; Zwane v Magistrate Maphumulo 1980 (3) SA 976 (N); Khumalo v MEC for Education, KwaZulu-
Natal 2014 (5) SA 579 (CC) para 52. 
143 See City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2015] ZAWCHC 135 paras 13 & 15; Chairman STC v JFE Sapela 
Electronics (pty) Ltd [2005] 4 All SA 487 (SCA) para 28; Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 
(6) SA 222 (SCA) para 27 242E-F; Wolgroeiers Afslaers (Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit van Kaapstad 1978 (1) SA 
13 (A) 41E-42C; Gqwetha v Transkei Development Corporation Ltd 2006 (2) SA 603 (SCA) paras 22-23; 
Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance v The South African National Roads Agency Ltd [2013] 4 All SA 639 (SCA) 
para 25. 
144 City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2015] ZAWCHC 135 para 13. 
145 See Cash Paymasters Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province 1999(1) SA 324 (CK CH) 353G; Actaris 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Platjie Municipality [2008] 4 All SA 168 para 25; Lawyers for Human Rights v Rules 
Board for Courts of Law [2012] 3 All SA 153 (GNP) para 22. 
146 Rule 53(1)(b) & (5). 
147 Rule 53(3). 
148 5 3 8 2 1(a). 
149 Rule 53(2), (4), (5)(b), (6) & (7); r 6(5)(g); Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd v Stellenvale Winery (Pty) Ltd 
1957 (4) SA 234(C) 235 E-G; National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) para 26; 
Indiza Airport Management (Pty) Ltd v Msunduzi Municipality [2012] ZAKZPHC 74; [2013] 1 All SA 340 (KZP) 
para 2. 
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where an application cannot properly be decided on affidavit, the court may dismiss it.150 
Contrariwise, it may, based on a party’s request,151 order that oral evidence be heard on 
specified issues with a view to resolving dispute of fact; or it may refer the matter to trial with 
appropriate directions as to pleadings or definition of issues, or otherwise.152 This is similar to 
what obtains under Nigerian judicial review. 
There is no defined timeframe for concluding procurement judicial review. Duration of 
the proceedings depends on the general court system, the complexity of the case, and counsel. 
The average duration for an opposed procurement case is two and a half years;153 and, it may 
still go on appeal. This is not indicative of the ability to proceed swiftly within a reasonably 
short period of time. However, an applicant is expected to “proceed seriously and prosecute his 
case with reasonable swiftness within reasonable time”.154 Also, courts can award costs against 
a party that unduly prolongs proceedings.155 The Supreme Court of Appeal in Millennium 
Waste Management (Pty) Ltd. v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo Province156 had 
exhorted the High Court to give priority to procurement review cases. The review timeframe 
does not necessarily erode the possibility of intervention without delay, as the court can 
promptly grant interim reliefs. 
7 8 Interim Relief 
Interim relief refers to short-term discretionary remedies that a party may request a court to 
grant before a full trial. It could also be obtained pending conclusion of administrative 
review.157 Interim relief is available in Nigeria and South Africa. It relates to the power to 
implement other interim measures, such as giving restraining orders. It is resorted to because 
courts in both jurisdictions consider and grant it expeditiously (within a few days or weeks).158 
                                                          
150 Rules 53(7) & 6(5)(g). 
151 See City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2015] ZAWCHC 135 para 188; H R Computek (Pty) Ltd v State Information 
Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd (54646/2010) [2014] ZAGPPHC 386 paras 2-3. 
152 Rule 6(5)(g). 
153 See De Rebus “Court-Annexed Mediation Officially Launched” 11 [2015] 57 DEREBUS 2; M Ngoepe 
“Mediation Rules to ease the burden on Country's Court Roll” in DoJ & CD Justice Today (2015) 4. 
154 Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Chairman of the Tender Committee of Third Respondent [2007] ZAFSHC 136 
para 21; Mkhwanazi v Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Kwazulu 1990 (4) SA 763 (D). 
155 Rule 39(24). 
156 [2007] ZASCA 165, [2007] SCA 165 (RSA), [2008] 2 All SA 145, 2008 (2) SA 481; 2008 (5) BCLR 508 para 
34. 
157 For South Africa, see 5 3 8 2 1 above; also, City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2015] ZAWCHC 135 para 119; 
Darson Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2007 (4) SA 488 (C) 506F-H. 
158 This satisfies the element of possibility of intervention without delay. 
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Interim orders preserve the current state of the challenged procurement pending the trial. This 
is usually to prevent the conclusion or continuing performance of the procurement contract. It 
could also be directed at stopping any aspect of the procurement process, including cancelling 
or re-advertising a tender.159  
Although a concluded contract may be set aside during review/trial,160 interim relief is 
still advantageous. First, it may be impractical to overturn a completed or nearly-completed 
contract even if the award was invalid.161  Secondly, a court may refuse to set aside a defective 
but not fraudulently concluded contract, even if only barely performed, where balance of 
interests and convenience demand.162 Thirdly, interim relief prevents loss of opportunity to win 
contract and profit. Besides, a person claiming damages must mitigate its loss. The court may 
refuse to award damages for such loss where an aggrieved bidder had failed to timeously apply 
for injunction/interdict to stop performance of invalid contract.163 
 The forms and effectiveness of interim relief available in both jurisdictions are 
discussed below. 
7 8 1 Nigeria 
Interim relief is generally in the form of an interim or interlocutory injunction to restrain further 
action in the challenged procurement for a definite time, or pending the final determination of 
the trial or review proceeding.164 The application is by motion on notice. But an interim 
                                                          
159 Example: Indiza Airport Management (Pty) Ltd v Msunduzi Municipality [2012] ZAKZPHC 74; [2013] 1 All 
SA 340 (KZP) paras 11-13. Thus, it satisfies the element of effectiveness requiring the prevention in normal 
circumstances, the entry into force of a procurement contract while the dispute remains outstanding. 
160 See 5 2 4 above. 
161 Chairperson - Standing Tender committee v JFE Sapela Electronics [2005] 4 ALL SA 487 (SCA) paras 26-
29; Sebeza Kahle Trade v Emalahleni Local Municipal Council [2003] 2 ALL SA 340 (T) 348. See Olitzki 
Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA) para 1265F-H; and, John Holt Ltd v Holts 
African Workers Union (1963) 1 All NLR 379, (1963) 2 SCNLR 383; Governor Imo State v Anosike (1987) 4 
NWLR (Pt 66) 663; and, Race Auto Supply Co Ltd v Akib [2001] 1 NWLR (Pt 695) 463. See Quinot PPLR (2011) 
198.  
162 See Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo Province [2007] 
ZASCA 165, [2008] 2 All SA 145, 2008 (5) BCLR 508, 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA) paras 22-32; Moseme Road 
Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZASCA 13, 2010 (4) SA 359 (SCA), 
[2010] 3 All SA 549 (SCA) paras 15-21. 
163 See, SA: Darson Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2007 (4) SA 488 (C) 506F-H; Olitzki Property 
Holdings v State Tender Board [2001] ZASCA 51 para 39; Eskom Holdings Limited v New Reclamation Group 
(Pty) Ltd [2009] ZASCA 8, 2009 (4) SA 628 (SCA), 2009 (8) BCLR 813 (SCA), [2009] 2 All SA 513 (SCA) 
paras 12-13.  Nigeria: Linus Onwuka v RI Omogui (1992) SCNJ 98 124; Obasuyi v Business Ventures Ltd [2000] 
12 WRN 112 SC. 
164 FHC Rules o34 r3(6)(b).  
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injunction may be applied ex parte, on affidavit disclosing real or extraordinary urgency.165 
Interim injunction lasts for a definite short date or until the hearing of another related 
application or until a further order. While interlocutory injunction lasts till the end of the trial.166 
Interim injunction may be granted when the respondent has been served with the notice of 
motion but has not filed an answering affidavit; thus, it proceeds faster than interlocutory 
injunction.167 However, it is only granted where evidence shows that any delay in hearing it 
would entail irreparable damage or serious mischief to the applicant. In addition, he must 
furnish the court with a satisfactory undertaking as to damages.168 Evidence that the contract 
would be concluded may not suffice as irreparable damage, since concluded contract can be 
set aside. But that the contract is about being performed or completed could suffice.  
Injunctive remedies are discretion. However, the applicant must show concurrently in 
his affidavit that:169 
• he has a right or a serious question to be tried (with possibility of success);  
• the balance of convenience is on his side; 
• damages cannot be an adequate compensation, if the applicant succeeds at the trial. 
The applicant satisfies the first requirement if he establishes that he was a bidder in the 
challenged procurement and identifies a breach of the procurement regulatory framework. 
Balance of convenience relates to weighing the interests of the parties and the public, based on 
the facts of each case. An applicant satisfies this if he shows that more justice will result in 
granting the application than in refusing it.170 A delay in bringing the application indicates that 
                                                          
165 FHC Rules o 28 r 1(2); o 26 r2(1), 7 & 8(1). See 7-Up Bottling Company Ltd v Abiola and Sons Nigeria Ltd 
[1995] 3 NWLR (Pt 457) 257; Obeya Memorial Hospital v AG Federation (1987) 3 NWLR (pt 60) 325; Ojukwu 
v Governor of Lagos State (1986) 3 NWLR (pt 26) 39; Kotoye v CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (PL98) 446. 
166 FHC Rules o26 r12; Beese v Woodhouse (1970) 1 ALL E.R. 769; (1970) I W.L.R. 586 590; Woluchem v 
Wokoma (1974) 1 All NLR (Pt 1) 605 607; Kotoye v CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 98) 446; Attorney-General of the 
Federation v Fafunwa-Onikoyi (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt 1010) 51; AIC Ltd v NNPC (2005) 5 SC (Pt 11) 60, (2005) 
11 NWLR (Pt 937) 563. 
167 Olowu v Building Stock Limited [2004] 4 NWLR [Pt 864] 445. 
168 Order 26 r 7(2); Globe Fishing Industries v Chief Folarin Coker (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt 162) 265, 293-294; 
Kotoye v CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 98) 419 422-423 SC; NIDB v Olaloni Ind Ltd (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 419) 338 
CA; Obeya Memorial Hospital v AG Federation (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt 60) 325 SC; Olowu v Building Stock Limited 
[2004] 4 NWLR [Pt 864] 445. 
169 Egwuatu v Egwuatu [1992] 4 NWLR (Pt 237) 594; Kotoye v CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 98) 446; Obeya 
Memorial Hospital v AG Federation (1987) 3 NWLR (pt 60) 340; Missini v Balogun (1968) 1 All NLR 318; 
Ladunni v Kukoyi (1972) 3 SC 31. 
170 Kotoye v CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 98) 446; American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (1975) 1 All ER 504 510-
511; llechukwu v Iwugo (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt 101) 99 106-107. 
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there is no urgency in the matter and defeats the basis for the prompt relief sought. Also, it may 
be refused if applicant has not taken steps to initiate the substantive suit or review.171 Although 
damages is awardable at review or trial, a bidder could satisfy the third requirement by showing 
that damages would not adequately compensate for loss of opportunity for fair competition and 
of enhancing business profile and capacity. 
7 8 2 South Africa 
Interim relief here takes the form of an interim interdict to temporary restrain further action on 
the challenged procurement.172 The order lasts till the final determination of the related review; 
except the court rescinds or varies it pursuant to a party’s application.173 Interim interdict 
application is brought on notice of motion supported by an affidavit.174 An urgent application 
could also be brought; in which case the court, to hear it more expeditiously, dispenses with 
certain processes and service.175 
Interim interdict is discretionary. The concurrent requirements for an interim interdict are 
as follows:176 
• existence of a prima facie right, though open to some doubt; 
• a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the relief is not granted; 
• a balance of convenience in favour of granting it; and 
• the absence of a suitable alternative remedy. 
                                                          
171 O 28 r 1(2). 
172 See Quinot PPLR (2011) 198; PAJA s 8(1)(e); National Council of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals v Openshaw 2008 5 SA 339 (SCA) 346H para 20; Waenhuiskrans Arniston Ratepayers Association v 
Verreweide Eiendomsontwikkeling (Edms) Bpk [2009] ZAWCHC 181; 2011 (3) SA 434 (WCC) paras 66 & 179. 
173 See Esorfranki Pipelines v Mopani District Municipality [2014] ZASCA 21, [2014] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 
34; Phillips v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (6) SA 447 (SCA) para 21; Atkin v Botes 2011 (6) 
SA 231 (SCA) para 12. 
174 Uniform Rule 6(1).  
175 Rule 6(12); Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Plaatje Municipality [2008] 4 All SA 168 (NC) para 32(1). 
176 City of Cape Town v SANRAL (6165/2012) [2013] ZAWCHC 74 paras 62; Easypay (Pty) Ltd v Mangaung 
Metropolitan Municipality [2013] ZAFSHC 44 para 14; Digital Horizons (Pty) Ltd v SA Broadcasting 
Corporation (2008/19224) [2008] ZAGPHC 272 para 7; TBP Building & Civils (Pty) Ltd v East London Industrial 
Development Zone (Pty) Ltd [2009] JDR 0203 (ECG) para 30; Matlafalang Training CC v MEC: Free State, 
Department of Public Works [2008] ZAFSHC 136 para 7. See also National Treasury v Opposition to Urban 
Tolling Alliance 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) para 41; Gool v Minister of Justice 1955 (2) SA 682 (C) 688; Webster v 
Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W); Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221. 
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The court assesses the parties’ affidavit evidence holistically to determine whether the 
requirements have been satisfied; and, if they have, how to exercise its discretion.177 The 
existence of a prima facie right, and the extent to which its certainty is open to doubt, are 
determined by considering the applicant’s prospects of success in the pending review, relying 
on facts presented by the parties.178 Balance of convenience entails the court weighing the 
interests of the parties and the public.179 “[T]he more certain the prospects of success, the more 
inclined the court will be to grant the interim remedy; the less certain, the greater the weight 
that will be attached to the balance of convenience”.180 Evidence that obtaining an effective 
remedy will be thwarted if interim relief is not granted would satisfy the concept of irreparable 
harm.181 Such evidence includes performance of the contract which may render set-aside 
impracticable. Where such evidence is established, it would be deemed that there is no suitable 
alternative remedy.182 
South African courts are more inclined than not to grant interim interdict in public 
procurement cases, where a right or strong case for review is established, to preserve the 
viability of review remedies.183 
                                                          
177 City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2013] ZAWCHC 74 paras 62, 75 77. See Quinot (2011) PPLR 198-199; LTC 
Harms “Interdict” in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa 2 ed vol 11 (2008) 412–440. 
178 City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2013] ZAWCHC 74 para 77. See Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Services, Kluh Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Services 
2011 (6) SA 65 (WCC) para 53; Van der Westhuizen v Butler 2009 (6) SA 174 (C) 182C-E; Camps Bay Residents 
Ratepayers Association v Augoustides 2009 (6) SA 190 (WCC) para 10; Ladychin Investments (Pty) Ltd v South 
African National Roads Agency Ltd 2001(3) SA 344 (N) 357C-E; Ferreira v Levin NO, Vryenhoek v Powell NO 
1995 (2) SA 813 (W) 832I-833B.  
179 See Digital Horizons (Pty) Ltd v SA Broadcasting Corporation [2008] ZAGPHC 272 paras 7, 24–28; TBP 
Building & Civils (Pty) Ltd v East London Industrial Development Zone (Pty) Ltd [2009] JDR 0203 (ECG) para 
34; Quinot (2011) PPLR 198. 
180 City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2013] ZAWCHC 74 para 77. See DE Van Loggerenberg (ed) Erasmus, Superior 
Court Practice [Service 39, 2012] E8-9. 
181 City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2013] ZAWCHC 74 para 78. The evidence is also relevant in determining the 
balance of convenience. 
182 Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 (2) SA 638 (SCA); 
Matlafalang Training CC v MEC: Free State, Department of Public Works [2008] ZAFSHC 136 para 21; Actaris 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Plaatje Municipality [2008] 4 All SA 168 (NC) paras 29 & 31; Eskom Holdings Ltd 
v The New Reclamation Group (Pty) Ltd 2009 (4) SA 628 (SCA) para 11. See R Summers “When Certainty and 
Legality Collide: The Efficacy of Interdictory Relief for the Cessation of Building Works Pending Review 
Proceedings” 2010 13(5) PER/PELJ 166 182. 
183 See for example: City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2013] ZAWCHC 74 para 77;  Easypay (Pty) Ltd v Mangaung 
Metropolitan Municipality[2013] ZAFSHC 44; Esorfranki Pipelines v Mopani District Municipality [2014] 
ZASCA 21, [2014] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) paras 5-6; Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer 
of South African Social Security Agency NO (53753/09) [2009] ZAGPPHC 169; Matlafalang Training CC v MEC: 
Free State, Department of Public Works[2008] ZAFSHC 136; and, Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Platjie 
Municipality [2008] ZANCHC 6; [2008] 4 All SA 168 (NC). See also Quinot (2011) PPLR 200. 
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7 8 3 Analysis 
As seen immediately above, the requirements and procedure for obtaining interim 
remedy in public procurement are essentially similar in both jurisdictions. However, interim 
relief is more imperative to South African public procurement. Nigeria’s PPA, unlike the 
relevant South African legislation, stipulates automatic suspension of procurement proceedings 
during administrative review.184 Thus, interim relief would only be necessary in Nigeria’s 
federal procurement system during judicial recourse; but relevant during both administrative 
and judicial review in South Africa. 
Injunctive or interdictory orders are peremptory and disobeying them attracts 
sanctions;185 such as being charged for contempt of court, punishable by imprisonment or 
fine.186 This corresponds with the power to impose financial sanctions for non-compliance with 
interim orders. It thus contributes to the effectiveness of the remedies system; which is further 
strengthened by the availability of final remedies. 
7 9 Final remedies 
Final remedies are the relief that the court may grant at the conclusion of the full trial or review.  
This section takes a look at the nature and effectiveness of these remedies. On effectiveness, 
what is assessed is: whether the forum has power to cancel (set aside) the procurement 
proceedings or to award damages if such intervention is no longer possible. 
7 9 1 Nigeria 
As seen above,187 Nigerian procurement judicial recourse may be pursued by judicial review 
or writ of summons proceedings. Relevant remedies derivable from judicial review under the 
FHC Rules are primarily certiorari and mandamus;188 and the primary relief from a 
                                                          
184 See 6 8 1 and 5 3 8 above.  
185 Nigeria: Woluchem v Wokoma (1974) 1 All NLR (Pt 1) 605 607; Alexander Marine Mangi v Koda International 
Ltd (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt 585) 40 48. SA: S v Beyers 1968 (3) SA 70 (A); Gentech Engineering Plastic CC v Reddy 
(2462/2008, 1422/2009) [2011] ZAECPEHC 31 paras 338-340; Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd [2006] 
ZASCA 52; 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) paras 6 & 11. 
186 See R v Almon (1765) Wilm 243 254–257, 97 ER 99-100. Nigeria: Atake v Attorney General of the Federation 
(1982) 11 SC 153 177-179, (1983) 3 NCLR 66; Abiegbe v Registered Trustees of the African Church [1992] 5 
NWLR (Pt. 241) 366; Ebhodaghe v Okoye [2005] 1 MJSC 156. SA: S v Beyers 1968 (3) SA 70 (A); Burchell v 
Burchell (ECJ 010/2006) [2005] ZAECHC 35 paras 8-13; Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd [2006] ZASCA 52; 
Gentech Engineering Plastic CC v Reddy (2462/2008, 1422/2009) [2011] ZAECPEHC 31 paras 340-342. 
187 7 3 1 and 7 7 1. 
188 Order 34 r1. These remedies are discretionary. 
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procurement-related writ proceeding is a set aside order.189 Other remedies, obtainable under 
both proceedings, are declaration, perpetual injunction and damages.190  
7 9 1 1 Certiorari/set aside order  
The court may issue a certiorari or grant an order to set aside the original procurement or the 
administrative review decisions found to be in breach of the law. The effect of both is to nullify 
the challenged decision. In Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources191 
the administrative review decision of BPP was set aside, for violating a statutory 
requirement,192 viz., notifying interested bidders to make representation during the review. The 
matter was remitted to the BPP for rehearing. Generally, a court may quash only a part of a 
challenged decision that is in breach, and sustain the part(s) that is valid.193 
Nigerian legal authorities still limit the application of certiorari to the exercise of 
judicial or quasi-judicial powers by a public body.194 The modern approach in some common 
law jurisdictions is to apply certiorari (quashing order) flexibly to administrative actions, 
including executive decisions.195  As long as the restrictive application of certiorari prevails in 
Nigeria, the implication is that certiorari may only issue against an administrative review 
decision, not the original procurement decision. A set aside order through a writ proceeding 
applies to both the procurement and review decisions; and may be a preferable alternative. 
7 9 1 2 Other remedies 
Where the procuring entity has failed to act in accordance with the regulatory frameworks or 
the review decision of the BPP, court may grant a mandatory order/injunction or a mandamus 
                                                          
189 See Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC(Abuja) 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. 
190 FHC o2 r2(1); 034 r7. 
191 FHC(Abuja) 12-6-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. 
192 PPA s 54(5). 
193 Barnett Constitutional and Administrative Law 712. 
194 See Amaka v Lt-Governor, Western Region (1956) 1 FSC 57; R v Ondo Divisional Council Ex parte Akinbote 
(1960) 5 FSC 52; Arzika v Governor, Northern Region (1961) All NLR 379; Nwaoboshi v Military Governor of 
Delta State (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt 568) 131, (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt 831) 305; Lagos State Judicial Service 
Commission v Kaffo [2008] 17 NWLR [Pt 1117] 525; Young v Judicial Service Commission [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt 
1091) 1.  See also Nwadialo Civil Procedure 1055-1056. 
195 See, England: Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40; R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain [1967] 
2 QB 864; R v Gaming Board, ex p. Benaim [1970] 2 QB 417; R v London Borough of Hillingdon, ex p Royco 
Homes Ltd [1974] 2 All ER 643; R v Hull Prison Board of Visitors, ex parte St Germain [1978] 2 All ER 198 20; 
Ireland: Ingle v. O'Brien (1974) 109 ILTR 7; State (Healy) v Donoghue [1976] I.R. 325 364. 
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to compel it to act accordingly.196 For example, it would issue against a procuring entity that 
refused to reverse its award as determined by the BPP. A failure to comply with the order 
amounts to a contempt of court.197 
 The court can issue declarations on the legal position of the parties. For example, there 
may be “a declaration that the award of the contract by the procuring entity is wrongful, void 
and of no effect”.198 Although lacking coercive force, public bodies will respond to a 
declaration and comply with its terms by rectifying its actions.199  
A perpetual injunction may be ordered to permanently restrain a procuring entity, the 
BPP or the successful bidder from acting unlawfully as it relates to the challenged procurement. 
For example, court may grant an order perpetually restraining the originally successful bidder 
from performing the contract, where the court has nullified the award. Failure to comply with 
an injunction is a contempt of court.200 
There is no known Nigerian procurement case yet where the court substituted or varied 
an award decision of the procuring entity or the review decision of BPP. However, as the PPA 
provides them as remedies under administrative review, it is arguable that the legislature had 
intended that such powers may also be exercised by the court in appropriate circumstances. 
7 9 1 3 Damages 
There is no known procurement case where the court awarded damages. Thus, it is not 
established whether a bidder can recover damages for loss of profits, out-of-pocket expenses 
in preparing the tender, and the financial loss, arising from the award which is subsequently set 
aside by a court. Notwithstanding, relying on related authorities,201 damages may be awarded 
where the procurement process is proven to be tainted with fraud, corruption, and bad faith; 
especially where the court may no longer intervene in the procurement. 
                                                          
196 See FHC Rules o34 r1; Shitta-Bey v Federal Civil Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 40; Fawehinmi v Akilu 
(1987) 4 NWLR 797; Nwadialo Civil Procedure 1053.  
197 Barnett Constitutional and Administrative Law 712-713; Nwadialo Civil Procedure 1034. 
198 See Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC(Abuja) 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11 2. 
199 Bernett Constitutional and Administrative Law 712-713. 
200 See Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal Ministry of Water Resources FHC(Abuja) 12-6-2012 suit no 
FHC/Abj/CS/867/11 74-77. 
201 Luxbridge Permanent Benefit Building Society v Pickard [1939] 2 K.B. 248; Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] 
AC 1027; Ughutevbe v Shonowo [2004] 16 NWLR (Pt. 882) 300.  
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 The possibility of awarding damages, although uncertain, adds to the effectiveness of 
the system.202 
7 9 2 South Africa 
7 9 2 1 Set aside order 
The court “may grant any order that is just and equitable”.203 Where a public procurement 
decision is held to be reviewable or invalid, the court normally grants an order setting aside the 
decision or the contract.204 However, a set aside is discretionary;205 which entails the court 
weighing all interests which the order may affect;206 and given consideration to “pragmatism 
and practicality”.207 Thus, the court will not invalidate public contracts for inconsequential 
irregularities.208 Also, in exceptional circumstances, it may refuse to set aside an invalid award 
or contract. Examples include: where the impugned contract is completed or nearly-
completed;209 or where the order would cause disruptions and a host of problems to a new 
tender process and the work to be performed;210 or where the review proceedings was not 
instituted within a reasonable time.211  
                                                          
202 To wit, the power to award damages if intervention is no longer possible. 
203 PAJA s 8(1); SA Constitution s 172(1)(b). 
204 PAJA s 8(1)(c). See Quinot (2011) PPLR 204; Quinot (2009) TSAR 443-446. 
205 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 (6) SA 222  SCA para  36 246D; Chairperson: Standing 
Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 (2) SA 638 (SCA), [2005] 4 All SA 487 (SCA) para 
28; Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZASCA 13, 2010 (4) 
SA 359 (SCA), [2010] 3 All SA 549 (SCA) para 15. 
206 Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province 2008 (2) SA 481 
(SCA) 23.  
207 Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 (2) SA 638 (SCA) paras 
27-29; Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZASCA 13, 2010 
(4) SA 359 (SCA) para 15; Esorfranki Pipelines (Pty) Ltd v Mopani District Municipality (40/13) [2014] ZASCA 
21; [2014] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 20. 
208 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO SASSA 2013 (4) SA 557 (SCA) para 21; South 
African National Road Agency Ltd v The Toll Collect Consortium [2013] 4 All SA 393(SCA), 2013 (6) SA 356 
(SCA) para 16. 
209 Chairperson - Standing Tender committee v JFE Sapela Electronics [2005] 4 ALL SA 487 (SCA) paras 26-
29; Sebeza Kahle Trade v Emalahleni Local Municipal Council [2003] 2 ALL SA 340 (T) 348; Olitzki Property 
Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA) para 1265F-H. 
210 Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 (2) SA 638 (SCA) para 27; 
Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZASCA 13, 2010 (4) SA 
359 (SCA) para 15. 
211 See 7 7 2 1 above. 
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7 9 2 2 Other remedies 
A set aside is usually accompanied with an order remitting the award decision for 
reconsideration by the contracting authority, with or without directions.212 This is because the 
court is exercising review jurisdiction, not merit appeal. Thus, it generally will not substitute 
its decision for the invalidated award decision.213 Rather, the court affords the authority another 
opportunity to exercise its administrative power lawfully. Nevertheless, in exceptional 
circumstances, the court may substitute or vary an award decision or correct a defect resulting 
from the decision or the failure to decide;214 particularly, where it would result in time and 
money being saved or it would prevent another improper decision being taken.215 Exceptional 
circumstances would include where:  
• the court is in as good a position as the administrative authority to decide the issue;  
• the administrative decision is a foregone conclusion (that is, only one proper outcome 
can emerge from the exercise of the administrator’s discretion); 
• the administrative authority should not be allowed to exercise its power.216  
In the procurement context, a court would be in as good a position as the awarding 
authority where the relevant procurement processes (particularly bid evaluation and 
recommendation) had been duly completed by authorised persons, and the court has the benefit 
of the record of the processes that was relied upon by the awarding authority to make its 
decision.217 Also, an awarding authority that is found to be grossly biased or incompetent 
                                                          
212 PAJA s 8(1)(c)(i). See Alexander Maintenance and Electrical Services CC v Nyandeni Local Municipality 
[2012] ZAECMHC 10 paras 24 & 27; City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2015] ZAWCHC 135 para 277(d)&(e). 
However, in CC Groenewald v M5 Developments [2010] ZASCA 47 para 27, it was held that a court reviewing 
an appeal decision made in terms of Systems Act s 62(3) ought not to refer the matter back to the appeal authority, 
based on the restrictive provision of the section.  
213 See 7 3 above; also, City of Cape Town v SANRAL [2015] ZAWCHC 135 para 8; RHI Joint Venture v Minister 
of Roads and Public Works, Eastern Cape [2003] ZAECHC 23 para 43. 
214 PAJA s 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa). See Intertrade Two (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Roads and Public Works, Eastern Cape 2007 
6 SA 442 (CkHc) paras 42 & 48(2); CFIT (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence (22496/2013) [2015] ZAGPPHC 2 para 
62. 
215 RHI Joint Venture v Minister of Roads and Public Works, Eastern Cape [2003] ZAECHC 23 para 43; 
Johannesburg City Council v Administrator, Transvaal 1969 (2) SA 72 (T) 76D-G; Premier, Mpumalanga v 
Executive Committee, Association of State Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC). 
216 Trencon Construction (Pty) Limited v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited [2015] 
ZACC 22, 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC), 2015 (10) BCLR 1199 (CC) para 35-55; Sanyathi Civil Engineering & 
Construction (Pty) Ltd v eThekwini Municipality, Group Five Construction (Pty) Ltd v eThekwini Municipality 
(KZP) [2011] ZAKZPHC 45 para 24. See Gauteng Gambling Board v Silver Star Development Ltd 2005 (4) SA 
67 SCA paras 28, 29. 39, 41. 
217 Trencon Construction (Pty) Limited v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited [2015] 
ZACC 22, 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC), 2015 (10) BCLR 1199 (CC) paras 57-58. 
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should not be afforded another opportunity to exercise its power.218 An example of where the 
outcome of the administrative decision is a foregone conclusion is where the court finds that 
the applicant’s bid was responsive, was evaluated as the highest points earner according to 
applicable criteria, and recommended for award at all levels of evaluation: thus, could not have 
been lawfully awarded to any other bidder. 219 The substitution order in this case would be to 
award the contact to the aggrieved bidder-applicant.220 
However, according to the Constitutional Court in Trencon Construction (Pty) Limited 
v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited,221 “even where there are 
exceptional circumstances, a court must be satisfied that it would be just and equitable to grant 
an order of substitution”, based on section 8(1) of PAJA222 
The court may grant other just and equitable remedies, such as ordering that the 
aggrieved party be paid the cost of litigation,223 where it refused to order a set aside- to avoid 
or minimize injustice.224 It can also grant: declaratory orders, orders directing the administrator 
to act in an appropriate manner, and orders prohibiting him or her from acting in a particular 
manner.225 
7 9 2 3 Damages and compensation  
Where the court may no longer intervene in the challenged procurement, it may, in rare cases, 
direct the contracting authority or any other party to the proceedings to pay compensation or 
                                                          
218 Trencon Construction (Pty) Limited v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited [2015] 
ZACC 22 paras 38-39; Johannesburg City Council v Administrator, Transvaal 1969 (2) SA 72 (T) 76D-G. 
219 See Trencon Construction (Pty) Limited v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited [2015] 
ZACC 22 paras 35, 59-60, 101; RHI Joint Venture v Minister of Roads and Public Works, Eastern Cape 
(769102) [2003] ZAECHC 23 paras 49 & 51; CFIT (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence (22496/2013) [2015] 
ZAGPPHC 2 para 65(3); Indiza Airport Management (Pty) Ltd v Msunduzi Municipality [2012] ZAKZPHC 74 
paras 44-45. 
220 See RHI Joint Venture v Minister of Roads and Public Works, Eastern Cape (769102) [2003] ZAECHC 23 
paras 49 & 51; CFIT (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence (22496/2013) [2015] ZAGPPHC 2 para 65(3); Indiza Airport 
Management (Pty) Ltd v Msunduzi Municipality [2012] ZAKZPHC 74 paras 44-45. 
221 [2015] ZACC 22, 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC), 2015 (10) BCLR 1199 (CC). 
222 See also Livestock and Meat Industries Control Board v Garda 1961 (1) SA 342 (A) 349G. 
223 PAJA 8(1)(f). See Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 (2) SA 
638 (SCA) paras 30-31; Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd [2010] 
ZASCA 13 para 26. 
224 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) para 36; Moseme Road Construction 
CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZASCA 13 para 25. 
225 PAJA 8(1)(a), (b)&(d); Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 113 
(CC) 146E. 
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damages.226 This is limited to where the procurement process or decision is tainted with fraud, 
corruption, bad faith, or is completely outside the legitimate scope of the empowering 
provision;227 and, where a successful tenderer incurred out-of-pocket expenses in order to 
comply in good faith with its contractual obligations under the award.228 In the absence of these 
factors, both initially successful and unsuccessful tenderers cannot recover damages for loss of 
profits; out-of-pocket expenses in preparing the tender;229 and, financial loss arising from the 
award which is subsequently set aside by a court.230 The Constitutional Court held in AllPay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO SASSA (No 2)231 that the loss to an 
unsuccessful bidder from a wrongful procurement decision/action was no more than the loss 
of the opportunity to have its tender considered. Thus, it opined that other remedies will afford 
adequate redress to the aggrieved unsuccessful bidder. The practical reason for holding thus is 
the consideration of limited public resources.232 While the legal reason is that a contracting 
authority’s negligent but bona fide conduct in the public tender process would not be wrongful 
in a delictual sense, since it owes no legal duty to tenderers to avoid such losses.233  
Although the burden of proof for compensation may be lighter than for damages,234 the 
unfavourable disposition of South African courts toward granting damages would be the same 
towards compensation. First, both are similar in nature- they have negative impact on scarce 
public resources and on efficient public administration. Secondly, contractors are expected to 
                                                          
226 PAJA s 8(1)(c)(ii) (bb). See Quinot (2011) PPLR 204; Quinot (2009) TSAR 446-447; Quinot (2008) Stell LR 
101. 
227 Minister of Finance v Gore NO 2007 (1) SA 111 (SCA); Transnet Limited v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Limited 
2005 (1) SA 299 (SCA); Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) 92; 
South African Post Office v De Lacy 2009 (5) SA 255 (SCA) 2-5, 14. 
228 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) paras 92-94.  
229 This “is always irrecoverable whatever the fate of the tender”, according to the Constitutional Court in 
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) para 53. 
230 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC); LM Du Plessis & G Penfold, 
“Bill of Rights Jurisprudence” (2007) Annual Survey of South African Law 67, 93–94. Contra: Millennium Waste 
Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA) para 
35(2)(e)(iii). 
231 [2014] ZACC 12 para 72. See Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: 
Limpopo Province [2007] ZASCA 165; 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA) para 25 
232 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) paras 55(c) & 81. 
233 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC) para 54 & 56. Quinot (2008) 
Stell LR 101 argues that “From a public procurement perspective, this judgment is unfortunate.” 
234 Bolton Government Procurement 332–333; Du Plessis & Penfold (2007) Annual Survey of South African Law 
67, 93.  
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proceed with caution and mitigate and safeguard against losses where the tender is disputed.235 
Thirdly, PAJA section 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb), specifies that both apply only in exceptional cases. 
Notwithstanding, the possibility of awarding damages or compensation, though remote, adds 
to the effectiveness of the system, to wit, the power to award damages if intervention is no 
longer possible. 
7 9 3 Enforcement  
Orders of court are peremptory and the parties (especially contracting authorities) would 
usually abide by them without further ado.236 Where a party to a procurement review fails to 
obey court order, instituting civil contempt proceedings may be the most viable option. First, 
the remedies readily granted in procurement cases in both jurisdictions are non-monetary, as 
seen immediately above. Thus, proceedings for enforcing money judgment would rarely apply. 
Secondly, contempt proceeding is fast and simple. A litigant can institute it by motion 
supported by affidavit.237 Thirdly, it is effective in compelling obedience and deterring 
disobedience to court orders; as the proceeding may result in payment of fines or committal to 
prison (which may be suspended on condition that the order is complied with or the contempt 
is not repeated within a prescribed period).238 
 In rare cases of money judgments (damages, compensation or cost), the judgment 
creditor may file an application for a writ of execution to attach moveable or immovable 
property; or garnishee proceedings to attach creditor’s money with a third party.239 In Nigeria, 
if money is in the custody or control of a public officer or the court, the consent of the 
                                                          
235 Quinot (2008) Stell LR 115; Quinot (2011) PPLR 205; Darson Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 
2007 (4) SA 488 (C) 506F-H & 509; Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 
(CC) paras 51-52, 55(c) & 81. 
236 South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 534 (A); 
Superior Courts Act (SA) s 18. 
237 Nigeria: FHC Rules o 35 r 2; Sheriff and Civil Process Act Cap S6 LFN 2004 s 72; Judgments (Enforcement) 
Rules LN 40 of 1955 order IX rule 13; Nwadialo Civil Procedure 1033-1037; Ojukwu & Ojukwu Civil Procedure 
358-360; Hart v Hart (1990) 1 NWLR 276 293; Omoijahe v Umoru (1999) 5 S.C (Pt III) 14; (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt 
614) 178 181. SA: Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd [2006] ZASCA 52 paras 7, 55, 63-64; Burchell v Burchell 
(ECJ 010/2006) [2005] ZAECHC 35 paras 2 & 24. See also Attorney-General v Crockett 1911 TPD 893 917 922; 
Cape Times Ltd v Union Trades Directories (Pty) Ltd 1956 (1) SA 105 (N) 120D-E.  
238 Nigeria: Sheriff and Civil Process Act section 72; Ojukwu & Ojukwu Civil Procedure 358. SA: S v Beyers 
1968 (3) SA at 80C-H; Gentech Engineering Plastic CC v Reddy (2462/2008, 1422/2009) [2011] ZAECPEHC 31 
para 346(2); Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd (653/04) [2006] ZASCA 52; 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) paras 1 & 
11. 
239 In accordance with: Nigeria- Sheriff and Civil Process Act ss 44 & 83; FHC Rules orders 36-37; - SA- Uniform 
Rules of Court rules 45 & 46.  
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appropriate officer240 or court shall be obtained before garnishee order nisi will be ordered, 
according to section 8 of Sheriff and Civil Process Act Cap S6 LFN 2004.241 In South Africa, 
proceedings for the satisfaction of final court orders sounding in money againt the State are 
subject to the special rules under the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 (as amended),242 particularly 
section 3. 
 The foregoing satisfies the following elements of effectiveness: decisions of the review 
body (court) are binding; and, the decisions/remedies given are easily enforced by a fast and 
simple mechanism. 
7 10 Summary of basic features of the judicial remedies regimes 
A summary of the basic features of the judicial remedies mechanisms in both systems are set 
out below.  
Features  Nigeria South Africa 
Enabling legislation  PPA section 54(7) PAJA section 6(1) 
Constitution section 33(1), (2) 
Nature of recourse Judicial review Judicial review 
Grounds of 
recourse 
Lack of authority, bias, error of 
law, noncompliance with a 
mandatory and material 
procedure, procedural 
unfairness, unreasonableness, 
failure to take a decision. 
Lack of authority and unlawful 
delegation, bias, Failure to comply 
with mandatory and material 
procedure, procedural unfairness, 
error of law, action taken for wrong 
reasons or considerations, 
irrationality and unreasonableness, 
unconstitutionality or 
unlawfulness, failure to take a 
decision. 
                                                          
240 The Attorney General of the Federation or the State. 
241 See NNPC v Fawehinmi (1998) 7 NWLR (Pt 559) 598; Osimene v Commissioner for Agriculture, Water 
Resources and Rural Development [2003] 22 WRN 125. 
242 Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act 9 of 1989; Constitution Consequential 
Amendments Act 201 of 1993; State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011. 
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Parties to suit The parties in an initial 
procurement external 
administrative review and the 
BPP. 
All persons mentioned under 
section 38 of the Constitution may 
apply. Respondents: contracting 
authority and the winning bidder. 
Forum  Federal High Court (appeal may 
lie to the Court of Appeal, up to 
the Supreme Court). 
High Court (appeal may lie to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, up to the 
Constitutional Court). 
Commencement 
and duration of 
review 
Within 30 days after the receipt 
of BPP’s review decision; or, 
after failure of BPP to give 
decision within deadline. 
No specified duration. 
Not later than 180 days after 
concluding the applicable internal 
remedies proceeding; or after the 
applicant became or should have 
become aware of the challenged 
award decision. 
No specified duration. 
The proceedings  Commenced by: 
(i) Motion or originating 
summons (where it is 
interpretation of law or 
documents) 
(ii) Writ of summons (where 
facts are disputed). 
Commenced by notice of motion. 
Interim relief Interim or interlocutory 
injunction. 
Interim interdict. 
Final remedies Certiorari or set aside order; 
mandatory order (mandamus); 
declaration; perpetual 
injunction. 
Any just and equitable order, 
including: set aside order; 
remitting to the contracting 
authority for reconsideration; 
substitution order, declaratory 
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order, restraining order; damages 
(if procurement is tainted with 
fraud or corruption). 
Enforcement  Through civil contempt 
proceeding. Rarely, by writ of 
execution or garnishee (subject 
to Sheriff and Civil Process Act 
section 8) 
Through civil contempt 
proceeding. Rarely by writ of 
execution or garnishee (subject to 
State Liability Act section 3) 
 
7 11 Conclusion and analysis 
From the foregoing, procurement judicial remedies in both jurisdictions are substantially 
effective in relation to the relevant elements considered. This is because procurement judicial 
review in both jurisdictions runs on existing well-structured or properly designed judicial 
systems.  Nevertheless, certain factors adversely affect the advantages of the mechanisms.  
First, only general remedies apply; which are not always well suited to public 
procurement context.243 For example, in the Nigerian case of Cupero Nigeria Limited v Federal 
Ministry of Water Resources,244 the court agreed with BPP’s review decision to award the 
procurement contract to the lowest responsive bidder who was unlawfully denied the award; 
nevertheless, it set aside the decision for BPP’s failure to inform all interested bidders of the 
review. In quashing the decision, the court leaned too heavily on the principle of fair hearing, 
which should have applied only limitedly within the context; since the right of the other 
unsuccessful bidders (who did not challenge or indicate interest to be joined) was not affected. 
In the South African case, Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape,245 the 
courts neither granted damages nor an alternative remedy for the loss the initially successful 
tenderer incurred from relying on the award that was subsequently invalidated.246 There is 
accordingly a need to mould remedies to suit the public procurement context. Some South 
African judges have recognised and addressed this need. The wide power of the court to “grant 
                                                          
243 Quinot (2011) PPLR 205. 
244 FHC(Abuja) 12-6-2012 suit no FHC/Abj/CS/867/11. 
245 2006 (3) SA 151 (SCA); 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC). 
246 See also Government of the Republic of South Africa v Thabiso Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2009 (1) SA 163 (SCA) 
18. 
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any order that is just and equitable” under section 8 of PAJA supports this. In Millennium Waste 
Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province,247 the court ordered 
a conditional set-aside, which required affected tenders to be re-evaluated, while allowing 
service delivery from the challenged procurement to go on uninterrupted until conclusion of 
re-evaluation.248 Nigerian courts may be less inclined to fashioning remedies that suit public 
procurement context, as an equivalent of PAJA’s remedies does not exist; and, as seen above, 
they still apply judicial review remedies restrictively.249 However, the availability of viable 
administrative remedies in Nigeria largely makes judicial recourse an avoidable last resort. 
Secondly, the systems are bedevilled by long duration of cases; high cost of litigation, 
presumptive inconclusiveness of remedies pending the determination of multiple appeals; some 
judges’ lack of procurement-related technical knowledge; and disruption caused by suspension 
and set aside orders against administration and related service delivery.250 Some of these 
problems could be addressed by appropriate legislation. For example, legislation could fix 
exact duration (for instance, 90 working days) for completion of procurement matters; and limit 
its adjudication to the court of first instance,251 with permission to appeal only by leave of court 
where it is satisfied that the appeal discloses a novel or significant issue of law that requires 
the attention of a higher court. If an adjudication deadline for procurement matters is fixed, 
special procedural rules would have to be made to ensure achievement of the deadline.252 This 
would ensure that the courts will handle procurement matters expeditiously. The other 
problems, such as cost of litigation, disruptions, and judges’ lack of technical expertise, could 
be ameliorated by streamlining or strengthening the administrative review mechanisms.  
Thirdly; decisions of Nigeria’s FHC are currently seldom reported. Thus, it is quite difficult 
to access procurement decisions of the court, which ought to serve as precedent for determining 
subsequent cases and assessing the viability of proposed ones. The Nigerian Court of Appeal 
                                                          
247 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA). 
248 See Quinot [2009] TSAR 445; Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA) 7-8; Tetra 
Mobile Radio (Pty) Ltd v MEC, Department of Works 2008 (1) SA 438 (SCA). 
249 7 9 1. 
250 See Quinot (2011) PPLR 207; Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 313-314. Also, 
Gordon (2006) Pub Cont L J 437; Penal Reform International Access to justice in Sub Saharan Africa: The Role 
of Traditional and Informal Justice Systems (2000) 17; Pachnou Bidder Remedies ch 8 s 2.  
251 Section 175 (3) & (4) of Kenya’s PPA (inspired by the UNICITRAL Model Law) makes Court of Appeal’s 
decision on procurement matter final, and fixes 45 days as adjudication deadline, both at the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal. See Udeh (2013) PPLR 198-199. In Nigeria, the Jigawa State Due Process and Project 
Monitoring Bureau Law 2012, s 25(8) limits procurement challenge to administrative review. 
252 For Nigeria, the Chief Judge of the FHC can make such rules: CFRN s 254; FHC Act s 44. For South Africa, 
it is the Rules Board for Courts of Law: s 2 of the Rules Board for Courts of Law Act; PAJA s 7(3)). 
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and Supreme Court, whose decisions are fully reported, have hardly dealt with appeals on 
procurement. Procurement cases that are ripe do not frequently come before the Nigerian 
courts, owing to the effective administrative review remedies that must be exhausted before 
judicial recourse. Besides, the current public procurement regime is nascent. The BPP in 
collaboration with the FHC Registry could undertake reporting procurement decisions of the 
court. For South Africa, the South African Legal Information Institute has a free-public-access 
online database of reported and unreported decisions of South African courts, containing a 
trove of procurement cases.253 This affords a rich source of public procurement case law for 
decision-making and research. 
Having looked at the countries’ administrative review mechanisms in chapters 5 and 6, and 
presented the judicial remedies here; the other remedies to procurement challenge are 
considered in the next chapter. 
 
                                                          
253 Go to <http://www.saflii.org/> (accessed 06-10-2017). 
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Chapter 8 
Other Remedies and Enforcement Mechanisms 
8 1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the mechanisms, other than bidder remedies, for addressing grievances 
or breaches in public procurement and enforcing procurement regulations. There are referred 
to here as secondary remedies, since bidder remedies is regarded as the foremost means of 
enforcing procurement regulation by the actions of aggrieved bidders.1 The mechanisms 
considered in this chapter are: alternative dispute resolution (ADR); investigation, 
administrative remedial actions, and sanctions; audit; and CSOs’ action.  
Although bidder remedies constitute the foremost means of enforcing procurement 
regulations,2 secondary remedies have their advantageous, as will be discussed below. It 
suffices here to note that apart from ADR, the secondary remedies may be initiated or triggered 
by persons other than bidders or procuring entities. Thus, these mechanisms open up 
procurement enforcement to wider participation. 
8 2 ADR 
ADR refers to “any method of resolving issues susceptible to normal legal process by 
agreement rather than by an imposed binding decision”.3 Some of the relevant ADR methods 
include: negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. Negotiation is the process of 
working out an agreement by direct communication of the parties.4 Conciliation is a process in 
which an independent third party assists the parties to settle their difference; but may, if 
necessary, deliver his opinion as to the merits of the dispute.5 Mediation is a process in which 
an independent third party assists the parties to settle their difference; but does not advise them 
as to the issues and merits of the dispute.6 The terms conciliation and mediation are often used 
                                                          
1 Guide to Enactment Ch VIII para 2 228: for it makes the systems to “an important degree self-policing and self-
enforcing”. 
2 See Guide to Enactment ch VIII, para 2, 228; Gordons (2006) Pub Contract LJ 427, 428, 430-431, 445; Quinot 
“Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 308; Marshal et al (1991) Hofstra L Rev 4; Cofee Jr 
(1986) 86 Colum L Rev 669; Lees (2002) PPLR n 3. See also 2 3 2 2 above. 
3 Academy of Experts “The Language of ADR: An International Glossary of ADR Terms” (2004) 1 Negotiation 
& Dispute Resolution Journal 119. 
4 122. 
5 199. 
6 121. 
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interchangeably.7 Arbitration involves one or more neutral third parties who are usually agreed 
to by parties and whose decisions are binding.8  
 Some of these ADR mechanisms may either be used as an alternative to (where 
allowed) or an integral part of the bidder remedies systems, as discussed below.  
8 2 1 Nigeria 
The PPA does not provide for ADR as a pre-contract dispute resolution mechanism; although 
section 16(26) requires all procurement contracts to provide for arbitral proceeding as the 
primary form of contract dispute resolution.9 However, ADR may be integrated into the internal 
review proceedings.10 Also, it may serve as a court-supported alternative to judicial remedies.  
Negotiation or mediation may be incorporated into the internal review stage in two 
ways. First, the aggrieved bidder, when submitting a complaint, may request that it be resolved 
by mediation or negotiation. Secondly, an accounting officer may on his own initiative opt to 
resolve complaints by mediation or negotiation. Mediation here will entail inviting an external 
independent third-party to facilitate the review or dispute resolution process. The PPA does not 
prescribe procedure for an accounting officer’s internal review functions. Section 54(2) (b) 
only states that he shall, on reviewing a complaint, “make a decision in writing within 15 
working days indicating the corrective measures to take”.11 Thus, it is valid for an accounting 
officer to review and reach his decision through negotiation or mediation. Arbitration would 
be inappropriate for this purpose, as an accounting officer cannot transfer his review decision-
making power to an arbitrator(s).12 In addition, it is unlikely that an arbitral panel could be set 
up and have its proceedings completed within the fifteen days deadline for internal review. 
                                                          
7 121 
8 Garner Black’s Law Dictionary 119.  
9 This is the standard practice in many jurisdictions: see Bolton Government Procurement 346, M Aronson & H 
Whitmore Public Torts and Contracts (1982) 231; SD Cirell & J Bennett Compulsory Competitive Tendering: 
Law and Practice (1991) para 12.16; A Ashworth Contractual Procedures in the Construction Industry 5 ed 
(2006) 49-50. 
10 ADR proceedings parallel to internal review may be impracticable considering that the short commencement 
time for internal review may elapse while attempting to arrange for ADR, thus foreclosing review; also, the 
accounting officer (the internal review authority) is necessarily the one that spearheads the ADR proceedings.    
11 See also PPA s 19(f). 
12 Delegatus non potest delegare applies. See Yakasai v Nigerian Air Force [2002] 15 NWLR (Pt 790) 294; Okoro 
v Delta Steel Co Ltd (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt 130) 87; NNPC v Trinity Mills Ins. Brokers [2003] 9 NWLR (Pt 825) 
384; AS Ogwuche (ed) Compendium of Laws under the Nigerian Legal System vol 1 2 Ed (2008) 60-61; M 
Aronson & M Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action 5 ed (2013) 6.20-6.40. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
213 
 
Besides, an arbitral proceeding cannot be unilaterally set up by a party; as it must be based on 
an existing written arbitration agreement.13  
Where an accounting officer decides to integrate negotiation in the internal review, he 
would invite the complainant and probably other interested bidders to negotiate resolution. 
Afterwards, he may adopt the agreed resolution as his review decision in writing.  Where 
conciliation/mediation is used, an accounting officer would appoint a conciliator/mediator to 
facilitate amicable resolution of the complaint.14 He may then adopt the agreed resolution as 
his review decision in writing.  In the two instances, the process must be completed within the 
fifteen working days deadline for internal review.  
The above ADR options are advantageous. First, they enhance the acceptability of the 
review decision, as the aggrieved party is actively involved in decision making; and this may 
significantly reduce the likelihood of the case proceeding to external review before the BPP. 
Secondly, they may resolve the dispute without straining the cordial relationship among the 
parties. Thirdly, they tone down the likelihood of bias inherent in internal review;15 as the 
parties are involved in the decision-making, and conciliators/mediators are independent. 
However, in relation to the BPP’ external review, incorporating ADR in the 
proceedings may be unsuitable, as the BPP is an independent review body, with power to give 
binding decision within short deadline. In addition, the BPP’s review procedures, as prescribed 
by legislation, do not accommodate ADR. Besides, the parties cannot negotiate or settle 
contrary to the terms of BPP’s review decision; they either abide by the BPP’s decision or they 
challenge it in court. 
At the stage of judicial recourse, the parties require the leave of court to resort to ADR. 
The matter must first be instituted in court; and the court requested to adjourn it, to enable the 
parties to attempt settlement by ADR. With this, the parties’ right to judicial recourse will not 
be foreclosed when its commencement time elapses. If the parties settle, they may either apply 
to the court to enter the written terms of settlement as its consent judgment; or apply for the 
                                                          
13 Arbitration and Conciliation Act CAP A18 LFN 2004 s 1. See Compagnie Generale De Geophysique v Jackson 
Etuk [2004] 1 NWLR [Pt 853] 20; also: Kano State Urban Development Board v Fanz Construction Co Ltd (1986) 
5 NWLR (pt 39) 74; Commerce Assurance Ltd v Alli (1992) 3 NWLR (pt 232) 701; GC Nwakoby The Law and 
Practice of Commercial Arbitration in Nigeria (2004) 19-23. 
14 See O Olagunju Peacemaking (2002) 74-103 for general mediation procedures. 
15 See 5 3 6 1 above. 
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matter to be discontinued and struck out.16 Incorporating ADR during judicial review is 
worthwhile, considering the long duration and high cost of litigation in Nigeria.17  
8 2 2 South Africa 
According to section 44 of the MFMA, attempts must be made to resolve out of court (by ADR) 
disputes that arise where a municipality or municipal entity engages another organ of state for 
the procurement of good and services.18 The National Treasury (if it is not a party to the dispute) 
or any third party may be engaged as a mediator in this regard.19 The National Treasury may 
determine the mediation process where it is in engaged as the mediator.20 
Perhaps, ADR may be an option for resolving procurement disputes before resort to 
court, if the contracting authority and the aggrieved bidder agree. For example, an aggrieved 
bidder, or a contracting authority that receives a complaint or is sued, may request and obtain 
the consent of the other party to settle the matter by a particular ADR method.21 A contracting 
authority could also incorporate in the solicitation or bidding document that the resolution of 
the procurement dispute shall be by a specified ADR proceeding. This practice is permissible 
under general principles of contract, particularly invitation to treat, offer and acceptance; and, 
the relevant legislation is not against it.22 Also, South African external administrative review 
is largely unviable and ineffective; thus, warranting resort to viable redress options, such as 
ADR, where applicable.  However, the SCA in Telkom SA Ltd v ZTE Mzanzi (Pty) Ltd23 held 
that such term in the solicitation/bidding document does not impose a “contractual obligation” 
                                                          
16 The first type is referred to as “settlement in court”, and the second “settlement out of court”.  See Ojukwu & 
Ojukwu Civil Procedure 297.  See, on consent judgment: Nwadialo Civil Procedure 508-511; Joseph Afolabi v 
John Adekunle (1983) 8 SC 98 100; Afegbai v AG Edo State [2001] 33 WRN 29; UBN Plc v Edamkue 7 NWLR 
(pt 925) 520; also, Green v Rozen (1955) 2 All ER 797; Lees v Motor Insurance Bureau (1955) 1 WLR 620. On 
discontinuance: Nwadialo Civil Procedure 485-486; Spincer v Watts (1889) 23 QB 350; Nwachukwu v Nze (1955) 
15 WACA 36.  
17 See 7 11 above. 
18 See ss 110(2), 41 & 42 of MFMA. 
19 Section 44(2). 
20 Section 44(3). 
21 See Airports Company South Africa Ltd v ISO Leisure OR Tambo (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 642 (GSJ) paras 6-10, 
24; Cachalia v Harberer & Co 1905 TS 457 462 – 464. 
22 See 5 3 2 2 & 6 11 2 above.  See examples of the practice in: Airports Company South Africa Ltd v ISO Leisure 
OR Tambo (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 642 (GSJ) para 9; ZTE Mzanzi (Pty) Ltd v Telkom SA Ltd [2012] ZAGPPHC 50 
para 26-27. However, an ADR clause intended for contract dispute will not apply to tender dispute: Telkom SA 
Ltd v ZTE Mzanzi (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZASCA 14 para 8; MCB Business Solution t/a Africa Business Solutions v 
Premier of the Northern Cape [2006] ZANCHC 30 para 26. 
23 [2013] ZASCA 14 para 8. 
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on the parties to resolve a tender dispute by the prescribed ADR.24 Thus, consent to undertake 
ADR is still required in such circumstance. Although the Constitutional Court, in Allpay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO of SASSA,25 opined that: “Request for 
Proposals (solicitation/bidding documents) … constituted the legally binding and enforceable 
framework within which tenders had to be submitted, evaluated and awarded”;26 it does not 
obviate the contractual nexus required between the bidders and the contracting authority for 
ADR to be invoked.  Another impediment is that the High Court in Airports Company South 
Africa Ltd v ISO Leisure OR Tambo (Pty) Ltd,27  held that public procurement disputes in South 
Africa are constitutional disputes, which are ostensibly not justiciable in ADR settings.  
In any case, agreeing to and opting for an ADR does not foreclose recourse to 
procurement administrative or judicial review.28 An ADR clause would be invalid if it 
stipulates that the proceeding shall be final; as it will deny an aggrieved party the constitutional 
right to judicial review of administrative action.29 Also, the court may refuse to grant a stay of 
judicial review proceeding applied to enable the parties to first exhaust the ADR as agreed, if 
the stay would be inconvenient or the outcome of the ADR is doubtful.30 An arbitral proceeding 
to resolve a tender dispute would be invalid if the parties regarded and conducted it as a judicial 
review.31 In Airports Company South Africa Ltd v ISO Leisure OR Tambo (Pty) Ltd,32 an 
aggrieved bidder applied for judicial review to challenge a tender decision; however, the parties 
discontinued the proceeding, to undertake arbitration as provided in the solicitation document, 
which they however regarded as a continuation of the judicial review proceedings. The court 
held that “s 7(4) of PAJA precludes any forum, apart from the High Court and the 
Constitutional Court, to adjudicate over claims brought in terms of PAJA (judicial review)”.33  
Furthermore, the fact that procurement decisions in South Africa are viewed as 
administrative action, and the resolution of its disputes ordinarily attracts public law remedies 
                                                          
24 See also Golden Arrow Bus Services (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town [2013] ZASCA 154; [2014] 1 All SA 627 
(SCA) para 27.  
25 [2013] ZACC 42, 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) paras 38 & 40. 
26 Emphasis added. See also ZTE Mzanzi (Pty) Ltd v Telkom SA Ltd [2012] ZAGPPHC 50 para 36 (overruled in 
Telkom SA Ltd v ZTE Mzanzi (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZASCA 14); Volmink (2014) APPLJ 45. 
27 2011 (4) SA 642 (GSJ) para 67. 
28 Airports Company South Africa Ltd v ISO Leisure OR Tambo (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 642 (GSJ) para 41, 55. 
29 Paras 10, 41, 54, 67-68. See SA Constitution s 33(1 ) &(2); PAJA s 6. 
30 Airports Company South Africa Ltd v ISO Leisure OR Tambo (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 642 (GSJ) paras 73-76. 
31 Paras 21, 27, 39.2, 67-68. 
32 2011 (4) SA 642 (GSJ). 
33 Para 67. Emphasis added. 
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and not private law remedies,34 may affect the attitude of courts regarding the application of 
ADR to procurement. Perhaps the courts may be reluctant to support (such as ordering a stay 
of judicial proceeding to enable exhaustion of ADR) or order resolution of procurement dispute 
through ADR, even where the parties had agreed to an ADR.35  
8 2 3 Analysis 
On the whole, resolving public procurement disputes by ADR in Nigeria and South Africa is 
quite limited.  
Notwithstanding the above, opting for ADR, where applicable, in resolving public 
procurement disputes could be advantageous.36 It saves time, cost and energy for parties, 
compared to litigation. This is even more apt for South Africa as it aligns with its constitutional 
principal of cost-effectiveness of the procurement system. ADR proceedings and outcome are 
flexible and under the parties’ control. The parties have the opportunity to reach settlement 
beyond traditional judicial remedies. ADR usually protects the privacy of the parties and the 
confidentiality of communications and presentations during the proceedings. Amicable 
settlement is pursued within a convivial atmosphere, and existing business relationships are 
preserved.  
The disadvantage of resorting to ADR for resolving procurement disputes is that the 
focus is not on enforcing compliance with procurement regulations, but on reaching a 
compromise. This is unlike the public law remedies available in review proceedings, whose 
purpose is to pre-empt or correct or reverse an improper administrative function; and focuses 
on affording the prejudiced party administrative justice, advancing efficient and effective 
public administration based on constitutional precepts, and entrenching the rule of law.37 In 
ADR, an infraction may be left unaddressed where the parties are happy with the outcome of 
the ADR. It is even possible that a procuring entity may compromise a subsequent procurement 
process to favour the aggrieved bidder as a form of settlement.38 However, the following could 
minimise such occurrence: taking records of the ADR proceedings, publishing the decisions 
                                                          
34 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board of the Eastern Cape [2006] ZACC 16; 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC); 2007 
(3) BCLR 300 para 29. 
35 Airports Company South Africa Ltd v ISO Leisure OR Tambo (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 642 (GSJ). 
36 See Lees (2002) PPLR 143-144.  
37 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board of the Eastern Cape [2006] ZACC 16; 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC); 2007 
(3) BCLR 300 para 29. 
38 See for example, State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd [2016] ZASCA 
143, [2016] 4 All SA 842 (SCA), 2017 (2) SA 63 (SCA) para 1-14. 
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reached, and holding debriefing session on the proceeding with interested bidders.39  Also, the 
investigative functions of relevant authorities, discussed below, may curb such occurrence. 
8 3 Investigation, administrative remedial action and sanction  
Public procurement is prone to abuse and corruption40 owing to various factors, including: the 
large sums involved; possible conflict of interest of officials (“principal-agency problem”);41 
and, a level of unsupervised discretion involved.42 Some abuses may go on undetected or 
unchallenged by affected suppliers. An investigation by relevant authorities may be the 
effective law enforcement option or remedy in such cases. It serves to detect abuses; which 
may lead to outcomes such as administrative remedial actions, prosecution and sanctions, 
geared towards preventing and redressing such abuses. These mechanisms apply to bidders, 
contractors, procuring entities and their officials; and to both pre and post contractual matters. 
This section takes a look at the procedures for triggering and undertaking the 
aforementioned processes; the authorities involved; and their outcomes and limitations. 
8 3 1 Nigeria 
8 3 1 1 Investigation 
The BPP may recommend to a “relevant authority” to investigate any matter related to the 
conduct of public procurement proceedings, or the conclusion or implementation of a 
procurement contract, if it considers that such is necessary to prevent or detect a contravention 
of the PPA.43 The “relevant authority” includes: the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC), and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC).44 The BPP 
has so far referred more than 50 companies to the EFCC for investigation and prosecution, over 
falsification of information to obtain government contracts; and recommended four staff of 
some government agencies for prosecution, for attempting to compromise the procurement 
                                                          
39 These accord with transparency and equity enshrined under the SA Constitution s 217(1); and Nigerian PPA s 
16(1)(d). 
40 See Soreide Corruption in Public procurement; Anechiarico & Jacobs The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity ch 8; 
Kelman Procurement and Public Management; William-Elegbe Fighting Corruption 25; Williams-Elegbe 
“Corruption and Public Procurement” in Procurement Regulation 337, 345. 
41 Marshall, et al (1991) Hofstra L Rev 11. 
42 William-Elegbe Fighting Corruption 25; Williams-Elegbe “Corruption and Public Procurement” in 
Procurement Regulation 337, 345. 
43 PPA s 53(1); also, s 6(1)(d)(i), (h) & (j). 
44 PPA s 60. See s 6 of Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 (EFCC Act); and, 
ss 9 & 10 of Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2003 (ICPC Act). 
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procedure of the Federal Government.45 In addition, these investigative authorities may of their 
own accord investigate any suspected criminality in public procurement.46  
Interested members of the public, including bidders and procuring entities, may 
instigate such investigation by writing a petition or reporting an alleged or likely contravention 
of the PPA to the BPP. For example, a CSO, Civil Society Network Against Corruption, in 
August 2016 petitioned the BPP about a federal agency that had in 2016 budget sought the sum 
of N4.4 billion for the purchase of its headquarters building, notwithstanding that it had earlier 
in 2013 awarded a contract for its construction.47 The petition was to instigate investigation 
which will lead to the suspension of the proposed purchase; thus preventing possible waste of 
funds and fraud, contrary to the PPA.48 Such petitions may also be written directly to the EFCC 
or ICPC, pursuant to their enabling Acts.49 However, it is preferable to route it through the 
BPP; as it could follow up with these authorities and finally take its resultant remedial actions 
as discussed immediately below. 
The relevant authority may in the course of its investigation: (i) require a staff or agent 
of the procuring entity, bidder or contractor concerned, to provide relevant information; or 
explain entries in or produce related books, records, accounts or documents; or (ii) it may 
                                                          
45 B Agande “Contracts: BPP Drags 50 Firms to EFCC over False Information” Vangaurd (12-11-2013) 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/11/contracts-bpp-drags-50-firms-efcc-false-information/> (accessed 11-11-
2017); BPP “Articles” (01-09-2017) BPP 
http://bpp.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=175&catid=83 (accessed 01-09-2017). The 
BPP itself has in some occasions been investigated for alleged corrupt practices in carrying out its functions. See 
H Umoru “Senate probes alleged corruption in BPP” (11-05-2017) Vanguard 
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/05/senate-probes-alleged-corruption-bpp/> (accessed 01-02-2018); Punch 
“Reps to probe BPP over indiscriminate issuance of certificate” (02-03-2017) Punch < http://punchng.com/reps-
to-probe-bpp-over-indiscriminate-issuance-of-certificate/> (accessed 01-02-2018). 
46 See EFCC Act s 6(1)(h) and ICPC Act ss 31 & 48. See EFCC “Re: DSS, EFCC in Fresh Face-Off over Invitation 
to SSS Operatives” (07-11-2017) EFCC <https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/news/2854-re-dss-efcc-in-fresh-face-off-
over-invitation-to-sss-operatives> (accessed 01-02-2018); Punch “Alleged N919m fraud: EFCC, ICPC begin 
probe of suspended NHIS boss” (27-12-2017) Punch < http://punchng.com/alleged-n919m-fraud-efcc-icpc-
begin-probe-of-suspended-nhis-boss/> (accessed 01-02-2018); D Adebayo “FG awaiting EFCC investigation on 
NITDA’s 2017 Budget – Communications Minister, Adebayo Shittu” (06-11-2017) Daily Post 
<http://dailypost.ng/2017/11/06/fg-awaiting-efcc-investigation-nitdas-2017-budget-communications-minister-
adebayo-shittu/> (accessed 01-02-2018); S Opejobi “$2.1bn arms fraud: EFCC reveals why it invited DSS 
operatives” (08-11-2017) Daily Post <http://dailypost.ng/2017/11/08/2-1bn-arms-fraud-efcc-reveals-invited-dss-
operatives/> (accessed 01-02-2018). 
47 News Express “Group Petitions BPP, Seeks Investigation of CCB’s Proposal for Purchase of Secretariat” News 
Express (22-08-2016) < http://www.newsexpressngr.com/news/27416-Group-petitions-BPP-seeks-investigation-
of-CCBs-proposal-for-purchase-of-secretariat> (accessed 11-11-2017). 
48 Sections 5(n), 16(1)(e) & (f), 58(4)(b). 
49 EFCC Act s 6(1)(h) and ICPC Act ss 31 & 48. 
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search for, remove, examine and make extracts or copies of them.50 On completion of the 
investigation, the relevant authority informs the BPP and the procuring entity of its findings.51 
8 3 1 2 Remedial actions 
If the BPP is satisfied from the findings that a breach of the PPA or any regulations had 
occurred, it shall take actions to rectify the contravention, which include: 
(a) nullification of the procurement proceedings; 
(b) cancellation of the procurement contract; 
(c) ratification of anything done in relation to the proceedings; or 
(d) a declaration consistent with any relevant provisions of the PPA.52 
The BPP, following its own or a relevant authority’s findings,53 may also debar any 
guilty bidder or contractor from participating in federal government procurement for a period 
it may determine.54 Although the duration is not stipulated, it is assumed that it would depend 
on the severity of the contravention. The names of such debarred suppliers shall be published 
on BPP’s website and the Procurement Journal.55 The publication notifies federal procuring 
entities to comply with the debarment. If a contract is awarded to a debarred supplier, the BPP 
may withhold its Certificate of No Objection, required for payment of contract.56  Besides, a 
supplier interested in that contract may challenge such award and have it set aside.57 
In addition, the BPP may issue a variation order requiring a contractor at his own 
expense to repair, replace, or to do anything in the contract left undone or found to have been 
carried out with inferior or defective materials or with less skill and expertise than required by 
the contract.58  
The above actions that the BPP may take to rectify identified contravention are more 
extensive than the remedies available under BPP’s administrative review, as the latter does not 
apply to contract administration stages.  The BPP’s remedial actions may be reviewed by the 
                                                          
50 PPA s 53(2). 
51 PPA s 53(5). 
52 PPA s 53(4). 
53 BPP http://www.bpp.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141:bpp-s-stakeholders-
workshop-on-debarment-procedure&catid=83:latest-news (accessed 25-08-2017) 
54 PPA s 6(1)(e). See 8 3 1 3 for debarment resulting from court sentence.  
55 PPA s 6(1)(g). 
56 Sections 6(1)(b); 16(1)(b) & (2), (4); 19(h); 60. 
57 Section 16(4). 
58 Section 53 (3). 
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Federal High Court (FHC);59 if an aggrieved party sues within three months of such action,60 
after giving BPP a 30 day notice of intention to sue.61   
8 3 1 3 Prosecution and sanctions 
Where the investigation discloses an offence, the relevant authority that investigated the matter 
shall take all necessary steps to commence prosecution.62 This entails reporting its findings to 
the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF).63 The AGF or any of his officers or agent may 
prosecute the offender(s) on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,64 at the FHC.65 The 
procedure for the prosecution shall be as provided by the Administration of Criminal Justice 
Act 2015.66 
The PPA creates specific offences, which include the following. 67 
1. Entering or attempting to enter into a collusive agreement with a supplier, contractor or 
consultant where the prices quoted in their respective bids are or would be higher than would 
have been the case in the absence of the collusion. 
2. Conducting or attempting to conduct procurement fraud by means of fraudulent and corrupt 
acts, unlawful influence, undue interest, favor, agreement, or bribery. 
3. Influencing or attempting to influence in any manner the procurement process to obtain an 
unfair advantage in the award of a procurement contract. 
4. Splitting of tenders to enable the evasion of monetary thresholds set; and bid-rigging.68 
5. Altering any procurement document with intent to influence the outcome of a procurement 
proceeding. 
6. Using fake documents or encouraging their use. 
7. Willful refusal to allow the BPP or its officers to have access to any procurement records. 
                                                          
59 CFRN s 251(1)(r). 
60 Public Officers Protection Act s 2(a). 
61 PPA s 14(1). 
62 PPA s 53(5). 
63 Combined reading of ss 53(5) & 58(3) of the PPA. See CFRN ss 150 & 174. 
64 PPA ss 58(3); CFRN s 174(2). 
65 PPA s 58(2). 
66 See s 2. 
67 PPA s 58 (4)-(11). 
68 Bid-rigging means “an agreement between persons whereby offers submitted have been pre-arranged between 
them; or, their conduct has had the effect of directly or indirectly restricting free and open competition, distorting 
the competitiveness of the procurement process and leading to and escalation or increase in costs or loss of value 
to the national treasury.”: PPA s 58(10). 
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 All the offences under the PPA, presented above, carry the same penalty for the same 
class of persons, as listed in 1-4 below. In other words, the penalty that a person will suffer 
under the PPA for any of the offences is the same, as fixed for the class he falls under.  The 
penalties that the various classes of persons will bear for being convicted for any of the offences 
are as follows.69 
1. An officer of the BPP or any procuring entity: imprisonment of not less than five calendar 
years without any option of fine; and summary dismissal from government services. 
2. Any legal person: debarment from all public procurements for a period not less than five 
calendar years; and a fine equivalent to 25% of the value of the procurement in issue;  
3. Every registered director of a convicted company: not less than three calendar years but not 
exceeding five calendar years without an option of fine.  
4. A natural person that is not a public officer: imprisonment for not less than five calendar 
years, but not exceeding ten calendar years without an option of fine.  
 Penalty in 3 above is arguably disproportionate, as the PPA does not prescribe the 
elements that make the directors criminally liable; such as complicity in committing the 
offence, direct or implied knowledge of the offence, control of the affairs of the convicted 
company, etc. This is more grievous than a strict liability offence, for there is an absence of 
both actus reus and mens rea,70 as conviction is based only on ground of being a registered 
director of such company. Some directors do not engage in the day to day running of their 
companies. It may be inappropriate to hold a person guilty for an offence, only by reason of 
his official position; without requiring proof that he acted, omitted to act or had culpable 
intention or knowledge with respect to the offence. This is arguably unconstitutional, as section 
36(5) of the Constitution requires that every person’s guilt must be proved before he loses 
presumption of innocence. Thus, the guilt of a director for the offence committed by the 
company should be proved before he can be convicted of it. If the court agrees with the above 
view it would invalidate the affected provision of the PPA,71 by virtue of the supremacy of 
constitution.72 Even if the court does not so hold, it may read the requirement to establish 
                                                          
69 PPA s 58 (1), (5)-(7). 
70 See Garner Black’s Law Dictionary 998; JLJ Edwards Mens Rea in Statutory Offences (1955) 247; Lim Chin 
Aik v R (3) [1963] AC 174, [1963] 1 All ER 228; R v Agu (4) 12 WACA 489; Brend v Wood (1) (175 LT 307, 62 
TLR 463; Yakubu v Federal Republic of Nigeria [2009] 14 NWLR (pt 1160) 151. 
71 Section 58(7). 
72 CFRN s 1(3) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
222 
 
personal guilt of the directors into the affected provision, especially since the offence is a 
felony.73  
Where there are persistent or serious breaches of the PPA or its regulations, the BPP 
may recommend to the National Council on Public Procurement (NCPP) as follows.74 
1. The suspension of officers concerned with the procurement or disposal proceeding. 
2. The replacement of the head or any of the members of the procuring or disposal unit of any 
entity or the Chairperson of the Tenders Board. 
3. The discipline of the accounting officer of the procuring entity. 
4. The temporary transfer of the procuring and disposal function of the entity to a third party 
procurement agency or consultant.  
5. Any other sanction that the BPP may consider appropriate. 
 However, as the NCPP is yet to be inaugurated,75 the above administrative measures 
are currently inchoate.76 
8 3 2 South Africa 
8 3 2 1 Investigation  
The South African authorities that may investigate procurement irregularities include: the 
National Treasury/Office of Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO), the Public Protector, and the 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). Their jurisdiction extends to the three tiers of 
government. The accounting officers or accounting authorities of contracting entities may also 
investigate procurement irregularities.77 These institutions have powers to take certain remedial 
actions, based on their investigation, as discussed immediately below. The significance of this, 
among other relevant issues, are analysed under 8 3 3 below. 
a.  National Treasury  
The National Treasury is empowered by the PFMA section 6(2)(e) to investigate any system 
of financial management (including procurement) in any department, public entity or 
constitutional institution. The purpose of this power is not to investigate the conduct of any 
                                                          
73 See Criminal Code Act Cap C38 LFN 2004 s 3; R v Gray L & C 365; R v Prince Law Rep 2 CCR 154; The 
Queen v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168. 
74 PPA s 6(1)(i). 
75 Pursuant to PPA s 1(4), 
76 See generally Udeh (2015) APPLJ 1; also, Udeh “Nigeria” in Procurement Regulation 149. 
77 Treasury Regulation 16A9.1(b); Municipal SCM Regulations 38(1)(b). The extent of and procedure for 
exercising this power are not regulated; thus are not discussed below. But see 8 3 2 2-3 below for its outcomes. 
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particular person, but the institutions’ financial or SCM system.78 The Treasury may commence 
an investigation on its own initiative or based on a request by a public entity;79 or on a complaint 
received from any member of the public, including suppliers.80  
The Treasury may appoint or mandate an investigator or a team of investigators to 
conduct the investigation within a given period. The investigators would send their 
investigation plan or notice to the stakeholders and respondents to enable them prepare and 
attend when required.81 The proceeding entails the investigators interviewing the respondents, 
in addition to respondents making representations or presenting evidence.82 At the end, the 
investigators will compile a report, containing their findings and recommendations, and submit 
to the Treasury, and where appropriate, to the requesting authority.83   
In other instances, the Treasury’s response to a request for investigation or a complaint 
is that the OCPO would write a letter to the accounting authority or officer of the contracting 
authority, requesting documents/records of the affected procurement.84 The OCPO reviews the 
documents/records to determine if the process followed was in accordance with the SCM 
standards;85 after which it compiles a report containing its findings and recommendations.86  
b. Public protector  
The Public Protector, established in terms of chapter 9 of the Constitution, is empowered to 
investigate all complaints or allegations of improper conduct by public officials in all spheres 
of government (except court’s decisions).87 It may investigate improprieties in public 
procurement, by its own initiative or as reported to it.88 A person, such as an aggrieved bidder, 
may report a matter by means of a written or oral declaration under oath or affirmation; stating: 
the nature of the matter, the grounds necessitating an investigation, and all other relevant 
                                                          
78 The National Treasury v Kubukeli [2015] ZASCA 141, [2016] 1 All SA 30 (SCA), 2016 (2) SA 507 (SCA) 
para 24. 
79 Paras 1-2. See National Treasury 2015 Public Sector Supply Chain Management Review (2015) 19. 
80 Treasury Regulations reg 16A9.3. 
81 See The National Treasury v Kubukeli [2015] ZASCA 141 paras 3-5. 
82 3-7. 
83 7-11. 
84 Statement by Bonolo Moloto, SCM Monitoring and Compliance, OCPO (email correspondence, 
Bonolo.Moloto@treasury.gov.za, 11-05-2016). 
85 Post contract cases may require site inspection to verify compliance with the specification and existence of 
projects. 
86 Moloto 11-05-2016. 
87 Constitution s 182(1). See 3 3 3 2 above. 
88 Public Protector Act 6(1) & (4)(a).  
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information known to him or her.89 Such report must be made within two years from the 
occurrence of the incident or matter concerned.90 Reports outside this deadline shall be rejected 
except the Public Protector accepts it.91 This ensures that matters are promptly reported, which 
enhances evidence gathering and chances of remedying improprieties. The Public Protector 
may refuse to investigate such reported matter if the person prejudiced by the conduct referred 
to by the Act92 has not taken all reasonable steps to exhaust his or her relevant legal remedies.93  
This will forestall overburdening the office with matters that would be better addressed by 
challenge proceedings or ADR. 
 The Public Protector determines the investigation format and procedure based on the 
circumstances of each case.94 Generally, such investigation rely on: documents from various 
sources, media reports, related correspondences, interviews, consulting stakeholders (such as 
the National Treasury), legal opinions, legislation and other prescripts.95 Witnesses may be 
subpoenaed to: submit affidavit or affirmed declaration, appear to testify, or to present 
documents.96 It could, with warrant, also search premises and seize items that have a bearing 
on the investigation.97 Anyone implicated during the investigation shall be afforded hearing 
and opportunity to tender evidence or examine witnesses at the investigation.98 Advocates or 
attorneys may be involved in the investigative proceedings.99  
 After its investigation, the Public Protector produces and publishes the related report, 
containing its recommendations and the remedial actions to be taken.100 
  
                                                          
89 Public Protector Act s6(1)(a). 
90 Public Protector Act s 6(9). 
91 Section 6(9). 
92 Section 6(4) & (5). 
93 Public Protector Act s 6(3)(b). 
94 Section 7(1)(b)(i). 
95 See Public Protector (PP) Yes We Made Mistakes report no 1 of 2012/13 (2012)  25-28; PP Inappropriate Moves 
report no 13 of 2013/2014 (2013) 33; PP Unsolicited Donation report no 22 of 2013/14 (2013) 32-35; PP Poisoned 
Processes report no 20 of 2013/14 (2014) 4-7; PP Cost of Deviation report no 4 of 2015/16 (2016) 20-24; PP 
Postponed Delivery report no 5 of 2015/16 (2016) 25-28. 
96 Public Protector Act s 7(4)-(8). 
97 Section 7A. 
98 Section 7(9). 
99 Section 7(8) & (9)(b)(ii). 
100 SA Constitution s 182(1)(b) & (5). 
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c. National Prosecuting  Authority 
Any person may report a suspected specified offence101 in procurement, such as corruption or 
fraud, to the NPA, by means of an affidavit or affirmed declaration.102 This shall specify the 
nature and grounds of the suspicion and relevant information.103 The National Director of 
Public Prosecution (NDPP)104 may refer the matter to the Investigating Director or appoint an 
investigator to investigate the matter.105 Also, the Investigating Director on his own initiative 
may investigate a suspected specified offence.106 The procedure for investigation under the 
NPA is determined by the Investigating Directors based on the circumstance of each case.107 
Generally, the procedure is similar to what obtains in investigation conducted by the Public 
Protector, seen above.108 However, NPA’s investigative proceedings take place in camera.109 
In practice, the NPA sometimes refers complaints of criminal conduct to the police for 
investigation.110 In such instances, it supervises, directs and co-ordinates the investigations. 
d. Analysis  
The timeline for investigation and report by the above entities are undefined. Some 
procurement related investigations of the Public Protector studied lasted for a year or less; 
while some lasted up to seven years.111 This factor may limit the viability of investigation and 
its concomitant remedy as recourse for suppliers; as the impugned procurement contract may 
be completed and become impracticable to reverse. However, investigation will still serve the 
purpose of enforcing procurement regulation notwithstanding its duration. 
The National Treasury/OCPO has more opportunity of investigating procurement 
improprieties than the Public Protector and the NPA, since it performs procurement regulatory 
                                                          
101 See Schedule to Proclamation R123 of 1998; NPA Act ss 1(“Specified Offence”) & 7(1). See Investigating 
Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd In re: Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO [2000] ZACC 12; 2000 (10) BCLR 1079, 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC). 
102 NPA Act s 27.  
103 Section 27. 
104 The head of the NPA: SA Constitution, s 179(1)(a). 
105 NPA Act, ss 22(3) & (4)(a)(i); 28(1)(b) & (2); 7(3). 
106 Section 28(1)(a). 
107 Section 28(4). 
108 Sections 28(6) & (8); 29. On its power of search, see: Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO [2000] ZACC 12, 
2000 (10) BCLR 1079, 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC). 
109 Section 28(3). 
110 NPA Prosecution Policy (2013) 12 para 7. 
111 See the dates the matters were reported and concluded: PP Cost of Deviation 12 & 27; Yes We Made Mistakes 
19 & 115; Inappropriate Moves4 & 210; Poisoned Processes 3 & 65.   
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functions.112 Besides, the NPA will conduct investigation only where a specified offence is 
suspected to have been committed.113  Specified offences in public procurement are: 
corruption, fraud, forgery or economic offence “of a serious and complicated nature”.114 
Furthermore, the Public Protector may refuse to investigate if: (1) the matter occurred more 
than two years; 115 or (2) the person prejudiced by the reported improper conduct has not 
exhausted his legal remedies.116 Thus, the investigative functions of the Public Protector and 
the NPA in relation to procurement are limited.  
Nevertheless, it appears that where there is a conflict between the investigative 
report/findings of the Public Protector and that of any other public body, the report/findings of 
the Public Protector shall prevail.117 
The Public Protector has published several reports of its investigation of public 
procurement on its website,118 in accordance with its constitutional mandate;119 whereas the 
National Treasury/OCPO currently does not publish such reports. Publishing the investigative 
reports may enhance enforcement of procurement regulations; as any stakeholder, contracting 
authority and supplier may rely on the findings and recommendations to take or initiate 
remedial actions. They also act as a guide for handling similar future matters. 
Investigation of public procurement process by the Public Protector, the National 
Treasury and an accounting officer or authority is aimed at identifying improprieties in the 
process and taking remedial actions. The purpose of NPA’s investigation is to determine 
whether to prosecute or not.120   
                                                          
112 PFMA s 6(2)(c); MFMA ss 5 & 6. See 3 3 2 above. 
113 Schedule to Proclamation R123 of 1998; NPA Act ss 1 & 7(1). See Investigating Directorate: Serious 
Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 
NO [2000] ZACC 12. 
114 Schedule to Proclamation R123 of 1998; NPA Act ss 1 & 7(1). 
115 Public Protector Act s6(9). 
116 Public Protector Act s 6(3)(b). 
117 South African Broadcasting Corporation Soc Ltd v Democratic Alliance [2015] ZASCA 156; [2015] 4 All SA 
719 (SCA) para 52; Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd; Democratic 
Alliance v Motsoeneng [2016] ZAWCHC 188; [2017] 2 BLLR 153 (WCC); [2017] 1 All SA 530 (WCC) para 
102.   
118 Go to http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/investigation_report.asp (accessed 08/05/2017). 
For example: PP Yes We Made Mistakes; PP Cost of Deviation report; PP Inappropriate Moves; PP Poisoned 
Processes; PP Postponed Delivery; PP Secure in Comfort report no 25 of 2013/14 (2014); PP Unsolicited 
Donation; PP Allegation of Procurement irregularities, Nepotism, Victimization and Corruption within Tshwane 
South College report no 20 of 2016/2017 (2017). 
119 Constitution s 182(5); Public Protector Act s 8(1). 
120 NPA Act s 22(2)(c) & (4)(a)(i). 
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8 3 2 2 Remedial actions 
The remedial action of the Public Protector is generally to give binding directives or 
recommendations to relevant authorities or persons to carry out a specific action, towards 
redressing the impropriety identified by its investigation.121 It may also resolve the matter by 
conciliation, mediation or negotiation.122 In some cases, the remedial actions may simply be 
that those to whom they are directed are to consider them properly, with due regard to their 
nature, context and language, to determine what course to follow.123 In all cases, its findings 
and remedial actions cannot be ignored by authorities or individuals; unless they are later set 
aside by a court.124 Other governmental institutions cannot embark on a parallel investigation 
and claim that its investigation trumps the findings or remedial action of the Public Protector.125 
The remedial action that the Public Protector may take is extensive; only limited by the 
Constitution and applicable national legislation and judicial scrutiny.126 For example, it may 
direct a contracting authority to cancel an improper award and conduct a fresh procurement 
process;127 it may ask the National Treasury to review a contract to ascertain the market value 
and recover extravagant expenditure from those implicated.128  
                                                          
121 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the 
National Assembly [2016] ZACC 11, 2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC), 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) paras 67 & 105(3)-(11); 
South African Broadcasting Corporation Soc Ltd v Democratic Alliance  [2015] ZASCA 156; [2015] 4 All SA 
719 (SCA) (SABC v DA) para 52; Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd 
(SABC); Democratic Alliance v Motsoeneng [2016] ZAWCHC 188; [2017] 2 BLLR 153 (WCC); [2017] 1 All 
SA 530 (WCC) (DA v SABC)  para 103. See Fose v Minister of Safety and Security [1997] ZACC 6; 1997 (3) SA 
786 (CC); 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) para 69. Before the SCA and CC settled that the remedial action of the Public 
Protector is binding, it was widely regarded as only persuasive: Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation Ltd 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC) paras 50-51; Law Society of South Africa Position Paper: The Extent 
and Limit of the Powers of the Public Protector (2015) 5-6; P de Vos & W Freedman (eds) South African 
Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 258 & 264; M Mhango “Public Protector’s Powers: What Law Says” Sunday 
Independent  (21-9-2014) <http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/public-protectors-powers-what-law-says-
1753981> (accessed 11-11-2017); P de Vos “The Powers of the Public Protector: What the High Court Actually 
Found” Daily Maverick (26-10-2014) <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2014-10-26-the-powers-of-
the-public-protector-what-the-high-court-actually-found/#.WRSEu4jytPa> (accessed 11-11-2017). 
122 Public Protector Act s 6(4)(b)(i). 
123 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the 
National Assembly [2016] ZACC para 69. 
124 Paragraphs 67, 73-75, 97. 
125 SABC v DA [2015] ZASCA 156 para 52; DA v SABC [2016] ZAWCHC 188 para 102. 
126 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the 
National Assembly [2016] ZACC paras 66 & 71. 
127 PP Poisoned Processes 63-65. See also PP Postponed Delivery 79;   
128 PP Inappropriate Moves 208-210; Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; 
Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly [2016] ZACC 11 para 10. 
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The Public Protector’s remedial actions are quite effective. The Constitutional Court in 
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v 
Speaker of the National Assembly129 held that even the President of the Republic is bound to 
comply with the remedial actions of the Public Protector. It is thus one of the most invaluable 
constitutional gifts to South Africa in the fight against corruption, unlawful enrichment, 
prejudice and impropriety in State affairs, including public procurement.130 This is especially 
so considering that ordinary citizens can trigger the investigative powers and remedial action 
of the Public Protector; without cost, and technical barriers such as locus standi.131  
The National Treasury makes non-binding recommendations to relevant persons or 
institutions in response to its investigation.132 Nevertheless, contracting authorities would 
hardly ignore such recommendations,133 as the National Treasury can withhold their funds, 
relying on section 216 (2) of the Constitution and section 6(2)(f) of the PFMA. In addition, the 
OCPO monitors implementation of such recommendations.134  
Furthermore, the findings of the National Treasury may lead it to make binding 
procurement regulations or instructions.135 But these would apply to all relevant institutions 
and matters, as singling out a particular matter or institution investigated would amount to 
legislative judgment, and thus invalid.136  
The National Treasury could also take remedial actions as may be directed by the Public 
Protector; as seen above.137  
                                                          
129 [2016] ZACC 11paras 76-77. 
130 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the 
National Assembly [2016] ZACC 11 paras 52 & 56. 
131 See Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 (4) SA 744 
(CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) para 161. 
132 The National Treasury v Kubukeli [2015] ZASCA 141 paras 25-26. 
133 See The National Treasury v Kubukeli [2015] ZASCA 141 para 11. 
134 Moloto 11-05-2016; PFMA s 6(1)(g). 
135 PFMA 76(4)(c); MFMA s 168 (1). See for example: National Treasury Instruction Note on Enhancing 
Compliance Monitoring and Improving Transparency and Accountability in Supply Chain Management (31-05-
2011): enforced by the SCA in Minister of Transport v Prodiba (Pty) Ltd (20028/2014) [2015] ZASCA 38 paras 
37-40. 
136 See S v Dodo 2001 (5) BCLR 423 (CC). See also: Calder v. Bull (1789) 3 Dallas U.S.S.C. 386; Lakanmi v 
Attorney-General (West) (1970) NSCC 143; W Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England vol 1 4ed 
(1765-1769) 44. 
137 PP Inappropriate Moves report 208-210; Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; 
Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly [2016] ZACC 11 paras 10 & 105(6)-(7). 
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An accounting officer or accounting authority may report any conduct that may 
constitute an offence to the Police,138 for further investigation. In addition, it must reject a 
contract award proposal or cancel a contract awarded to a supplier it found, relying on  
investigation, to have committed a corrupt or fraudulent act during that bidding process or the 
execution of that contract.139 It may, based on its findings, reject a bid if the bidder or its director 
had earlier abused the institution’s supply chain management (SCM) system.140 The PPPFA 
Regulations 14(1)(c)(i) mandates contracting authorities to disqualify a tenderer (for that tender 
only) or terminate a contract where it finds that the tenderer submitted false information 
regarding its BBBEE status, or any other matter required in terms of the Regulations, which 
will affect or has affected the evaluation of a tender. In addition, the National Treasury may 
decide to restrict the tenderer from doing business with any organ of state for a period not 
exceeding 10 years.141 The affected tenderers have the right to notice and representation before 
the above restrictions are imposed.142 The measures that may be taken by any of these entities 
under review may involve criminal or disciplinary actions, where appropriate, as discussed 
below. 
8 3 2 3 Prosecution and sanction 
The investigative bodies above may recommend prosecution to the NPA,143 and sanction of 
culprits. An example of a sanction that may be recommended is disciplinary action against the 
public officers indicted of procurement offences or breach. For example, the Public Protector 
directed the President to reprimand the Minsters involved in mishandling the Nkandla project 
and abusing public funds; and, the court upheld and ordered its enforcement.144  
                                                          
138 Treasury Regulations 16A9.1(b)(ii); Municipal SCM Regulations 38(1)(b)(ii). 
139 Treasury Regulations 16A9.1(e) & (f); Municipal SCM Regulations 38(1)(e) & (f). See Bolton Government 
Procurement 403-404; Williams-Elegbe Fighting Corruption 100-101.  
140 Treasury Regulations 16A9.2; Municipal SCM Regulations 38(1)(g). 
141 PPPFA Regulations 14(3). 
142 Supersonic Tours (Pty) Ltd v State Tender Board [2007] JOL 19891 (T); Chairman State Tender Board v 
Supersonic Tours (Pty) Ltd 2008 (6) SA 220 (SCA). PPPFA Regulations 14(1)(a)-(b) expressly requires the 
observance of audi alteram partem. See Williams-Elegbe Fighting Corruption 117; S Arrowsmith “Judicial 
Review of Public Procurement: The Recent Decisions in the National Lottery case and R v Bristol City Council 
ex p. DL Barrett” (2001) PPLR NA41. 
143 Public Protector Act s 6(4)(c)(i); SA Constitution s 179(1); NPA Act s 2; Treasury Regulations 16A9.1(b)(i). 
144 PP Secure in Comfort para 11.1.3; Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; 
Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly [2016] ZACC 11 para 105(9). See The National Treasury 
v Kubukeli [2015] ZASCA 141 para 10. 
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Where an investigation discloses an offence, the NPA, based on a recommendation as 
aforementioned or on its own initiative, may prosecute those indicted.145 The NPA may 
prosecute the matter in a High Court, regional court or a magistrate court.146 The decision 
regarding the court in which to prosecute an accused person is determined by  
the complexity and seriousness of an offence, among others.147  
Some procurement related offences and penalties prescribed by legislation include the 
following. 
1. An accounting officer or accounting authority wilfully or in gross negligence fails to 
ensure that its institution maintains an appropriate procurement and provisioning system which 
is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective- liable on conviction to a fine, or 
to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.148 
2. An accounting officer of a municipality deliberately or in gross negligence fails to 
take reasonable steps to implement the municipality's SCM policy; or fails to take all 
reasonable steps to prevent corrupt practices in the implementation of the SCM policy- liable 
on conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or to a fine.149 
3. The accounting officer of a municipal entity deliberately or in gross negligence fails 
to take all reasonable steps to prevent corrupt practices in the SCM system. Penalty is the same 
as in 2 above.150 
4. Impeding the accounting officer of a municipality or municipal entity in 
implementing the body’s SCM policy, or of taking all reasonable steps to ensure that proper 
mechanisms and separation of duties in the SCM are in place to minimise the likelihood of 
fraud, corruption, favouritism and unfair and irregular practices.151 Penalty is the same as in 2 
above.152 
5. Offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to contracts and procurement, under 
sections 12 and 13 of the Corruption Act.153 Penalty include either a fine; or imprisonment up 
                                                          
145 NPA Act s 20. 
146 See NPA Act ss 22(9), 24(2)(a); Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (Corruption 
Act) s 26(1); NPA Prosecution Policy 5(A). 
147 NPA Prosecution Policy 5(A). 
148 PFMA ss 38(1)(a)(iii), 51(1)(a)(iii), 86. 
149 MFMA ss 173(1)(a)(ii) & (iv)(bb) 174. 
150 Section 174. 
151 MFMA ss 115(2), 173(5)(e). 
152 Section 174. 
153 See also offence under s 17. 
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to life (High Court); imprisonment for a period not exceeding eighteen years (regional court); 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years (magistrate court). In addition, the court 
may order that the following be endorsed on the Register kept within the National Treasury:154 
• the particulars of the convicted person/enterprise; 
• the particulars of any of the enterprise’s or its subsidiary’s partner, manager, director 
or other person, who wholly or partly exercises or may exercise control over that 
enterprise and who was involved in the offence concerned or who knows or ought 
reasonably to have known or suspected that the enterprise committed the offence; 
• the conviction, sentence, and any consequential order(s) of court. 
Where the Register has been endorsed, the National Treasury may: (1) terminate any 
agreement with the person or enterprise; (2) recover from them damages incurred by the State 
from the tender process or the conclusion of the agreement or for having to make less 
favourable alternative arrangements; (3) debar or disqualify them from participating in all 
South African government contracts for a period determined by the National Treasury (may 
not be less than five years or more than 10 years).155 The National Treasury may at any time 
vary or rescind any of the above sanction/restriction it imposed; and it must delete such 
particulars from the register when the stipulated period expires.156   It must, within fourteen 
days of imposing the restriction or revising such, notify the culprit, the contracting authority 
and all government departments of that decision; and request all those institutions to comply.157 
The court may review such restriction as imposed or revised.158  
8 3 3 Analysis 
It is apparent from the above that two forms of debarment operate in Nigeria and South Africa. 
One is imposed as a penalty following a conviction; the other constitutes a remedial action 
following investigative findings by a regulatory body or procuring entity. Triggering the latter 
is a more viable secondary remedy for a bidder than the former; as the former also involves a 
prosecuting authority and the court, with the attendant uncertainties and delays. Debarment 
attempts to keep offenders out of a public procurement system. Thus, it supports the integrity 
                                                          
154 Corruption Act ss 28(1) & (7); 29. Available at 
<http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/Register%20for%20Tender%20Defaulters.pdf > (accessed 
23/05/2017) 
155 Section 28(3), (5); Treasury Regulations 16A9.1(c). See Bolton Government Procurement 388-402   
156 Corruption Act s 28(4). 
157 Section 28(5). 
158 Section 28(3)(b); Red Ant (Pty) Ltd v Mogale City Municipality (16813/2012) [2013] ZAGPJHC 301 para 34. 
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of the system.159 It constitutes a remedy for responsible suppliers, as it enhances fair 
competition and opportunity to secure government contracts. It also acts as deterrence to 
procurement abuses owing to its detrimental impact on the culprits.160  
It is advantageous that, in both jurisdictions, practically no deadline applies to the triggering 
and conducting of investigations,161 which are precursors to debarment and other remedial 
actions. Consequently, a bidder who failed to secure a review remedy or to institute a review 
within time may resort to triggering investigation, with a hope of securing available remedial 
action.  
On the other hand, the absence of a deadline for concluding investigation and taking 
remedial action is a drawback; as the affected contract may be partially or fully completed 
before the investigation is finalized. This may make it impracticable for the contract to be 
cancelled. Nevertheless, offences related to the procurement or contract could still be 
prosecuted. 
Also, an investigative finding which discloses fraud in a contract award may entitle an 
aggrieved bidder to sue for damages for loss suffered owing to the award.162  
Investigating or recommending investigation is within the discretion of relevant authorities; 
163  thus, a party’s right to trigger it is limited. Where the authorities exercise their discretion 
bona fide and rationally to refuse investigation, they may not be compelled to investigate.164 
However, once an investigation discloses a contravention, it becomes incumbent on that 
authority to take remedial actions.165  
                                                          
159 See Williams-Elegbe Fighting Corruption 34. 
160 See Williams-Elegbe Fighting Corruption 34; S Arrowsmith, H-J Priess & P Friton “Self-Cleaning- An 
Emerging Concept in EC Procurement Law?” in H Punder, H-J Priess & S Arrowsmith Self-Cleaning in Public 
Procurement Law (2009); R Kramer “Awarding Contracts to Suspended and Debarred Firms: Are Stricter Rules 
Necessary?” (2005) 34(3) PCLJ 539 543. 
161 Note that the Public Protector Act s 6(9) gives the Public Protector the discretion to entertain a matter reported 
two years after the occurrence of the incident. 
162 See Minister of Finance v Gore NO [2006] SCA 97 (RSA) paras 1-11 & 91.  
163 Nigeria: PPA s 53(1); SA: PP Act s 6(3), (4)(b), (c) & (d); NPA Act s 28(1)(a); PFMA s 6(2)(e). 
164 Nigeria: See Fawehinmi v Akilu (1987) 2 NSCC 1265; Gani Fawehinmi v Inspector-General of Police [2002] 
7 NWLR (pt 767) 606. SA: M & G Media Limited v Public Protector [2009] ZAGPPHC 98, [2010] 1 All SA 32 
(GNP) paras 100-101; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re: Ex parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa 2000(2) SA 674 (CC) paras 83-86; S v Makwanyane [1995] ZACC 3, [1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd 2003(6) SA 407 (SCA) 409J-410A. 
See also Shidiack v Union Government (Minister of the Interior) 1912 AD 642 651; R v Northumberland Quarter 
Sessions ex p. Williamson (1965) 2 All ER 87, (1965) 1 WLR 700; Re: Fletcher's Application (1970) 2 All ER 57 
165 Nigeria: PPA s 53(4); SA: Constitution ss 182(1)(c); 216(2). 
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The remedial actions that the Nigerian BPP, and the South African Public Protector and 
National Treasury may take are extensive. However, the BPP generally does not conduct 
investigation on its own, but refers it to a relevant authority; unlike the two South African 
authorities that could investigate and also take remedial actions. It has been argued that the 
Public Protector exercising power to investigate and take binding remedial actions violates 
separation of powers.166 It is submitted that it does not: as the powers are vested by the 
Constitution; its actions are subject to judicial review; it is not a branch of government and its 
powers are limited within the narrow confines of its statutory duties. 
8 4 Audit  
Background information on audit and relevant audit institutions in Nigeria and South Africa 
that relate to public procurement was presented in chapter 3.167 This section focuses on audit 
as a secondary enforcement mechanism in these public procurement systems. 
Audit is a form of investigation, as it is a formal examination of an entity’s accounting 
records, financial situation, or compliance with some other set of standards.168 Its outcome is a 
report of findings and non-binding recommendations/opinions, usually addressed to legislative 
and oversight bodies; and also published.169 However, it differs from the investigation 
discussed above,170 as public-sector audit is generally done on regular basis by the audit 
institutions;171 hence, does not depend on complaints or suspicion of irregularity to be 
triggered. It is aimed at determining whether public-sector entities and public servants perform 
their functions effectively, efficiently, ethically and in accordance with the applicable laws and 
regulations.172 Unlike ordinary investigation, it is not primarily focused on detecting or 
confirming particular suspected breaches or offences, for the purposes of imposing sanctions.  
                                                          
166 Mhango Sunday Independent (21-09-2014). On Separation of Powers in South Africa, see Glenister v President 
of the Republic of South Africa 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC) 298; South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers 
v Heath 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (CC) para 22-23; S v Dodo 2001 (5) BCLR 423 (CC); PM Mojapelo “The doctrine of 
separation of powers (a South African perspective)” (2013) 26 Advocate 37-46 <www.sabar.co.za/law-
journals/2013/april/2013-april-vol026-no1-pp37-46.pdf> (accessed 11-11-2017). 
167 3 3 3 3. 
168 See Garner Black’s Law Dictionary 150; INTOSAI ISSAI 100 – Fundamental Principles of Public-sector 
Auditing (2013) 3. 
169 Nigeria: PPA s5(p); CFRN s 85(2) & (5); SA: Constitution s 188(3); PAA ss 4, 20, 21, 28. 
170 8 3. 
171 Nigeria: PPA s 5(p); CFRN s 85 (5). SA: Constitution s 188(3); Quist et al Public Expenditure 23. 
172 INTOSAI ISSAI 100 4. 
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Nevertheless, a complaint or request to the relevant audit institutions concerning an 
alleged procurement irregularity may instigate them to audit a procuring entity or the 
procurement process concerned.173 Such complaint or request is usually made by public 
entities. There is no legal barrier against a private person, such as an aggrieved supplier, to 
make such complaint or request. This option is unlikely though; considering that there are more 
accessible and effective options to address such grievances, including triggering investigation 
as in 8 3 above.  
An audit report/finding could be relied upon by a bidder to institute administrative or 
legal action; for example, to claim damages where the report has detected fraud in the 
procurement process.174 Also, the court could rely on audit reports in drawing up remedies.175 
Furthermore, audit reports could lead to formulation or review of policies and legislation that 
may support the integrity of the procurement system. 
A limitation of audit is that it is generally undertaken after the procurement process and 
the contract are completed. Thus, it is not a remedy route for an aggrieved bidder that wishes 
to have a contract cancelled or set aside and re-awarded; as it may have become impracticable 
to do so.176 Besides, audit recommendations are not binding. 
8 5 CSOs action 
In chapter 3,177  the role of CSOs in the enforcement of public procurement regulations in 
Nigeria and South Africa was discussed. In summary, the actions they may take to support 
enforcement include: acting as observers in procurement processes; whistle blowing on 
identified procurement breaches/infractions (through media exposure); reporting or 
complaining to law enforcement or investigative authorities; and acting as amicus curiae in 
procurement related litigations.178 These CSOs’ actions support the integrity of the public 
procurement system, as they can push for and possibly obtain remedial actions against 
                                                          
173 See SA PAA s 5(1)(d).  
174 See Gore v Minister of Finance (11190/99) [2008] ZAGPHC 338; Minister of Finance v Gore NO [2006] SCA 
97 (RSA) paras 9-11, which relied on the investigation report of the Office for Serious Economic Offences under 
the NPA. 
175 See the SA case: Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development [2017] ZACC 20; 2017 (9) BCLR 1089 
(CC) para 76(12). 
176 Chairperson - Standing Tender committee v JFE Sapela Electronics [2005] 4 ALL SA 487 (SCA) paras 26-
29; Sebeza Kahle Trade v Emalahleni Local Municipal Council [2003] 2 ALL SA 340 (T) 348. See also Olitzki 
Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA) para 1265F-H. See Quinot PPLR (2011) 198. 
177 3 3 3 6. 
178 See 3 3 3 6 above for examples. 
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infractions that suppliers or government may overlook or fail to identity.179 Aggrieved bidders 
may actually instigate CSOs to take the above actions by passing relevant information to them 
or supporting their cause in other ways. This may be a viable option for bidders or suppliers 
who do not wish to be at the forefront of the controversy for various reasons; such as protecting 
their commercial relationship with the procuring entity and fellow suppliers. 
8 6 Conclusion and analysis 
Except for ADR, the secondary mechanisms involve the engagement and corporation of public 
institutions; which may not always be forthcoming.  Nevertheless, as seen in this chapter, these 
mechanisms may occasionally be the preferred or only option for redressing breaches or 
enforcing procurement regulations. 
 ADR (specifically negotiation or mediation) could effectively resolve disputes where 
an organ of government engages another organ for the procurement of goods and services; as 
the process accords with routine inter-governmental relations. This is even more so for South 
Africa, considering that ADR is given statutory recognition by section 44 of the MFMA; and 
it aligns with the constitutional principle of cooperative government and friendly 
intergovernmental relations.180  The tendency for unwholesome compromise in ADR could be 
minimal in such intergovernmental disputes, compared to when private-interest-driven and 
intensely profit-seeking contractors are involved. Also, confidentiality of communication that 
ADR entails is arguably more acceptable in intra-governmental procurement dispute than when 
contractors are involved. Notwithstanding, comprehensive records of such intergovernmental 
ADR proceeding should be kept and made accessible to interested members of the public, 
including suppliers, in accordance with Nigerian FOIA and South African PAIA, to ensure 
transparency. 
 Investigation, and concomitant remedial action or sanctions, are effective where there 
is reasonable suspicion of procurement-related offences, such as fraud, forgery or corruption; 
since bidder remedies cannot effectively address this criminal aspect of procurement law 
violation. Bidder remedies involves civil proceedings, and aggrieved bidders would be more 
interested in remedying their injury or the disadvantage caused by a procurement breach, than 
pursuing investigation and related remedial action or sanctions against the violators. Bidders 
                                                          
179 See generally Udeh “Social Accountability Mechanisms” in Public Procurement Reform 235; C Ekwekwuo & 
SN Nyeck “The Role of New Technologies of Communication and Social Audits in Procurement Monitoring” in 
SN Nyeck Public Procurement Reform and Governance in Africa (2016) 261. 
180 SA Constitution s 41(1)(h). 
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or suppliers would normally regard this form of enforcement of procurement law as the very 
last resort; usually where bidder remedies failed, or can no longer be invoked owing to the 
expiration of the commencement time. In most cases studied, it was CSOs or relevant 
governmental authorities that triggered or initiated investigation into violation of procurement 
law; some of which resulted in remedial actions or sanctions, or prosecution.181 In South Africa, 
the role of CSOs, political parties, or their members, in this regard is becoming increasingly 
significant. The investigative institution that they usually petition is the Public Protector; 
apparently owing to its independence, proven neutrality, effectiveness, and far reaching 
powers. Following the judgment of the Constitutional Court, in Economic Freedom Fighters v 
Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly,182 
that the remedial actions or directives of the Public Protector are binding, the frequency with 
which procurement-related petitions may be presented to this institution would likely increase. 
Nigeria may consider establishing a body, or empowering an existing one, with status and 
power similar to the Public Protector of South Africa, to investigate or handle specific 
procurement-related petitions. This is considering allegations of corrupt practices in the 
BPP.183  The Nigeria Public Complaints Commission is an ombudsman,184 but lacks the status 
and power, and the resultant effectiveness enjoyed by the Public Protector; as the Commission 
can only investigate complaint against administrative actions, and make non-binding 
recommendations.185  
                                                          
181 Nigeria: see generally Udeh “Social Accountability Mechanisms” in Public Procurement Reform 235; 
Ekwekwuo &Nyeck “Social Audits in Procurement Monitoring” in Public Procurement Reform 261; News 
Express “Group Petitions BPP, Seeks Investigation of CCB’s Proposal for Purchase of Secretariat” News Express 
(22-08-2016) < http://www.newsexpressngr.com/news/27416-Group-petitions-BPP-seeks-investigation-of-
CCBs-proposal-for-purchase-of-secretariat> (accessed 11-11-2017). South Africa: The National Treasury v 
Kubukeli [2015] ZASCA 141, [2016] 1 All SA 30 (SCA), 2016 (2) SA 507 (SCA) paras 1-2; PP Inappropriate 
Moves report no 13 of 2013/2014 (2013) 4; PP Poisoned Processes report no 20 of 2013/14 (2014) 3; PP 
Postponed Delivery report no 5 of 2015/16 (2016) 3; PP Secure in Comfort report no 25 of 2013/14 (2014) 5; Yes 
We Made Mistakes report no 1 of 2012/13 (2012) 5; PP Unsolicited Donation report no 22 of 2013/14 (2013) 14. 
182 [2016] ZACC, 2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC), 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC) 11 paras 67 & 105(3)-(11). See South African 
Broadcasting Corporation Soc Ltd v Democratic Alliance [2015] ZASCA 156; [2015] 4 All SA 719 (SCA) 
(SABC v DA) para 52; Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd (SABC); 
Democratic Alliance v Motsoeneng [2016] ZAWCHC 188; [2017] 2 BLLR 153 (WCC); [2017] 1 All SA 530 
(WCC) (DA v SABC) para 103. 
183 See H Umoru “Senate probes alleged corruption in BPP” Vanguard; Punch “Reps to probe BPP over 
indiscriminate issuance of certificate” Punch. 
184 By virtue of Public Complaints Commission Act CAP P37 LFN 2004. 
185 Public Complaints Commission Act ss 5 & 7. 
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 Although procurement audit is routine and may not be as prominent as bidder remedies 
and other secondary remedies in redressing breaches in public procurement, its relevance lies 
more in detecting and suggesting redress against institutional lapses which encourage these 
breaches or corruption. This role would hardly be played by any other mechanism under 
review; and, it would always remain relevant to the integrity and effectiveness of public 
procurement systems.   
 The overall effectiveness of the Nigerian and South African procurement enforcement 
mechanisms is assessed in the next (last) chapter. 
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Chapter 9 
General Conclusion: Improving Effectiveness and Design of Systems 
9 1 Outline 
Having looked at the various aspects of the bidder remedies systems of Nigeria and South 
Africa, in addition to the secondary remedies and enforcement mechanisms, this chapter draws 
some conclusions on the overall effectiveness of these systems. It further presents practical 
recommendations on improving the effectiveness of each system; which partly includes 
transposing the good practices and rules in one into the other. It is aimed at guiding 
stakeholders1 within the jurisdictions to maximize the potential of the systems.  The later part 
goes beyond the two systems to present a blueprint for designing a bidder remedies system, 
with focus on procurement systems in Africa. This will be partly based on findings from 
studying the two systems. Lastly, the concluding remarks identify the study’s key finding and 
the areas of further study on the subject-matter; and present general comments on remedies in 
public procurement that are relevant beyond the systems studied and the African systems. 
9 2 Effectiveness of the Systems 
The remaining elements of effectiveness, for which the systems had not been assessed, relate 
to: 
(1) whether the objectives of the systems and the interests involved are balanced; and  
(2) whether the disadvantages of the challenge mechanisms are minimal. 
The assessment is left for this stage2 since it entails drawing conclusions from all aspects of the 
systems. It also requires a summation on the extent to which the systems conform to the other 
elements of effectiveness.3 
                                                          
1 These include: suppliers, public entities, law enforcement agencies, court, legislative authorities, lawyers, and 
CSOs. 
2 9 2 2 below. 
3 Listed in 2 4 3 above. 
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9 2 1 Assessment summary 
Nigeria and South Africa regulate public procurement and have bidder remedies and other 
mechanisms of enforcement.4 The bidder remedies systems of both countries are reasonably 
effective,5 although this is undermined by certain legal factors. 
Nigeria’s PPA, section 54, grants bidders a general right to challenge acts or decisions 
of procuring entities, by sequential administrative and judicial review before hierarchical 
forums.6 It is arguable that a potential bidder who was excluded from bidding also has a right 
to challenge.7 Similarly, the South African Constitution, section 33(1), and PAJA, confers a 
general right of challenge on actual and potential bidders against public procurement decisions 
that are unlawful, unreasonable and procedurally unfair; as public procurement is regarded as 
an administrative action.8 Bidders may opt for administrative or judicial review before the 
relevant forums; except the matter relates to a municipal procurement, which requires 
exhaustion of the internal appeal under section 62(1) of the Systems Act.9 The scope of right 
to procurement remedies in Nigeria and South Africa meets and, in certain respects, goes 
beyond the UNCITRAL Model Law, article 64(1), which affords actual and potential bidders 
the right to challenge alleged non-compliance of the decision or action of a procuring entity 
with the provisions of the law. Whereas article 64(1) requires the bidder to prove that it suffered 
or may suffer loss or injury because of the alleged breach; section 54 of the Nigerian PPA only 
requires proof of the breach. The Nigerian PPA thus enlarges the reviewability of procurement 
decisions beyond the scope prescribed by the Model Law.  Also, the South African 
Constitution10 permits persons other than bidders/contractors, such as persons acting in public 
interest or group or class interest, to institute judicial review against procurement decisions or 
actions.11 So South African CSOs and political parties or their members have successfully 
                                                          
4 As seen chapters in chapters 3-8. 
5 Identified below in italics. 
6 Discussed in chapters 5-7. 
7 See 5 3 5 1 above. 
8 See 4 3 2 2 1. Also, Quinot (2011) PPLR 192, 195; Quinot State Commercial Activity 162; Umfolozi Transport 
(Edms) Bpk v Minister van Vervoer en Andere 1997 2 All SA 548 (SCA); Transnet Ltd v Goodman Brothers (Pty) 
Ltd 2001 1 SA 853 (SCA); Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo 
Province [2007] ZASCA 165; 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA) para 4. 
9 Discussed in chapters 5-7. 
10 Sections 33, 34; also, PAJA ss 1(1) & 6(1). See 7 5 2 above. 
11 Quinot (2011) PPLR 192, 195; Quinot State Commercial Activity 162. See also Umfolozi Transport (Edms) Bpk 
v Minister van Vervoer en Andere 1997 2 All SA 548 (SCA); Transnet Ltd v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 2001 1 
SA 853 (SCA); Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo Province 
[2007] ZASCA 165; 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA) para 4 
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instituted judicial review to challenge pubic procurement decisions,12 or applied for and acted 
as amicus curiae in procurement review cases.13 Thus, the Nigerian and South African remedies 
systems focus on pre-empting or correcting or reversing improper administrative actions and 
entrenching the rule of law, beyond affording administrative justice to a prejudiced party, 
which arguably is the focus of article 64 of UNCITRAL Model Law. However, the 
disadvantage of enlarging the scope of review right as obtainable in Nigeria and South Africa 
is that it also enlarges the potential for disruption to procurement proceeding and contract.  
In both jurisdictions, essentially no procurement matter is exempted from review and 
the forums’ decisions are binding.14 However, South African courts’ interpretation of section 
62(3) of the Systems Act effectively exempts unconditional award or concluded contracts from 
the internal appeal under the Act.15 This interpretation is contestable and limits the 
effectiveness of that internal review mechanism.16 However, an unconditional award or 
concluded contract that escapes the review under section 62(3) of the Systems Act could be 
challenged under judicial review. Thus, all aspects of both public procurement systems are still 
open to the law-enforcement role of suppliers.17 Not exempting any public procurement 
decision from review is in consonance with the current Model Law;18 which improved upon 
the 1994 Model Law that exempted certain matters from challenge.19 Since concluded contracts 
are reviewable in both jurisdictions, it obviates the need to provide for a standstill period after 
notification of award, as the standstill is to forestall execution of contract to foreclose review.   
However, the approach of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which provides for standstill in article 
22(2) notwithstanding that it permits review of concluded contracts, is preferable. The reason 
is that standstill allows any challenge to the proposed award to be dealt with before the 
                                                          
12 Examples: Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of 
the National Assembly [2016] ZACC 11; Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017] ZACC 8, 2017 
(5) BCLR 543 (CC), 2017 (3) SA 335 (CC). 
13 See AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social 
Security Agency [2015] ZACC 7;  
14 See 2 3 2 3 (ii); 4 3 2 and 5 3 3 above. 
15 Loghdey v City of Cape Town [2010] ZAWCHC 25 para 33; Loghdey v Advanced Parking Solutions CC 2009 
(5) SA 595 (C); Lohan Civil-Tebogo Joint Venture v Mangaung Plaaslike Munisipaliteit 508/2009 (O) [2009] 
ZAFSHC 21; City of Cape Town v Reader (719/2007) [2008] ZASCA 130, 2009 (1) SA 555 (SCA) paras 25, 31. 
See Quinot, (2011) PPLR 197. 
16 See 5 3 3 above and 9 3 2 below. 
17 See 2 3 2 3 (ii). 
18 Guide to Enactment 82 & 230.  
19 Article 52(2): which included: procurement method, concluded contract. See Myers (1994) IBL 253 255. 
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additional complications and costs of addressing an executed contract arise.20 In addition, 
procurement review would be impracticable and foreclosed where the contract is nearly-fully 
or fully performed; even if there were irregularities or unlawfulness in the procurement 
process.21  
Nigeria’s sequential internal and external administrative review mechanism, with 
effective remedies, which must be exhausted before recourse to the court, is advantageous. It 
substantially obviates the recourse to court.  In addition, the timeframe for completing the 
administrative reviews are short,22 thus the intervention is speedy. This consequently 
minimizes the disruption of the procurement process, which a suspension order (available to 
all the forums) could cause. The reverse is the case for South African administrative review. It 
is not coherent, and the remedies are largely ineffective.23 However, this has led to a robust 
judicial intervention in South African public procurement; which has enriched its related 
jurisprudence, more than is obtainable in Nigeria. Nevertheless, the frequency of procurement 
cases unnecessarily increases the courts’ workload. How this may be curbed is discussed 
below.24 The element of effectiveness requiring a body to hear a challenge as a first step and a 
further body to hear an appeal as a second step, is met by the sequential  administrative and 
judicial review mechanisms of Nigeria; and by the effective judicial review jurisdiction of the 
South African High Court whose review decisions are appealable to the higher courts (apart 
from the instances where available administrative mechanisms are effective). The above 
scenarios align with the UNCITRAL Model Law, which presents the options of administrative 
and judicial recourse mechanisms,25 but is more interested in systems providing for a body to 
hear a procurement challenge at first instance and another body to entertain an appeal or review 
of the first challenge decision.26 
                                                          
20 Guide to Enactment to Model Law 232 para 20.  
21 See SA: Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd [2005] ZASCA 90, 2008 
(2) SA 638 (SCA), [2005] 4 All SA 487 (SCA) paras 25, 27-30; Aurobindo Pharma (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, 
State Tender Board [2010] ZAGPPHC 51 para 7; Sebenza Kahle Trade CC v Emalahleni Local Municipal Council 
& Another [2003] 2 All SA 340 (T). Nigeria:  Badejo v Federal Ministry of Education (1996) 8 NWLR (part 464) 
15 40-41; Ogbonna v President Federal Republic of Nigeria (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt 504) 281 187. 
22 PPA s 54(2)-(6). 
23 See 5 4 and 6 11 2 above. 
24 9 3 2. 
25 Articles 64-67; Guide to Enactment 230-231 paras 9-14. 
26 Article 64(2) & (3); Guide to Enactment 230-231 paras 9-14. 
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Nigerian PPA27 and the FOIA28 collectively grant access to procurement records within 
seven days of request, or fourteen days when circumstances warrant. The South African 
Constitution29 and the PAIA30 together grant access to procurement records within 30 days of 
request, extendable by another 30 days. In addition, Rule 53(1)(a) and (3) of the Uniform Rules 
of Court creates a mechanism for an applicant for judicial review of a public procurement 
decision or proceeding, at the High Court, to obtain access to all records of the procurement. 
Access to records facilitate exercise of review right, as parties rely on procurement records to 
identify contravention and prove their cases. The response time of Nigeria aligns with the 
global average (fifteen days);31  while that of South Africa does not, however, the mechanism 
under Rule 53(1)(a) and (3) may be effectively used to obtain, within fifteen days of service of 
notice of motion, the relevant records of the decision or process sought to be reviewed. The 
stipulation by Nigerian and South African legislation of specific timeframe for responding to 
request for records is preferred to the approach of the UNCITRAL Model Law, article 25(2) 
and (3), that only provides for grant of access to records without provising a definite timeframe. 
A definite timeframe imposes an obligation on the body concerned to grant access within the 
deadline; thus, enhancing its responsiveness. Where request for information is not granted 
promptly or within the days stipulated by law, the applicant may request the suspension of the 
challenged procurement proceeding or the restraining of the entity from taking an action. 
Besides, concluded contracts are reviewable.  
Suspension or restraining orders are usually granted expeditiously by the administrative 
or judicial forum. Thus, they generally intervene without delay on interim basis. However, final 
determination of case at the judicial review stage in Nigeria, and at both administrative and 
judicial review stages in South Africa, do not proceed swiftly within a reasonably short period 
in the normal course. Nevertheless, if at the end, breach or irregularity in procurement is 
proved, the aggrieved bidder may be granted any of the various available remedies, including 
setting aside of contract and ordering the re-tendering or re-evaluation. Where circumstances 
warrant, the forum could order that the contract be awarded to the aggrieved bidder. Courts in 
both jurisdictions have power to award damages. However, for South Africa, it is only available 
                                                          
27 Sections 16(14), 38(1) & (2). 
28 Sections 4 & 6. 
29 section 32. 
30 Sections 25 & 26.   
31 Open Society Institute Transparency & Silence 176. 
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where the procurement process is tainted with fraud and the party suffered consequential loss.32 
Review decisions in both jurisdictions are easily enforced by a fast and simple mechanism; 
such as contempt proceeding when court orders are disobeyed.33  
Beyond bidder remedies, the Nigerian and South African systems provide other 
mechanisms (such as ADR, in limited cases; investigation, administrative remedial action, or 
sanctions; and audit), to redress infractions in procurement and enforce procurement law. 
Investigation and audit, and the concomitant administrative remedial action or prosecution and 
sanction, are more effective for handling criminal aspects of procurement law violation and 
addressing institutional lapses which encourage breaches or corruption. These mechanisms are 
not covered by the Model Law; but are important for African procurement systems still 
grappling with integrity concerns.34 
9 2 2 Concluding assessment 
Striking a balance between the sometimes-competing objectives of the remedies system and 
the various interests involved makes the system sustainable.35  Also, the disadvantages of the 
regime would have to be minimal to be viable.  
9 2 2 1 Balancing the objectives and interests 
The objectives of the remedies system include protecting the rights of bidders, and ensuring 
the integrity of the procurement system.36 The parties whose interests may be affected by a 
procurement review decision include: the challenging bidder, the successful bidder, other 
bidders, the procuring entity/government, and the public. 
The binding nature and ease of enforcing review decisions in Nigeria and South Africa 
support both objectives and the interests concerned. The available remedies such as interim 
suspension of procurement proceedings, set aside of wrongful award or contract, and order to 
re-evaluate bids, afford aggrieved bidders opportunity to re-compete fairly and probably win 
                                                          
32 See 7 9 above. 
33 See 5 3 9; 6 8; and 7 9 3 above. 
34 See Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Procurement regulation 308; World Bank Institute (WBI) Contract 
Monitoring Initiative http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/content/transparent-contracting-and-procurement (accessed 
12-11-2017); Odhiambo & Kamau (2003) OECD Development Centre: Working Paper No 208; OECD 
Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement; and most of the Country Procurement Assessment Reviews on 
African countries conducted by the World Bank; Asare et al “Trends in Public Procurement in Africa”;  Hunja 
“Obstacles to Public Procurement Reform” in Public Procurement 13-22. 
35 Gordon (2011) PCLJ 432; Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement 309. 
36 See 5 2 1 above; Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement 308. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
244 
 
contracts. Bidders’ rights are thus protected. On the other hand, the availability of these 
measures leads to respect of the procurement rules and integrity of the systems. It presumably 
deters actors from committing procurement infractions, since they know that such actions may 
lead to a review, with the attendant adverse consequences. However, the automatic suspension 
of procurement proceedings during external administrative review in Nigeria does not permit 
consideration of factors that could warrant the refusal or lifting of suspension; such as urgent 
public interest. However, this is ameliorated by the brevity of the review timeframe.37 
Nonetheless, the approach of the UNCITRAL Model Law in this regard is preferable, as it 
grants discretion to the review authority to order suspension of the procurement proceeding or 
contract, or to refrain from ordering it if urgent public interest considerations require the 
procurement proceedings or contract to proceed.38 Restricting award of damages to where 
procurement decisions are tainted with fraud or corruption strikes a balance between 
compensating the loss suffered by aggrieved bidders as a result of criminal acts of public 
officers, and saving public funds in other instances.  
Courts in both jurisdictions exercise restraint when considering applications to interfere 
with the administrative (procurement) decisions of public entities. They accord appropriate 
deference to the lawful decisions and interests legitimately pursued by administrative agencies, 
based on the constitutional principle of separation of powers.39 This deference is shaped by 
courts carefully weighing not only the need for judicial intervention, but also its consequences. 
Judicial recourse in both jurisdictions, being in the form of judicial review, limits the 
interference of courts in the decisions of procuring entities. While the courts can intervene to 
protect the rights of bidders to fair and lawful procurement decisions; it does not usurp the bid 
evaluation and award functions of procuring entities.40 Also, not every slip in the procurement 
process necessarily attracts judicial sanction.41  Even where there is an infraction in a 
                                                          
37 PPA 54(6). See 6 7 1 above. 
38 Article 67(3) & (4). 
39 See PJH Maree & G Quinot “A Decade and a Half of Deference Part 1” (2016) 2 TSAR 268; PJH Maree & G 
Quinot “A Decade and a Half of Deference Part 2” (2016) 3 TSAR 447; Dyzenhaus “The Politics of Deference: 
Judicial Review and Democracy” in M Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279 303; C 
Hoexter (2000) SA Law Journal 484 501-2.  See Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA) 
para 21; Balarabe Musa v Auta Hamza (1982) 3 NCLR 229 257.  
40 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 45. 
41 Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZASCA 13, 2010 (4) 
SA 359 (SCA) para [21]; South African National Road Agency Ltd v The Toll Collect Consortium [2013] 4 All 
SA 393(SCA); 2013 (6) SA 356(SCA) para 16; AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
CEO SASSA [2013] ZASCA 29; 2013 (4) SA 557 (SCA) para 21; Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 
(2) SA 460 (SCA) para 17. 
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procurement process the court may refuse to set aside the related contract if it is nearly or fully 
completed. It considers the public interest served by the project, and that the innocent 
contractor ought to be paid for the completed work.42 
The power of Nigeria’s BPP and South African Treasury to terminate procurement 
contracts based on a finding or conviction for procurement infraction or corruption protects the 
integrity of the procurement system. However, they consider certain factors and interests before 
exercising the power. These include: the duration of the contract and the extent to which it has 
been executed, the urgency of the services involved; and whether the termination would cause 
extreme cost.43 Such consideration balances the pursuit of policy objectives and the interests 
that may be affected by the termination.  
9 2 2 2 Disadvantages are minimal  
The disadvantages that may arise from a bidder remedies system include: disruption and delay 
to procurement process or contract; over-compliance by procuring entities owing to fear of 
challenge, leading to bureaucratic bottleneck; inappropriate compromise between parties to 
dispute; and, loss of public funds on damages or compensation and litigation cost.44  
 In Nigeria, the disruption caused by bidder remedies is relatively minimal. This is 
owing to the following factors:  
• locus standi is limited to actual and potential bidders;  
• the two-tier administrative review mechanisms are effective and expeditious; and, 
• administrative review must be exhausted before judicial recourse.45  
Consequently, only a few procurement cases get to judicial review;46 where disruption to 
procurement could be substantial, owing to lengthy proceedings and possible appeal. 
The disruption that may be caused by the South African bidder remedies system is quite 
substantial. This is owing to:  
• largely ineffective and incoherent administrative review mechanisms;  
                                                          
42 See Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 (2) SA 638 (SCA) paras 
26-29; Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZASCA 13, 2010 
(4) SA 359 (SCA) para 15; Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo 
Province 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA) para 23.. 
43 Corruption Act s 28(3)(a)(i); William-Elegbe Fighting Corruption 224. 
44 See Zhang (2007) PPLR 332-339; Marshall et al (1994) Rand Journal of Economics 297-317; Pachnou 
Effectiveness of Bidder Remedies 378-379, 410; Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement 1435; Pachnou 
(2005) 5 PPLR 256 262-263; Arrowsmith Judicial Review 305; Arrowsmith Regulating Public Procurement 774. 
45 PPA s 54(2), (3) & (6). See chs 5 & 6. 
46 See 6 11 1 above. 
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• the fact that the administrative review options may not be exhausted before judicial 
recourse (except for the internal appeal under the Systems Act);  
• the numerous procurement cases that go to court;  
• no defined time for administrative and judicial review proceedings;  
• the resultant lengthy judicial proceedings;  
• generous judicial review grounds;  
• multiple appeal opportunities; and, 
• the possibility to review and set aside even partially completed contracts.47   
It is arguable that procuring entities in both jurisdictions hardly indulge in over-
compliance with procurement rules owing to fear of challenge. Over-compliance is where 
procuring entities, for the fear of procurement challenge or to prevent such challenge, make 
unnecessary efforts towards complying with the procurement rules, and fail to exercise their 
lawfully allowable discretion, leading to avoidable delay and bottleneck in the procurement 
system.  The following are factors that make over-compliance virtually non-existent in both 
jurisdiction.  First, cost of litigation in both jurisdictions is relatively high and could deter 
litigation.48 Secondly, it is not often that winning a challenge translates to winning the bid 
concerned. As a result, bidders would be circumspect about instituting challenge proceedings.  
Thirdly, the fact that public servants are not personally liable for procurement breaches, except 
for punishable infractions, may make them only reasonably cautious about complying with 
procurement rules. 
Inappropriate compromise between parties to dispute is likely to occur where ADR is 
used, as discussed above.49 How to avert this is suggested in 9 3 below. Such compromise 
would be minimal where an independent adjudicatory authority and other bidders are involved; 
which is largely the case under administrative (external) and judicial review in both 
jurisdictions. 
As seen above,50 damages for loss suffered by bidders as a result of a challenged 
procurement process is limited to where the process is tainted with fraud or corruption. Hence, 
compensation or damages is hardly awarded. Litigation cost is relatively high; but public 
                                                          
47 Discussed in chs 5-7. 
48 Quinot (2011) PPLR 207; Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 313-314; Penal 
Reform International Access to justice in Sub Saharan Africa 17 
49 8 2 3. 
50 7 9 1 3 & 7 9 2 3. 
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attorneys or state counsel usually handle such litigation on behalf of government with no fees 
paid.51 Thus, the public fund that may be spent in response to procurement review is minimal. 
On the whole, the disadvantages of the bidder remedies systems do not surpass the 
benefits. 
Nevertheless, certain aspects of the systems require reform to improve their 
effectiveness. 
9 3 Improving effectiveness of the Systems  
9 3 1 Nigeria 
1. The internal review mechanism is effective; but there is a likelihood of bias, as seen 
in chapter 5. To tone down the bias and enhance the acceptability of the review decision, the 
accounting officer could incorporate negotiation or mediation during the review.52   The BPP 
could make regulations in this regard.53 This may reduce the likelihood of procurement cases 
going on further review. Thus, it will curtail disruption of the procurement process or contract, 
save cost and reduce review burden on the BPP and courts.  
2. To reduce the likelihood of unacceptable compromises, especially where ADR is 
incorporated, and to enhance transparency, the BPP should make regulations mandating the 
authorities concerned to:  
• keep records of the internal and external review proceedings;  
• electronically share all internal review decisions and records of proceedings with the 
BPP;  
• publish the records and the review decisions on the website of the procuring entities or 
the BPP; and,  
• hold debriefing meeting on the proceedings with bidders, on request. 
Published review decisions would serve as precedents for determining subsequent cases, and 
assessing the viability of proposed ones. The BPP could provide templates for record of 
proceedings and administrative review decisions, to ensure standardization.54 
3. The BPP could make regulations pursuant to section 5(1) of the PPA to stipulate a 
standstill period after notice of award has been made, to restrain the execution and performance 
                                                          
51 However, private attorneys may be hired and paid for such legal representation. 
52 As described in 8 2 1 above. 
53 PPA ss 5(a) & 16(23). 
54 For an example, see Kenya’s administrative review decisions reported at: <http://www.ppoa.go.ke/2015-08-24-
14-47-13/pparb-decisions> (accessed 23-06-2017). 
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of the contract. Fifteen working days could be stipulated as the standstill period.55 It should be 
required that procuring entities shall indicate this in the solicitation documents and in the notice 
of award, to sensitize the bidders. This is tenable notwithstanding the fact that concluded 
contracts are administratively and judicially reviewable, considering that additional 
complications and costs arise when reviewing an executed contract.56  
4. The decisions of the Federal High Court (FHC), including those on public 
procurement, are rarely reported. The system is thus denied the benefit of related case law. 
Public procurement matters currently rarely proceed to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court, whose decisions are fully reported. The BPP should undertake the reporting of public 
procurement decisions of the FHC, in conjunction with the FHC registry; as it arguably falls 
within its statutory functions.57 It would be preferable to publish such law reports on BPP’s 
website, to eliminate cost of paper-publication and enhance access. The free-public-access 
format of law reporting by the South African Legal Information Institute could be adopted.58 
5. A Practice Direction or court rules, by the Chief Judge of the FHC,59 may be used to 
achieve expeditious adjudication of procurement cases at the FHC, since the PPA does not 
provide time-limit for such proceedings. The Practice Direction or rules may abridge the time 
for filing, serving and responding to court processes on public procurement cases, and for 
hearing and giving decisions.60 Expeditious adjudication would reduce litigation cost and the 
disruption of procurement process and contract. 
6. It could be advisable to limit the procurement decisions of the FHC that may go on 
appeal; since there is an effective two tier administrative review with far-reaching remedies. 
This would entail amending section 54(7) of the PPA, and sections 241-242 of the Nigerian 
Constitution on right of appeal. Accordingly, it could be prescribed that appeals of final 
decisions of the FHC on procurement shall require the leave of the FHC or the Court of Appeal. 
Also, the court shall grant such leave based on certain conditions, including: (1) there is an 
important question of law requiring an appellate court’s determination; or (2) the case involved 
                                                          
55 This aligns with section 54(1) of PPA that stipulates similar timeframe for commencing internal (first instance) 
review. 
56 Guide to Enactment to Model Law 232 para 20.  
57 PPA s 5 (i), (q), & (r).  
58 Go to <http://www.saflii.org/> (accessed 12-11-2017). 
59 CFRN s 254, and FHC Act s 44. 
60 See 9 4 5 below for suggested timeframes. 
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fraud or corruption. This could strike a balance between the right of appeal and curtailing 
disruption to public procurement arising from multi-level adjudication.  
9 3 2 South Africa 
1. The factors that render procurement administrative review ineffective and unviable 
in South Africa include: lack of clear linkage or coherence among the procurement 
administrative review forums, leading to confusion on choice of forum;61 and, lack of structure 
and effective remedies for the review.62 The Municipal SCM Regulation 49 may be revised to 
become an ADR (mediation) option, since there is an effective internal appeal under section 
62 of the Systems Act. Also, it accords with the constitutional principle of cost-effectiveness.63 
Aggrieved bidders may be required to exhaust this ADR before invoking the internal appeal 
under section 62.  Safeguards against inappropriate compromises should be incorporated within 
the ADR: such as reporting and publishing the proceedings and decisions.64  
The mechanism, timeframes and remedies for the administrative review under 
Municipal SCM Regulations 49 and 50, and Treasury Regulation 16A9.3 (a) should be 
stipulated. For this purpose, the Nigerian administrative review regime could be considered as 
a guide. The review options under Municipal SCM Regulations 49 and 50 should be properly 
linked, thus: where the proposed mediation under regulation 49 fails, further review would go 
to the Treasury; and then to judicial review if necessary.  The above proposals entail amending 
the relevant subsidiary legislation, which does not require parliamentary involvement. 
  2. Section 62 of Systems Act should be interpreted and applied in a manner that sustains 
its general viability as a bidder remedies mechanism. This is not only in consideration of its 
advantages as an internal remedy, but also because relevant legal principles support such 
approach. It should be regarded that the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in CC 
Groenewald v M5 Developments (Pty) Ltd65 has overridden the High Court decision in Loghdey 
v City of Cape Town.66 Thus, the current position should be that unsuccessful tenderers enjoy 
a right of internal appeal under section 62 of the Systems Act. Also, that it constitutes a viable 
                                                          
61 For example, incoherence between the internal review under Systems Act section 62 and Municipal SCM 
Regulation 49; and no proper linkage of the stages of review under Municipal SCM Regulation 50. See 5 3 2 2 2 
and 6 2 2 1 above. 
62 Except for the internal appeal under the Systems Act. See 6 11 2 above. 
63 SA Constitution s 217(1). 
64 See 8 2 3 above. 
65 [2010] ZASCA 47 para 21. 
66 (100/09) [2010] ZAWCHC 25. 
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internal remedy which aggrieved bidders must exhaust before resorting to judicial review,67 by 
virtue of DDP Valuers (Pty) Ltd v Madibeng Local Municipality.68 South African Supreme 
Court of Appeal should reconsider its position that section 62(3) exempts unconditional award 
and concluded contract from the internal appeal, so as to give effect to the law rather than 
making it fail.69 The current position would only be tenable if a standstill period is enshrined 
within the legislation, to bar contracting authorities from unconditionally awarding or 
concluding contracts within the period.  
Meanwhile, the practice by many municipalities of providing in their SCM policy or 
tender notification that award would be subject to section 62 appeal period should be sustained, 
as it safeguards the viability of the appeal. It is in the interest of municipalities, as well as all 
tenderers, and the public at large, that a viable internal appeal mechanism exists. It affords an 
opportunity for resolving procurement disputes cheaply and speedily; with less likelihood of 
resorting to court and increasing its burden.70 Thus, the attendant disruption of procurement 
process is avoided.  
3. Relevant authorities71 should record and publish procurement administrative review 
decisions of the various forums on official websites. As noted earlier,72 this enhances 
accountability, curbs unacceptable compromises, and acts as reference and guide for similar 
cases. 
4. The limited remedies under the various administrative review mechanisms 
undermine their effectiveness; and tend to overburden the court that has practically become the 
first recourse. Thus, the remedies available within the various forums should be broadened, 
through legislative amendment. Remedies that could be provided are presented in 9 4 6 below.  
The court in judicial review proceedings have wide ambit of remedies, as PAJA 
empowers it to “grant any order that is just and equitable”.73 However, South African courts 
require a paradigm shift, from restricting themselves to the traditional remedies to adopting a 
                                                          
67 Pursuant to PAJA s 7 (2).  
68 [2015] ZASCA 146 paras 23-25.  
69 Argued in 5 3 3 above. 
70 The SCA in CC Groenewald v M5 Developments [2010] ZASCA 47 para 1 expressed its concern thus: “As this 
court has recently observed, awards of tenders in the public sector are a fruitful source of litigation which has led 
to courts being swamped with cases concerning complaints about the award of contracts.” See also Moseme Road 
Construction CC & others v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZASCA 13 para 1. 
71 Such as Municipalities and the Treasury. 
72 9 3 1. 
73 Section 8(2). 
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flexible approach that achieves a middle ground. Such was the approach taken by the SCA in 
Millennium Waster Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province.74 
It found to be reviewable the award of a tender for the removal of medical wastes from public 
hospitals, which contract was already concluded and being performed. Rather than take the 
usual approach of simply invalidating the contract,75 the court ordered a re-evaluation of the 
affected tenders within a timeframe, and held that the award shall be invalidated only if the re-
evaluation shows that the applicant’s tender should have won. Thus, performance of the 
contract (critical to public good) was allowed to continue within the short timeframe; the 
contractor’s right to payment for the work done was preserved; while the challenger’s right to 
remedy remained intact and enforceable in the defined circumstance.76 
5. The current commencement deadline, the frequency and duration of procurement 
cases before the courts disrupt affected procurement processes or contracts, and impact 
negatively on the parties and the public.77 The 180 days deadline prescribed by PAJA78 for 
instituting judicial review is too long for procurement cases, considering that procurement is 
usually time-sensitive. Thus, rules of court (by national legislation)79 could be made to fast-
track procurement review proceedings. If the rule prescribes a shorter commencement 
timeframe, it will not be invalidated by the commencement timeframe in section 7(1) of PAJA. 
This is because such court rule (national legislation) will be of the same status with PAJA, it 
will be subsequent to PAJA, and the rule of interpretation that special legislation (the proposed 
rule of court) may override a general one (PAJA s 7(1)) may apply.80  Another option could be 
amending section 7(1) of PAJA to allow for a shorter commencement timeframe for 
proceedings such as procurement judicial review. 20 days after actual or implied knowledge of 
the complained action or exhaustion of internal remedy is suggested.81 Inadtion, court rules 
could provide for abridged timeframes and procedure for filing reply to review application, and 
                                                          
74 121 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA). 
75 See Quinot (2008) Stellenbosch Law Review 117-120; Quinot (2011) PPLR  203; 7 9 2 1 above. 
76 See Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Procurement Regulation 331-332.  
77 See Millennium Waster Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province 121 2008 (2) 
SA 481 (SCA) para 34. 
78 Section 7(1). 
79 SA Constitution 171. 
80 Captured by the Latin maxim: Lex specialis derogat legi generali: which is applied in national and international 
law. See H Grotius De Jure belli ac pacis. Libri Tres (1625) Book II Sect XXIX; CW Jenks The Conflict of Law-
Making Treaties XXX BYIL (1953) 446. 
81 Court could in extraordinary circumstances minimally extends the time. 
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for hearing and determining the case, based on section 7(3) of PAJA.82 Also, legislation could 
abridge timeframes and procedures for appeals of procurement cases before the SCA and the 
Constitutional Court.  The above will strike a balance between bidders’ right to redress and the 
need to minimize disruption of public procurement process, with the attendant negative impact 
on third parties and the public. 
6. It is advisable to limit the number of public procurement cases that go on appeal from 
the High Court to the SCA and the Constitutional Court, achievable perhaps by the courts’ 
strict or restrictive interpretation to the conditions for grant of leave to appeal. All appeals from 
the High Court to a higher court must be by leave of court, according to section 16(1) of the 
Superior Courts Act.83 A leave to appeal may only be granted where the judge(s) concerned 
considers that: (1) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or (2) there is some 
other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on 
the matter under consideration; or (3) where the decision concerned does not dispose of all the 
issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt resolution of the real issues 
between the parties.84 Strict interpretation of condition (2) above may mean limiting “other 
compelling reason” to where there is an important question of law requiring an appellate court’s 
determination, which serves the interest of justice. For example, if “the case was of great public 
importance and raised issues that were complex and difficult to resolve”;85 or, the issues have 
not been considered by the appellate court before.86 This strikes a balance between enriching 
jurisprudence and curtailing delays to public procurement process resulting from multi-level 
adjudication. 
It is assumed that the current public procurement legal and institutional frameworks of 
Nigeria and South Africa would be retained; thus, only minimal reviews have been suggested 
above. Below is a proposed blueprint for any country, particularly in Africa, that seeks to design 
or redesign it bidder remedies system. 
                                                          
82 See 9 4 5 for suggested timeframes. 
83 See Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2005] ZACC 14; 2006 (2) SA 311 
(CC); 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) paras 72-77; Gentiruco A.G. v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 589 (A) 608E-
F; Sita v Olivier NO1967 (2) SA 442 (A) 450F-H; 
84 Superior Courts Act s 17(1). See DE van Loggerenberg & E Bertelsmann Erasmus Supreme Court Practice 2 
ed (2015) vol 1, DR Harms Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts (1996) C1.7 – C1.3 
85 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2005] ZACC 14; 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC); 2006 (1) 
BCLR 1 (CC) para 73. 
86 National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa obo M Fohlisa v Hendor Mining Supplies (a division of 
Marschalk Beleggings (Pty) Ltd) [2017] ZACC 9, [2017] 6 BLLR 539 (CC), 2017 (7) BCLR 851 (CC), (2017) 
38 ILJ 1560 (CC) para 74. 
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9 4 Blueprint for designing remedies systems  
The blueprint briefly suggests options that may be adopted as the basic structure of a bidder 
remedies system.87 It highlights their implications and hints at options that may be preferable. 
9 4 1 Regulatory framework 
The right to challenge public procurement decisions should be recognised or established by the 
primary public procurement legislation. It is easier to identify and apply the right where it is 
provided in the public procurement legislation itself, than by general administrative law. 
Besides, specific or special legislation (on public procurement) may override a general one.88  
Such review right established by a primary legislation is more secure than one established by 
subsidiary legislation. Subsidiary legislation is easily altered or abrogated by an authorised 
office/officer; and is inferior to primary legislation.89 
 It is beneficial to provide for other enforcement mechanisms, such as investigation, 
administrative remedial action and prosecution.90 First, some breaches are better addressed 
through mechanisms other than bidder remedies. For example, investigation and prosecution 
are more suitable for procurement offences, such as fraud. Secondly, some breaches that escape 
bidder remedies could be redressed through these other mechanisms. For example, breaches 
may still be addressed after deadline for filing procurement review, by mechanisms such as 
investigation and administrative remedial action. 
9 4 2 Grounds of review 
Review grounds may be established by:  
(1) a general administrative law stipulating specific grounds (such as bias, unlawfulness, and 
unreasonableness);  
(2) procurement legislation making actionable any omission or breach of its provisions, which 
results in an actual or impending personal loss or injury; 
(3) procurement legislation making any omission or breach of its provisions actionable per se. 
                                                          
87 For other views on how to design a bidder remedies system, see Gordons (2005-2006) PCLJ 427; The World 
Bank Benchmarking Public Procurement 1 2017: Assessing Public Procurement Regulatory Systems in 180 
Economies (2016) 38-43. 
88 Captured by the Latin maxim: Lex specialis derogat legi generali: which is applied in national and international 
law. See H Grotius De Jure belli ac pacis. Libri Tres (1625) Book II Sect XXIX; CW Jenks The Conflict of Law-
Making Treaties XXX BYIL (1953) 446. 
89 See CT Carr Delegated Legislation: Three Lectures (2016) chs 2 & 4. 
90 See ch 8 above. 
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Option 1 above is more suitable where there are several pieces of legislation on public 
procurement procedures. The implications of this option are that: (i) review grounds are easy 
to identify within that general legislation; (ii) the grounds apply to general administrative 
decisions; thus, have to be adapted for procurement matters; (iii) it is holistic in dealing with 
administrative law matters and infractions; but may be less effective in procurement matters, 
as it is not specialised. Thus, this option should generally not be adopted in establishing or 
redesigning a bidder remedies system. 
The implications of option 2 are that: (i) it limits actions to breaches that result in injury 
or loss; (ii) thus, may reduce speculative actions; (iii) it reduces review opportunities, as 
breaches that have not caused loss or injury to bidders is not actionable; (iv) it may 
consequently reduce adjudicative intervention in procurement process and the resultant 
disruption. It balances bidders’ right to review with the need for minimal disruption of 
procurement process. This is the most preferable of the three options (especially where 
alternative or secondary procurement enforcement mechanisms exist), as it contributes in 
reducing incidences and cost of review, minimizes disruption of public procurement processes 
and its attendant negative impact. This option is recommended for adoption considering its 
advantages over the others. 
The implications of option 3 are that: (i) the complainant need not prove loss or injury 
occasioned by a breach; (ii) it enhances standing; (iii) it focuses more on enforcing compliance 
with procurement law than redressing injury for non-compliance; and (iv) it permits complaints 
that would have ordinarily been rejected for not disclosing actual or likely damage or injury. 
This is preferable where bidder remedies constitute the only effective procurement enforcement 
mechanism.  
9 4 3 Exempted matters and standstill 
No public procurement decision should be exempted from review. The implication of this is 
that no procurement infraction escapes review. This could be counterbalanced by requiring that 
applicants shall prove an actual or impending personal injury or loss arising from the 
challenged decision.  
Another option is generally exempting concluded contracts from review, with 
necessary conditions. This is tenable considerin the impact that review concluded comtract may 
have on third parties and the public.  Where this option is adopted, there must be a general 
prohibition on the procuring entity to take any step that would bring into force a procurement 
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contract while a challenge or appeal remains unresolved.91 Also, a standstill period must be 
established, within which bidders are notified of a proposed award and given a set time, such 
as fifteen working days, to challenge the award or process before the contract is signed.92 
However, it should be stipulated that an urgent public interest could warrant the conclusion of 
the contract without observing a standstill, which shall be subject to review;93 or that the review 
forum may order a lifting of the standstill, while a challenge or appeal is on-going, based on 
urgent public interest.94    
The standstill period should be sufficient to enable bidders to reasonably identify any 
breach in the procurement process and apply for review. Thus, the statutory response period of 
public entities to request for information must be taken into consideration in prescribing a 
standstill period. It should be stipulated that standstill period shall begin to run from the date 
the procuring entity provides interested bidders with relevant information requested. If no 
challenge arises within this period, the contract may be signed, and exempted from review. 
This upholds pacta sunt servanda principle;95 safeguards concluded contract from disruption 
by review; and, strikes a balance between the need for transparency and accountability in public 
procurement and the reality of extreme resource constraint.96 
However, it should be stipulated that such a contract shall be subject to review where 
evidence indicates that it is tainted with fraud or corruption;97 or it is concluded without 
observance of the standstill period. This ensures that there is no rush to sign contract to block 
review, and retains fraud or corruption as a vitiating element. 
9 4 4 Parties  
Right to apply for public procurement review (at first instance) should be extended to bidders 
that participated in the challenged procurement and suppliers that had interest and potential to 
participate in the process, but were directly or directly excluded, probably by absence of 
advertisement. Limiting review rights to actual bidders practically exempts the procurement 
method used from review. This is because it is potential bidders, who were excluded by a 
restrictive procurement method used by the procuring entity (such selective tendering or sole 
                                                          
91 See UNCITRAL Model Law art 65(1). 
92 See Priess & Friton “Effective Challenge Procedures” in WTO Regime on Government Procurement 526-528. 
93 See Model Law art 22 (3)(c). 
94 See UNCITRAL Model Law art 65(3); Guide to Enactment 238 para 4. 
95 See Garner Black Law Dictionary 1217  
96 See Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Procurement Regulation 335. 
97 UNCITRAL Model Law art 67(2)(c). 
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sourcing), that would ordinarily challenge the method. If potential bidders do not have review 
right, the procurement method used would hardly ever be challenged. Such restriction of review 
should not be adopted. Procurement method is very critical to the transparency and 
competitiveness of procurement; the more restrictive the method the less transparent and 
competitive the procurement.98 However, standing should not extend to the public, as it would 
be unwieldy for the system, and enlarge the potential for disruption of public procurement and 
contract. Rather, mechanism should be provided to enable members of the public to easily 
report suspected procurement infraction and offences to a relevant investigative or prosecution 
authority, to trigger concomitant administrative remedial action, sanction or prosecution. 
The respondents must include the procuring entity and the successful bidder (where 
contract has been awarded). Legislation may require that other bidders will be informed of the 
review proceedings, as they may want to be involved. However, it should not make this 
requirement to vitiate a review proceeding where such notice is not issued. The contrary would 
be disruptive; notwithstanding that the requirement is arguably not fundamental, as any bidder 
that is aggrieved by the procurement decision should have challenged it. Notices on 
procurement review proceeding instituted could routinely be displayed on the website of 
relevant public procurement regulatory body or the procuring entity.99 Any other electronic 
platform forming part of an e-procurement system could also be used. With this, any interested 
bidder would be regarded as having actual or implied notice of the proceeding, to instigate it 
to seek to participate if it deems fit.           
 For further review or appeal, parties should be limited to only those that participated in 
the first instance review.100 There is an option of allowing other parties to apply and join at this 
stage. However, former should be adopted, as it would curtail speculative litigation. Besides, 
there should be an end to litigation. 
9 4 5 Forum and proceedings 
The three levels of public procurement review: internal administrative review, external 
administrative review, and judicial review: may be established for a system. However, any of 
these stages could be excluded to reduce the review timeline and cost. Excluding judicial 
review will significantly reduce challenge timeline; but the system will be denied the benefits 
                                                          
98 See generally E Carbon & S Arrowsmith “Procurement Method in the Public Procurement Systems of Africa” 
in G Quinot & S Arrowsmith Regulating Public Procurement in Africa (2012) 261. 
99 Caborn & Arrowsmith “Procurement Methods” in Procurement Regulation 305. 
100 Amicus curiae could be permitted. 
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of the derivative case law. Excluding internal review or making it optional allows the aggrieved 
party direct access to the higher forum, but denies the system of the earliest and least disruptive 
resolution.101 External review, under an independent and impartial body, could largely obviate 
the need for the usually lengthy judicial review; excluding it would remove this benefit.  
The three stages should be established; designed in the following manner to minimize 
unwieldiness. The forums should be hierarchical; and each level of review must be exhausted 
before recourse to the next. A lower forum’s review decision should constitute a subject-matter 
of review at the higher forum. Evidence tendered before one level should be relied on at another 
level, except where new evidence is required.  
The table below presents suggested timeframes for applying and completing 
proceedings at the various stages. 
Forum Application Respondent reply Conclusion & 
decision 
Internal review Fourteen days after 
applicant became 
actually or impliedly 
aware of the breach. 
Ten days after 
being served the 
application. 
Fourteen days after 
deadline for the reply. 
External review Fourteen days after 
conclusion of or 
deadline for internal 
review. 
Ten days after 
being served the 
application. 
30 days after deadline 
for the reply. 
Judicial review 20 days after 
conclusion of or 
deadline for external 
review. 
Fifteen days after 
being served the 
application. 
60 days after deadline 
for the reply. 
 
Special procedures must be designed to accelerate proceedings to meet the above deadlines.102 
These include: filing all evidence to be relied on together with the application or reply, using 
                                                          
101 See Guide to Enactment 230 para 11. 
102 See Gordons (2005-2006) PCLJ 437-438 for arguments for and against strict timelines, 
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affidavit instead of oral evidence; adopting motion instead of writ proceedings;103 day-by-day 
hearing; limiting the number of adjournments; and using mainly written argument.  
Internal review should be conducted in the form of ADR (negotiation or mediation). 
Mediation would involve inviting an external mediator to facilitate the reconsideration process 
by the procuring entity. This minimises the likelihood of bias and enhances acceptability and 
robustness of remedies. Measures to curb inappropriate compromise must however be 
incorporated; such as keeping and publishing records of proceedings.  The external review 
forum should be the public procurement regulatory body. This is usually effective and obviates 
the cost of running a parallel adjudicatory agency. However, the structure for its review 
function should be defined. Judicial intervention should be in the form of judicial review, not 
appeal/merit review (which is more intrusive).104 Limit judicial review to court of first instance; 
while permitting appeal, by leave of court, only where important question of law was raised 
requiring determination by a higher court. These will preserve the benefits of the various stages; 
while achieving speedy dispensation of cases. 
9 4 6 Remedies 
Remedies should include interim and final reliefs. Interim reliefs, such as suspension, interdict 
or interim injunction, preserve the status quo; so that the final remedy is not rendered vain. It 
also prevents parties from continuing down a non-compliant path, risking waste of time and 
costs.105 Thus, incorporating it is worthwhile. However, it is advisable that suspension should 
not be automatic, to enable the forums to refuse it where urgent public interest necessitates 
it.106   
 Final remedies for administrative review would be as spelt out by legislation. Available 
remedies at administrative review stage should include powers to:  
• prohibit the procuring entity from taking an unlawful action or decision; 
• compel the procuring entity to take a decision or to act in compliance with the law; 
• nullify in whole or in part an unlawful act or a decision of the procuring entity; 
• revise an unlawful decision of the procuring entity or substitute its own decision for 
such a decision;  
• confirm a decision of the procuring entity;  
                                                          
103 For judicial review. 
104 See 7 3 above. 
105 Guide to Enactment 235 para 32. 
106 See UNCITRAL Model Law arts 65(3), 67(3)(b) & (4)(b); Guide to Enactment 90 para 16. 
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• overturn the award of a procurement contract or a framework agreement concluded in 
violation of standstill period; 
• terminate procurement proceedings;  
• take such alternative action as is appropriate in the circumstances. 
The recommended remedies above do not include cancellation of a procurement 
contract; and payment of monetary compensation; owing to reasons adduced in 9 4 3 above 
and the second paragraph below. 
Judicial remedies may also be defined by legislation or left for the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court. Considering the special nature of public procurement and that court is inclined to 
traditional remedies, legislation should provide for or enjoin court to give tailor-made remedies 
to suit the specific circumstances of various cases. Such remedies should include:  
• set aside of procurement contract only when tainted with fraud or concluded in violation 
of standstill period;  
• revision of procurement or administrative review decision;  
• substitution of a challenged decision in prescribed circumstances;107 and, 
• taking alternative decision that is appropriate in the circumstance, such as conditional 
invalidation.  
Conditional invalidation entails the court declaring that a procurement contract tainted 
with irregularity will stand invalid, only if after a court-ordered re-evaluation is conducted it is 
found that the applicant would have won the award but for the irregularity.108 Thus, the contract 
remains valid and its performance continues, pending the re-evaluation. Consequently, 
disruption of the procurement is minimized and the monetary claim of the initially successful 
contractor to the quantum of work performed is preserved up to the point the contract may be 
set aside. 
Awarding monetary compensation or damages is not advisable considering the severe 
resource constraint in Africa. However, awarding costs to a deserving party could be tenable. 
Monetary remedies may be limited to where all these are present: the procurement process is 
tainted with bad faith, fraud or corruption; it has become too late to revise the procurement 
decision; and, the applicant has suffered actual personal damages. Damages should also be 
awarded to a successful bidder, who has signed and commenced implementation of the contract 
                                                          
107 See 7 9 2 2 above. 
108 Adopted in Millennium Waster Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province 121 
2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA). See Quinot “Supplier Remedies” in Public Procurement Regulation 331.  
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within reasonable time in the absence of litigation, if a challenge later arises and the contract 
award is set aside for breach of procurement law.109 This would be particularly tenable where 
there are no available remedies other than compensation or damages. Where damages are 
awarded owing to bad faith, fraud or corruption, it should be stipulated that officials involved 
shall be personally liable to pay or defray the damages.  Other remedies such as investigation, 
administrative sanctions and prosecution could be invoked to redress breaches where review 
has become infeasible.  
In all cases, available remedies must be just and equitable; and strike a balance between 
the affected interests. Importantly, review decisions must be in writing, with reason. They must 
be binding to be effective.  
9 5 Concluding remarks  
As was stated in the introduction, the study was limited to a doctrinal and comparative 
examination of the legal texts on bidder remedies and other enforcement mechanisms on public 
procurement in Nigeria and South Africa. The key finding is that the design of the bidder 
remedies systems affects their effectiveness. This is the rationale for presenting the blueprint 
for designing remedies systems above. A state contemplating establishing or redesigning its 
bidder remedies system must be sensitive to its environment, while considering lessons from 
the law, practices and realities around bidder remedies in other jurisdictions, especially in 
similar settings. It will avoid the negative aspects and outcomes of those systems studied, while 
adapting those positive aspects that are workable within its environment. It may be wiser to 
test the model or design being contemplated before it is crystalized. Perhaps the way to achieve 
this is to set the design of the remedies system in a subsidiary legislation made by an authorised 
peron or body, such as the procurement regulatory agency, which would easily be amended or 
repealed, as the need arises. The aspect of the remedies systems that, from the outset, ought to 
be established in the primary legislation are the scope of right of procurement review, the 
forum(s), and, the available remedies or some of them.  As some of the other aspects of the 
remedies system are confirmed to be acceptable and effective, they could be secured by 
enshrining them in the primary legislation. However, specific procedural rules for procurement 
review at the various forum(s) are better left in subsidiary legislation made by relevant 
                                                          
109 This contrasts with a view in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 SA 121 (CC). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
261 
 
authorities, for easy of revision, to make procedures more effective based on changing 
circumstances and experience. 
Empirical study is required to determine the extent to which practical factors such as: 
cost and length of review, rate of success in pursing review process, suppliers’ fear of 
victimization for pursuing review process, lack of knowledge or understanding of the remedies 
system: may impinge on the use and effectiveness of the systems. This could be undertaken as 
an academic study; or as a research by or in collaboration with the public procurement 
regulatory agencies. The findings from such study will help the regulatory bodies to ascertain 
the aspects to focus its attention to redress. For example, where lack of knowledge or 
understanding of the remedies system is identified as a major factor militating against the use 
and effectiveness of the system;110 it could carry out relevant enlightenment programme. This 
may include disseminating a simplified guide on the remedies system to the stakeholders. 
Where fear of victimization is high, the regulatory body could establish an easily-accessible 
feedback mechanism, where suppliers could report such victimization; for the officials 
involved to be sanctioned, and to curtail the occurrence. 
 This study affords other countries some lessons on adopting practices and regimes on 
procurement remedies and enforcement that are effective; while guiding them away from the 
legal and related factors that weaken effectiveness.
                                                          
110 This would usually be the case in jurisdictions where the remedies system is relatively nascent or where it is 
incoherent or complicated. 
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